FINAL EVALUATION

Jandeniyo! Let’s Talk About It

An Initiative to support the Disengagement and Reintegration of Boko Haram/ISIS-WA Combatants and Affiliates in Niger

APRIL 2021

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Acronyms & Abbreviations

BH: Boko Haram
FDS: Defense and Security Forces
FGD: Focus Group Discussion
HACP: High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace
ISIS WA: Islamic State – West Africa province
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA: Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Search: Search for Common Ground
TOR: Terms of References
UNDP: United Nations Development Program
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Executive Summary

Search is an international non-profit organization founded in 1982 whose mission is to transform the way conflicts are managed by promoting collaborative rather than confrontational approaches, focusing on community activities, dialogue, mediation, and media production. The non-profit organization has been in Niger since 2011 and in this context, it initiated the ‘Jandeniyo! Let’s Talk About It’ project funded by the US State Department through the CSO (Conflict and Stabilization Operations), which started in April 2018 and ended in December 2020. The aim of this project was to support the reintegration process and the peaceful return of Boko Haram ex-combatants to the communities of Diffa.

The main objective of this evaluation is to analyze to what extent the Jandeniyo project, through communication and community awareness, has contributed to and promoted voluntary disengagement as well as peaceful reintegration of Boko Haram ex-combatants and affiliates from Diffa in host communities.

This final evaluation aimed to:

1) Appreciate the contribution of the communication and awareness program to change the perceptions of the community regarding the reintegration of ex-combatants and ex-detainees who have left Boko Haram;
2) Measure the project performance indicators;
3) Identify lessons learned, best practices, and challenges in the communication program on the reintegration policy for ex-combatants;
4) Provide recommendations relevant to the project and the design of future projects aimed at using strategic communication to promote the defection and reintegration of ex-combatants, and
5) Provide recommendations on how Search can/should build on this project to advance stability in the Diffa region.

The methodology used for this assessment is based on a quantitative and qualitative approach. The quantitative survey questionnaire was administered to 660 people from the population and 72 defectors. A discussion guide was used for individual interviews and Focus Group Discussions, which were also administered for qualitative data collection. 19 individual interviews and 7 FGDs were carried out. The collected data by KoboCollect were then transferred to Excel and SPSS to generate tables and graphs.

Key findings from the evaluation include:

Relevance. The project objectives fully correspond to the needs of the beneficiaries and the population. The state wants, through the outstretched hand policy, to provide a way of return for those who have joined Boko Haram and want to return. The population is waiting for the end of the conflict and wants to see its children return. Repentant individuals just want to go home after the disillusionment.

The outstretched hand policy therefore responds to an obvious need and the Jandeniyo project has been able to provide the necessary support in terms of communication about this policy. The project was able to inform the various parties that the state was offering a path of return and reintegration.

The initiative was appreciated by the populations and especially the defectors, as one of them who did not know how to return declared, and the message made them understand that they will be welcomed.

The project enabled efficient transmission of the message on surrender and the disengagement of Boko Haram fighters.
Effectiveness. The project achieved its objectives: the messages were received by much of the population and by returnees. The project enabled the disengagement of the defectors by sending them the message of the outstretched hand policy.

• 86% of repentant respondents say they have seen a message and 45% of them have seen at least two messages. Three-quarters (74%) of the defectors surveyed saw and heard the message when they were within Boko Haram. This means that for the majority the message has reached the front lines, which is an important mark of effectiveness.

• 88% of community members said they had seen or heard a message about the surrender of ex-combatants from BH across all channels. The message is that, if they agree to lay down their arms and come back, they will not be criminalized but on the contrary, they will be accompanied and reinstated. (The message is still relevant).

• The message allowed two-thirds of the returnees (62%) to be assured that there was a way back and 66% of them said that the message allowed them to return from Boko Haram.

• More than half of them (57%) said they knew of other BH defectors that came back because of the message.

The data thus reveal an important level of reception of the message by the defectors but also show that this message had an impact on the disengagement of the defectors.

Some of the channels have been particularly effective in transmitting messages to defectors, in particular the leaflets dropped from planes into the bed of the lake.

Regarding the surrender and reintegration process, on the one hand, the study reveals that the messages fostered understanding of the surrender process and the reintegration process:

- 42% of community members believe that the message enabled them to better understand the surrender process of ex-Boko Haram combatants and the reintegration process (41% of respondents).
- At the level of the repentant respondents, 62% of them say they have a better understanding of the surrender process thanks to the message, and two thirds of them answer in an affirmative way that the message made it possible to better understand reinstatement.

On the other hand, communication has also contributed to the return of Boko Haram fighters:

- Two-thirds of the defectors indicate that the message gave them assurance of a path to surrender (62% of repentant respondents) and a path of reintegration (66% of them).
- 67% of returnees said the message got them back from Boko Haram.

Finally, on the aspect of the reintegration of the defectors, the evaluation highlights that most of the community members are willing to accept the reintegration of repentant individuals.

- Most of the community members (90%) say they agree to forgive a former Boko Haram combatant.

The population is particularly ready to undertake business collaboration with the ex-combatants:

- 83% of those polled say they agree to work with a former Boko Haram combatant.
- 90% of respondents said they would buy goods and services from a Boko Haram ex-combatant.
Efficiency. The human and financial resources deployed have made it possible to achieve a satisfactory level of overall results in a very short time (less than two years). The rate of completion of activities and the level of achievement of results is 100%.

Sustainability. Radio programs, videos, pictures that were created remain sustainable communication tools that can be used beyond the end of the project. Defectors who successfully reintegrated demonstrate the sustainability the actions put in place in order to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants. Their experiences of forgiveness and reintegration demonstrate the potential sustainable effects of the program.

While the project has ended because of funding, it would be necessary to continue the initiative to consolidate the gains and results achieve. The conflict is still rife, and the state still needs the help of civil society partners in the fight against insecurity. The Jandeniyo project has proven to be an effective part of the solution.

Assets and communication products can be reused. There are about a hundred sketches that can continue to be broadcast as much as possible, as the topics they cover remain relevant.

The authorities collaborated on the project, but they also followed it closely especially as they realized that the messages had really had an impact on the surrender of BH fighters. The authorities are the first to receive combatants wishing to surrender so during interrogation they seek information on the person but above all they try to determine whether it is true or a false repentance. During these interviews, the authorities noted that the ex-combatants came back after the message of the outstretched hand policy had reached them and had given them reassurance.

Lessons learned, best practices, and challenges. The following lessons learned emerged from the implementation of the communication program on the reintegration policy for ex-combatants:

- Communication is an important element in the peaceful resolution of a conflict.
- Communication is an important means of promoting social cohesion in a context of crisis.
- Although this is an important part of the ex-combatant surrender process, communication is not enough. The commitments made must also be kept at the risk of having a counterproductive effect on surrender.
- The messages and the communication codes used must be simple to be understood by the combatants because the latter do not necessarily understand the language used or cannot read.
- Social networks and mass media can be important communication channels.
- Innovative solutions like leaflets can be effective communication channels.

Finally, the authorities regret that the project has come to an end, as the center has been abandoned and there are no longer any partners to finance the activities. The number of repentant individuals in the center at the time of the evaluation was 36. Intervening on the issue of repentance is even more necessary as this issue is a stake in the establishment of a lasting peace.

Based on the results of the final evaluations, several recommendations can be made to Search and its partners:

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1. **Advocate to mobilize funding for the continuation of the Jandeniyo project.**
   - Produce a movie on the project's communication strategies and its impact.
   - Capitalize on strengths and positive results such as leaflets.
   - Communicate about the project itself to allow different audiences to get to know it.

2. **Coach and collaborate with reintegrated defectors who would like to become ambassadors of peace in their community.**
   - Target the reinstated returnees to pass on the messages to the BH ex-combatants and the population, always with the aim of reaching additional BH combatants.
   - Promote the history of reinstated defectors. Support them testify so that they can become ambassadors.

3. **Promote joint initiatives between defectors and young people from host villages.**
   - Set up projects involving young people from host communities and defectors working together.

4. **Support the government in seeking funding to continue its support to reintegration.**
   - Evaluate the needs for the Goudoumaria center.
   - Seek funding for a Phase 2 of the process and continue to encourage the return.
   - Organize a workshop with all partners to discuss needs and ways to raise funds.

5. **Harmonize approaches on repentance and reintegration with other partners.**
   - Develop harmonized tools for demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration as done in Nigeria with funding from the US.

6. **Encourage the population to disseminate messages calling for surrender.**
   - Maintain awareness and dissemination of videos and audio messages by radio stations and sharing among groups.

7. **Prioritize communication towards women.**
   - Reach out to men and encouraging them to go and inform their wives at home.
   - Carry out awareness campaigns aimed only at young girls and mothers, with women who would visit homes to meet the women there, where they live.

8. **Create women's awareness teams for home awareness raising.**
   - Reach out to women directly in the household.

9. **Mobilize youth, including by organizing a meeting between Nigerien universities and young Nigerien researchers working in the Diffa region.**
   - Encourage universities to reflect on the theme of the future of peace and the importance of the reintegration of repentant individuals.
I. Introduction

Search is an international non-profit organization founded in 1982 whose mission is to transform the way conflict is managed by promoting collaborative rather than adversarial approaches. The organization seeks to contribute to lasting peace by focusing on community activities, dialogue, mediation, and media production.

In the context of strengthening community resilience and preventing violent extremism and conflict in the Lake Chad Basin of Niger in the Diffa region, Search is part of the actors working on recovery through strengthening community engagement, peaceful cohabitation, social cohesion and peacebuilding.

Its approach is based on innovative methods with a high impact on attitude change and proposes to support transformation and conflict resolution. This, by mobilizing all influential actors in the production of conflict sensitive massage, and by enabling communities to find prospects for peace and increased stability in Diffa.

The Jandeniyo project, funded by the United States Department of State through the Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), began in April 2018, and ended in December 2020. The purpose of this project was to support the reintegration process and the peaceful return of ex-Boko Haram combatants to the communities of Diffa. This project relies on communication and information-sharing mechanisms adapted to the context of the Diffa region, placing communities at the heart of the disengagement of young people recruited into violent groups.

For more than a year and a half, Search has crafted messages about the process of disengaging violent groups for the attention of wider communities and specifically targeting young people enrolled in violent extremist groups in the region. This communication was meant to let them know that there was a way back for those who wanted to surrender. These messages were integrated into different media, paper, audio, and video products and disseminated through various channels in the Diffa region. As part of this project, Search used local radios, social networks, movies and videos kiosks, and even military operations that dropped paper messages into the lakebed, where no one can reach by car, motorcycle or bicycle.

II. Methodology

- Objectives of the Evaluation
The main objective of this evaluation is to analyze to what extent the Jandeniyo project, through communication and community sensitization, has contributed and promoted voluntary disengagement as well as the peaceful reintegration of former combatants and affiliates of Boko Haram from the Diffa region in host communities.

*Jandeniyo* was born after a long cycle of reflections, discussions, and meetings between the heads of Search for Common Ground Niger, the various representatives of the United States Department of State at the time and local authorities. The project also involved community members and leaders - men, women, and youth - in the process of consulting and understanding the local context.

**The sub-objectives are:**

1. Appreciate the contribution of the communication and awareness program to change the perceptions of the community regarding the reintegration of ex-combatants and ex-detainees who have left Boko Haram;
2. Measure the project performance indicators;
3. Identify lessons learned, best practices, and challenges in the communication program on the reintegration policy for ex-combatants;
4. Provide recommendations relevant to the project and the design of future projects aimed at using strategic communication to promote the defection and reintegration of ex-combatants, and
5. Provide recommendations on how Search can/should build on this project to advance stability in the Diffa region.

The data collection informed the level of the project indicators, which are:

- ✔ Percentage of ex-combatants (reintegrated or in Goudoumaria camp) who saw or heard Search's messages.
- ✔ Percentage of community members who have seen or heard Search messages.
- ✔ Percentage of community members and ex-combatants who claim to have a better understanding of the process of reintegration and peaceful reintegration of ex-combatants.
- ✔ Percentage of community members with increased, accurate and up-to-date information that encourages current Boko Haram/ISIS WA fighters to disengage.
- ✔ Percentage of community members willing to accept the return of (future) ex-combatants to their communities.
- ✔ Percentage of community members and ex-combatants who report having a better understanding of the process of reintegration and peaceful reintegration of ex-combatants.

**Evaluation Questions**

**Relevance of the project**

- How has the project contributed to the disengagement of Boko Haram defectors who are currently reintegrated into the communities? Did former combatants disengage because they heard or saw one of our messages? If so, which message? Why did that message motivate the combatant to disengage? Did it clarify the process of defecting and instill confidence in the combatant that there was a defection and reintegration pathway for them? Did community members reach out to combatants after hearing or seeing our messages to encourage them to defect?
- If we had to take over this project, what activities should be maintained, added, adjusted? and why?
- Were the stakeholders and leaders calling for reintegration in the messages effective and were they disseminated appropriately? Justify the response and formulate concrete proposals for follow-up.
● Have the messages disseminated for the call for the reinsertion of defectors been accepted and owned by the communities?
● To what extent have our approaches enabled the implementation of conflict-sensitive actions?

**Project Efficiency**

● What is the level of achievement of the project output indicators after the implementation of the activities?
● What worked in the project and what do we want to remember? What messages were most helpful in disengaging youth from violent groups and why?
● To what extent has gender been taken into account in the implementation of the project? Where was it not taken into account or incorporated and why not? What could be done in the future to better incorporate gender into similar projects?
● What went wrong in the implementation of the activities, despite the adaptations made, and what lessons can we learn for future projects?
● Has the ratio between the execution time and the level of budget consumption been balanced? If not, why not, and what remedial actions are necessary for better performance in the implementation of future projects? To what extent have financial, human, and material resources been sufficient (quantity) and adequate (quality) in relation to the expected results?

**Project Effects and Impact**

● What is the collective impact of this program on social cohesion?
● What are the changes induced by the dissemination and sharing of reintegration messages on the knowledge, perception, behaviors, discourses, and habits of participants at the community and institutional levels?
● What are the messages calling for reintegration and peace that have helped to achieve changes in the perception of the community and the defectors?
● Were there any unexpected outcomes (positive and/or negative) related to the implementation of this project? What do we see emerging that we did not anticipate?

**Project Sustainability**

● What is the basis for the sustainability of the project's achievements (structures, knowledge, skills, relationships)?
● What will remain after project implementation according to the stakeholders and affected communities?
● To what extent did each targeted category (communities and defectors) feel fully involved in the implementation of project activities? What facilitated this? What was missing and could be strengthened?
● What is the degree of institutionalization of approaches, tools, and ownership by local authorities and state institutions? In particular, to what extent have they adopted the Common Ground approach?
● To what extent did the project strengthen vertical and/or horizontal social cohesion? Why/why not?
● What factors (internal and external) hinder the sustainability of the project's achievements? What opportunities are available to us? (Culture, stakeholders, institutions, social norms, laws, ...)
● What are the lessons learned and recommendations to strengthen the sustainability of the project's achievements?
● Was there a dissemination/replication/intersection effect? Have other actors been inspired by this project?

○ Methodological Approach
To conduct this study, a mixed approach combining quantitative and qualitative methods was adopted. Quantitative data was collected from a representative sample of men, women, and young people. In addition, qualitative data was collected through semi-structured interviews with resource persons: administrative officials, municipal and customary authorities, religious leaders, kiosks managers, radio presenters, and staff who intervened in the field within the project framework. Focus groups of up to 8 people with women and young people were held in the project areas to triangulate qualitative information.

To reach the targeted actors, a two-level stratified sampling plan was adopted:

- **Municipal level**: this is the decentralized administrative level, the ideal level for data collection. This is mainly the area of intervention of the project. 9 municipalities were targeted: Diffa, Mainé Soroa, Goudoumaria, Chétimari, Geskerou, N’guigmi, Kablewa, Bosso and Toumour.
- **Neighborhood level**: this is the community level where families (men, women and young people) live, and it is also in these neighborhoods that Boko Haram defectors live. They are the first to be affected, so it is important to measure the impact of the project on social cohesion between the communities and the latter.

**Sampling**

The sample is calculated based on the population and according to the weight of each of the municipalities. For a survey design based on a simple random sample, the required sample size is calculated by applying the following formula:

\[ n = \frac{z^2pq}{i^2} \]

With:

- \( n \): sample size
- \( pq \): expected proportion of a response from the population or actual proportion. In the case of a multi-criteria study or when no other study has been carried out, which is the case for this study. This variable can therefore be set to 0.5 by default, which makes it possible to have the largest possible sample. \( q \) is the complement of \( p \) in 1 to go to 100.
- \( z \): sampling confidence interval.
- \( i \): margin of sampling error.

For the different parameters

- As the prevalence of the indicators sought is not known, it is estimated that \( p = 0.5 \) (normal distribution) and \( 1 - P = 0.5 \).
- The 95\% confidence level, the Type \( T_p \) value = 1.96
- The margin of error is 4\% or 0.04
- Applying the formula \( n = \frac{z^2pq}{i^2} \) gives a sample of 600 people.

**Target to be surveyed by municipality**

Once the sample has been obtained, it is a question of finding the number of people to be surveyed per municipality. This is obtained according to the weight of each municipality.

In this case, the investigation is taking place in the administrative centers for security reasons. Thus, the sample is calculated from existing data on the localities concerned. The latest existing data on the Diffa region are those for 2017 from the statistical yearbook of the Diffa region provided by l'Institut National de Statistiques (INS).
Projections are made from 2017 to 2021 to have the size of the population and then the number of people to be surveyed per municipality according to the weight of the latter when it was established.

### Table 1: Population to be surveyed by commune capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commune</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>population2</th>
<th>échantillon</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosso</td>
<td>4767</td>
<td>5728</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chétimari</td>
<td>1518</td>
<td>1824</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffa</td>
<td>39,960</td>
<td>48,019</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goudoumaria</td>
<td>4647</td>
<td>5584</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gueskérou</td>
<td>2414</td>
<td>2901</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kablewa</td>
<td>2537</td>
<td>3049</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainé</td>
<td>13,136</td>
<td>15,785</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N’Guigmi</td>
<td>23,670</td>
<td>28,444</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toundou</td>
<td>6742</td>
<td>8102</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99,391</td>
<td>119,436</td>
<td>600</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The population size in 2021 is obtained by applying the region's growth rate of 4.7% (according to INS data, this figure is uniform over the Diffa region) multiplied by the number of years.

### Sample of defectors surveyed

- For the Goudoumaria camp, given the low number of returnees, the method adopted is that of exhaustiveness. Any repentant who accepted has been questioned.
- For the defectors of the city of Diffa, the method is that of the accidental in a time interval. After identifying the area where the defectors are, the team went there for a day to interview the defectors.

### Data collection techniques

#### Collection tools

The data collection tools fell into two categories: questionnaires and the interview guide.

The questionnaire was administered to the populations and defectors. The interview guide was administered to community leaders (canton, village, and neighborhood chiefs) and communal authorities.

The survey was conducted on a smartphone or tablet using the Kobo Collect app. For this, the tools were digitized and programmed on the Kobo server to ensure day-to-day data collection and quality assurance.

#### Tools validation

After developing all the collection tools, the consultant presented them to the experts at Search for Common Ground. Amendments were requested during this exercise and corrections were incorporated to perfect the tools. The validated versions were shared with Search before the interviewer training and pre-test phase in the field.
Recruitment and training of enumerators

The investigators who were recruited to collect the data in the field are mainly young students from the Diffa region with a minimum bac + 3 level. A total of 10 interviewers were recruited, including 4 women, considering the understanding of the local language of the target groups per municipality and their experience in the field. The recruitment was purely strategic, as the investigators were recruited in the localities directly concerned or if this was not possible in the nearest locality.

The training first involved the supervisors who were trained on the questionnaires and briefed on the objective of the evaluation and the expected results. This first phase also concerned the translation of the questionnaire into Kanouri and Hausa. Supervisors had to get a good understanding and then train the teams. This training lasted two days. The first day of training was on the questionnaire and the second day was reserved for the test. From there, adjustments were made, and the supervisors briefed the investigators.

The investigators were divided into 4 teams, each of them works mainly in the locality where they come from.

Data collection

To reach the targets, the random method was used. Once the investigators team visited the commune's capital, each member of the team took a random direction and interviewed every person over the age of 15 they met.

To collect qualitative data, interviews were conducted with the authorities of the municipalities which the teams visited. The General Secretary of the governorate, the prefect, the defectors center director, radio hosts, kiosk holders, defectors leaders and ex-prisoners were also interviewed. These meetings made it possible to collect important additional information to analyze and interpret the quantitative data.

Search also provided the consultant with extensive video and audio resources to provide an overview of the material that was released to the public.

The consultant also went to the Planning Department to obtain population data and thus compare its projections and verify its sampling.

Data processing, analysis, and reporting

The data extracted from smartphones and the Kobo Collect app was then processed using SPSS and Excel software.

Limitations

The collection initially scheduled for February 17 had undergone some changes due to the election situation and the security situation. It was extended until February 27, 2021.

Election period

The data collection phase coincided with the second round of the presidential elections, a difficult period for interviews with the authorities, the latter being very busy: administrative procedures, personal campaigns (some resign to be able to give themselves full time). The interviews were therefore not fruitful, the respondents being too preoccupied to be able to make clear analyzes of the project. The quality of the responses was not as expected.
_security situation_

The period during which the data collection was to take place was also marked by an upsurge in attacks of Boko Haram. The security incidents affected the morale of the team, mainly investigators from the region. It was therefore necessary to be extra careful and move forward according to their intuition and according to the gathered information from their close residents in the localities to be investigated.

**Sociodemographic characteristics of respondents**

**Repentant respondents**

The evaluation planned to interview repentant people, a sensitive target in the sense that it raised many questions in terms of the methodology used to reach it. The information available on the issue indicated two locations where it was possible to survey repentant individuals. The Goudoumaria repentant camp and the town of Diffa, where the large majority of repentant individuals from the center who had been reintegrated had returned for security reasons.

In the case of the Goudoumaria camp, all the repentant individuals who agreed to respond were interviewed, and in the case of the town of Diffa, the chief of the repentant was approached initially and asked to mobilize all of them for a day so that the team could interview them. And finally, at random, a repentant was interviewed in the town of N’guigmi.

A total of 76 defectors were interviewed: 39 defectors in the city of Diffa, the Awaridi district, 36 in the Goudoumaria camp and finally 1 repentant in the town of N’guigmi.

*Table 2: Number of returnees interviewed by location and sex*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Diffa</th>
<th>Goudoumaria</th>
<th>N’guigmi</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>76</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

76 defectors were interviewed in total across the study, including 7 women and 69 men. The number of women in the repentant sample is very low. As a result, it will therefore not be necessary to desegregate the graphics by gender. In the Goudoumaria camp, generally the women are the ones who have followed their husbands, and outside it is the methodology and the refusals that have not made it possible to meet more women.

The ages are diverse, but overall, the repentant population surveyed is young. We note that 82% of returnees are under 32 years old, and 97% of defectors are under 40 years old. The age of the defectors interviewed is representative of the reality, because according to one of the authorities in the region, the Boko Haram fighters are mostly young people.

*Figure 1: Distribution of the defectors population by age group*
Almost three quarters of the defectors surveyed (71%) have a level of Koranic training. Note that 22% of returnees have at least a primary education level and only 8% of them are illiterate.

*Figure 2: Distribution of the population by level of study*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table 3: Population distribution by sex and city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosso</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chétimari</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffa</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goudoumaria</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gueskérou</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabléwa</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maîné-Soroa</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N’guigmi</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Using this random methodology, 660 people responded to the population questionnaire (for a base sample of 600). Women are under-represented in the sample, among other reasons because they are usually inside the house and therefore much more difficult to access. Given that the methodology was established, it was not possible to bias it by changing the protocol or by seeking out women even in their homes. It is also sometimes difficult to reach women who feel that they cannot talk without their husbands being present or sometimes that it is better to talk to their husbands as the head of the household.

The surveyed population is relatively young with 45% of respondents who are between 15 and 30 years old (298 people) and 38% of respondents who are between 30 and 46 years old (254 people).

*Table 3: Distribution of the population by age group*

The surveyed population is young 45% between 15 and 30 years and 38% between 31 and 36 years.

### III. Key Findings

#### A. Project performance against DAC/OECD evaluation criteria

The criteria have given rise to sub-questions which will allow results to be measured. These secondary questions were translated into a more accessible and context-appropriate form for data collection. The criteria for evaluating a project developed by the OECD Development Assistance Committee have been known and applied since 1991.

For this evaluation, the criteria that were established by Search and taken from the TOR are as follows:

1. Relevance
2. Effectiveness and efficiency
3. Effects and impacts
4. Sustainability
**Relevance**

Relevance is the extent to which the project objectives respond to the problem identified or the actual need. The aim is to assess the impact of the project on the disengagement of the defectors from Boko Haram.

As part of the *outstretched hand policy* and to achieve lasting peace, it was necessary to urge the elements of Boko Haram to lay down their arms and return. Then, it was necessary to facilitate their reintegration into their base communities or into those they chose with the acceptance of all.

And the project implemented by Search has, in view of the figures and all the authorities interviewed, had an impact on the return of BH fighters.

As for reintegration, it depended on many parameters, because a de-radicalization program was needed, public awareness-raising and reintegration support. In addition, many partners engaged in the process by not always respecting their commitments, which impacted the effectiveness of the project and marked the memory of the defectors and the population in a negative way.

The project enabled efficient transmission of the message on surrender and thus the disengagement of Boko Haram fighters. The effectiveness of the project is therefore proven because it achieved its objective by promoting the surrender of Boko Haram fighters.

*How did the project contribute to the disengagement of Boko Haram ex-combatants who are currently reintegrated into the communities?*

The *Jandeniyo* project contributed to disengagement by supporting government efforts through communication. Search has developed several messages disseminated through different channels to reach the BH fighters deep in the forest in which they are established. The channels used are radio (ORTN, Anfani), social networks, awareness raising. Sketches were also produced, and videos were broadcast through kiosks.

The project enabled the disengagement of the defectors by sending them the message of *the outstretched hand policy*. **86% of repentant respondents say they have seen a message and 45% of them have seen at least two messages.** This message is that if they agree to lay down their arms and come back, they will not be criminalized but on the contrary, they will be accompanied and reinstated. **The message ensured two-thirds of the defectors (62%) to have the insurance that there was a way back and 66% of them declared that the message made them leave Boko Haram.** The message prompted additional feedback, as more than half of them (57%) said they knew other BH people who came back because of the message. The data thus reveal an important reception of the message by the defectors but also show that this message had an impact on the disengagement of the defectors.
Did the veterans disengage because they heard or saw one of our messages? If so, what message? Why did this message motivate the fighter to disengage?

In total, more than a 100 audio and video products have been developed. There is not a particular message that caught the attention of people especially since they cannot tell if all are from Search or not. However, the evaluator team asked the content of the messages heard and it was possible to identify several themes:

- Calls for surrender: "lay down arms", "stop violence", "fighters can come back and lay down their arms", "quit extremism",
- Awareness of peace: "messages on social cohesion", "Seeking peace with the population",
- Forgiveness and acceptance of defectors: "forgiveness", "To welcome those who want to lay down their arms", "Reconciliation and forgiveness", 
- The reintegration of the defectors: "The ex-combatants of BH can return to the city to work various types of jobs", "We will find them work", "The defectors will have vocational training".

The channels that have been the most effective in this transmission are social networks and leaflets dropped from planes into the lakebed.

The leaflets, which are paper messages, were dropped by military operations in the lakebed. The SDF's collaboration was obtained by the US State Department, which was able to negotiate that the military radio broadcast messages and that the planes could drop the photos as they passed. This very original and interesting strategy has had real success. On the one hand, it allowed the fighters to get the message. On the other hand, the implementation of this operation by the military reveals that they have adhered to the project.

The other two most used channels are radio (20%) and video (14%). The defectors say they picked up the papers (they call it paper or photo) or heard the radio or their relatives told them. A repentant said it was his father who informed him.
The videos are delivered through kiosks which are infrastructure that already existed in cities and which Search relied on for the distribution of video material through a paid contract. The kiosk managers had to transmit the videos to the users when they came to buy movies, audio clips, video games or other.

Respondents say the message came to reinforce the decision they had already made to leave Boko Haram, as they realized the wrong choice they had made, and that Boko Haram was not what they had hoped.

The defectors argued that surrendering always carries a real risk for each person, because Boko Haram's command was very knowledgeable and still is. It emerged from the interviews that the chiefs were following very closely the policies put in place by the government and the actions resulting from them. Thus, the leaflet posed a risk for whoever ventured to pick it up and keep it on his person. Likewise, some defectors have revealed that they were banned from using the radio after the chiefs picked up the surrender messages over the radio, and others said they were deprived of cell phones. These testimonies show that Boko Haram automatically adapted to prevent their members from leaving. Despite these methods of detention, the defectors all say they knowingly took the risk of leaving and being killed if caught.

The "conflict sensitive" aspect of certain channels such as radio or messages cannot compete with their effectiveness. They are the way out for those who had decided to leave at the risk of dying. One can even say that the message was lifesaving as the people who had decided to leave had done it at the risk of their life without knowing where to go, and thanks to the message they could be guided.

The messages, for those who got them, convinced them to leave because they assured that there was a way for surrender and even reintegration. The messages were a determining motivation in the choice to surrender, as they suggested that there was life after Boko Haram and that the returnees were entitled to a second chance.

**Did the messages clarify the defection process and give the fighter assurance that there was a path of defection and reintegration for him?**

The message clarified the process and provided assurance of surrender

The communication made by Search around the surrender program was relevant because three quarters of the defectors (75%) replied that the message was useful to them. This relevance is confirmed by the fact that more than 62% of respondents say they have a better understanding of the process because of the message. In addition, the interviews with the returnees revealed that the returnees particularly appreciated the clarity of the message regarding the possibility offered to them to lay down their arms. Some say they had heard of the possibility of surrender before but had doubts. Search's message convinced them of the veracity of this possibility.

*Figure 5: Distribution of the following defectors whether they think the message was useful or not*
The message clarified and reassured defectors of the reintegration process. In addition, the message clarified and facilitated the reintegration process. For example, 67% of defectors say that the message gave them a better understanding of the reintegration process and 66% of them say that the message gave them confidence on a path to reintegration.

Did community members contact combatants after hearing or seeing our messages to encourage them to defect?

Families in the community who have members at Boko Haram contacted them to let them know of the outstretched hand policy of the government. There is the example of a repentant who said that it was his father who gave him the information. However, the community is very discreet about passing the messages on to members of BH so that they return or surrender. As the subject is sensitive, they are afraid of being targeted as having links or relations with Boko Haram in a negative sense. However, 20% of community respondents say they know someone who said they heard the messages while on BH's side, and 21% of respondents say they know former Boko Haram combatants who said the messages got them back.

These data show that community members know that the message was disseminated to Boko Haram fighters either through them or through some other means. Likewise, the study also shows that community members spread the messages around them and shared them with loved ones. Also, on the question of which channel community members received the messages, the answers are often: "By word of mouth", "by the neighbors", "by the people of the city", etc. These responses demonstrate that those affected are effectively disseminating the message by speaking about or spreading it.

These data also indicate that community members can spread the message to combatants when it comes to their loved ones, although respondents did not make this clear due to the sensitivity of the question.

The activities that should be maintained, added or adjusted
The radio and leaflet messages are to be maintained. The dropping of the messages on the lakebed made it possible to reach a significant number of defectors so it must be maintained despite the sensitivity of this approach. The BH members wanting to surrender know what risks they are taking and when it comes to messages, they just need the phone number so they will know how to memorize it.

Awareness should be conducted among community members to promote surrender, acceptance, and reinstatement of defectors. This action was suggested by many interviewees within the community to increase the effectiveness of surrender and reintegration. This awareness could be targeted in order to increase the impact of the messages on specific groups such as women or young people.

The kiosks are to be abandoned. Their messages are considered quite clear and the initiative was appreciated in the Search kiosk monitoring report but today the radio messages already exist, and it is better to find a free way of animation and follow-up to ensure that the messages continue to be broadcasted. For this, it is necessary to rely on resource persons and other existing mechanisms.

**Why have stakeholders and leaders calling for reintegration messages been effective and disseminated appropriately?**

The messages appear to have given people hope that there can be peace if the combatants surrender and are reintegrated into the communities. As one of the respondents indicates when asked about the reasons for the usefulness of the message, he replies “we want peace in our country.” The outstretched hand policy of the government gave hope that it was possible to consider a resolution of the conflict other than through military approaches. This possibility of putting an end to the conflict peacefully and of considering a return to social cohesion were put forward by several members of the community to justify the usefulness of the messages. These arguments were decisive evidence in the effectiveness of the messages.

From another perspective, the messages also convinced the combatants to surrender specifically by offering them the possibility of reintegration. Here again, the possibility of peaceful reintegration has been a determining factor in the effectiveness of messages to combatants.

The messages were disseminated appropriately because the channels used made it possible to reach a large audience including radio and social networks and leaflets. Despite the methods Boko Haram used to prevent its members from gaining access to the messages, they still reached the fighters.

- **Effectiveness and efficiency**

**What is the level of achievement of the project performance indicators after the implementation of the activities?**

See tables 5 and 6 below.

**What worked in the project and what do we want to remember? Which messages have been most helpful in disengaging young people from violent groups and why?**

The community respondents know how to explain the sketches, or the scenes described in the videos. They know how to convey the message of sensitization. The sketches thus have a clear effect on respondents, who recall being portrayed as a boy who is between two choices: life in Boko Haram leading to death and life in surrender.
The effectiveness of the messages comes from the fact that they offer a solution to end the crisis and return to peace. Also, the effectiveness results from the fact that the project made it possible to reach the members of BH directly.

The defectors, on the other hand, rather keep in mind the leaflets, and the promises to help them when they return. On the leaflets, Search did not display its logo or name, but it did everything on behalf of the state, in particular to be able to protect its employees in the event of reprisals. Although respondents attribute the messages to the state, they were produced by Search.

The promises are those of the government to allow the repentant to return and to help them reintegrate by supporting them, by allowing them to access jobs. *Jandeniyo* comes to support a government policy and there are promises of deradicalization and reintegration. It is promised that they will learn a trade, and that they will be helped to reintegrate.

The evaluation was unable to detect the most useful messages because the recall is quite confusing among those interviewed. This does not affect the effectiveness of the project, because despite a somewhat vague memory they remember the message and how it is implemented. The effectiveness comes from the fact that the message was understood clearly and that it promoted social cohesion and peace and facilitated reintegration. Respondents saw several messages and it should be noted that there were more than a hundred messages shared.

However, the sketches, the paper messages: the leaflets dropped in the lake and the radio. These three sources were the most mentioned by the repentant respondents.

**To what extent has gender been considered in the implementation of the project? Where has it not been considered or integrated and why not? What could be done in the future to better integrate gender in similar projects?**

*Figure 6: Distribution of defectors according to whether they believe that women are considered in the messages.*

Male and female respondents answered yes to the question "Were women included in the messages?" 91% say they are considered.
For the improvement of the project, the respondents propose to sensitize the men so that they in turn sensitize the women. This strategy aims to reach women in the households, because the problem is that they are usually in the houses, which is why there is less impact on them.

**What went wrong in the implementation of the activities, despite the adaptations made, and what lessons can we learn for future projects?**

Certain dysfunctions were highlighted, at the level of collaboration with the media. The TV and Radio partners mentioned payment delays that impacted the broadcast of messages in the sense that they were not broadcasted at the time requested but at the time of payments. The recommendation is to ensure the direct payment of services to avoid delays.

**Has the relationship between execution time and level of budget consumption been balanced? If not, why, and what corrective actions are necessary for better performance in the implementation of future projects? To what extent have the financial, human, and material resources been sufficient (quantity) and adequate (quality) in relation to the expected results?**

The relationship between execution time and the level of budget consumption was balanced. Respondents are unanimous on the fact that the dissemination of messages must be stepped up to reach even more people.

Respondents did not make any suggestions for improvement regarding the quality of activities. They believe that the activities are well designed, the radio messages are understandable, the videos and sketches also in the sense that they clearly explain the choice that arises between life at BH and returning to the community. They manage to describe certain scenes and the message that is conveyed, in addition they believe that the sketches are made by young people and that the main ones concerned are precisely the young people.

On how to improve the project, an important answer that comes up, both in the survey and in the interviews, concerns keeping promises made to repentant individuals. The difficulties experienced by the members of the first wave of defectors through the consequent delay in the implementation of the de-radicalization program and the exit of ex-BH from the camp strongly impacted the project. These difficulties led to the other members of BH who wanted to return, losing confidence, and thinking that this was a trap and that their friends were ultimately prisoners. Members of this first wave of repentance said they discouraged anyone left behind from following them because of this delay.

The number of activities carried out in one year on the project is impressive. About a hundred prepared sketch videos, a basic study, the leaflets dropped in the lakebed, plus the kiosks, especially on a budget that is not that high.

Interviews with project managers revealed that the planned objectives were achieved, and the project was extended twice. The project enjoys broad positive reviews at all levels. It is an indicator of success and efficiency.

**Measuring the effectiveness of the project**

*Table 5: Achievements of the project in terms of outputs*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Intended Completion Date/ Milestone</th>
<th>Actual Completion Date/ Milestone</th>
<th>% met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Video clips</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>131%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special edition clips</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>106%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Leaflets produced | 10,000 | 40,000 | 385%
--- | --- | --- | ---
Audio clips | 46 | 140 | 165%
Mixed format radio programs | 40 | 108 | 225%
Bluetooth & Social Media sharing Group meetings | 30 | 75 | 183%
Videos shared on Search and partner social media networks | 54 | 74 | 124%
Videos/audios provided through 24 distribution depots | 54 | 170 | 314%
Audio clips shared on Search and partner social media networks | 46 | 39 | 85%
Mixed format radio programs broadcasted through 8 community radio stations | 40 | 108 | 225%
Leaflets distributed | 10,000 | 38,500 | 385%
Discussion platforms | 2 | 2 | 100%

Measuring the efficiency of the project

Table 6: Detailed analysis of efficiency in relation to the use of USD resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projected Expenses</th>
<th>Actual Expenses</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>244,815.9</td>
<td>198,100.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fringe Benefits</td>
<td>64,632.89</td>
<td>59,759.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>69,358.06</td>
<td>54,719.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>10,032.81</td>
<td>2,824.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies</td>
<td>20,305.23</td>
<td>10,313.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractual</td>
<td>4,495.54</td>
<td>1,686.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Direct Costs</td>
<td>207,674.79</td>
<td>184,078.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Direct charges</td>
<td>621,315.2</td>
<td>511,482.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Indirect costs</td>
<td>147,363.29</td>
<td>120,249.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Project Cost</td>
<td>768,678.48</td>
<td>631,732.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,158,672.19</td>
<td>1,774,946.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The level of implementation of activities was reached at 100% at least, and target were exceeded most of the time. For leaflets, the achievement rate is 385% and for radio programs, the achievement rate is 225% and for both expenses, costs did not reach the budget forecasts; they are always below. On the whole project, 82% of the forecasted budget was spent. In terms of efficiency, Jandeniyo is an example, exceeding expectations with fewer resources mobilized than expected.

- **Project effects/impacts**

**What is the collective impact of this program on social cohesion?**

The message had a positive effect, as it improved rapport and the perception that both parties (repentant and community members) had of each other. 86% of returnees believe the message has contributed to improving relations between ex-Boko Haram combatants and the population. And 62% of the population
believes that the radio and video messages have helped to improve relations between the defectors and themselves. In Diffa, one of the respondents said: “Because of this awareness, the degree of hatred has greatly decreased between the population and the repentant individuals.” The messages therefore made it possible to pacify relations between the repentant individuals and the population.

The two parties have maintained relations of peace and they have established a peaceful coexistence. According to the information we were able to obtain from the various stakeholders in the study (authorities, population, repentant individuals), no negative incident was recorded.

Although the population say they have forgiven and accepted the defectors, there remains a mistrust and a fear that is due to trauma and the fact that the members of the community fear that the defectors will go back to Boko Haram or that history will repeat itself.

Figure 7: Distribution of defectors according to whether the reinstatement went well

91% of reinstated returnees surveyed say that the reinstatement went well. They feel that it went well because they were greeted peacefully by the population and there were no conflicts. Reintegration is assessed through the conditions of settlement and relations with the population. The defectors believe majorly that they were well received and thus justify their good reinstatement. However, although the reintegration went well for most defectors, there are about twenty who have returned to their home. This was due to the difficult conditions of the reintegration: “The state did not keep the promises and it was difficult that is why some left” replied a repentant, another said: “Yes today we could go back to the camp we will go back there at least we were taken care of, here we have no work.” For a small part, the difficult condition of life discourages them.

What are the changes induced by the dissemination and sharing of reintegration messages on the knowledge, perception, behaviors, speeches, and habits of participants at the community and institutional level?

The population is tired of the conflict, the restrictions of the state of emergency, eager to see their children return, and wait for the state to find a solution in favor of social cohesion. The qualitative survey and questionnaire revealed that people say they accept reintegration because it can bring peace and because they obey state orders.
The rhetoric that often comes up is: if the state asks us to accept them, let’s accept them “or if it helps bring peace, we are ready to forgive them.”

Overall, the reinstatement of the defectors has been well received by the population. 58% of respondents state that there has been a reintegration in the neighborhood and 66% of them consider that the reinstatement went well. They have no difficulty with the defectors, there has been no problem. The latter say that no case of conflict or reprisals has been recorded following the reintegation of defectors and ex-detainees of Boko Haram. According to these responses, the sensitization messages on the reintegration process facilitated this acceptance, because they explained the need for such a process for peace and stability in the region.

The message has brought about a change in the way people see repentant individuals. A respondent from N’Guigmi said: “the messages have made people not hate ex-combatants from BH” and a respondent from Diffa said: “Without these messages, the population will never be able to understand that the ex-combatants of BH are our brothers.”

According to the respondents, there was an acceptance of the defectors because of the messages. The messages prompted members of the community to consider living with the repentants as the experience of this inhabitant: “Thanks to the messages we have understood that we can live with them.”

There is still a background of mistrust because the repentant is perceived through his membership in Boko Haram and the population does not forget the past of the individual. According to one of the authorities questioned: “We have one in Bosso, he is seen and known by everyone. We don’t have a problem but until today people are a little worried because they are afraid he will return again.” Likewise, mention was made of individuals in N’guigmi, Bosso or Maine Soroa who are known to all and whom people are suspicious of but who live in society.

Figure 8: Proportion of the surveyed population indicating that there are integrated ex-BHs in their neighborhood

Figure 9: Proportion of the surveyed population who consider that the integration went well or not

There was no new phenomenon observed. There were no effects that were not anticipated by the project. Jandeniyo undeniably favored the reintegration of the defectors because the messages made it possible to modify the perception of the populations by making them consider living with the defectors. It achieved its objective which was to support the reintegration process and the peaceful return of Boko Haram ex-
combatants to the communities of the Diffa zone through appropriate communication and information sharing mechanisms empowering communities at the heart, and the disengagement of young people recruited into violent groups.

However, the successful reintegration of defectors also results from the actions of all the partners, namely the messages disseminated within the framework of the project, the sensitizations made by the authorities, and the de-radicalization carried out in the camp. This shows the interdependence of the projects and should lead the partners to improve their collaboration and seek the external coherence of their public policies.

- **Impact on the perception of the authorities**

  Figure 10: Distribution of defectors depending on whether the message changed the vision with the authorities

The messages helped change the views that the repentant individuals had of authority that had until then been seen as vengeful and ruthless. One repentant said “I thought when we came back, we were going to be executed.” The defectors perceived the authorities in the region through the fighting between the Defense and Security Forces and BH. After the message, the repentant perceives the authority as understanding, forgiving, and reaching out. This new image reassured the ex-combatants of BH that they could return, have a peaceful future, and enjoy forgiveness and reintegratio
What are the messages calling for reintegration and peace that have helped change the perception of the community and of the deserters?

The populations answer that it is the sensitizations and the sketches that have enabled them to better understand and accept.

Were there any unexpected results (positive and / or negative) related to the implementation of this project? What do we see emerging that we did not anticipate?

There were no unexpected results.

• Sustainability

What is the basis for the sustainability of the project outputs (structures, knowledge, skills, relationships)? What will be left after project implementation according to stakeholders and affected communities?

The project is sustainable when after its completion one can still use its results. At the end of the project what is left? Radio programs, videos, pictures that were created remain sustainable communication tools that can be used beyond the end of the project. Defectors who successfully reintegrated demonstrate the sustainability the actions put in place in order to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants. Their experiences of forgiveness and reintegration demonstrate the potential sustainable effects of the program.

Jandeniyo was intended to support the outreach policy through communication and to incite BH fighters to surrender. And it did work, as Search leveraged its audacity to achieve the result. It implemented this program maximizing human and financial resources and leveraging most of the channels available to facilitate the success of the communication program.

Within this, it is a question of looking at the sustainability of the improvements made by the project. It is not easy to calculate how long the memory of the communication made by Search will remain, but the results achieved have the potential for long-lasting effects.

Today, the number of returnees, which stands at 36 people in the center, is perceived as largely insufficient when looking at the scale of the issue. This raises questions about the low number of returns. It emerged from the interviews that this is not necessarily linked to issues related to the communication campaign, but rather to the time that the first group of repentant individuals spent in the camp, which was taken as a treason. The repentant individuals, who came in good faith, finally thought that they were in prison and informed their brothers who wanted to surrender. More and more, the repentance issue is problematic because BH members do not surrender, and the center lacks funding. At the time of the evaluation, the authorities pointed out the importance of the center for building a sustainable peace.

As Search is associated with the image of the center and the support for repentant individuals, even though the activities have been appreciated by all the stakeholders, they blame Search for its departure and thus blame it for the failure of the reintegration process: “You have abandoned the center and the repentant individuals” are generally the first remarks that come up during interviews with the authorities. This just shows the image they had of the management of the issue of the repentant, which according to them was done by Search rather than the state.
The Director of the Center said: “since the withdrawal of Search, we have had great difficulty in continuing the programs, de-radicalization is no longer taking place, there are many things missing, and it is therefore even a risk for the company’s future if we cannot perform certain essential activities.” These comments show that Search's support is important and that the authorities want it to continue.

To what extent did each target category (communities and deserters) feel fully involved in the implementation of project activities? What made it easier?

The community felt involved because the issue of reintegration concerned them, and they had to accept and understand the return of the repentants. They were sensitized and had the opportunity to speak out. It was their leaders who were specifically involved in the project, they are people they know.

They were also called upon because they were asked to deliver the messages and video to whoever needed them. Respondents, although shy on the question because they are afraid to say that they are in contact with defectors, still said they pass the message on or speak about it to those close to them. An example is of this repentant who declared that it was his father who informed him.

What was missing and could be reinforced? What is the degree of institutionalization of approaches, tools and ownership by local authorities and state institutions? To what extent have they adopted the Common Ground approach?

The authorities collaborated on the project, but they also followed it closely especially as they realized that the messages had really had an impact on the surrender of the fighters of BH. The authorities are the first to receive the combatants wishing to surrender so during the interrogations they seek information on the person but above all they try to determine whether it is a real or a false repentance. During these interviews, the authorities noted that the ex-combatants returned when the message of the outstretched hand had reached them and had given them reassurance. The Director of the Center himself said “I was surprised at the number of defectors who told me that it was on a picture that the plane threw that they found the number or called to come back.”

Based on this observation, the authorities understood the importance of communication and awareness. Thus, a lot of awareness raising is done at the level of town halls according to the open responses of the respondents.

What factors (internal and external) hinder the sustainability of the project's achievements?

Today the project has come to a halt because its funding has ended. It is necessary to be able to continue the initiative to consolidate the gains. The conflict is still rife, and the state still needs the help of partners in the fight against insecurity and the Jandeniyo project has proven to be an effective part of the solution.

What opportunities are available to us? (Culture, actors, institutions, social standards, laws,) What are the lessons learned and the recommendations to strengthen the sustainability of the achievements of the project?

Assets and communication products can be reused. There are about a hundred sketches that can continue to be broadcast as much as possible, as the topics they cover remain relevant.

Was there a diffusion / replication / intersection effect? Were other actors inspired by this project?

We did not get the information during the interviews, nor did the authorities claim to have another partner supporting them for the same activities Search was carrying out.
B. Analysis of project performance regarding result indicators

This project includes a logical framework with results indicators for which target, and reference values have been set. Each result indicator of the project was calculated on the basis of the survey questionnaire carried out on the general population, including defectors and ex-prisoners at the level of each municipality. The following analysis concerns the values achieved for each of these indicators. The four indicators that will be informed are the reach of the beneficiaries through the messages disseminated, the understanding of the messages by the community and by the defectors, the propensity of the members of the community to accept the return of the defectors and finally the disposition of the members of the community to collaborate professionally and socially with the returnees.

Table 7: Summary of indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Repented (reintegrated or in the Goudoumaria camp)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of members who have seen or heard Search messages</td>
<td>88 %</td>
<td>86 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of members who claim to have a better understanding of the process of reintegration and peaceful reintegra- tion of defectors</td>
<td>41 %</td>
<td>62 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of community members with increased, accurate and up-to-date information that encourages current Boko Haram/ISIS WA fighters to disengage</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of community members willing to accept the return of (future) ex-combatants to their communities</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Reaching beneficiaries through the messages disseminated

The first indicator is that of the impact of messages, specifically related to the outstretched hand policy. Through the quantitative survey, the aim is to find the proportion of community members and returnees who declared having received the message but also the channel through which they received the messages and finally the frequency with which they received the messages.

Figure 11: Distribution of the population according to whether they saw or heard the messages
During the survey among the defectors a woman declared: “the message said to return to Niger that we will be well received” and another resident of the camp of the defectors declared: “the messages speak of laying down their arms and coming back and the state will help us to reintegrate into the population.”

The messages hit their target, as a large majority of returnees (86% of them) say they have heard or seen an awareness message from Search.

Communication campaigns were more effective as 74% of repentant individuals saw and heard the message while at Boko Haram camps. The authorities also affirmed that during the interrogations with the defectors, they affirm to have seen a message of Search when they were with BH either by the radio or by “the photos dropped by the planes.” The data are also corroborated by the testimony of the repentant Moustapha during the capitalization workshop of December 3, 2020 (It could be interesting to give it again in the evaluation, since it is complete as to the impact of the messages on the and reinstatement).

“Some of my friends and I learned about the surrender program from the leaflets dropped by the defense and security forces on the lakebed. These leaflets were written in French, in a language we did not understand. That’s why when we had them, we took them to our leaders who could read. But having read the content of the messages, they immediately burned all the leaflets brought by the combatants. They even planned to kill anyone found in possession of these flyers. Fortunately, my friends and I had managed to find out about the content. Afterwards, one day I left with my two wives and my children to surrender to the authorities. This was done after four days of walking to arrive at the water's edge to cross again and arrive at Toumour. We were transported to Diffa where we spent five months in detention before being transferred to the Goudoumouria center. Through the training received, we quickly forgot everything related to Boko Haram. After leaving the center, social reintegration was initially difficult due to mistrust and stigma, but it did not last. Today we mainly suffer from economic difficulties, with no real prospects for activities. Our living conditions are vulnerable and if we could return to the Center, I will not hesitate for a moment because we were well taken care of there ”.

Figure 12: Distribution of repentant according to whether they saw or heard the message when they were at BH.
• **Information channels**

The channels through which most of the returnees have been reached by the messages are social networks and flyers dropped from planes into the lakebed, which in the following table represent “others”. The effectiveness of the flyers has been confirmed by authorities that many returnees said it was through the phone number displayed on the flyers that they were able to return. The other two most effective channels are radio (20%) and video (14%).

*Table 8: Distribution of retirees according to the channel through which they received the message*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channels</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Videos</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other social networks</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other leaflets</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word of mouth</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empty</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>76</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

➢ **Percentage of community members who have seen or heard Search messages**

Like the defectors, a large part of the population heard or saw the messages. The survey revealed that 88% of respondents said they had seen or heard a message about the surrender of ex-combatants in BH across all channels. This high rate confirms the effectiveness of the communication campaign.

*Table 9: Distribution of the surveyed population according to whether they saw or a message on the surrender of the ex-combatants*
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saw or heard a message of the surrender of ex-combatants</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(empty)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

➤ Channels of dissemination

The main channel through which messages have been transmitted is radio. Almost three-quarters of respondents (74%) said they had heard the messages on the radio.

Next, the most effective channels were videos (20%) and social networks (19%). Videos can either be sent through social media or transmitted to residents at the kiosks.

Table 10: Distribution of the surveyed population according to the channel through which they saw or a message on the surrender of ex-combatants

- The impact of kiosks

The kiosks are places where the inhabitants come to buy video content, films, clips, games etc. Search set up agreements with them so that the managers of the kiosks gave the videos free to users by raising their awareness so that they too can share them.

The evaluation also made it possible to question the activity of the kiosks as to whether they broadcast video messages and the reports of the population within the vicinity of these kiosks. The question of the proximity of the kiosk should allow us to analyze whether the distance from a kiosk influenced the rate of reception of messages. Video messages, which represent 20% of messages received, or the second message transmission channel, are directly linked to the Kiosks.

Despite the proximity of a kiosk, there is low attendance. Although more than half of respondents (58%) said they live near a kiosk, only 36% frequent them and 36% go to the Kiosk to look for videos.

This had to be compared with the figure from the kiosk monitoring study carried out by Search itself, which gave the following results:
The audio and video messages shared initially, and the mechanism set up by the Jandeniyo project to make information accessible and improve the understanding of the population on the reintegration process is effective. As proof, several variants of the social strata of the Diffa region regularly come to collect this media content to stay informed about the reintegration process and to engage in the search for stability in the Diffa region. Considering the contents of these messages, users find that the project's strategy of addressing such a sensitive subject is necessary for the population to focus on actions contributing to peace. Most respondents strongly agree that upholding the call to lay down arms in favor of reintegration could trigger the disengagement of violent groups. And for this, many claimed to have shared these messages on social networks because they believe it is an effective way that would allow members of armed groups to lay down their arms.

Youth interviewed and even team members said they went to the kiosks, but not frequently. “It depends on what I’m looking for and if I’m sure I’ll find it there because they don’t often have new stuff,” said one of the respondents from Diffa City.

In addition, it should be noted that only one fifth of respondents said that the kiosk had transmitted a video to them (21%), showing that the transmission of messages at the kiosk level is not systematic. This figure raised questions as to why the transmission was not done. But kiosk owners say that they transmit the videos when the team passes the videos to them.

- **Percentage of community members and deserters who claim to have a better understanding of the process of reintegration and peaceful reintegration of defectors**

  - **Community members**
    
    42% of community members believe that the message gave them a better understanding of the surrender process of ex-Boko Haram combatants and the reintegration process (41% of respondents). For the most part, they were informed before seeing the message and very often through the awareness campaigns made at the town hall, so they believe that the message was not new.

  - **Defectors**
    
    At the repentant level, more than 6 in 10 (62%) of them say they have a better understanding of the surrender process thanks to the message.
Two-thirds of defectors responded affirmatively with 67% saying that the message helped to better understand the reintegration. The message encouraged the return of the defectors because two-thirds of them indicate that the message gave them the assurance of a path of surrender (62% of defectors) and of a path of reintegration (66% of them).

Moreover, the message was passed on to other Boko Haram fighters, as more than half of the repentants (57%) said they knew other returnees of BH who returned thanks to the message.

"We are still in contact with our brothers who have stayed behind, and we want them to be able to come back if it goes well for us," said one of the returnees from the center.

One of the authorities said: "We know that they still have very close ties to the other side, and we want to use that and their example to be able to bring in the others."

To encourage others to come, the defectors first propose to keep the promises on reinstatement. This response is linked to their experience because several defectors stayed two years in the center. "We thought we were going to be free but at the end we were put in prison in the center" declared one of the defectors. This time, perceived as very long, discouraged all the members who made an act of surrender and those who wanted to do it because they felt trapped and in jail. They suggest stepping up communication and messaging. "Broadcast awareness messages on the radio every day because they listen to the radio and when they come they have to be released in a short time because I repented thinking that I would have a good life but that this is not the case we are still locked in the center we have no freedom" or "By respecting the promises made, saying that we are released three months after our surrender is what allowed us to come back". And finally, “By doing a lot of sensitization and finding a way to pass the information on to women”, are three examples responding to the question on how to inform others of this program.

➢ Percentage of community members willing to accept the return of (future) ex-combatants to their communities

Half of the population (54%) say they accept the resettlement of an ex-BH returnee in their neighborhood.

In the same perspective as reintegration and wishing to go further, the study questioned the propensity of the population to live with ex-combatants of Boko Haram. To better understand the scope of this, the respondents were questioned on the forgiveness they grant to returnees, the acceptance of resettlement and the daily, commercial, and social collaboration with the ex-combatants of Boko Haram. A contradiction on any of these points would mean that the acceptance is not complete.

● Forgiveness

Most of the population forgives the ex-combatants as nearly 90% of the community members say they agree to forgive a former Boko Haram combatant.

When we question the population on the condition on which they would agree to forgive the repentant, they generally answer: "We accept to forgive if they are sincere", "We agree to forgive them if we watch them", "We accept to forgive them. Forgive if they agree to live peacefully with the population".

You can feel the trauma of what happened, they are afraid it will start again but they want to find peace. "If that makes it possible to end this war, we accept what the state offers," one respondent said.
- **Professional and civil collaboration**

The population is particularly ready to undertake a commercial collaboration with the ex-combatants, because 83% of the people questioned say that they agree to work with an ex-combatant of Boko Haram, and 90% of the respondents declare that they would buy a good and service from a Boko Haram ex-combatant.

However, community members seem a little more reserved about day-to-day collaboration and social relations with ex-Boko Haram combatants, both of which require closer proximity between the two parties. In fact, half of the population (54%) declares that they accept the resettlement of an ex BH combatant in their neighborhood, 83% agree to work with an ex BH combatant or to use his services or to buy what he produces, while only 54% of the population would give their child in marriage to an ex-combatant of Boko Haram. The trend is the same in the focus groups and even within the team which is made up only of young people from the region. They accept collaboration in labor and relocation, but on the team only one person would accept marriage. Taken together, these variables show that there is some level of acceptance and sincere forgiveness towards ex-BH combatants.

**Gender analysis**

- **Impact of messages on women**

Far fewer women than men have been affected by the surrender messages of Boko Haram ex-combatants. Only a third of them (32.4%) saw or heard messages about the surrender of ex-Boko Haram combatants (compared to 68% for men). Like men, radio is the channel through which most women have been reached. Then unlike men, the second channel is information transmitted by neighbors ("other" category) and finally the third channel is through social networks.

- **Understanding the process**

Women have taken less ownership of the surrender and reintegation message than men. In both cases, only a third of them indicated that the message gave them a better understanding of the process of surrender of ex-combatants in BH (compared to half of the men). The lower appreciation of the messages by women results from the fact that fewer of them received the message. There were more women who indicated that they did not hear the message about surrender or reinstatement. The reason is that they are in the houses, go out less and attend less sensitizations and the like. What is interesting is that it was the repentants who proposed for improvements that the project should sensitize men to sensitize women at home or find solutions to reach them.

Regarding the relationship between women and authorities, the messages have little impact on the perception and relationship that women have with the authorities. Like men, two-thirds of women believe that the messages have not changed their outlook and relationship with the authorities.

- **Reintegration**

Women are generally more suspicious of defectors than men because they are more affected. During interviews several of them indicated that they had suffered the abduction of their children, the murder of their husbands, or sometimes slaughtered before their eyes. Accounts show that they suffered many traumas. They are also victims of sexual violence because several girls have been kidnapped by BH and sometimes married.

Women who do not forgive the repentant or do not wish to have any relationship with them indicate that they are afraid, that they fear that they will commit new attacks or that they will return to Boko Haram.
Some of the women interviewed highlighted the loss of a loved one, revealing that they were very affected by such events. Others justify their mistrust or refusal to cooperate by saying "They have done us too much harm".

*Figure 14: Perception of repentance by sex of respondent*

Women are more likely to doubt the repentance of ex-Boko Haram combatants than men. More than half of them believe that the repentance of ex-Boko Haram combatants is either questionable or false (compared to 47% of men).

There are slightly more men who agree to forgive a repentant (85.5% of women against 89.1% of men), but overall, more than 8 out of 10 women would agree to forgive a repentant. Some say the violence she suffered is too much for them to forgive. One of them said, “It’s hard to forgive the one who killed my husband for what caused the loss of our income, our dignity and our children were orphaned”.

However, for the women who have a family member or relative among the Boko Haram, they said they can forgive because they want peace and social cohesion again in the region.

Women are slightly less likely than men to accept the resettlement of Boko Haram defectors in their neighborhood (60% of women against 67.5% of men). Women are less willing to work with returnees than men (75.2% against 86.5% of men).

Women are less likely than men to want to buy goods and services from a repentant living in a locality (84.5% against 94.8%).

Almost two-thirds of women would not agree to give up one of their children in marriage to an ex-BH combatant, compared to less than 50% of men.

**IV. Lessons Learned and Best Practices**

On the lessons learned, best practices, and challenges: in the communication program on the reintegration policy for ex-combatants:

1. Communication is an important element in the peaceful resolution of a conflict.
2. Communication is an important means of promoting social cohesion in a context of crisis.

3. Although this is an important part of the ex-combatant surrender process, communication is not enough. The commitments made must also be kept at the risk of having a counterproductive effect on surrender.

4. The messages and the communication codes used which are sent must be simple to be received by the combatants because the latter do not necessarily understand the language used or cannot read.

5. Social networks and mass media can be important communication channels.

6. Innovative solutions like leaflets can be effective communication channels.

V. Conclusions

The evaluation made it possible to report that the Jandeniyo project largely achieved its objectives. In 18 months, Search leveraged audacious and quality tools and approached, which resulted in the production of multiple leaflets, video films, and radio messages, which were particularly effective as demonstrated by the targets achieved.

The Jandeniyo project contributed to disengagement by supporting government efforts through communication. Search has developed several messages disseminated through different channels to reach the BH fighters deep in the forest in which they are established. The channels used are radio (ORTN, Anfani), social networks, and community awareness raising. Sketches were also produced, and videos were broadcast through kiosks.

The effectiveness comes from the fact that the message was understood clearly and that it positively impacted social cohesion, peace and facilitated reintegration.

The project enabled efficient transmission of the message on surrender and thus the disengagement of Boko Haram fighters. 86% of repentant respondents say they have seen a message and 45% of them who have seen at least two messages. This message allowed two-thirds of the returnees (62%) to be confident that there was a way back and 66% of them said the message got them back from Boko Haram.

Three-quarters of repentant respondents (75%) responded that the message was useful to them. This relevance is confirmed by the fact that more than 6 out of 10 repentant respondents (62% of respondents) say they have a better understanding of the process thanks to the message.

The project has achieved its objectives and all the partners are satisfied with it, which is why at the last workshop on the issue organized by Search, the authorities reiterated the need for this initiative to continue for peace in the Diffa region. It is important to be able to support the state in this fight to lay down arms and bring back the children of the motherland.

This project has proven the importance of strategic and relevant multi-media communication campaigns in ending conflict. It must continue in everyone's opinion.
## VI. Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Implementation actions</th>
<th>Actors involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Advocate to mobilize funding for the continuation of the Jandeniyo project.</td>
<td>- Produce a movie on the project's communication strategies and its impact.</td>
<td>Search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Capitalize on strengths and positive results such as leaflets.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Communicate about the project itself to allow different audiences to get to know it.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Coach and collaborate with reintegrated defectors who would like to become ambassadors of peace in their community.</td>
<td>- Target the reinstated returnees to pass on the messages to the BH ex-combatants and the population, always with the aim of reaching additional BH combatants.</td>
<td>Search HACP UNDP UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Promote the history of reinstated defectors. Support them testify so that they can become ambassadors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Promote joint initiatives between defectors and young people from host villages.</td>
<td>- Set up projects involving young people from host communities and defectors working together.</td>
<td>HACP UNDP Search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Support the government in seeking funding to continue its support to reintegration.</td>
<td>- Evaluate the needs for the Goudoumaria center.</td>
<td>Region Governorate Manager of the Goudoumaria center Anti-terrorist cell DRPPF/PE Search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Seek funding for a Phase 2 of the process and continue to encourage the return.</td>
<td>Technical &amp; financial partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Organize a workshop with all partners to discuss needs and ways to raise funds.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Harmonize approaches on repentance and reintegration with other partners.</td>
<td>- Develop harmonized tools for demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration as done in Nigeria with funding from the US.</td>
<td>Search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Encourage the population to disseminate messages calling for surrender.</td>
<td>- Maintain awareness and dissemination of videos and audio messages by radio stations and sharing among groups.</td>
<td>Search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Prioritize communication towards women.</td>
<td>- Reach out to men and encouraging them to go and inform their wives at home.</td>
<td>Search and its implementing partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Carry out awareness campaigns aimed only at young girls and mothers, with women who would visit homes to meet the women there, where they live.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Create women's awareness teams for home awareness raising.</td>
<td>- Reach out to women directly in the household</td>
<td>Search</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 9. Mobilize youth, including by organizing a meeting between Nigerien universities and young Nigerien researchers working in the Diffa region. | • Encourage universities to reflect on the theme of the future of peace and the importance of the reintegration of repentant individuals.  
• Involve young people in the processes very early on so that they feel involved and are actors of peace in their communities. | Search |
|---|---|---|
| 11. Creation of an office of policy coherence. | • Coordinate all actions in the field to avoid inefficiency and give unified directions  
• Collectively assess needs  
• Activity monitoring and evaluation of activities, including production of a quarterly report  
• Control of public action  
• Establishment of awareness raising | Search, Government and its partners |