Baseline Study

Uchaguzi Bila Bilaa: Violence Free Elections in Coastal Kenya

19 July 2022

Authored by

B O D H I
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Acronyms

CSO  Civil Society Organisation  
DnH  Do No Harm  
EU  European Union  
FGD  Focus Group Discussion  
HURIA  Human Rights Agenda  
IEBC  Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission  
KECOSCE  Kenya Community Support Centre  
KII  Key Informant Interview  
KYI  Kiunga Youth Bunge Initiative  
LAPSSET  Lamu Port and Lamu-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport  
MCA  Member of the County Assembly  
MP  Member of Parliament  
MUHURI  Muslims for Human Rights  
NCIC  National Commission on Integration and Cohesion  
NGO  Non Governmental Organisations  
ODM  Orange Democratic Movement  
Search  Search for Common Ground  
ToC  Theory of Change  
TRPRD  Tana River Peace, Reconciliation, and Development Organisation  
UDA  United Democratic Alliance

Disclaimer

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of Search for Common Ground and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
I. Executive Summary

Project Background
In light of the increased risk of election-related violence before, during and after the 2022 Kenyan Elections, Search for Common Ground (Search) and its partner organisations (Human Rights Agenda (HURIA), Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), Kiunga Youth Bunge Initiative (KYBI), Ijara Women for Peace, Tana River Peace, Reconciliation and Development Organisation (TRPRD)) began implementation of a EU-funded 18-month programme.

This programme works together with local-level actors, empowering them to serve as an early warning and intervention mechanism in order to strengthen resilience to election-related violence during the critical electioneering periods, both in the campaign and after the elections have been conducted. The project targets Garissa, Lamu, Tana River, Kilifi, Kwale and Mombasa counties, aiming to respond to increasing election-related tensions and conflicts which often fuel violence and can lead to increases in radicalisation and recruitment by violent extremist organisations.

Baseline Survey Purpose and Use
In June 2022 Bodhi Global Analysis was contracted by Search to undertake a baseline survey of the project "Uchaguzi Bila Balaa: Violence Free Elections in Coastal Kenya". The objectives of the survey are to:

1) Assess the validity of the Theory of Change (ToC), the general objective and the expected results of the project
2) Collect the baseline values for project indicators
3) Conduct a risk analysis related to Do No Harm (DnH) and conflict sensitivity
4) Provide recommendations for the project execution strategy regarding intended project results

Methodology
The Bodhi team implemented a multi-phased study involving qualitative interviewing and quantitative surveying, which fostered an understanding of the contextual realities, tested the relevance of the Theory of Change, established the baseline values of the project indicators to facilitate comparisons over time, identified potential risks related to DnH and conflict sensitivity, and provided actionable recommendations for the implementation phase. The study was conducted in the six counties targeted and encompassed:

- 20 Key Informant Interviews (KII)s with programme staff and partners
- 20 FGDs across Garissa, Lamu, Kilifi, Mombasa and Kwale with adult men, adult women, young men, young women, civil society representatives and religious groups. The aim of these FGDs was to elicit how election-related violence is manifested in the community, how it affects these groups and which kind of interventions would help alleviate the threat of conflict and build resilience in their locality.
In total 904 respondents from Mombasa (17 percent), Kwale (16 percent), Kilifi (19%), Tana River (17 percent), Lamu (16 percent), and Garissa (15 percent) counties were surveyed, comprising 444 women and 460 men. Of the interviewed respondents, 58 percent were young adults between the ages of 18-34.

Key Findings and Conclusions

According to the survey, only 16 percent of target community members demonstrated a belief that violence is sometimes necessary to accomplish electoral goals. When presented with different election related scenarios, however, and asked whether violence would be acceptable or necessary in these specific scenarios, the number of respondents who stated that it would be necessary was higher, especially in Lamu County. This suggests that while support for election-related violence is relatively low, there is a need to address attitudes and beliefs that lead to violence in the target counties, and especially in Lamu.

The spread of propaganda and hate speech, especially via social media, remains a significant challenge to communities. Social media poses a far greater risk than the mainstream media in terms of spreading hate speech, incitement and propaganda that can cause violence. In the discussions with community members, social media platforms like Facebook, Whatsapp and Tiktok were identified as the biggest drivers of fake news. However, according to the community survey 48 percent of the respondents reported that they felt well equipped to respond to issues of misinformation and hate speech. Moreover, despite some scepticism, respondents demonstrated strong support for the role of the media in the electoral process. Overall 78 percent of survey respondents believed that the media plays a constructive role during the election process. Therefore, the media can play a key role as an agent of positive change.

Community members reported a lack of opportunities to address their grievances. Only 13 percent reported having such an opportunity. In terms of support to find different avenues to resolve election concerns, 67 percent of respondents believed that media and outreach activities helped them to identify peaceful methods in addressing electoral related issues.

CSOs and CBOs play a key role in mobilising people to engage in peaceful activities that promote social cohesion and peaceful co-existence among communities in the target counties. These groups offer support in building the communities’ resilience and cohesion through the multiple programmes they undertake, like peace education and support in addressing security challenges through community security committees. The presence of CSOs can make it easier to engage with the local communities. However, they lack the capacity and ability to address challenges, especially those related to electoral conflicts. Moreover, respondents felt that some local CSOs and CBOs have links with local politicians who fund their activities. This has called into question the impartiality of some of the organisations in promoting pathways that address election-related conflict in a nonviolent way.
Coordination and collaboration between national, county and local level stakeholders in the management of election-related conflict is a challenge. There is limited sharing of experiences and programmes between different inter-county organisations. In addition to inadequate collaboration, the challenge of limited resources plays a major role in reducing the capacity of some of those organisations engaging in the management of election-related violence.

The ToC is relevant and appropriate for the current context in the six counties. There is a strong sense of support for the various mechanisms, opportunities, and channels, both existing and new, that would support community members in mitigating some of the election-related conflicts in their communities. Thus the ToC is viable, providing sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing needs and priorities, and to seize opportunities that arise along the way.

### Key Recommendations

- **Recommendation #1:** Increased and continued partnership with local CSOs, NGOs and other stakeholders with the aim of capacity building and expanding their networks’ reach in addressing election-related conflicts.
- **Recommendation #2:** Increase advocacy and sensitisation to encourage greater participation of women and youth in election-related conflict management processes, especially in Garissa County.
- **Recommendation #3:** Place particular emphasis on programming in Lamu, to address the heightened risk of election-related violence in the County.
- **Recommendation #4:** Increase support for communities, in terms of building skills that will enable them to promote peaceful coexistence through peace committees and civic education on electoral-related conflicts, without the need for considerable external support.
- **Recommendation #5:** Encourage CSOs, NGOs and other stakeholders to collaborate across counties, to avoid duplicating roles and responsibilities, boost their capacity, and increase their coverage and influence.
- **Recommendation #6:** Boost the capacity of traditional and digital media in monitoring and addressing election related hate speech and misinformation.
- **Recommendation #7:** Broad engagement with the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission in partnership with local CSOs, NGOs and other stakeholders with the hope of engaging in civic education, in order to make people aware of their voting rights and sensitize them on the role of the IEBC.
- **Recommendation #8:** Improve the early warning system through complementarity with KECOSCE.

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II. Introduction

II.a Project Background

In response to the increased risk of election violence in the run-up to, during and following the 2022 Kenyan Elections, Search for Common Ground (Search) and its partner organisations Human Rights Agenda (HURIA), Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), Kiunga Youth Bunge Initiative (KYBI), Ijara Women for Peace, and Tana River Peace, Reconciliation and Development (TRPRD) began implementing an EU-funded 18-month programme.

This programme will work with local-level actors, empowering them to serve as an early warning and intervention mechanism to strengthen resilience to election-related violence. The programme is currently being implemented in Garissa, Lamu, Tana River, Kilifi, Kwale and Mombasa Counties in Kenya, and seek to produce the following outcomes and results:

1) Strengthen inclusive multi-stakeholder identification of, and response to election-related violence risks in targeted communities
   a) ER1.1 Increase capacity of civil society and community actors to peacefully identify and mitigate risks of election-related violence
   b) ER1.2 Increase opportunities for community-led identification and prevention of election-related violence

2) Mitigate the impact of narratives contributing to electoral violence in targeted communities
   a) ER2.1 Increase the capacity of traditional and digital media to monitor and address election related hate speech and misinformation
   b) ER2.2 Communities have increased access to constructive content that highlights pathways to non-violently address election-related concerns

These outcomes follow the preliminary programme logic, illustrated in the figure below.¹

¹ During the inception phase, the study team will critically assess the Theory of Change that underpins the programme logic.
II.b Purpose and Scope

Bodhi researchers will implement a mixed-methods baseline study to support Search’s “Uchaguzi Bila Balaa: Violence Free Elections in Coastal Kenya” programme. The baseline study will address four primary objectives:

1) Assess the validity of the Theory of Change (ToC), the general objective and the expected results of the project;
2) Collect the baseline values for project indicators;
3) Conduct a risk analysis related to Do No Harm (DnH) and conflict sensitivity; and,
4) Provide recommendations for the project execution strategy regarding intended project results.

To address these objectives, the team will implement a multi-phased project, consisting of an Inception Phase, Primary Data Collection Phase and then Analysis and Reporting phases. Each phase consists of several components which are detailed in the following section. Specifically, the study will answer the following research questions:

1) Is the ToC relevant to the current context in Garissa, Lamu, Tana River, Kilifi, Kwale, and Mombasa counties?

2) What are the baseline values of the project indicators? (Baseline values should be disaggregated by sex, age and location)*
   a) To what extent are civil society and community actors capable of peacefully identifying and mitigating risks of election-related violence, and which are the most relevant to engage?
   b) What are the opportunities for community-led identification and prevention of election-related violence?
c) To what extent is traditional and digital media capable of monitoring and addressing election related hate speech and misinformation, and how successful was this during the 2017 elections?
d) To what extent do communities have access to constructive content that highlights pathways to non-violently address elections-related concerns?

3) What are potential risks related to DnH and conflict sensitivity?

4) Are there recommendations for adaptations of the current project logic and results chain to improve the potential impact of the project?

II.c Baseline Methodology

The baseline study team implemented a multi-phased study involving qualitative interviewing and quantitative surveying, which fostered an understanding of the contextual realities, tested the relevance of the Theory of Change, established the baseline values of the project indicators to facilitate comparisons over time, identified potential risks related to DnH and conflict sensitivity, and provided actionable recommendations for the implementation phase. The study was implemented in all six counties targeted by the project: Garissa, Lamu, Tana River, Kilifi, Mombasa and Kwale.

II.c.i Data Collection

The Bodhi team collected data between 20th June to 14th July 2022. Bodhi team members conducted qualitative interviews and then mobilised contracted enumerators for the quantitative survey. These enumerators completed a two day training with Mombasa, Kilifi and Kwale all training together in Mombasa, with Tana River joining virtually. The Garissa and Lamu Groups received their training in their respective counties. The distribution of data collection activities by location is provided in Table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Collection Activity</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Garissa</td>
<td>Lamu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk review</td>
<td>Across programme</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk assessment - Key Informant Interview (KIIs)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk assessment - Focus Group Discussion (FGD)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator measurement - Community Survey</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Data collection activities by location
**Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with stakeholders:** KIIs, conducted in English and Swahili were completed with key stakeholders identified from the list that was shared by Search. Following an iterative review process, discussion guidelines were created based on the desk review and accepted by the consortium partners. The core discussion guides were tailored to stakeholder type and specific respondents.

KIIs were conducted with the following stakeholders:
- Consortium partner’s staff
- Political actors (ODM, UDA, Jubilee, IEBC)
- Members of the judiciary
- Local Security actors
- Religious actors
- Media Council members:
  - Youth representatives
  - Peace Committees
- CSOs

**Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with community members:** FGDs were conducted in English, Swahili and Somali. The Bodhi team conducted a total of 20 FGDs across Garissa, Lamu, Kilifi, Mombasa and Kwale with adult men, adult women, young men, young women, civil society representatives and religious groups. The aim of these FGDs was to elicit how election-related violence is manifested among the community and how it affects these groups, and which kind of interventions they feel would help alleviate the threat of conflict and build resilience in their locality. These areas of inquiry helped build understanding of the trends, drivers and ongoing interventions to mitigate any elections related risks that lead to conflicts in the target areas. The FGDs were conducted with the following respondent types.

**Il.c.iii Respondent profiles**

In total we surveyed 904 respondents from Mombasa (17 percent), Kwale (16 percent), Kilifi (19 percent), Tana River (17 percent), Lamu (16 percent), and Garissa (15 percent) counties. We surveyed 444 women and 460 men, with the gender balance being maintained across counties. Of interviewed respondents, 58 percent were young adults between the ages of 18-34.

13 percent of respondents reported that they had not had any schooling, of which 3 percent were literate. Most respondents reported that the highest level of education they had completed was: primary school (25 percent), secondary school (31 percent), and vocational training (11 percent). 16 percent of respondents had completed a university degree and 3 percent of respondents’ highest level of education was religious school.

The study found that 14 and 7 percent of respondents respectively were earning either a full-time or part-time regular salary, with an additional 10 percent having occasional, irregular work.
A quarter of respondents were self-employed and 19 percent were unemployed but actively looking for work. Students and housewives/husbands comprised 4 and 8 percent of respondents respectively. The smallest groups were the retired (1 percent) and respondents with disabilities (3 percent).

II.c.iv Limitations

**Inability to conduct in-person qualitative fieldwork in Tana River:** Due to inaccessibility and infrastructural issues the evaluation team was unable to travel to Tana River to conduct face to face qualitative data collection. The evaluation team mitigated this challenge through conducting qualitative data collection remotely. Quantitative data collection in Tana River was conducted in-person following online training.

**Response bias:** Participants may have formed their responses based on personal motivation rather than the most accurate information. Some participants have affiliations to certain political candidates or are from the same ethnic group and their responses may be biased. The fieldwork review highlights that some of the local partners (e.g. Garissa) who mobilised the groups may have selected respondents who had similar ideas and thoughts on politics.

**Cultural and religious Beliefs:** In some instances FGDs for both men and women were arranged to take place in the same location concurrently and contact between men and women in the same locality caused friction with community elders. In Garissa some men did not feel comfortable with the presence of women due to religious beliefs, leading to female participants leaving the venue before the activities started. These issues were conveyed to Search’s partner who was responsible for the organisation of FGDs.

**Data gaps:** Key stakeholders (e.g. members of the judiciary and political actors from ODM, UDA, Jubilee, IEBC in most counties) were not available, which may have limited the depth of information available. This is the case for County Commissioners (in all counties) who could not be interviewed due to lack of feedback and availability.

**Insecurity:** Insecurity was a challenge in some areas, for instance in Lamu where FGDs were to be conducted in Mpeketoni and Witu. Search’s partner in Lamu advised us not to send Bodhi’s researcher to those areas due to insecurity. Instead the research team provided respondents from those areas with additional transport allowance to enable them to travel to Lamu Island, where the planned FGDs then took place. The quantitative survey in Mpeketoni and Witu took place as planned.
III. Findings

III.a Context analysis

III.a.i Mombasa

The elections process and its outcomes in Mombasa pose a significant risk to social cohesion among communities living in Mombasa County. According to respondents, one of the greatest risk factors in the county is identity politics. The divide between communities that perceive themselves as indigeneous as opposed to migrant communities is more pronounced during the election period. Evidence shows that in relation to the upcoming election the declaration to stand for Mombasa governor by the former Nairobi governor, Mike Sonko, has already ignited the “outsiders vs insiders” debate. In this case outsiders are migrant communities, while insiders are local communities in Mombasa.\(^2\) According to some respondents there is a belief that some sections of the migrant communities should not vie for the governor’s post.\(^3\) This was also asserted by key informants who believe that such talk of certain political positions being reserved for specific communities fuels negative feelings regarding ethnicity and in turn contributes to the rising political tension.\(^4\)

Socio-economic grievances in Mombasa, as in other coastal counties, have significantly contributed to some of the ongoing security challenges. A number of historical issues relate to administration of land, lack of education opportunities for the local population and the perception of political marginalisation in relation to national governance. This manifests itself as a feeling that the needs of coastal communities have received scant attention from successive governments in Nairobi.\(^5\) Historical injustices, marginalisation and high levels of poverty have contributed to the violent nature of elections. This is because the issues of land ownership and use, and their overlap with ethnicity, fuels a debate over insiders versus outsiders and is consequently one of the biggest drivers of conflict.\(^6\) The shifting political alliances at the national level, especially the debate regarding ‘hustlers’ (have nots) and ‘dynasties’ (haves), relate to land inequality challenges in Mombasa. Issues around inequality have been compounded by the effects of COVID-19 that negatively impacted upon the economy of Mombasa county, especially within the tourism sector that saw the majority of its workers either sacked or sent on compulsory unpaid leave for long periods.\(^7\)

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\(^3\) FGD. Young Men. June, 2022


\(^6\) Ibid

According to respondents the hope that devolution would address some of the socio-economic challenges caused by the historical injustices and marginalisation has not been realised.\(^8\) The fortunes of the Mombasa people in the run up to the 2022 August elections seem to have deteriorated further. One key theme that emerged through analysis with regard to the operational logistics of the Mombasa County government is the view that patronage politics and misappropriation of county funds have had a negative impact. This has impeded development, due to a divergence in aims between the county executives and the people.\(^9\)

There is a belief among young male and female respondents that some of the government’s policy decisions have contributed to Mombasa county’s economic stagnation, driving the population further into poverty.\(^10\) This is mainly due to the Standard Gauge Railway policy that requires 40 percent of the freight cargo to be transported via the railway,\(^11\) which has had a negative impact on the livelihoods of those dependent on road freight cargo. This group includes the truck drivers, the warehouse operators and service industries related to the truck transport sector. This has contributed to increased suffering due to job losses, resultant loss of income and the breakdown of families.\(^12\) During the discussion with FGD of Young Male and Women, the issue of SGR is linked to the reduction of employment opportunities and driving the majority of the youth into criminal activities to earn a living.\(^13\) Speaking to a KII Religious leader, “Majority of the young people here relied on the casual jobs at the Port. Reduction of container handling has rendered a high number of jobless and are a time bomb for the society.”\(^14\) This is a very emotive campaign issue for the leading coalitions, Kenya Kwanza and Azimio La Umoja.

Political incitement remains a considerable risk in the run up to the upcoming elections. There is a general consensus among respondents that political actors play a negative role in terms of incitement.\(^15\) Respondents argue that despite the work undertaken by CSOs, NGOs and other local actors to promote cohesion and peaceful coexistence, politicians have the capacity to undo any progress made with one speech.

Despite the risks associated with the elections, there is a general consensus that there will not be widespread violence. Some respondents believe that there might be sporadic incidents over local seats like the MCA and MP seats that are hotly contested, especially in Likoni and Kisauni.\(^16\) This is due to politicians exploiting the high youth unemployment rates in these areas and using youth to create unrest. The likelihood of sporadic violent incidents also depends on the IEBC’s ability to conduct a free and fair election. If the IEBC is perceived to have failed in this

\(^8\) FGD with Adult Young Men. June 2022.
\(^10\) FGDs and KIIs. June 2022.
\(^12\) Study shows SGR freight service killing the Coast economy. Available at https://nation.africa/kenya/business/-SGR-freight-service-killing-the-Coast-economy/996-5274310-rrrnphz/index.html
\(^13\) FGD. Young Men and Women June 2022.
\(^14\) KII. Religious Leader. June 2022
\(^15\) FGD. Civil Society Organisations. June, 2022.
\(^16\) FGD. Adult Young Women. June 2022.
regard, there is a possibility that some candidates will reject the results and engage in violence.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Ill.a.ii Kilifi}

Kilifi county's biggest challenge is the management of land use, ownership of land, incidences of absentee landlordism and a high population of squatters.\textsuperscript{18} These factors, according to respondents, have contributed to the increase in incidences of violent land invasions by unauthorised persons who are allegedly influenced by political actors.\textsuperscript{19} For instance, respondents recalled that, in 2021, the conflict at the Nyika Reserve was allegedly politically instigated.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, respondents also linked these invasions with people's perceptions that certain lands, and their communities, have cultural importance as sacred sites of their ancestry.\textsuperscript{21} Respondents noted that elections have been associated with the increase in land invasions as politicians use the land inequality as a campaign tool to mobilise votes.\textsuperscript{22} Political incitements during the campaign period have created tension and escalated land conflicts, as noted by the KECSOCE Early Warning report. Just as in other coastal counties, the perception of skewed land policies which appear to favour only a certain section of the community overlap with historical injustices and high demand for arable land, playing a role in making land an emotive issue in Kilifi.

Respondents identified economic challenges as the main drivers of conflict and tensions in Kilifi County. As in other coastal counties, poverty levels are high due to historical land, regional and political marginalisation and exclusion by central governments. The County is characterised by a very high rate of absolute poverty (71.7 percent) compared to the national rate (47 percent).\textsuperscript{23} Poverty and unemployment are key campaign issues in the lead up to the 2022 elections. Kilifi's tourism sector has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Many locals depend on the hospitality industry and have lost their means of livelihood, especially in Malindi town.

Lack of livelihood opportunities and the rising cost of living have reportedly driven an increase in substance abuse among youth and led to a rise in petty crime among young people. A number of respondents stated that politicians take advantage of disadvantaged youth by recruiting them to form 'election gangs.'\textsuperscript{24} Respondents also stated that football has become a conflict flashpoint in Malindi. This has been manifested in the local football tournaments that are organised and sponsored by the local politicians. Respondents observed that the participating

\textsuperscript{17} KII Religious Leader Mombasa. June 2022.
\textsuperscript{19} FGD. Adult Men. Kilifi. June, 2022
\textsuperscript{20} The Standard: Five hurt as squatters and rival gangs clash over land https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/coast/article/2001412476/five-injured-in-fresh-coast-land-gang-wars
\textsuperscript{22} FGD. Kilifi. June 2022.
\textsuperscript{24} FGDs. Community Members, Kilifi. June, 2022.
teams like Mawela, Shela, Ganda and Kakuyuni are aligned to different political camps and when either of them lose matches the nature of celebrations, abuse and hate that comes afterwards is always violent. These incidents easily morph into creating “mini football gangs’, engaging’ in acts of retaliation and end up being used by politicians to instigate violence during campaigns. Furthermore, according to a key informant some of the fans who support these teams pretend to be football fans but they are not genuine fans and in most cases are just rowdy youths with the aim of creating violence.\textsuperscript{25} This is aided by indiscriminate financial handouts in the run up to the election, causing conflict between those who receive money and those who do not.\textsuperscript{26} The link between football violence on the pitch and the link to violence in elections, however, is an area that needs further research. As shown in Figure 1 a high number of respondents argued that they did not support violence to resolve party differences.

\textit{Figure 1.}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1}
\caption{Support using any means, including violence, to resolve the issue of rival supporters insulting your party’s candidates or your fellow supporters}
\end{figure}

\textbf{III.a.iii Kwale}

Some respondents state that tribalism is a feature of elections in Kwale, highlighting divisions between the Digos and Durumas. The fact that the previous governor was a Duruma was seen as evidence that there would be fierce competition for the governor’s post, with the Duruma not wanting to lose their hold on power. Respondents also highlighted tensions between historic

\textsuperscript{25} KII Interview with community leader, June 2022
\textsuperscript{26} FGDs. Community Members, Kilifi. June, 2022.
local communities and those who have migrated to Kwale from other parts of Kenya.\footnote{FGD Adult Male Community Members. Kwale. June, 2022} In particular, these tensions relate to competition for jobs between the two groups.

In Kwale County, the structure of land ownership is a reflection of how power is held and controlled both nationally and locally. Since independence, land control and ownership has been greatly influenced by both politics and economics. The historical injustices over land allocation and use remain unresolved in most parts of Kwale county. According to a discussion with one key informant, the land grievances in Kwale have been made worse by different government programmes that have led locals to believe the resettlement plan for squatters\footnote{KII, Community Leader Kwale June 2022} is implemented through a class dimension that favours those with the ability to acquire more land at the expense of the poor.\footnote{KII, Community Leader Kwale June 2022} According to the key informant, there is a piece of land in an area called Magandia where the lease had expired and therefore it was supposed to be given back to the community to resettle the landless.\footnote{KII, Community Leader Kwale June 2022} However, in unexplainable circumstances, an influential businessman was granted the land and the squatters who had started occupying the land in anticipation that they would be allocated were evicted.\footnote{KII, Community Leader Kwale June 2022} With 85 percent of the Kwale population living in rural areas, ownership of land and its use remains a key economic factor for the population. The goal of resettling people has not been achieved due to the slow resettlement process and the perceived favouritism by the government and this continues to generate grievances over land ownership.\footnote{KII, Community Leader Kwale June 2022}

The land reform programme in Kwale county is a sensitive issue. Despite the government efforts to redistribute the land, about 60 percent of the population remain landless.\footnote{KII, Community Leader Kwale June 2022} Going into the 2022 elections, land issues remain largely unresolved and the election battle is likely to aggravate tension among the communities. According to informants, however, the chances of the issues manifesting themselves violently are very slim. This is mainly because of the work of the CSOs, NGOs and other local peace committees in sensitising people over the need to use alternative approaches to address conflict. Respondents spoke positively of the local council of elders being the biggest influence to positive change.\footnote{KII, Community Leader Kwale June 2022}

There was a general consensus among the respondents that the downturn of economic fortunes in Kwale has contributed to poverty and unemployment becoming key election issues.\footnote{FGD. Community Members, Kwale. June, 2022} The number of unemployed persons has risen significantly in Kwale. For example, the

\footnotesize{27 FGD Adult Male Community Members. Kwale. June, 2022} 
\footnotesize{28 According to the KII, the land was under lease and after it expired, land ought to have reverted back to the community and then a resettlement plan set up for the landless. However, the local communities were not consulted about the renewal of the land lease and how it was handed over to someone influential without their input. This was mentioned about land in Magandia that ended up being allocated to a businessman perceived to have political connections to government officials at the expense of the landless. No explanation was given as to what criteria was used and why the community was not involved.}
\footnotesize{29 KII, Community Leader Kwale June 2022} 
\footnotesize{30 KII, Community Leader Kwale June 2022} 
\footnotesize{32 Nyanje, Michael (2010), Poverty in the Midst of Wealth: The Case of Natural Resources in Coast Province (Mombasa: Ilishe Trust)} 
\footnotesize{33 KII, Radio Presenter, Kwale. June, 2022} 
\footnotesize{34 FGD. Community Members, Kwale. June, 2022}
tourism sector that was hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic led to many local people losing jobs and livelihoods. According to the Kenya Economic Survey 2021, the earnings in the tourism industry declined by 43.9 percent from 163.6 billion shillings in 2019 to 91.7 billion shillings in 2021.\(^{36}\) Subsequently, the South Coast which is part of Kwale county witnessed a decline of 55 percent in the number of visitors.\(^{37}\) Furthermore, the World Bank Kenya Economic Update expects the economic cost of COVID-19 to Kenya's economy to be significant, contributing to the contraction of income and causing the economy to slow down.\(^{38}\) Based on this, according to respondents youth are the most affected, engaging in criminal activities and being susceptible to exploitation by politicians.\(^{39}\) Inadequate unemployment opportunities are a political issue, as some politicians incite local communities by claiming that their jobs have been taken by people from migrant communities.\(^{40}\)

The role of the IEBC loomed large in the discussion among respondents in Kwale county. There seemed to be a genuine concern about the IEBC’s ability to conduct a free and fair election. According to respondents IEBC officials in Kwale are not impartial and several have been seen in the company of certain political candidates.\(^{41}\) This information has not been corroborated but, in terms of perceptions, the IEBC is viewed as being weak and unable to stop some of the election malpractices being witnessed like vote buying, national identity card buying and failure to conduct civic education to sensitise the public.\(^{42}\) The Msambweni by-election in December 2020, where Feisal Bader, an ally of Deputy President William Ruto won the seat as an independent candidate, is indicative of how the IEBC has failed to inspire voter confidence. The by-election was marred by incidents of violence, reports of voter bribery and intimidation by all the participating parties.\(^{43}\) Despite the evidence of malpractices, IEBC did not punish any of the alleged perpetrators.

Despite the reduced level of violent extremism over the years it remains a valid threat. According to the Kwale County Plan for Countering Violent Extremism, the most recent occurrences of violent extremism have come to be linked to political behaviours, especially around elections.\(^{44}\) The levels of grievance that drive the young people to extremist groups in the past remain largely unaddressed and this remains to be one of the biggest threats to the relative peace and calm witnessed in Kwale County. According to the respondents there are many young people that still lack access to documentation like identity cards.\(^{45}\) This is partly linked to the educational gap with the rest of the country and failure by government agencies to facilitate the

\(^{36}\) Kenya Economic Survey 2021
\(^{37}\) Kenya Economic Survey 2021
\(^{38}\) World Bank Group: Kenya Economic Update 2021
\(^{39}\) FGDs. Young men and women, Kwale. June, 2022.
\(^{40}\) KII. Community leader, Kwale. June, 2022.
\(^{41}\) FGD. Community members, Kwale. June, 2022.
\(^{42}\) FGD Adult Men and Women, Kwale. June, 2022.
\(^{43}\) Msambweni by-poll: How politicians stoked deadly violence to defeat democratic process
\(^{44}\) Ibid
process because of poor government policies towards the Coastal region. Subsequently, this lack of documentation has contributed to the inability of youth to access employment opportunities, leaving them vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremism. There was no consensus on the exact link between elections and radicalisation but a section of the respondents warned that the lack of attention being paid to young people might drive them to radicalisation.

Opinion was divided about the extent to which the 2022 elections will have an impact on conflict dynamics and social cohesion in Kwale. One security sector respondent stated that as a result of awareness raising by CSOs and CBOs, in partnership with external actors, the community understands that ‘an election is not a war.’ Other respondents, however, were of the opinion that tribalism in particular poses a risk to stability during the election period.

III.a.iv Lamu

Conflicts within Lamu County are multi-faceted in nature and have different root causes. These stem from historical land injustices, land tenure systems, land ownership use, inequality and ethnic differences (due to the area's cosmopolitan nature) and the rise of the Lamu Port and Lamu-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) corridor project. In Lamu, political, social and economic processes generate uncertainty and increase competition for resources between the communities that perceive themselves as original inhabitants and migrant communities.

Youth in Lamu identified drug use, lack of livelihood opportunities, police corruption and political exclusion as drivers of conflict and tensions in their community. Respondents stated that political aspirants take advantage of the lack of livelihood opportunities for youth by giving them money or buying them drugs to cause ‘chaos’ in the community while armed with pangas, knives, and sticks. Male youth expressed the belief that there will be violence in their community during this election. One FGD respondent stated that ‘people are waiting for violence to happen,’ so a ‘minor trigger’ will cause violence to erupt. However, this assertion was not backed by the survey shown in Figure 3, as Lamu ranked as one of the least in terms of previous experience with election related conflicts. This explains why the residents are apprehensive with the upcoming elections because of fear of a repeat pattern and the lack of addressing previous drivers of election related conflict. As in the other counties covered by this

53 FGDS Adult Male June 2022
study, the concerns around violence do not relate to the presidential election. Fears of conflict relate to local elections.

Figure 3.

Ethnic differences in Lamu County remain a cause of tension. Previously, attacks in Mpeketoni, Majembeni and Poromoko that were allegedly committed by Al-Shabaab between 15th and 17th June, 2014 were framed as part of a retaliation plan against Kenya’s intervention in neighbouring Somalia. President Uhuru Kenyatta expressly denied the Al Shabaab link, however, and insisted that the attack was politically instigated and was fuelled by ethnic violence against one community. These ethnic differences emanating from historical injustices overlap with grievances over land, whereby some communities view the issuance of title deeds as favouring one community against another.

Another risk identified by respondents was that of politicians bringing in voters from other counties, such as Tana River and Garissa. Politicians pay these voters to vote for them. Community members in Lamu feel that this practice infringes upon their rights. Elections also

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55 Ibid
56 Ibid
create conflict at the household level. Women cannot openly support different candidates to their husbands, putting themselves at risk of violence and family separation.57

III.a.v Garissa

Kenya’s successive governments have contributed to the political marginalisation of Garissa county through excessive centralisation of state power. This centralisation has to a large extent reinforced the structural problems inherited from the colonial regime regarding the current state of affairs in countries like Garissa. For Garissa County the drivers of conflict are rooted in economic livelihoods, exacerbated by weak economic policies, high poverty and unemployment. In addition, ethnopolitical tensions have affected the socio-cultural dynamics due to the tensions between different clans that compete over control of power and resources in the county government. Linked to the two is also the issue of radicalisation and violent extremism that is fueled by both internal (political and socio-economic) and external factors (the continued instability in Somalia and terrorism spillover). Election boundary conflicts have also increased partly due to the farmer-herder conflicts and climate change that has affected food production.

Economic livelihoods in Garissa County have been impacted by three key issues, namely under allocation of national funds, climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. The historical marginalisation of Garissa County continues to impact the country as evidenced by the high poverty levels and low literacy rates.

A large part of the county’s working population are either traders, pastoralists or hold formal roles with the government (national and country), non-governmental organisations and donor agencies. The unemployment rate in Garissa stands at 28.4 percent. As discussed in the overview section, the employment level in the county stood at 259,150 persons according to the 2019 population census.58 This figure includes both formal and informal employment and it captures persons in the labour force in the county. Of those employed, 62.2 percent are male while 37.8 percent are female. On average the literacy level in the county is 8.2 percent while illiteracy stands at 74 percent.59

The 2010 Constitution of Kenya provides for equitable revenue allocation to historically marginalised counties through the creation of the Equalisation Fund. The national government, however, has consistently under-allocated revenue to Garissa County. The delay in fund allocation from the national government has led to the stalling of county development projects and has created a rift between the national and county governments, especially in light of the historical injustices.

Climate change and its resultant impacts have exacerbated conflict in the region. There is a direct linkage between violence, droughts, extreme weather and heightened political activity. Perennial droughts in Garissa County contribute to the poverty levels and magnify pre-existing

57 FGD. CSOs, Lamu. June, 2022.
56 Garissa Annual Development Plan 2021/2022. Available at Link
55 Garissa Annual Development Plan 2021/2022. Available at Link
conflicts. The County is currently experiencing a prolonged drought and this may create further instability during the electioneering season.

Pre-existing economic challenges were amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic given the introduction of social distancing measures. In 2020 the Garissa County Government closed the Dagahley Livestock market in Dadaab Sub-County which adversely impacted the local community.

In Garissa an ‘insiders vs outsiders’ rhetoric exists, especially due to the presence of migrant communities like Meru, Kamba, Kikuyu and Pokomo. Apart from the inter-ethnic competition, clan cleavages have also generated rivalry whereby members of the small clans feel marginalised by the larger clans. One of the recurring issues in Garissa county is the perceived unequal distribution of development resources, including job opportunities, among clans. Whichever clans manage to win more seats in the county often translates to unrestricted access to resources. This tends to create disputes on how to distribute the resources equally. Furthermore, given that available land within Garissa is limited, the competition over land use and control has generated deadly conflicts, especially along the border areas between farmer-herder communities. For example, there has been sporadic violence along the Garissa-Isiolo border, Garissa-Tana River border and even within counties along sub-county boundaries. This is linked to the larger debates over land politics in Kenya that revolve around redistribution that often ends up benefiting some and negatively impacting others. This has influenced the cyclical conflicts that displace communities, labelled as outsiders, during elections. One respondent stated that the heavy focus on inter-clan rivalries means that Kikuyu and Kamba migrants in Garissa are excluded from election campaigns.

Another factor that has affected the socio-cultural dynamics in Garissa is the issue of radicalisation and violent extremism. As mentioned in the earlier sections, the northern counties are prone to radicalisation and violent extremism due to socio-economic marginalisation, the porosity of borders with Somalia, high levels of poverty, youth unemployment, institutional weaknesses exemplified by absence of state security agents and unregulated cultural education. In addition, the presence of the Dadaab Refugee Camp in Garissa has also been linked to acts of terrorism in the past. Radicalisation and violent extremism, mixed with other geo-political issues, played a role in the sophisticated attacks such as the Garissa University attack in 2015 that killed more than 147 people.

60 Leave No One Behind. Peace and Conflict Analysis: Through the eyes of those at risk of being left behind. (March 2022) Available at Link
61 UNICEF, Responding to drought in Garissa County (May 2022). See Link
63 International Crisis Group: The Hidden Cost of Al-Shabaab's campaign in North-eastern Kenya. See Link
64 International Alert: Uwiano, Machafuko au Utengano: The path towards August 2022 elections in Kenya. See Link
66 County Action Plan to Counter Violent Extremism 2018-2023. See Link
68 Human Rights Watch: Wounds of Garissa Attack, Four years on. See Link
The upcoming 2022 elections have heightened tensions as the realignment and repositioning among the political elites evolves. In a county like Garissa where negotiated democracy among clans determines how elective positions are shared, there is a likelihood of potential violent outcomes. In the survey as shown in Figure 4, Lamu county had the highest number of respondents who said, violence can be used as a means when a rival party refused to accept results. This is because of the geographical size of Lamu where only few political parties compete for the political seats and therefore, the party that emerges the winner has the capacity to alienate the losers from control of county resources. Such outcomes play a key role in aggravating ethnic competition and disrupting peaceful cohesiveness.

Figure 4.

The Ogaden clan of ethnic Somalis predominates in Garissa County. Garissa's Ogaden population is divided into many sub clans: Abudwaq dominates the township, Balambala and Fafi; Abdalla has primacy in the southern region of the county (Ijara) and the Auliyahan dominate the regions near Dadaab and Lagdeera. There are minority clans as well, but these three Ogaden sub clans rule Garissa county, and its members vie for power. For instance, the Auliyahan and the Abudwaq sub-clans fight over the territory of Dujis, which is located between Garissa township and Lagdeera. These three groups are vying for control of governmental offices and seats, in addition to ongoing territorial disputes. The Auliyahan are making up for the Abudwaq's greater influence in the national government at the county level. Despite their strong links to the

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69 Saferworld (n.d.). Marginalisation and division in Garissa. See [Link](#)
Abudwaq, the Abdalla frequently side with whichever faction provides better conditions. An informant stated that elections pose a risk of exacerbating inter-clan rivalries in Garissa, adding that historically the Abduwak clan has been close to the national government, benefitting from the state patronage of former presidents Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Moi, and Mwai Kibaki. This proximity to power enabled them to control resources in the county. The emergence of Yusuf Haji as the most prominent leader contributed to the successful lobbying for Ijara, where they reside, to become a constituency, with the hope of reducing power struggles. The Auliyanah clan has also been marginalised by national governments and have therefore always been pro-opposition.

Respondents stated that inter-clan rivalries only come to the fore during election periods. In particular, they identified the gubernatorial election as posing the greatest risk to social cohesion in Garissa as candidates are actively inciting clans against each other. Moreover, one respondent stated that whoever wins the gubernatorial election will embark on a ‘clean-up spree,’ sacking individuals in the county government who were allied to the outgoing governor or who come from the ‘wrong’ clan. Similarly, respondents stated that elections exacerbate tensions between local Somali communities and migrant communities.

The devolved governance system aims at promoting and enhancing popular participation in decision-making at the local level. This transfer of corruption from the national government to the county government has contributed to the poor governance structures at the county level. The weak governance structures at the county level have seen the lack of functioning structures for law and order and increased corruption and organised crime.

The risk of the election campaigns exacerbating existing resource conflicts was also highlighted by another respondent. Respondents further stated that security agents’ failure to provide security in an impartial manner poses a further risk to communities in Garissa as people will not accept this.

Incitement, spread of propaganda, disinformation, and spread of fake news have all played a great role in the majority of electoral related conflicts in Kenya. The spread of fake news and disinformation is mostly driven by politicians and local leaders through mainstream and local media outlets. There has been marked progress in the fight against hate speech by the NCIC. Despite these efforts, however, the Kenya elections remain ethnically driven. Counties with a history of political marginalisation and exclusion are at high risk of suffering severe effects of hate speech and disinformation, especially during an election year. For instance, the competition

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70 Saferworld (n.d.). Marginalisation and division in Garissa. See Link
76 FGDs. Female Community Members. June, 2022.
among clans for the control of county resources has the potential of bringing forth abusive and derogatory statements that can trigger conflict.

When discussing the media, respondents stated that social media is the greatest threat to social cohesion. Video editing, Facebook posts about vote buying and voter importation were all identified as major challenges to social cohesion in Garissa.

Hate speech and propaganda contributes to the deterioration of community relations, especially in a multi ethnic county like Garissa. The identity politics driven by the clan divisions overlap with the Kenya-Somali politics leading to manipulative activities among vulnerable groups. This is done with the aim of controlling the local political seats and resources. The role of the media, both mainstream and local, constitutes the largest driver of hate speech and disinformation. In Garissa social media platforms like Whatsapp, Facebook, Twitter are the most frequently used tools in communicating, due to the speed with which they transmit information. The NCIC and Director of Criminal Intelligence (DCI) have been unable to counter the spread of hate speech, partly because of the role of the political elites who in most cases are not prosecuted. The level of impunity accorded the political class has in effect emboldened the larger part of society in engaging in disinformation without repercussions.

The link between resource control and ethnicity among the communities in Garissa contributes to the use of hate speech and propaganda. For example, the border conflicts between herders and farmers along the Garissa- Tana River borders is rooted in the labelling of Pokomos, a tribe originating from Tana River, as refugees.

The August 2022 elections present a challenge to state agencies on how they intend to address media disinformation and fake news. The increased internet penetration in rural counties, increased use of smartphones and presence of alternative sources of information like social media remain a great challenge. The inadequate capacity of state agencies to monitor and control the spread of misinformation remains a challenge.

III.a.vi Tana River

The NCIC designation of Tana River among the 23 high risk counties is rooted in the repeated patterns of electoral related conflicts in the county. The Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE) weekly conflict early warning response brief noted that during the weeks of 11th May to 18th May 2022 and June 23rd to June 29th, Tana River county was the most volatile and recorded the most incidents related to electoral violence, compared to counties like Taita Taveta, Lamu, Mombasa, Kilifi and Kwale. According to the early warning system, there was chaos during the political events of the Azimio La Umoja coalition. Rivalry between and among

77 FGDs. Male and Female Community Members, Garissa. June, 2022.
78 FGDs. Female Community Members, Garissa. June, 2022.
79 Kenya National Cohesion and Integration Commission Media Briefing. Available at Link
80 Kenya Community Support Centre Weekly Conflict Early Warning Response Brief 11-18 My 2022. Link
81 Kenya Community Support Centre Weekly Conflict Early Warning Response Brief 23-29 June 2022. Link
the two main coalitions, Azimio La Umoja and Kenya Kwanza, was largely to blame for this. The impacts of climate change, such as food shortages and interrupted livelihoods, have resulted in some youths engaging in criminal activity as an alternative. There is a need for the government and other actors to provide humanitarian aid and defuse hunger-related disputes, as young people have reportedly resorted to robbery to obtain food in Garsen. Some people have also started stealing cattle in order to feed their families. Livestock was stolen and killed in Salama by Pokomo youths over the course of 23rd to 29th June. This has led to conflict since, according to reports, the nearby pastoral villages have formed a pressure group to react against the Pokomo’s actions. Additionally, Tana River’s political contests appear to be developing along ethnic lines and the competition for power inside local communities, particularly for MCA posts, has raised the possibility of communal division.

Key informants identified tribalism as a key driver of conflict and tensions in Tana River. The two main tribes in the county are the Pokomo and Orma. As in Garissa, the Tana River gubernatorial election is seen as posing the greatest risk in terms of escalating tensions, as each tribe wants their candidate for governor to win. However, not all respondents agree on the scale of the threat posed by the elections. One respondent stated that people in Tana River are more open to supporting a politician from another tribe than they were in the past. He stated that there has been a realisation that people do not need to be divided along tribal lines and that people in Tana River have a voice.

Unresolved boundary issues are also a source of conflict in Tana River. In this county, conflict generally relates to access to land. There are frequent conflicts between the Pokomo and Orma communities that inhabit this community over access to land and water resources in Tana River. Farmer-herder conflicts in Kenya have been ongoing for centuries but were usually mild and were resolved by parties using the local mediation mechanisms. The advent of colonialism and the rise of the post-independent state in Kenya, however, created a paradigm shift based on mostly capitalist oriented ideas which favoured more cash crop farming and neglected pastoralism. This shift created a power structure that gave the farming communities dominance in terms of power over land ownership that was supported by successive governments through individualization of land rights using title deeds.

There are conflicting views between the Pokomo and the Orma in terms of land use. The Orma view land purely for livestock grazing, while the Pokomo view it as more than just for farm

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82 Kenya Community Support Centre Weekly Conflict Early Warning Response Brief 11-18 May 2022. Link
83 Kenya Community Support Centre Weekly Conflict Early Warning Response Brief 23-29 June 2022. Link
84 Kenya Community Support Centre Weekly Conflict Early Warning Response Brief 23-29 June 2022. Link
87 KII. Religious Leader, Tana River. July, 2022
88 KII. IEBC representative, Tana River. July, 2022
89 Shaiye, Mohammed (2013) Factors Influencing Conflict Between Communities: The Case Study of Orma and Pokomo Communities in the Tana Delta of Tana River County, Kenya. Available at Link
produce, but also for socio-cultural purposes like religious rituals and shrines of worship.91 The clash over the land use is a key issue that remains a driver of conflict in Tana River. According to a land expert, these conflicting views over the use of land have played a significant role in portraying the pastoralists as "primitive" and unproductive due to their pastoral nature of life and their reluctance to embrace crop production.92 In addition, the uneven distribution of land rights has played a role in exacerbating inequality, within and between groups, igniting more grievances among the beneficiaries of land title deeds, especially the Ormas and Wardei.93 Furthermore, major international and local development policies by the government have favoured crop farming which is considered to be the backbone of the Kenyan economy. This has led to the fencing of land which the Ormas would have used for grazing, as well as denying the local Pokomo communities access to land.

Some of the land policies that prioritise individual land rights have played a significant role in portraying the pastoral communities as strangers because of their pastoral nature.94 This in turn creates a perception that views the pastoral communities as trespassers on land that has been privatised and closed off to the grazing of their animals.95

The 2022 Leave No One Behind report found out that youth radicalisation and recruitment by violent extremism groups in Tana River county was largely driven by high unemployment among young people and the limited livelihood opportunities in the semi-arid region.96 Security is a concern in this area because it is home to several ethnic communities. There is a high probability of ethnic hostility in Tana River, as shown by four incidents in the month of June as per the KECOSCE briefing. According to the briefing, in one incident, pastoralists said that some locals had stolen their cattle, sold them, and then bought alcohol with the proceeds (in the Mwina area).97 The high unemployment rate overlaps with the issue of political marginalisation, where there are inadequate government services, including security. This has created an incentive for young people to join militia groups and gangs in an effort to defend their property from constant attacks and raids.

Competition for political power in Tana River has destabilised communities during every election cycle. The historical dispute over land between the Orma and the Pokomo remains an emotive issue and the struggle for control of county resources contributes to the violent nature of the electoral contests. Rising tensions among the communities has been influenced by the accusations of voter migration from outside Tana River instigated by some leaders, in a bid to

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92 Shaiye, Mohammed (2013) Factors Influencing Conflict Between Communities: The Case Study of Orma and Pokomo Communities in the Tana Delta of Tana River County, Kenya. Available at Link
94 Shaiye, Mohammed (2013) Factors Influencing Conflict Between Communities: The Case Study of Orma and Pokomo Communities in the Tana Delta of Tana River County, Kenya. Available at Link
96 United Nations Kenya: Leave No One Behind. Peace and Conflict Analysis: Through the eyes of those at risk of being left behind 2022. Available at Link
97 Kenya Community Support Centre Weekly Conflict Early Warning Response Brief 23-29 June 2022. Link
boost their numbers during the election period.98 This has raised fears that some communities might end up being disenfranchised, especially if they do not manage to get enough votes to win the county seats. With the current governorship being occupied by Dhadho Godhana, a Pokomo, there have been allegations by other leaders of discriminatory policies against the Orma and Wardie in terms of job appointments within the County Public Services Board and disbursement of resources to areas occupied by Pokomos.99

Given Tana River’s record of communal violence in times of national elections and the competition between the Orma, Wardie and Pokomo candidates in the run up to the 2022 elections, the county remains a volatile hotspot with a risk of violence in the upcoming elections.

The current administration of Governor Dhadho Godhana has been implicated in corruption allegations. This necessitated the Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission recommending the prosecution of the governor for misappropriation of county funds through a flawed tendering process.100 The National Ethics and Corruption Survey of 2018 ranked Tana River County highest in terms of bribe demands with an average of 3.76 times the average for government service delivery.101

A Roadmap to Peaceful 2022 Elections report by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission attributed violence between Pokomo and Orma communities during the electioneering period to competing for political supremacy over the control of county budget resources.102 The political supremacy battles are behind what some Tana River activists have accused the county government of, widespread corruption, as each leader sees an opportunity to misappropriate county funds once elected to office.103 Corruption has made the control of county resources lucrative and contributed to the electoral competition becoming more bitter.

Tana River County borders Garissa County to the North East, Isiolo County to the North, and Kitui County to the West, all of which are semi-arid and dry for most of the year. Therefore, the diminishing availability of water in already dry neighbouring counties has created competition over the waters in Tana River as the neighbouring communities from Garissa Country near Ijara sub-county cross over to Tana River in search of water and pasture. This has created conflict tensions over the boundary because of the competition over resources. During dry seasons the influx of livestock from Mandera, Kajiado, Wajir and Ijara is an emotive issue due to competition for the same scarce resources.

The KECOSCE early warning briefing for the month of May 2022 noted the upsurge of hate speech and propaganda through social media platforms like Facebook and Whatsapp which

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98 AllAfrica October 21st 2021: Tana Police bust alleged voter migration syndicate. See Link
99 The Star: Carry out Peace Campaigns, aspirant urges Tana River candidates. See Link
100 Daily Nation (March 2021). Godhana denies corruption claim. See Link
101 The National Ethics and Corruption Survey 2018. See Link
102 National Cohesion and Integration Commission Report. Available at Link
103 Tana River Activists call for the prosecution of Governor for corruption. Available at Link
were widely used to disseminate propaganda against different politicians and communities.\textsuperscript{104} A report by Atlas of the Future project called \textit{Una Hakika}, Swahili for ‘Are you sure’ found out that the use of mobile smartphones in Tana River is widespread and remains one of the key mediums of communication.\textsuperscript{105} This is partly because there is a low number of local radio stations in Tana River. Furthermore, according to the study, 81 percent of the people in Tana Delta use mobile phones and 45 percent of them have internet access.\textsuperscript{106}

As the August 2022 elections approach, state agencies are monitoring the speeches and behaviours of politicians in potential hotspots like Tana River to defuse any tensions that may arise. With the lack of capacity to monitor and curb the spread of misinformation, there is a need to sensitize both politicians and people on the need to fact check their information before acting on it. In a rural county like Tana River with a low literacy rate, however, such an exercise might prove ineffective as rumours continue to be prevalent during the electoral season.

### The Role of the Media

The role of the media is highlighted as a risk to cohesion across counties. The issue of fake news and disinformation on social media came up prominently in the discussions with respondents. They were also identified as sources of fake news and as platforms for arranging violent gatherings.\textsuperscript{107} Facebook and WhatsApp were both specifically mentioned as platforms that are used to spread hate speech.

\textit{"WhatsApp forward messages are like gasoline that lights up the fires of hatred and enmity."}\textsuperscript{108}

There have been incidents of fake news in relation to the race for the Mombasa gubernatorial seat. In the case of ODM’s Abdulswamad Nassir, edited screenshots purporting to have come from his official social media handles circulated claiming he had stepped down from the race. The fact checking site Pesa Check later discounted the information as false.\textsuperscript{109} Suleiman Shahbal encountered a similar issue when a quote attributed to him was shared across social media channels.\textsuperscript{110}

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\textsuperscript{104} Kenya National Cohesion and Integration Commission Media Briefing. Available at Link
\textsuperscript{105} Atlas of the Future \textit{Una Hakika} Project: Can words posted to social media suggest where a genocide might happen? This rumour police in Kenya fights misinformation with an SMS service that acts as a fact-checker. See Link
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid
\textsuperscript{107} FGDs and KIs. Lamu. June, 2022.
\textsuperscript{108} FGD. Male community members, Garissa. June, 2022.
\textsuperscript{109} False: Mvita MP Abdulswamad Sharrif Nassir has not dropped his gubernatorial bid for the senatorial seat. See Link
\textsuperscript{110} The digital card containing the branding Kenyanco.ke and a quote attributed to politician Suleiman Shahbal is fake. See Link
\end{flushleft}
Despite the social media space being regarded as harmful, the respondents noted that media can be very helpful and has the capacity to influence the population positively. In rural counties with high illiteracy levels, the media becomes a source of concern when misinformation is spread because a large section of the population does not have the capacity to verify information. In an election year, messages forwarded through Whatsapp, Facebook and Twitter are frequent as politicians seek votes. Kilifi Governor Amason Kingi, for example, was recently a victim of an attributed quote, later verified as fake by the Africa Check organisation that aims at stopping the spread of fake news. The inability of government agencies to effectively deal with misinformation remains a source and trigger for potential conflict.

In some of the discussions with respondents in Kwale, ethnic stereotyping was highlighted as a challenge that is closely linked to political incitement. For instance, for the purposes of trying to win political power, some politicians have branded one community (the Durumas) to be “illiterate” and therefore not fit to govern the county. For instance, in Kwale the Duruma community have been referred to as ‘Wanyika’ Subsequently, the name of the local gang is christened as ‘weusi’ to mean people with a darker complexion who are mostly the migrant communities.

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Figure 6.

Media content is sometimes purposefully inaccurate, in order to drive a negative agenda

- Mombasa
- Kwale
- Kilifi
- Tana River
- Lamu
- Garissa
- Female
- Male
- Overall


112 FGD. Community Members, Kwale. June 2022.

113 Wanyika in the local lingo means people who are backward and primitive.
Such sentiments are shared through social media and messaging services, and contribute to the fight over the control of the governor's office.

Opinion polls were also highlighted as increasing the tensions among the different groups and hence raising the risk of insecurity during the elections. These polls reportedly give individuals hope that their candidate will win, and when this does not happen at the elections they ‘complain’ of ‘foul play’ and end up rejecting the results which can result in violence in some situations.\textsuperscript{114}

There are also challenges associated with the mainstream media. According to the KII media respondent interviewed, the ownership of the media houses is the problem. Some radio stations are owned by politicians and therefore have no objectivity in terms of how they report.\textsuperscript{115} There are broader questions around the objectivity and impartiality of the mainstream media, as claims of favouritism and promoting disinformation were raised.\textsuperscript{116} According to respondents, media organisations in Kwale are not impartial. This is partly due to the role of journalists who are believed to be on the payroll of some politicians and are paid to spread propaganda or misinform the public.\textsuperscript{117} Furthermore, respondents also noted that the way in which national media outlets like the TV and radio report political messaging from other regions has a negative impact on the local dynamics.\textsuperscript{118} For instance, one key informant pointed out that politicians inciting the public in rallies in other parts of the country also raise tensions among local groups.\textsuperscript{119}

The mainstream media, which acts as the main provider of news, in certain instances has been found to be biased in their reporting. One key informant argued that the media has faced this challenge due to political events being covered by inexperienced journalists.\textsuperscript{120} This makes it difficult for the majority of the junior journalists to be able to report partially. The impartiality is also aided by the poor remuneration towards the journalists and end up being financially supported by some political actors and hence forced to be partial.\textsuperscript{121} Furthermore, politicians sometimes incite the public against media houses that are perceived to be biased. However, it is difficult to address the bias, since media houses are frequently owned by politicians or associated individuals.\textsuperscript{122} This makes self regulation very difficult for the media. Despite these challenges, social media

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114} KII. Religious Leader, Kwale. June, 2022.
\item \textsuperscript{115} FGD. Adult Women, Kwale June, 2022.
\item \textsuperscript{116} When the press fails the people: A critique of Kenya’s media
\item \textsuperscript{117} FGD. Adult Women, Kwale. June, 2022.
\item \textsuperscript{118} FGD. Young Men and Women, Kwale. June, 2022.
\item \textsuperscript{119} KII. Religious leader, Kwale. June, 2022.
\item \textsuperscript{120} KII Media Council of Kenya Mombasa. June 2022.
\item \textsuperscript{121} KII Media Council of Kenya Mombasa. June 2022.
\item \textsuperscript{122} KII Media Council of Kenya Mombasa. June 2022.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
especially Facebook, Whatsapp, Tiktok videos pose a far greater risk in terms of spreading hate speech, incitement, and propaganda that can cause violence than the mainstream media. According to the KII media stakeholder, “The biggest drivers of fake news remain the social media [companies] because they lack a fact checking mechanism or a self regulating programme unlike the mainstream media which undergoes multiple editorial checks before a story is shared.”

III.b Stakeholder mapping

This section outlines the role of key national/external actors that play a role in peacebuilding identified by respondents. It also identifies actors that respondents consider to have the ability to strongly influence conflict in their communities, either positively or negatively. Where there are gaps in the table, respondents did not fully explain why they selected specific stakeholders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tana River</td>
<td>CSOs (KECOSCE, Talent Warriors (a youth group), Tana River Peace, Reconciliation and Development (TRPRD), FIDA and SFCG)</td>
<td>Creating awareness, undertaking peacebuilding programmes and helping resolve conflicts in the region, spread peace and to discuss the effects of conflict through poems, songs and drama, sensitise people on peaceful and fair elections, advocacy for peace and conflict management, work on GBV</td>
<td>Positive: SFCG holds seminars on mediation and conflict prevention in Tana River. These organisations associate themselves with local communities and are well received because they are on the ground.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious actors (The Interfaith Movement, Interfaith Religious leaders, CICC (Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics))</td>
<td>Advocacy for a peaceful election, creating awareness on peace in the community, conducting events involving community leaders, political leaders, and security agencies</td>
<td>Positive: They have a strong influence on the community. People always listen to religious leaders. They are always available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media (stations like TBS)</td>
<td>Spread awareness on the effects of election violence.</td>
<td>Positive: Informing the community of the situation, spreading the message of peace, and encouraging voting. Negative: Misinformation/disinformation, biased reporting on candidates, for</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

example on the basis of their gender, and corruption can all contribute to conflict and tensions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kilifi</th>
<th>National Government</th>
<th>Nyumba Kumi Initiative (Ten Houses) is an initiative that was started by the national government that uses the nearest local administrator that the youth “can relate to”</th>
<th>Positive: The local administrators under the Nyumba Kumi Initiative are in charge of working with the youth to positively influence them, and can act as an early warning mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSOs (MUHURI, Haki Africa, FIDA, Sisita)</td>
<td>Provide education and peace sensitisation, including awareness raising about elections and violence mitigation, and stress and anger management, trauma healing</td>
<td>Positive: Promote peaceful co-existence among the communities through peace programmes, offer to mediate some of the conflicts that emerge between different groups.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Leaders</td>
<td>Provide religious guidance to the community including moral values and ethics to the community. They act as peacemakers when conflict emerges. They also serve as role models for the younger generation.</td>
<td>Positive: They serve as a positive example for youth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Police Service</td>
<td>Apart from providing security, the police through community policing are trying to build a relationship with the community. Due to the past history of police violence, they are viewed negatively by communities.</td>
<td>Positive: Through the community policing initiative, the security agencies have been responsive to the security needs of the people.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village elders</td>
<td>The Village elders are most respected in the society to act as custodians of values and ethics. They act as arbiters during conflict among the different groups. They have a huge positive influence over the younger generation.</td>
<td>Positive: They promote peace resolution of disputes through dialogue and act as arbitrators in the inter ethnic disputes over resources, especially the border disputes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>Political actors are seen as only engaging the community during the election period when seeking votes. They have little role in terms of guiding the community and majority of them are the biggest threats to peaceful co-existence among the groups.</td>
<td>Negative: Politicians are responsible for being positive influencers, but are not interested in fulfilling this role, but inciting conflict instead. MPs, specifically, can drive tension. Moreover, MCAs do not fulfil the positive role they are supposed to and are only visible at election time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwale</td>
<td>CSOs (HAKI Africa, Stretchers for Youth, HURIA, COVAV, KECOSCE )</td>
<td>Engage with young people on peace awareness and peace education, awareness raising on ethnicity and</td>
<td>Positive: The CSOs have managed to engage the communities and promote peace awareness between</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

127 FGD Adult Men, Kilifi. June 2022
128 FGD Adult Male, Kilifi, June 2022
129 FGD Adult Male and Women, Kilifi. June 2022
| **The Kambi (Mijikenda Councils of Elders)** | Acts as the custodians of the Kayas and the related cultural expressions of the Mijikenda communities. \(^{132}\) | **Positive:** The elders are respected in the society as custodians of culture, values and provide guidance to the society. Their decisions are binding to all and have always acted as arbiters when there is conflict. \(^{133}\)  
**Negative:** The elders can influence the decisions of the communities and favour certain Political leaders. These elders install politicians from different communities as Duruma elders, which causes controversies. \(^{134}\) |
| **Religious actors (SUPKEM)** | Inter-faith forum with other religious groups to promote peaceful co-existence. \(^{135}\) | **Positive:** Inclusive and target local challenges |
| **Politicians** | According to Human Rights Agenda, a lobby at the Coast, the majority of political candidates in Kwale are unaware of their civic responsibilities. \(^{136}\) | **Negative:** Responsible for inciting community member. Political incitement is a risk because the politicians engage in the spreading of hate speech and propaganda. \(^{137}\) |
| **Media** | Media plays a critical role in educating the community on issues of peace, security and promotes peaceful co-existence. \(^{138}\) | **Positive:** The media plays a key role in helping in the dissemination of information and providing news to the community. \(^{139}\)  
**Negative:** The media is sometimes biased in the way they report the information. Some of the media organisation are owned by politicians and therefore they are never neutral when reporting and end up favouring only one side. \(^{140}\) |

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130 FGD. Youth Male and Female Community Members, Kwale. June 2022
131 FGD Adult male, Kwale. June 2022
132 Intangible cultural heritage (2009), *Traditions and practices associated with the Kayas in the sacred forests of the Mijikenda*. UNESCO. See [Link](#)
133 KII, Religious Leader, Kwale June 2022.
134 The Standard (2021), *Councils of elders role in politics put into sharp focus ahead of 2022 poll*. See [Link](#)
135 FGD. Adult Male Community Members, Kwale. June 2022
136 The Star (2022), *Kwale candidates lack knowledge of their civic roles, says lobby*. See [Link](#)
138 KII, Media Practitioner, Kwale, June 2022
139 KII, Media Practitioner, Kwale, June 2022
140 FGD, Adult Women Community Member, Kwale. June 2022
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Activities and Contributions</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assembly, LATA, Kiunga Youth Bunge (KYBI), Lamu Social Justice Center, MUHURI, human rights organisations, and Lamu Women Alliance</td>
<td>Conduct Programs on violence prevention, before and during the election.</td>
<td>Human rights organisation, the main focus to promote access to justice, and sensitise the community on the human rights agenda - bring the realisation of the human rights agenda to local communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Leaders</td>
<td>Religious leaders will hold meetings in the mosque, or “field meetings” to disseminate positive messages, preaching non-violence.</td>
<td>Positive: Bring people together and mitigate conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Partner with CSOs, CBOs and engage in peace awareness campaigns.</td>
<td>Positive: Youth have the ability to influence other youth, if they talk about peace their peers will listen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>Engage in security meetings with national government, local community leaders.</td>
<td>Positive: They use their influence to help mobilise the security agencies and national government to respond to the local security challenges. Negative: Encouraging supporters to commit acts of violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (Teachers, Chief)</td>
<td>Chiefs act as a bridge between the national government and the local community.</td>
<td>Positive: They conduct public participation meetings to collect views and offer advice to the national government on how to address the local security challenges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External NGOs/agencies (USAID, Act!, LP, Search)</td>
<td>These Organisations try to support local CSOs and CBOs in conducting civic education among the communities and promote peaceful co-existence.</td>
<td>Positive: Perceived to be neutral in the communities they engage in, as they are not subject to local social dynamics like ethnicity and tribalism. This gives what they say more weight.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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141 FGD. Participant, Male Youth Community Member, Lamu. June 2022
142 FGD. Participant, Male Adult Community Member, Lamu. June 2022
143 FGD. Civil Society Organisation (CSOs) Participant, Lamu. June, 2022
144 Strong Cities Report: How Civil Societies is adopting to COVID-19 effects. See Link
145 FGD. Participant, Male Adult Community Member, Lamu. June 2022
146 FGD Participant, Male Youth Community Member, Lamu. June 2022
148 FGD Adult Male Community Member, Lamu. June 2022
149 KII Religious Leader, Lamu. June 2022
150 FGD. Youth Female Community Members. Lamu. June 2022 shared this opinion as well.
151 FGD Adult Male, Community Member Lamu. June 2022
153 FGD. Adult Female Community Members, Mombasa. June 2022
and means they are well respected and listened to. Moreover, they offer resources that the local organisations cannot access and this gives them a bigger mandate when offering programmes in the communities. CSO representatives stated that, when working with external NGOs, there is a requirement of 50-50 gender representations which makes it an all-inclusive approach. Now that external actors have to report to the County Commissioner, they share information with the relevant security agencies that support their work. Programs like civic education sensitise the youth on the dangers of violence.

| CSOs/CBOs (Haki Africa, Kenya Human Rights Commission, and MUHURI) | Conduct civic education, and engage in human rights activism. | Positive: Female Youth participants felt that these external organisations and actors also factor in the role of women's leadership in the majority of their programs. |
| National Government | National government funds and supports local programmes like peace caravans. | Positive: Through the local provincial administration especially the chiefs are part of the community and act as a link between the national government and the people. They organise public meetings called ‘barazas’ to address several challenges of the communities and promote peaceful co-existence. |
| Religious leaders/groups (especially through Inter-Faith dialogue) | Through the Inter-Faith Dialogues, religious leaders engage in peace education to the communities and promote peaceful resolution of conflicts through dialogue and mediation. | Positive: Provide direction for youth. Negative: Encourage youth radicalisation and incite violence and negative ethnicity. |
| Local government actors | The provincial administration through the chiefs engage the community in public meetings on peace and conflict very often to diffuse any tensions that | Positive: The local chief at Ziwa La Ng’ombe has a very positive influence on the community. In addition, the provincial administrators like county |

154 FGDs. Adult Community Members, Mombasa. June 2022  
155 FGD. Civil Society Organization (CSOs) Participant, Mombasa. June, 2022  
156 FGD. Civil Society Organization (CSOs) Participant, Mombasa. June, 2022  
157 FGD. Civil Society Organization (CSOs) Participant, Mombasa. June, 2022  
158 KI Religious Leader, Mombasa. June 2022  
159 KI Religious Leader, Mombasa. June 2022  
160 FGD Adult Men, Mombasa June 2022  
161 FGD. Civil Society (CSOs). Mombasa. June 2022 shared this opinion as well.
| **Politicians** | Provide leadership in crises that involve the national government. | Negative: Incite the public, and have considerable influence. Specific political parties also identified as ‘violent’. |
| **Youth** | Embedded in programmes that promote peace through peace campaigns and caravans within the community. | Positive: They are majority in number and quite active when it comes to promoting awareness in the community. Negative: Easily compromised by the politicians to be used in violence acts especially during the elections. |
| **Influential business people** | They support and fund some local groups that engage in peace activities and promote activities for the youth groups. | Negative: Sometimes incite communities against each other especially over land acquisition. |
| **Garissa** | Provide local CBOs with knowledge, expertise, and resource support to improve the quality of programming in the community. | Positive: This gives the community the capacity to address these issues themselves, if they arise in the future. These external actors are also perceived to be neutral and inclusive and therefore better equipped to help manage conflict than local organisations. Even if the men do not want women to be involved, the organisations do not accept the discrimination. |
| **Local CSOs (MUHURI, Silverlining, WOKIKE (WomanKind Kenya))** | Partner with multiple CSOs in Garissa, especially on civic education. | Positive: They help the community in addressing some of the root causes of conflict and tensions through education, awareness, and to some extent sponsoring training for |

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161 FGD Adult Men, Mombasa, June 2022
162 FGD. Adult Male Community Members, Mombasa. June 2022 shared this opinion as well.
163 FGD Young Female, Mombasa. June 2022
164 KII Community Leader, Mombasa, June 2022
165 FGD Young Male, Mombasa. June 2022
166 FGD. Female Adult and Youth Community Members, Garissa. June 2022
167 FGD. Adult Male Community Members, Garissa. June 2022
168 FGDs. Community Members, Garissa. June 2022
| **Religious Leaders (including SUPKEM)** | SUPKEM plays a role in civic education, and promotes dialogue among the different religious players especially through the inter-faith dialogue. | Positive: According to a male youth religion is very important to the majority of Garissa residents, and therefore these organisations have partnered with the mosques and the church to try and get more people for their work. |
| **Village/clan elders and Council of Elders** | Clan elders provide leadership to the community by upholding the cultural values, act as mediators during conflicts and promote dialogue among the different clans. | Positive: The clan of elders are highly respected in the society and they promote mediation during conflicts and guide the younger generation on leadership. Negative: Female community members disagreed with male respondents on the role of clan elders, believing that they can influence conflict negatively through gender discrimination. |
| **IEBC** | Conduct civic education and engage in voter education and also ensure that there is credible free and fair election. | Negative: The IEBC has not demonstrated impartiality and some of the officers it has recruited seem to be compromised by the politicians. Therefore, there is genuine concern that the election might not be free and fair and risks causing violent contestation over the results. |
| **Youth Gangs** | Engage in political violence during the election | Negative: They engage in criminal activity during the election. |

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170 FGD. Adult Male Community Members, Garissa. June 2022

171 KII Religious Leader, Garissa. June 2022

172 KII, Community Leader, Garissa. June 2022

173 FGD Adult Male, Garissa June 2022

174 FGD Adult Women, Garissa. June 2022

175 The Star, Help us recruit neutral presiding officers, IEBC tells Garissa residents. [Link](#)

III.c Risk analysis

Understanding risks and ensuring the "Do No Harm" principle is adhered to is key to protecting communities in Garissa, Kwale, Mombasa, Kilifi, Lamu and Tana River against the adverse effects of electoral-related conflicts. These are the risks identified through the context analysis and primary data collection.

Table 2: Risk mitigation matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Risk likelihood</th>
<th>Risk impact</th>
<th>Recommended Mitigation Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Misinformation about Search and implementing partners - suspicions about INGO/NGO activities during the election period can result in the spread of false information about their intentions and activities, and result in loss of community members’ trust</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>• Ensure full transparency about all activities being undertaken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Training community members and community leaders to differentiate between media sources and identify fake news</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government interference in</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>• Brief government stakeholders on</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

177 KII Religious Leader, Garissa. June 2022
178 FGD Youth Male and Women, Garissa. June 2022
179 FGD Adult Men, Garissa. June 2022
180 KII, Religious Leader Garissa. June 2022
181 FGD Adult Male, Garissa, June 2022
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Probability 1</th>
<th>Probability 2</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Search programming</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the purpose of the project and proposed activities where appropriate, ensuring that all necessary permissions for these have been obtained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Involve government stakeholders in programming where appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions of partiality (i.e. for specific parties or candidates)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>• Consider community dynamics and inter-group relationships when developing targeting criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure that targeting criteria are clearly communicated to beneficiary communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity affecting local Search staff and IP staff in parts of Lamu</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>• Closely monitor government security updates and KECOSCE early warning reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Consider remote engagement with communities in insecure locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Community sensitisation on the purposes of Search programming and the benefits to beneficiaries, families and the wider community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased risk of domestic violence in areas where conservative</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>• Engage with local authorities to make them aware of any forthcoming activities, the purpose of these activities, and wider benefits for the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Brief programme beneficiaries on how to deal with harassment from authorities safely and effectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme beneficiaries being harassed by local authorities for</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participating in programme activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III.c Baseline Indicators

The tables below outline baseline values for programme indicators. These are disaggregated by sex and location.

*Table 3: Baseline indicators disaggregated by sex*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator definition</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of target community members surveyed who demonstrate beliefs that violence is sometimes necessary to accomplish electoral goals</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of target community members surveyed who have experienced election-related issues/conflicts and report them being addressed peacefully</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of action's media program audience members/participants in listening sessions who report feeling better equipped to recognize instances of misinformation/hate speech</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of action's media program audience members/participants in listening sessions who believe that the media plays a constructive role during electoral periods</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change in community members surveyed who report having access to avenues or opportunities to address grievances</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of targeted audience surveyed who say that media and outreach activities helped them to identify peaceful pathways to resolve election concerns</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4: Baseline indicators disaggregated by location*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator definition</th>
<th>Mombasa</th>
<th>Kilifi</th>
<th>Kwale</th>
<th>Lamu</th>
<th>Garissa</th>
<th>Tana River</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of target community members surveyed who demonstrate beliefs that violence is sometimes necessary to accomplish electoral goals</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of target community members surveyed who have experienced election-related issues/conflicts and report</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
them being addressed peacefully

| % of action's media program audience members/participants in listening sessions who report feeling better equipped to recognize instances of misinformation/hate speech |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 62% | 57% | 19% | 41% | 50% | 55% | 48% |

| % of action's media program audience members/participants in listening sessions who believe that the media plays a constructive role during electoral periods |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 83% | 89% | 73% | 61% | 64% | 90% | 78% |

| % of community members surveyed who report having access to avenues or opportunities to address grievances |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 17% | 32% | 5% | 1% | 10% | 7% | 13% |

| % of targeted audience surveyed who say that media and outreach activities help them to identify peaceful pathways to resolve election concerns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 74% | 86% | 53% | 49% | 50% | 82% | 67% |

**Table 5: Baseline indicators disaggregated by age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator definition</th>
<th>18-34</th>
<th>Over 35</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of target community members surveyed who demonstrate beliefs that violence is sometimes necessary to accomplish electoral goals</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of target community members surveyed who have experienced election-related issues/conflicts and report them being addressed peacefully</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of action's media program audience members/participants in listening sessions who report feeling better equipped to recognize instances of misinformation/hate speech</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of action's media program audience members/participants in listening sessions who believe that the media plays a constructive role during electoral periods</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change in community members surveyed who report having access to avenues or opportunities to address grievances</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of targeted audience surveyed who say that media and outreach activities helped them to identify peaceful pathways to resolve election concerns</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III.d Theory of Change

The “Uchaguzi Bila Balaa: Violence Free Elections in Coastal Kenya” programme’s ToC is:

*If* diverse local civil society, women, youth, and justice actors are empowered to meaningfully engage and collaborate with one another on early warning and early response efforts to de-escalate tensions related to election violence and *if* media (both traditional and digital) are equipped to identify and mitigate the impact of harmful media content then violence and radicalisation due to unaddressed tensions and grievances related to the elections will decrease because risks of electoral violence will be identified and addressed more effectively and comprehensively in the target communities.

The primary data collected suggests that, broadly speaking, the ToC is relevant and appropriate for the current context in the six target counties. The ToC and proposed activities are highly relevant to the contexts of the counties that are covered and there is a strong sense of support for Search’s work from community members. Respondents were enthusiastic about the various mechanisms, opportunities, and channels, both existing and new, that would support communities in mitigating some of the election-related conflicts in their communities.

Results in Table 3 show that over 18 percent of male, and 14 percent of females, responded that violence is sometimes necessary to accomplish electoral goals. However, it is worth noting that when presented with different election related scenarios and asked whether violence would be acceptable or necessary in these scenarios, the number of respondents who stated that it would was higher, especially in Lamu County (see figures 3 and 4). This change in views suggests that there is a need to interrogate how attitudes and beliefs play a role in shaping the decisions taken by the community to resolve violence during the election period. 30 percent of male respondents and 32 percent of female respondents stated that they had experienced electoral related issues that were addressed peacefully, also suggesting that there is still a significant need for programming to foster social cohesion and facilitate the peaceful resolution of election-related conflicts. Respondents demonstrated strong support for the role of the media in the electoral process. Overall 78 percent of survey respondents believed that the media plays a constructive role during the election process as shown in figure 7. In Kilifi county, the media was rated the highest in terms of being more helpful regarding elections while Garissa rated the
media much more harmful regarding elections. It is, however, worth noting that the qualitative data suggests greater scepticism about the media's ability to report on the elections accurately, and to promote peace. This is because during the data collection, the interviews gave an opportunity for follow up questions to get further information especially from the KII and the FGDs. Moreover, those respondents who were positive about the media's role, tended to see the traditional media as positive because of the regulation aspect and government control as opposed to social media which is harder to control in their opinion.

*Figure 7.*

Consider these factors, do you believe media is more helpful or harmful regarding elections?

![](chart.png)

In terms of access to avenues or opportunities to address grievances, respondents showed lack of opportunities to address their grievances. Only 13 percent reported having such an opportunity. In terms of support to find different avenues to resolve election concerns, 67 percent of respondents believed that media and outreach activities helped them to identify peaceful methods in addressing electoral related issues. This suggests that the premise underlying the ToC is valid. Despite the high volatility and risk of violence, a significant proportion of respondents in all counties surveyed said they are unaware of pathways to non-violently address election related concerns as shown in *Figure 8*. This lack of awareness of mechanisms or channels to address election-related issues shows the need for programming on non-violent conflict resolution during this period.
Figure 8.

If you are frustrated with something that happens in the elections, are you aware of pathways to non-violently address those election-related concerns?

- Very aware
- Somewhat aware
- Somewhat not aware
- Not at all aware
- Don't know
- Refuse
IV. Recommendations

Having reviewed the baseline findings, the research team has developed a series of recommendations outlining areas where Search programming can be strengthened to improve target outcomes.

- **Recommendation #1**: Increased and continued partnership with local CSOs, NGOs and other stakeholders with the aim of capacity building and expanding their networks’ reach in addressing election-related conflicts. There was positive feedback on the role Search in engaging with local CSOs and the community actors especially in capacity building and partnerships. Increased collaboration with Search will expand their networks, and boost their efforts to play a role in civic education.

- **Recommendation #2**: Increase advocacy and sensitisation to encourage greater participation of women and youth in election-related conflict management processes, especially in Garissa County. This study has determined that the role of women in the target communities is still limited due to different cultural practices and beliefs. Women and children are also among the most vulnerable and affected by election-related conflicts and therefore their engagement in offering solutions is critical to finding lasting solutions. Partnering with local CSOs and CBOs, to develop programmes that specifically target women’s participation to boost their capacity will improve decision-making processes. Partnering with the Council of Elders and religious leaders to support these programmes is key as these actors hold the most influence in communities.

- **Recommendation #3**: Place particular emphasis on programming in Lamu, to address the heightened risk of election-related violence in the County. Lamu county (Witu and Mpeketoni) remains a hotspot because of the unique factors that affect social cohesion in these communities. Search should engage with local CSOs and community actors to enhance their capacity in early warning and conflict mitigation.

- **Recommendation #4**: Increase support for communities, in terms of building skills that will enable them to promote peaceful coexistence through peace committees and civic education on electoral-related conflicts, without the need of considerable external support. Local actors and CSOs are engaging in peace awareness, youth empowerment, women's empowerment and civic education. However, they lack the necessary skills to help them to be more effective and to avoid widespread duplication of roles. There is a need to map CSOs in target communities and assess their skills and capacities, so that it is easy to identify skills gaps among organisations promoting peace in target communities, and ensure capacity building efforts are targeted to address these gaps.

- **Recommendation #5**: Encourage CSOs, NGOs and other stakeholders to collaborate across counties, to avoid duplicating roles and responsibilities, boost their capacity, and increase their coverage and influence. Creating opportunities for CSOs and NGOs to
collaborate across target counties would encourage the exchange of lessons learned on how to tackle diverse election-related challenges. This is particularly important in areas like Kwale, Kilifi, Lamu, and Tana River, that have a lot of cross border issues.

- **Recommendation #6:** This recommendation is based on the Expected Result 2.1 that is expected to boost the capacity of traditional and digital media to monitor and address election related hate speech and misinformation. There is a need to partner with the Media Council of Kenya to empower communities to develop a community mechanism that acts as a verification platform for news stories.

- **Recommendation #7:** Broad engagement with the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission in partnership with local CSOs, NGOs and other stakeholders with the hope of engaging in civic education, to make people aware of their voting rights and sensitise them on the role of IEBC. Confidence in the IEBC is very low and there is widespread concern about its capacity to conduct a credible free and fair election. Search can engage the IEBC and other stakeholders to organise periodical civic engagements with the people to sensitise them about the IEBC's role, any new legislation relating to elections, and voters' rights.

- **Recommendation #8:** Improve the early warning system through complementarity with KECOSCE. Collaborating with KECOSCE on early warning would enable Search to engage in more targeted programming in identified hotspots.
V. Annexes

V.a Scope of Work

1. Context

**Search for Common Ground**
Search is an international conflict transformation NGO that aims to transform the way individuals, groups, governments and companies deal with conflict, away from adversarial approaches and towards collaborative solutions. Headquartered in Washington DC, USA, and Brussels, Belgium, with 52 field offices in 29 countries, Search designs and implements multifaceted, culturally appropriate and conflict-sensitive programs using a diverse range of tools, including media and training, to promote dialogue, increase knowledge and determine a positive shift in behaviours.

**The Project**
Search for Common Ground (Search-Belgium), in partnership with our co-applicant Search for Common Ground USA (Search-USA), proposes an 18-month action that will seek to strengthen community resilience to election-related violence by empowering diverse local-level actors to identify, monitor, and de-escalate rising violence. As they are part of the same family Organisation, both Search-Belgium and Search-USA are referred to collectively as “Search” in this proposal. Search has also partnered with four co-applicants under this action: Human Rights Agenda (HURIA), Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), Kiunga Youth Bunge Initiative (KYBI), and Tana River Peace, Reconciliation, and Development Organisation (TRPRD). This action will target Garissa, Lamu, Tana River, Kilifi, Kwale, and Mombasa counties, will take place over a period of 18-months and will respond to increasing tensions and conflicts in the lead up to, during, and after the 2022 Kenyan Elections which often fuel violence and can lead to increased radicalization and recruitment to violent extremist organizations.

The overall objective of the project is to foster collaborative and inclusive community-led prevention of election-related conflicts in Coastal Kenya. The action has two interrelated objectives and corresponding outcomes, as follows:

   - **ER1.1** Increase capacity of civil society and community actors to peacefully identify and mitigate risks of election-related violence.
   - **ER1.2** Increase opportunities for community-led identification and prevention of election-related violence.

2. Mitigate the impact of narratives contributing to electoral violence in targeted communities
● **ER2.1** Increase the capacity of traditional and digital media to monitor and address election related hate speech and misinformation

● **ER2.2** Communities have increased access to constructive content that highlights pathways to non-violently address elections-related concerns

This project has two objectives and four expected results as outlined in the table below.

Our project is supported by the *theory of change* that *if* diverse local civil society, women, youth, and justice actors are empowered to meaningfully engage and collaborate with one another on early warning and early response efforts to de-escalate tensions related to election violence *and if* media (both traditional and digital) are equipped to identify and mitigate the impact of harmful media content *then* violence and radicalization due to unaddressed tensions and grievances related to the elections will decrease *because* risks of electoral violence will be identified and addressed more effectively and comprehensively in the target communities.

### 2. Goal and Objectives of Study

The objectives of the baseline assessment are:

- **Objective 1:** To assess the validity of the theory of change, the general objective and the expected results of the project.
- **Objective 2:** To collect the baseline values of the project results indicators
- **Objective 3:** To conduct a risk analysis related to DnH and conflict sensitivity
Objective 4: To provide recommendations for the project execution strategy regarding intended project results

3. Key Questions of the Study

The baseline study seeks to answer the following research questions:

Objective 1
1. Is the ToC relevant to the current context in Garissa, Lamu, Tana River, Kilifi, Kwale, and Mombasa counties?

Objective 2
2. What are the baseline values of the project indicators? (Baseline values should be disaggregated by sex, age and location)*
   ➢ To what extent are civil society and community actors capable of peacefully identifying and mitigating risks of election-related violence?
   ➢ What are the opportunities for community-led identification and prevention of election related violence?
   ➢ To what extent is the traditional and digital media capable of monitoring and addressing election related hate speech and misinformation?
   ➢ To what extent the communities have access to constructive content that highlights pathways to non-violently address elections-related concerns?

Objective 3
3. What are potential risks related to DnH and conflict sensitivity?

Objective 4
4. Are there recommendations for adaptations of the current project logic and results chain to improve the potential impact of the project?
*Indicative list of key indicators (subject to change):

Goal: To foster collaborative and inclusive community-led prevention of election-related conflicts in Coastal Kenya
- % of target community members surveyed who demonstrate beliefs that violence is sometimes necessary to accomplish electoral goals
- % of target community members surveyed who have experienced election-related issues/conflicts and report them being addressed peacefully

- % of trained civil society, women, youth, and CUC members who feel confident in their ability to identify and respond to election-related violence.

SO: 2. Mitigate the impact of narratives contributing to electoral violence in targeted communities
- % of action's media program audience members/participants in listening sessions who report feeling better equipped to recognize instances of misinformation/hate speech encouraging electoral violence
- % of action's media program audience members/participants in listening sessions who believe that the media plays a constructive role during electoral periods.

4. Geographic Location

This Project targets Garissa, Lamu, Tana River, Kilifi, Kwale, and Mombasa counties, will take place over a period of 18-months and will respond to increasing tensions and conflicts in the lead up to, during, and after the 2022 Kenyan Elections which often fuel violence and can lead to increased radicalization and recruitment to violent extremist organisations.

5. Methodology and Data Collection Tools

The consultant is expected to propose the methodology. The proposed approach, the tools utilized and the means of analysis should be determined based on what is necessary and relevant to the project, and a justification for this should be included in this section. Each tool/method should then be listed with justification of its use, intended target groups for the tool, and numbers of each target group to be reached. Please include the sampling strategy for the study in this section.

Deliverables
Search expects the following deliverables from the external consultant(s) as they correspond to the timeline and budget:
- An inception report detailing the methodology, data collection tools and timeline;
  - The inception report should include a review of previous studies related to Search’s programming and incorporate relevant learning
● Any necessary training of data collectors or set-up of systems for data collection;
● Supervision and participation in data collection;
● Oversight of data coding and analysis;
● All original data submitted to Search;
● **Debrief session** after data collection with presentation of preliminary findings before report writing begins
● A **Powerpoint presentation** of key findings and recommendations
● A **restitution session** with Search staff, local partners and key stakeholders
● A draft baseline report in English for review by Search staff and partners;
● A **final report in English** (20 pages max in length, excluding appendices) consistent with Search branding and standards for evaluation. The report:
  ○ Uses the Search evaluation template unless otherwise agreed in the contract
  ○ Provides a clear connection between the conflict or context assessment and the intended results, articulate the project’s ToC, and include other relevant project specifics
  ○ Fully explains the objectives and research questions of the study, limitations and methods chosen for analysis,
  ○ Findings respect Search’s evaluation standards, are structured around the main objectives of the study, and are presented in relation to the intended target groups.
  ○ Recommendations should have a clear audience and be specific, accessible, and actionable.
  ○ Indicator table showing all indicators
  ○ Appendices should include detailed research instruments, list of interviewees, terms of references and evaluator(s) brief biography.
● A **Powerpoint presentation** of key findings and recommendations
● A **restitution session** with Search staff, local partners and key stakeholders

**Logistical Support**
Consultant(s) will be responsible for organizing their own logistics for data collection (vehicles, fuel, and drivers), and this must be budgeted into the study. Search can provide support in arranging logistics as agreed upon based on the consultant’s proposal. At least one Search staff member may be available to support data collection and logistics.

In addition, Search and partners will share the following elements with the external consultant(s): All relevant project documentation including the project proposal and logframe, M&E plan, and previous studies.

**6. Ethical Considerations**
Please outline key risks of conducting the study and the steps to assure Do No Harm and Conflict Sensitivity and inclusion principles (i.e. gender, age, ethnicity, religion, etc.) in the study. Steps taken to ensure informed consent is collected should also be outlined.

7. Data Quality Assurance and Management

All studies will be reviewed and approved by our country office and global Institutional Learning Team prior to acceptance of the final product. The inception report detailing the proposed method, study matrix, and work plan is to be approved by the Search team before starting data collection. In addition, draft reports will be reviewed and feedback incorporated before finalization and sign off.

All data and materials collected in the course of this study is to be safely stored and handed over to Search at the end of the study. Submitted proposals should include plans for how the study will manage data throughout the study to ensure data quality.

The consultant should also outline clear plans for ensuring data quality assurance for this study.

8. Timeline

This study will take place from February 2022 to March 2022 with the final deliverables due by the end of March 2022 at the latest. Key deliverables include:

- Detailed inception report
- Data collection tools
- Draft baseline report with raw data, recordings and other qualitative data
- Updated baseline indicator reference sheet
- Final baseline study report incl. powerpoint presentation & 2-page summary
- Restitution session with Search staff, local partners and key stakeholders

Final deadlines will be agreed by Search and the consultant upon finalization of the contract.

9. Budget

A detailed budget should be provided, including daily rates for personnel, and costs related to data collection (per total number of people sampled, sites for collection, etc.), analysis, and production of deliverables.
10. Requirements of Consultant

The following skills and experience are expected by Search for our evaluator for this project:

- Proficiency in English and Swahili (written and spoken);
- More than 5 years of experience in project evaluation, including collecting data in interviews, surveys and focus groups;
- Experience in conflict analysis and conducting election related studies, including early warning and early response (EWER) systems;
- Experience working with international organizations;
- Experience conducting quantitative surveys and analysis;
- Evaluation methods and data collection skills;
- Familiarity and experience with contextual challenges in the geographic location(s) where the study will take place;
- Experience / records that show the consultant has done similar/related assignments in Coastal of Kenya will add value.

In addition, the consultant is required to respect the following Ethical Principles\textsuperscript{182}:

- **Comprehensive and systematic inquiry:** Consultant should make the most of the existing information and full range of stakeholders available at the time of the review. Consultant should conduct systematic, data-based inquiries. He or she should communicate his or her methods and approaches accurately and in sufficient detail to allow others to understand, interpret and critique his or her work. He or she should make clear the limitations of the review and its results.
- **Competence:** Consultant should possess the abilities and skills and experience appropriate to undertake the tasks proposed and should practice within the limits of his or her professional training and competence.
- **Honesty and integrity:** Consultant should be transparent with the contractor/constituent about: any conflict of interest, any change made in the negotiated project plan and the reasons why those changes were made, any risk that certain procedures or activities produce misleading review information.
- **Respect for people:** Consultant respect the security, dignity and self-worth of respondents, program participants. Consultant has the responsibility to be sensitive to and respect differences amongst participants in culture, religion, gender, disability, age and ethnicity.

Selection Criteria

\textsuperscript{182} Adapted from the American Evaluation Association Guiding Principles for Evaluators, July 2004
Consultant proposals will be selected for:
1. Relevance of proposed methodology to the goal, objectives, and research questions for the project.
2. Quality of proposed methods, conflict sensitivity approaches, and quality control measures.
3. Qualifications of the candidate(s).
4. Proposed budget in relation to proposed methodology, deliverables and team.
5. Timeline for proposed activities.

Applications

To apply, interested candidates (individuals or teams) are requested to submit the following two documents by January 14, 2022:
- Curriculum vitae;
- A technical proposal proposing a methodology for the baseline together with a financial proposal for the completion of the aforementioned deliverables and a short cover letter.

Note: Only two documents can be submitted, so the technical and financial proposals must be combined, along with the short cover letter.

For any inquiries
For any inquiries you can write to the DM&E Coordinator (smwakitalu@sfcg.org) with a copy to: lrohrbach@sfcg.org, mmwachausa@sfcg.org and jkimamo@sfcg.org.
Hello, [name], thank you for agreeing to speak with me.

My name is [name] and I work with Bodhi Kenya Ltd. Bodhi Kenya is a subsidiary of Bodhi Global Analysis, an independent British research company that has been engaged by Search for Common Ground to understand the social and political context leading up to the Kenyan General Election, in order to support future programming.

Your participation in the interview is completely voluntary, and you may stop the interview at any time. If you agree to be interviewed, we will make written notes of your responses, which will not be discussed or shared with any Search for Common Ground staff. Your name will not appear in connection to any information you give us.

This interview should take between 45 and 60 minutes. Are you willing to participate?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions to ask during KIIs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Note - these will be adapted depending on the informant’s specific area of knowledge or expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Question area one: conflict dynamics</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. What are the main types of election related conflicts in the county? and their root causes?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Are you aware of any challenges or opportunities posed to the work of NGOs or INGOs - like Search for Common Ground - as a result of working on the election-related issues in your area?

3. Do you see the upcoming election affecting conflict dynamics or broader social cohesion in the area? If so, how?
   a. What are the greatest risks to social cohesion you see from the upcoming election?
      i. Probe: role of media
   b. How might these risks be mitigated?

Question area two: conflict management and stakeholders
1. What role does your organisation play in conflict management, or broader building of social cohesion, in the area?
2. Are you aware of any other stakeholders working in conflict management or broader building of social cohesion? If so, what role do they play, and what are their strengths and weaknesses?
3. In your view, does your organisation and the other stakeholders working on conflict management, or broader building of social cohesion, work well together? What are the main strengths and weaknesses in your collective work?
4. Does your organisation consider gender in your work, including how conflict dynamics affect men and women differently?
   a. How about generational differences, and how the youth are impacted?

Question area three: civil society and community role and needs
1. What role do you think civil society should play in management of conflicts related to elections?
2. How might civil society be facilitated to participate better in management of conflicts related to elections?
3. What role do you think members of the broader community should play in managing the election related conflict?
4. Do you think adults and youth have different roles to play? How about men and women?
5. How might youth and women be facilitated to participate equally in the management of election related conflicts?

V.b.ii FGD Guide - Risk Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus Group Discussion Guide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Client:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project name:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher name:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview mode:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview date:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start time:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Your participation in the discussion is completely voluntary, and you may leave the discussion at any time. If you agree to participate, we will make written notes of your responses, which will not be discussed or shared with any Search for Common Ground staff. Your name will not appear in connection to any information you give us.

This discussion should take between 45 and 60 minutes. Are you willing to participate?

**Guide**

[Note: alternate exercises between groups - all questions served, but only one exercise completed per FGD]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions to ask and discuss during the FGD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Question area one: conflict dynamics [framed around Conflict Drivers Perception Ranking]</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. What are the main challenges for leading a stable and peaceful life (if any) in [Community]? In other words, what are the main causes of conflict?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the effects of conflict on you, your household and your community?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Do you experience any restrictions, challenges or constraints - or any particular forms of conflict or violence - based on your age or gender?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Do you see the upcoming election affecting conflict dynamics or broader social cohesion in the area? If so, how?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. What are the greatest risks to social cohesion you see from the upcoming election?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. And what role do you see the media playing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Probe: role of divisive rhetoric/hate speech

c. How might these risks be mitigated?

Question area two: conflict management and stakeholders [framed around Power Mapping]

5. What national/external actors (NGOs, stabilising personnel, etc.) are present in your area, and what role do they play? How do they affect conflict, peace and coexistence, and is their involvement equally inclusive for all (regardless of gender, religion, sect, ethnicity, age)?

6. Which individuals or groups are in a position to strongly influence conflict negatively or positively in your area?

7. What do you think are the best and worst means of conflict management in your area?

8. What roles do women and men play in conflict management in your area?

Question area three: connectors and dividers

9. What factors and issues help bring different people and stakeholders together in your community, and how?

10. What factors and issues cause conflict and/or divide people within your community, and how?

Question area four: community priorities

11. What role do you think youth (both men and women) should play in election related conflict management? What are their strengths and weaknesses?

12. What would you most like to support the youth and women on - personally, for your household, or for your community - in managing election related conflict which affects you?

Ask follow-up questions based on responses of the participants. Some examples of themes to explore or further discuss:

1. What role do you feel that the political parties plays in conflict?

2. What currently connects people across conflict lines?

3. What are factors that are most critical to pushing against positive change?

4. How do people cooperate?

5. Who exercises leadership for solving disputes and how?

6. How do you see the situation in your community developing in the run up to, and after, the elections? What do you think are the best/worst thinkable scenarios?