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<td>Strengthening Accountability for Ethno-Religious Violence</td>
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<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Data Project</td>
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<td>BBFH</td>
<td>Building Bridges between Farmers and Herders</td>
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<td>CAJR</td>
<td>Centre for the Advocacy of Justice and Rights</td>
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<td>CAPP</td>
<td>Community Action for Popular Participation</td>
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<td>LGA</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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<td>PEW</td>
<td>Participatory Early Warning for More Effective Response to Religious Conflict</td>
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<td>PIRV</td>
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<td>PWA</td>
<td>Plateau Will Arise!</td>
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<td>Search</td>
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<td>SGGPB</td>
<td>Security, Good Governance and Peacebuilding</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>YIAVHA</td>
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Acknowledgment

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Executive Summary

A better understanding of peacebuilding cost-effectiveness is essential to the long-term prevention of violent conflict. It can help stakeholders design better interventions targeted to specific conflicts, and enable them to articulate the return on investment associated with peacebuilding, thus ensuring that more resources are directed towards the field.

With most current investigations into the question of cost-effectiveness focusing either on individual programs or on the macro-economic benefits of peace, Search proposes to look at this issue at a different level. Taking Plateau State, Nigeria as a case study, we examine a range of programs to understand how multi-sectoral investments in peacebuilding have influenced patterns and trends in scenarios of conflict. This case study builds on ongoing experimentation with different frameworks for measuring cost-effectiveness, using conflict event data to unpack the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions and identify factors such as peacebuilding models, target groups, and entry points which have the greatest impact on conflict trends. Furthermore, looking at a range of cost data, we begin to quantify the return on investment associated with peacebuilding. We used Benue State as a comparison state to describe alternative scenarios of how violence could have played out in Plateau State if not for specific investments in peacebuilding interventions.

METHODOLOGY

The study is guided by two main research objectives:

1. Identify the peacebuilding approaches, target groups, and entry points which have the greatest effect on the mitigation and prevention of key conflict trends in Plateau State.
2. Quantify the return on investment associated with peacebuilding.

After mapping out responses to conflict in Plateau and Benue State between 2010 and 2020, we selected 8 peacebuilding interventions to create a sample representative of a range of peacebuilding approaches, target groups, and entry points. We used data on conflict events and fatalities from the Armed Conflict Location & Events Data (ACLED)\(^1\) project to analyse variations in conflict trends across the lifecycle of these interventions. By identifying correlations between peacebuilding interventions and variations in conflict trends, we sought to determine which interventions had the greatest impact on the mitigation of violence in Plateau State. We substantiated these quantitative results by reviewing program reports and evaluations, and by conducting Key Informant Interviews (KII) with key program staff, in order to better understand how and why specific interventions impacted conflict trends.

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Key finding #1:
The cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions does not depend on budget size, but rather on the adequate, intentional, and strategic allocation of spending and resources across programmatic activities and needs. Looking at which programmatic factors ensure that peacebuilding interventions have the greatest impact on the mitigation of conflict trends, we found that:

• Interventions which target a limited number of local government areas (LGAs) and communities are more effective than interventions which are more spread out.
• Organizations which maintain a relationship of trust with target communities tend to implement more effective peacebuilding interventions.
• Effective peacebuilding interventions strategically engage with both “more people” (especially through media programming) and “key people”, in a manner that is both inclusive and adaptive to the evolving context of the conflict.
• Interventions which aim to be sustainable also tend to be effective.

Recommendation #1: To achieve cost-effectiveness, impact-hungry practitioners should implement interventions:

• that target a geographical area that is proportionate to available resources, in order to more easily saturate their target stakeholders and beneficiaries through their activities.
• which sustain a relationship of trust with target communities, for instance by promoting local ownership and participatory decision-making.
• that strategically engage with both “more people” and “key people” and intentionally foster inclusivity by making sure they do not only target the “usual suspects” or the easy-to-reach communities. In particular, in highly volatile conflict contexts, peacebuilding interventions should be flexible and adaptive enough to bring in new conflict actors and stakeholders as needs emerge throughout the implementation.
• whose design ensures sustainable impact, for instance through capacity-building and empowerment of target communities, but also through the promotion of vertical cohesion and institutional linkages with local, state, and national authorities.

Recommendation #2: Donors should fund and support these peacebuilding interventions in a way that promotes adaptive management, for instance by supporting cost-extensions and the funding of subsequent project phases. Donors should also promote understanding of cost-effectiveness which goes beyond considerations of costs to emphasize the intentional, strategic allocation of resources towards achieving the greatest impact possible.
Key finding #2:

Peacebuilding has a significant return on investment and reduces the need for aid and humanitarian interventions. Not all peacebuilding interventions are effective - however, well-designed peacebuilding programs can and do prevent violence. As shown by the example of Plateau State which has seen significantly more peacebuilding efforts than Benue State between 2010 and 2020, investing in peacebuilding does have the power to alter scenarios of violence and save hundreds of lives. Moreover, peacebuilding also reduces the need for humanitarian interventions and aid by:

• Preventing displacement and contributing to the return of IDPs to their communities;
• Supporting economic growth and development;
• Mitigating the effect of conflict on access to basic services such as education and medical care.

Recommendation #3: Donors should invest more heavily in peacebuilding and reallocate a portion of current spending on humanitarian aid to peacebuilding efforts, which currently represent only about 2% of total official development assistance (ODA) to conflict-affected countries.

Key finding #3:

The use of conflict event data has great potential for future research on the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding. Conflict event data provided by the ACLED project is a great resource to evaluate and compare the cost-effectiveness of different peacebuilding interventions. While it remains difficult to fully attribute observed conflict trends to a specific intervention, we can at least determine a program’s contribution to these trends by supporting quantitative results with qualitative data from program evaluations and KII’s. This methodology should be tested on a greater sample of peacebuilding interventions to more easily compare different approaches.

Recommendation #4: Academic institutions and other organizations involved in research efforts on the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding should continue to promote the production and collection of more granular data on conflict events, fatalities but also on social cohesion and access to primary services, to better evaluate the impact of peacebuilding on the effects of violence, and not solely on violence itself.

Recommendation #5: Donors should encourage peacebuilding organizations to share their program evaluation and cost data more openly to support more collaborative and more effective research on the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding.
Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, peacebuilders have been involved in a wide range of programmatic efforts, whose aims are two-fold: to end violent conflict, and to build more just societies able to choose cooperative problem-solving over adversarial approaches. While official development assistance (ODA) to conflict-affected countries has globally been on the rise over the past two decades and grown by 26% between 2009 and 2016, spending on conflict prevention and related peacebuilding activities only represents around 2% of all ODA.\(^2\) Despite increasing knowledge and expertise on civilian-led action before, during, and after conflict, the peacebuilding community has not been able to provide relevant, credible, and timely evidence to inform responses to key crises. Interventions from Nigeria to South Sudan saw billions of dollars spent on stabilization efforts by foreign military forces, a mobilization of humanitarian aid, and a top-down intervention by world powers. With few exceptions, peacebuilding experts did not have the ability to use evidence and expertise to influence such interventions. Somewhat paradoxically, escalating levels of global conflict combined with tightening governmental budgets have also placed the peacebuilding community under increased scrutiny from decision-makers, politicians, and donors.

As a result, peacebuilding organizations, donors, and academic researchers alike have increasingly invested in efforts to demonstrate “what works” in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. In particular, the development of more thorough monitoring, evaluation, and learning practices has helped to determine the success of individual interventions\(^3\) and to measure their effectiveness, based on the extent to which their desired outputs and outcomes were achieved. But beyond looking at effectiveness, peacebuilders also need to develop a greater understanding of their intervention’s cost-effectiveness - that is, which programs achieve the greatest impact as compared to the resources they mobilized. Considering the field’s already limited resources, efforts to measure the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions have sometimes been perceived as a threatening diversion of “precious time and money [...] which might expose ineffective spending”.\(^4\) Previous research conducted by Search on this issue has also revealed a misunderstanding of this concept among peacebuilders, in which cost-effectiveness is primarily associated with marginal cost-saving and economy, rather than with a reflection on the relative impact and financial value of different peacebuilding approaches. Yet, a better understanding of peacebuilding cost-effectiveness is essential to the long-term prevention of violent conflict. First, an improved understanding of peacebuilding cost-effectiveness will enable stakeholders in the field to better advocate for donors to spend their money more effectively. It will help them articulate the impact of their interventions on specific conflicts in relation to the resources allocated to support them, and help strengthen the case to direct more resources towards the field of peacebuilding. Second, it will also allow organizations to improve the design

of their interventions, both independently and as part of coalitions, thus creating “a virtuous circle of improved resource allocation leading to better objective results and more funding”. To this day, however, evidence on which types of peacebuilding interventions achieve the greatest return on investment is scarce, principally due to a lack of peacebuilding cost and effectiveness data.

Recent investigations into the question of cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding have primarily looked at this issue at the level of individual programs or from a macro perspective. The latter have focused on evaluating the macro-economic benefits resulting from peacebuilding, to prove that investing in peacebuilding and conflict prevention is a “rational and cost-effective strategy for countries at risk of violence and for the international community”. For instance, the Institute for Economics and Peace developed a global model of the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding and found that “for every dollar invested [from 2016 onwards], the cost of conflict would be reduced by $16 over the long run”, saving US$2.94 trillion in direct and indirect losses from conflict over the course of ten years. Similarly, distinguishing three different scenarios based on differing assumptions on lost GDP growth attributable to conflict, as well as cost and effectiveness of prevention, Muller found that prevention of conflict could save between US$4,828 and US$69,907 million per year.

These findings, however, continue to assume that all peacebuilding interventions both cost the same amount and are equally successful. There is therefore a need to examine “the allocation of resources across different peacebuilding activities” and to compare the cost-effectiveness of individual peacebuilding interventions. This involves at least three main challenges. First, both the external borders of what qualifies as peacebuilding and the internal distinctions between different categories of peacebuilding interventions are still imperfectly defined within the field. Second, even when programs do subscribe to fairly similar categories and approaches, the peacebuilding field lacks a common standard to assess an intervention’s effectiveness. Programs with relatively similar theories of change thus often measure their success based on the achievement of different outcomes. Third, even if the measurement of their desired outcomes was more consistent, a program’s success should not solely be measured based on the realization of these outcomes, but also based on its contribution to peace and conflict trends. Yet, very few program evaluations do actually attempt to assess a program’s impact on the prevention and mitigation of violent conflict.

Based on these observations, Search is examining the question of cost-effectiveness at a different level. Taking Plateau State, Nigeria as a case study, we examine a range of programs to understand how multi-sectoral investments in peacebuilding have influenced patterns and trends in scenarios of conflict. This case study builds on ongoing experimentation with different frameworks for measuring cost-effectiveness, using conflict event

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6 Sheamer S., Courtney A. and Sheinbaum N. Cost-Effectiveness of Peacebuilding.
10 Sheamer S., Courtney A. and Sheinbaum N. Cost-Effectiveness of Peacebuilding, p.7.
12 Sheamer S., Courtney A. and Sheinbaum N. Cost-Effectiveness of Peacebuilding.
data to unpack the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions and identify factors such as peacebuilding models, target groups, and entry points which have the greatest impact on conflict trends. Furthermore, looking at a range of cost data, we begin to quantify the return on investment associated with peacebuilding. This case study generates an initial set of measures for cost-effectiveness and proposes a methodological framework that may be shared, tested and further refined by partners interested in exploring this issue.
Methodology

The purpose of this study is to identify lessons learned about the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions in Plateau State, Nigeria. Rather than examining the question of cost-effectiveness from a macro perspective or at the program level, we use a case study approach in order to provide actionable, practical information that is meaningful and relevant for decision-makers and implementers. The study is guided by two objectives and a set of related key questions:

1. **Identify the peacebuilding approaches, target groups, and entry points which have the greatest effect on the mitigation and prevention of key conflict trends in Plateau State.**
   - What were the key conflict trends and dynamics?
   - What were the key effects of violence on the population (i.e. health consequences, social consequences, economic consequences, etc…)?
   - What were the programmatic interventions?
   - How many lives were saved by location and at specific time periods?
   - Were lives saved correlated with specific types of interventions?
   - Beyond lives saved, was a reduction in the effects of violence correlated with specific types of interventions?

2. **Quantify the return on investment associated with peacebuilding.**
   - How much did the interventions cost? How do decisions on budget allocation impact the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions?
   - If we look at what was prevented in terms of further violence, how much did this reduce the need for humanitarian interventions or other responses?

**CASE STUDY SELECTION**

We selected Plateau State in Nigeria as a case study for this research for a number of reasons. First, cycles of conflict and violence in Nigeria have been well-documented over the past decade, not only at a national and state level but also at a provincial and city level. There are also a number of estimates related to loss of life, internal displacement, and the cost of violence in Nigeria, which can inform our understanding of the return on investment of peacebuilding interventions. Second, members of the international community from the US government to the European Union to UN agencies have made significant investments in Plateau State through large, multi-sectoral programs designed to mitigate violence and build peace. A number of local, state, and national actors have also implemented programs in favour of peace. The wide variety of programs approaches which have been implemented in Plateau State, ranging from rumor management to inclusion of women to
institutional strengthening, allows us to identify programmatic factors which have the greatest effect on the mitigation of key conflict trends.

We selected Benue State as a comparison state for this study, given that it has received significantly less international attention and investments over the last decade. Looking at Benue State will allow us to describe alternative scenarios of how violence could have played out in Plateau State if not for specific investments in peacebuilding interventions.

DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS

Based on an extensive review of published reports, program evaluations, and peer-reviewed articles, we outlined the main conflict dynamics, trends, and effects of violence in Plateau and Benue State. We also mapped out responses to conflict by local, state, national, and international actors in Plateau and Benue State between 2010 and 2020, including peacebuilding programs implemented by Search for Common Ground, other international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

From these, 8 interventions were selected to create a sample representative of a range of peacebuilding approaches, target groups, and entry points. Building partially on a method that was developed and tested by the Frontier Design Group, we had two main criteria for this selection: interventions had to be implemented in a precise area (at the minimum at the Local Government Area (LGA) level) and over a precise time frame. For each of the selected programs, we identified a pre- and post-implementation period of one year before the beginning and after the end of implementation. Using the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), we gathered data on the number and frequency of reported fatalities and conflict events across the life-cycle of the project, covering its pre-implementation, implementation, and post-implementation phase. For these programs whose implementation phase was not equal to a year, results were annualized in order to ensure comparability between phases. We use the generic term “conflict events” to designate an individual instance of political violence. The ACLED project defines political violence as “the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation”, and disaggregates events by data, type of violence, actors, and location. In this study, the term “conflict events” covers five types of events, including battles, explosions and remote violence, violence against civilians, protests, and riots. We did not include conflict events defined as “strategic developments” by the ACLED database. Furthermore, while we take in account ACLED’s recommendations regarding the reliability of fatalities numbers and always used both the number of reported conflict events and fatalities in our analysis, we privilege the number of reported fatalities as the primary indicator of violence throughout this study. We have increased confidence in using reported fatalities as the primary indicators considering that trends in conflict events and fatalities evolved in the same direction in most of our case studies.

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13 See Figure 2 and 4 below.
14 For ACLED’s definition of these types of events, see: https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2019/04/ACLED-Event-Definitions_Final.pdf
15 Strategic developments are defined by ACLED as “non-violent activity by conflict and other agents, such as recruitment, looting and arrests”. As they are not systematically coded and do not represent a significant amount of events in our area and period of interest, we decided not to include this type of event in our analysis. For more information on this, see: https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2019/04/ACLED-Strategic-Developments_FINAL.pdf
We analysed the data both from a static and a dynamic perspective, in order to evaluate the variations in fatalities and conflict events across the lifecycle of the interventions and to identify correlations between peacebuilding interventions and variations in conflict trends. A given program is considered to be effective if fatalities and conflict events decrease during its life cycle. Conversely, a program is considered to be ineffective, or to have limited effectiveness, if fatalities and conflict events increased or remained stable. While we recognize the inherent challenges related to the attribution of observed variations in conflict trends to a given program, which are discussed at length in the following section, we sought to partially address this issue by substantiating quantitative results with qualitative data. We gathered qualitative information on the predominant type of conflict events and actors involved in each case study, and thoroughly reviewed program evaluations in order to identify specific factors which may shed light on a program’s impact on conflict trends. Beyond qualitative data gathered from program evaluations, we also conducted 9 Key Informant Interviews (KII) with staff members who were involved in the implementation of these programs. The list of our key informants is provided in the appendix - all of them agreed to have their names mentioned and to be directly quoted in this study. The focus of these interviews was to gather information on the cost-effectiveness of these peacebuilding interventions, drawing lessons, and identifying patterns based on the memory recall of the respondents. When cost data were available, we also sought to identify correlations between the amount spent on an intervention and its effectiveness, looking whenever possible at the precise repartition of spending across budget items.

**LIMITATIONS**

The main limitation encountered in this study is the issue of attribution. Indeed, attributing the impact of any peacebuilding program is extremely sensitive, especially in highly complex and volatile conflict contexts such as Plateau State. While data on fatalities and conflict events reveal positive and negative trends in correlation with a given intervention, it is difficult to conclude that a program is directly responsible for the observed variations. In order to address this limitation, we chose to study programs which had been implemented at the LGA or city-level, in order to analyze conflict trends as precisely as possible. Working at such a granular level decreases the likelihood that other programs were implemented at the same time and in the same area as the examined program. Nonetheless, it remains difficult to directly and entirely attribute variations in conflict trends to a specific program. Indeed, there are a number of organizations and actors involved even informally in peacebuilding efforts in Plateau State, who may also contribute to observed trends. At least 3 key informants were themselves reluctant to directly attribute results to their organization only, underlining the cumulative impact of many organizations’ work in Plateau State. We were however able to gather some evidence and success stories which strongly suggest at least partial contribution to observed conflict trends. While the use of qualitative data can corroborate quantitative findings and to some extent address these challenges, it is overall difficult to determine more than a program’s partial (though sometimes substantial) contribution to conflict trends.

It is also difficult to know with certainty whether conflict trends would have been even worse in the absence of a given intervention, as an increase in violence can mask programmatic contributions to peace. The use of a counterfactual can nonetheless reveal that even a program correlated with an increase in violence may have
prevented outcomes from worsening to an even greater extent.\textsuperscript{17} Finally, it should also be stressed that this study primarily focuses on the short-term effectiveness of individual peacebuilding interventions, as the post-implementation period under consideration is of only one year. We recognized that the timeline to evaluate peacebuilding success can sometimes be much longer, as a program may have a positive impact on conflict trends in the short-time but later on spark a backlash or contribute to further destabilization.\textsuperscript{18} While an investigation of the long-term effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions is outside the scope of this research, we do nonetheless provide some compelling insights into the impact of cumulative investments in peacebuilding over the long-term.

A final limitation we encountered relates to the sample of peacebuilding interventions we included in the research. We were able to assess the cost-effectiveness of 8 different peacebuilding interventions, 5 of which had been implemented by Search for Common Ground itself. The 3 other interventions were each implemented by 3 local peacebuilding organizations based in Plateau State. We also conducted an additional KII with the representative of a fourth local peacebuilding organization, which we decided not to include in the individual case studies due to issues of comparability in size and reach. We did however include the qualitative insights provided by this KII in our analysis of factors which influence the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions. We reached out to at least 10 more local peacebuilding organizations in Plateau, as well as to a number of peacebuilding INGOs, to include their programs in our study, without success. We were also often unable to openly access program evaluations online. While the preliminary sample studied in this research already provides compelling insights into the question of peacebuilding cost-effectiveness, the quality of further research on this topic will depend on the willingness of other international and local NGOs to openly share data on their past programs’ effectiveness and cost, including detailed budgetary data.
Conflict dynamics and effects of conflict

1. CONFLICT DYNAMICS IN THE MIDDLE BELT REGION

Both Plateau and Benue State are located in the North Central geopolitical zone of Nigeria, commonly denominated as Nigeria’s Middle Belt. The Middle Belt region, which is crossed by some of the most frequented international transhumance routes in West Africa, has suffered serious consequences from violent confrontations between farmers and herders, as well as from inter-religious conflict. While farmer-herder relations have historically been harmonious, tensions have grown significantly between the two communities over the past decade. The conflict is mainly driven by competition over resources, but is also greatly influenced by ethno-religious differences, as a majority of farmers are sedentary “indigenes” of Christian faith, while most herders are nomadic “non-indigenes” of Muslim faith. The groups’ ethnic, religious, economic, and lifestyle differences mean that they rarely interact outside of confrontational scenarios, which has led to stereotyping and dehumanizing of the other community.

Several factors ranging from desertification, climate change, and population growth have also recently contributed to an increase in both scale and frequency of violent clashes between farmers and herders.

The effects of climate change across the Sahel and Nigeria’s far north have led to shifts in the migration patterns of herders. Migration was formerly seasonal, with herders staying in the Middle Belt from December to May before returning north. Recently, however, herders have been forced to stay in the Middle Belt region up until July or August, and sometimes to settle there permanently as result of droughts and desertification in the far north. More herders have also been driven south by growing instability in Northern states related not only to the Boko Haram insurgency but also to rural banditry and cattle rustling.

Beyond these migration patterns, rapid population growth, which resulted in an increased demand for farmland and the expansion of urban and private commercial infrastructures, has also meant that up to 300 of the 415

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19 Chris M.A. Kwaja and Bukola I. Ademola-Adelehin, Responses to Conflict between Farmers and Herders in the Middle Belt of Nigeria: Mapping Past Efforts and Opportunities for Violence Prevention, Search for Common Ground, January 2018.
grazing reserves established by the Northern regional government in the 1960s have been lost. As farming activities have spread into uncultivated land and many herdsmen have adopted a more sedentary lifestyle and settled in the Middle Belt region, relations between farmers and herdsmen have become increasingly competitive and characterized by frequent disputes over access to land and grazing routes. While these issues were regulated in the past by customary relationships and arrangements between sedentary and nomadic communities, these traditional community-level mechanisms have been eroded and replaced by police forces, which are mostly absent from rural areas and often perceived to be biased against nomadic herdsmen. In the absence of conflict-resolution mechanisms, citizens often turn to violence to solve their disputes.

**Ethnic militias and community vigilantes** have spread on both sides of the conflict and contributed to increased insecurity by engaging in cycles of retaliatory violence. With the proliferation of **small arms and light weapons** in the region, destruction and violence have become more widespread over the past years, with increasingly premeditated and organised attacks taking the form of “scorched-earth campaigns that kill scores, raze villages and burn down farms”. Violence is further exacerbated by widespread poverty and unemployment especially among youth, high rates of HIV/AIDS, small arms proliferation, the general climate of impunity, and the absence of security forces, especially in rural areas.

2. **PLATEAU STATE**

With its ethnically diverse population of around 4,200,000 people, Plateau State has long enjoyed a reputation of hospitality and tolerance and served as a haven for those fleeing conflicts in other parts of Nigeria. Since the 1990s, increased competition over land and political power has however led to increasingly frequent clashes between different identity groups. Resources-based conflicts have overlapped with a broader identity-based power struggle between Christian indigenes of the Berom ethnic group and Hausa-Fulani Muslims, who have seen their citizenship and political rights curtailed by discriminatory legislation enacted by Plateau’s Christian-majority governments. Conflicts between mostly Christian indigene farmers and mostly Muslim Hausa-Fulani pastoralists have often escalated into more general tensions between Christians and Muslims groups. Local leaders have stirred up tensions along religious lines and led to recurrent spikes in violence around local, state, and national elections.

The capital city, Jos, has experienced several episodes of violence throughout the 2000s, culminating in three massacres in January and March 2010 as well as a series of bomb attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram insurgents against Christian churches and neighborhoods in December of that same year. These attacks killed hundreds and
inflamed inter-religious clashes throughout the state. Since then, however, inter-religious tensions in the capital city have mostly remained under control thanks to the efforts of local vigilantes, military task forces, and civilian peacebuilding organizations, as demonstrated by the absence of large-scale intergroup violence following the May 2014 attack on Jos’ central market. The city nonetheless remains segregated between Muslim and Christian neighborhoods and populated by armed networks and high levels of crime, drug abuse, and insecurity. In rural areas outside the capital city, violence has followed an opposite trend. Violent confrontation between farmers and pastoralists over land access has increased in both frequency and scale since the 2010 Jos attacks, evolving from low intensity, disorganized violence towards wide-scale, premeditated destruction of entire villages. Both the scope and frequency of violence have nonetheless decreased since 2014, with a notable exception in 2018. As many Middle Belt states, Plateau indeed experienced an uptick in violence in 2018, most likely as a result of the influx of herders leaving Benue State following the adoption of the Open Grazing Prohibition and Establishment of Ranches Law by its government in November 2017.

Comparatively, with other Middle Belt states, Plateau State has received significant support from several international organizations and experienced a number of interventions by Nigerian local, state, and national actors, including a number of civilians-led peacebuilding groups working across communities and religious. The figure below provides a non-exhaustive overview of the responses to conflict in Plateau State by varying actors over the period from 2010 to 2020.

Figure 2. Responses to conflicts in Plateau State (2010-present)

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31 Abdu, Nigeria Cross-Sectoral Conflict Assessment.
34 Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (Nigeria), ed. 2016 Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria.
3. BENUE STATE

Benue State, located at the heart of the Middle Belt region, is home to an ethnically diverse population of around 5,780,000 people\(^{35}\) and acclaimed as the “food basket” of the country due to its fertile land.\(^{36}\) Benue is also a central migrating corridor for cattle herders, and as such has suffered from escalating tensions between farmers and herders. As in Plateau State, conflicts are mostly resource-based but intersect with divisions across ethnic and religious lines, with mostly Christian farmers of the Tiv ethnic group competing with mostly Muslim Fulani pastoralists for control over land and water resources.\(^{37}\) The crisis is further heightened by criminal activity and collusion between Tiv and Fulani youth, as well by corruption among traditional Tiv rulers, creating misunderstandings and disagreements which often lead to violence.\(^{38}\)

At least 14 out of Benue’s 23 LGAs have experienced violent incidents over the past decade, which have mostly been concentrated in rural areas. Benue has experienced increasing insecurity and violence over the past decade, with clashes of both greater scope and frequency\(^{39}\) killing hundreds and displacing more than 80,000 people.\(^{40}\) Violence has been particularly marked in 2016, which saw a series of particularly brutal attacks against communities of the Agatu LGA, and in 2018, following the adoption of the Benue State *Open Grazing Prohibition and Establishment of Ranches Law* in November 2017.\(^{41}\)

Responses to violence have included the controversial adoption of this law by the Benue State Government in 2017, which prohibits the open grazing of livestock and calls for the establishment of ranches across the state. While considered by some as a solution for the farmer-herder conflict, the law has been denounced as discriminatory, as it does not provide any support for the establishment of ranches and *de facto* deprives herders of their livelihoods and evicts them from the state.\(^{42}\) Its adoption has indeed further strained relations between farmers and herders in Benue and forced herders out of the state, leading to more violent clashes both in Benue and in neighboring states.\(^{43}\) These deadly confrontations between farmers and herders have encouraged the Nigerian federal government to deploy 300 troops and 7 helicopter gunships across Benue, Plateau, and Taraba State in July 2018.\(^{44}\)

\(^{36}\) Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (Nigeria), ed. *2016 Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria*.
\(^{37}\) Abdu, *Nigeria Cross-Sectoral Conflict Assessment*.
\(^{38}\) Abdu, *Nigeria Cross-Sectoral Conflict Assessment*.
\(^{41}\) Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (Nigeria), ed. *2016 Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria*.
Both federal and state governments have overall failed to provide security for the citizens of Benue, with most interventions focusing mostly on a military solution and doing more to escalate the conflict than to resolve it.45 While both local and international non-for-profit organizations have been involved in peacebuilding in Benue46, our review of responses to conflict synthesized in the figure above indicates that efforts to resolve the conflict have been more limited than in Plateau State. The recent increase in violence has nonetheless brought Benue under growing international attention.

4. EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE

Conflict opposing farmers to herders in the Middle Belt has had a heavy humanitarian toll and since 2017 has claimed more lives in Nigeria than the Boko Haram insurgency.47 Between 2015 and 2018, an estimated 6,000 people were killed in the states of Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and Plateau alone48, and over 62,000 people were displaced. They have often found refuge in schools, churches, mosques, and abandoned buildings, with poor access to potable water, sanitation, or health services.49 Women, girls, and boys in IDP camps are also at increased risks of rape, forced marriages, child trafficking, and child labor.50

Violence has led to the destruction of homes, properties, and farmlands. Crops and harvests are destroyed either on-farm by cattle, or in-stock when houses and barns are vandalized, burnt or demolished, while thousands of cattle are stolen or killed in retaliation. Many farmers are displaced by insecurity and fear of further attacks, and therefore forced to abandon their land and crops and to give up buying and selling activities in local markets. Loss of livelihoods has severe consequences for both farmers and herders, increasing poverty and affecting income-

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45 Abdu, Nigeria Cross-Sectoral Conflict Assessment.
46 Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (Nigeria), ed. 2016 Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria.
49 ACAPS, 2017.
50 Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (Nigeria), ed. 2016 Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria.
generating activities for current and future generations.\textsuperscript{51} Women and youth in particular often lack skills to develop other income-generating activities and are forced to engage in sometimes harmful coping strategies such as commercial sex, early marriages, child labor, or criminal activities.\textsuperscript{52} Food fragility is also heightened by conflict. Food production is below average both in Plateau and Benue State, while prices are extremely high and continuously increasing due to inflation and recession. As of 2017, around 133,000 people in Benue and 168,000 in Plateau were facing critical levels of food insecurity.\textsuperscript{53} Conflict has also severely impacted access to education. In Benue State, for instance, it was reported that dozens of schools were burnt down, demolished, or vandalized, and many more closed as a result of insecurity and displacement of students and teachers.\textsuperscript{54}

Despite the considerable human, social, and economic toll of farmer-herder conflicts, donor presence remains overall limited in the Middle Belt states compared with the North-East of the country, where international donors and humanitarian organizations have invested heavily in post-conflict reconstruction efforts in response to the Boko Haram insurgency.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{52} Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (Nigeria), ed. 2016 Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria
\textsuperscript{53} ACAPS, 2017
\textsuperscript{54} Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (Nigeria), ed. 2016 Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria.
\textsuperscript{55} International Crisis Group, Herders against Farmers, 2017, p.7
Case studies

KEY FINDING

1. We examined a sample of eight peacebuilding interventions implemented between 2010 and 2020 in Plateau State, with implementation periods ranging between 8 months and 4 years. Five of these interventions were implemented by Search, while the 3 others were implemented by local peacebuilding organizations based in Plateau State.

2. Six out of the eight interventions included in our sample were found to be effective, meaning that they contributed to a reduction in violence, manifested by a decrease in fatalities ranging from 23% to 100%. The two other interventions were considered to be ineffective and were associated with increases in conflict events and fatalities.

CASE STUDY #1
BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN FARMERS AND HERDERS (SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND)

Program title: Building Bridges between Farmers and Herders

Implementing organization(s): Search for Common Ground, in partnership with the local NGO Justice, Development and Peace Committee (JDPC)/Caritas

Targeted LGAs: Barkin Ladi, Riyom

Implementation period: July 2015 to June 2018 (36 months)

Total Budget: $1,159,860
Yearly Budget: $386,620

Goal: Strengthen engagement and understanding to reduce conflict between nomadic pastoralist and sedentary farming communities

Objective 1: Improve intercultural understanding between nomadic pastoralist and sedentary farming communities

Activities: Participatory Radio magazine on rural livelihood conflicts, dance theater for tolerance, facilitated local community dialogues, cross-cultural peace festivals

Objective 2: Build coalitions between community leaders, civil society, and government to prevent conflict between nomadic pastoralist and sedentary farming communities

Activities: Platform-building workshops, stakeholders community forums, participatory identification of mutual interests projects
CONFLICT TRENDS ANALYSIS

We looked at conflict trends within the LGAs of Barkin Ladi and Riyom across the pre-implementation phase (July 2014 to June 2015), implementation phase (July 2015 to June 2018), and post-implementation phase (July 2018 to June 2019) of the Building Bridges between Farmers and Herders (BBFH) program. We collected data on the number of reported conflict events and fatalities during each phase and annualized these numbers to ensure comparability. We then compared the pre-implementation phase to the implementation and post-implementation phase, to understand how conflict trends varied across the project's life cycle. The table below indicates a significant reduction in the number of fatalities and conflict events both between the pre-implementation and the implementation phases and over the whole lifecycle of the project.

Table 1. Trends of fatalities & conflict events for the BBFH program (static view)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Implementation (July 2014 to June 2015)</th>
<th>Implementation (July 2015 to June 2018)</th>
<th>Post-Implementation (July 2018 to June 2019)</th>
<th>Variation from pre-implementation to implementation</th>
<th>Overall variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-46%</td>
<td>-61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-46%</td>
<td>-53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4 below provides a dynamic overview of the trends in fatalities and conflict events during the pre-implementation, implementation, and post-implementation phases of the project. This figure shows that there was a significant reduction in fatalities at the beginning of the implementation phase, with both fatalities and conflict events remaining at a very low level for the first two years of the implementation phase. Most of 2018 are marked by increased numbers of fatalities and conflict events, including a severe spike around June. This spike can most likely be attributed to the passing of the *Open Grazing Prohibition Law* by the Benue State Government, which triggered important episodes of violence in neighboring states. However, by the end of the post-implementation phase, both fatalities and conflict events had significantly decreased again.

56 Data exported from Acled tool, Nigeria: 2010-2020, see: www.acleddata.com. Numbers for reported fatalities and conflict events during the implementation phase have been annualized to ensure comparability between the three phases and calculate variation.
In order to smooth out monthly variations, we used a 6-month moving average in Figure 5 below. This figure highlights a clear reduction in fatalities and conflict events over the project’s entire life cycle. While a spike in conflict events, and to a lesser degree in fatalities, is still visible at the end of 2018, by the end of the post-implementation phase, the monthly average of fatalities and events was close to zero again.

**LINKING CONFLICT TRENDS TO PROGRAM IMPACT**

While the analysis above shows a significant reduction in the number of fatalities and conflict events over the life cycle of the BBFH intervention in the LGAs in which it was implemented, our analysis cannot prove that this

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57 Data exported from Acled tool, Nigeria: 2010-2020, see: [www.acleddata.com](http://www.acleddata.com)
58 Ibidem
variation is entirely attributable to the program. However, the program’s relevance to the specific conflict dynamics at play in Barkin Ladi and Riyom suggests that the BBFH program did contribute to the reduction in fatalities and conflict events. Indeed, according to the program evaluation, the project’s approach was both relevant and effective in improving cultural understanding and relationships between the two communities, although participants in Plateau State tended to rate relationships between farmers and herders, between Muslims and Christians, and between communities and security actors less positively than respondents in other states targeted by the intervention. Moreover, looking at which type of conflict event was predominant over the different phases of the project in these two LGAs, we note that instances of violence against civilians represented more than 90% of all fatalities and 80% of all conflict events throughout the life cycle of the project. Fulani Ethnic Militias, which have historically been at odds with farmer communities, were also involved in 70% of instances of violence against civilians, as perpetrators or victims of attacks. By the end of the post-implementation phase, the number of fatalities related to violence against civilians had been reduced by 63%, and the number of events involving violence against civilians had been cut in half, driving most of the identified trend. A key informant did also underline that, as a result of the BBFH program, “when violence erupted in other LGAs, the LGAs where Search implemented the program, where we had our participants and structure were less likely to catch on fire, and more likely to be able to bring together stakeholders for prevention and response.” It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the BBFH significantly contributed to a reduction in violence in Barkin Ladi and Riyom.

CASE STUDY #2: PARTICIPATORY EARLY-WARNING FOR MORE EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN PLATEAU STATE (SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND)

Program title: Participatory Early-Warning for More Effective Response to Religious Conflict

Implementing organization(s): Search for Common Ground, in partnership with the local NGO Community Action for Popular Action (CAPP)

Targeted LGAs: Jos North, Jos South, Jos East, Barkin Ladi, Riyom, Bassa, Mangu, and Wase

Implementation period: December 2012 to July 2013 (8 months)

Total Budget: $38,559

Yearly Budget: $57,839

Goal: Increase the capacity of local peacemakers to analyze and respond to the emerging conflict before it escalates into a cycle of violence

Objective 1: Conflict prevention actors have enhanced information (in terms of quantity and quality) and analysis to plan and target timely conflict prevention activities

Activities: Establishment of a joint Search/CAPP Early Warning System (EWS), training of 109 focal points from across the 8 targets LGAs to send SMS messages, community outreach

Objective 2: Conflict prevention actors have enhanced capacity to take action based upon information collected through new media

Activities: Monthly meeting between security and NGO partners to analyze the received messages


60 Mulmi R. Interview with Ferbach S. July 2020.
CONFLICT TRENDS ANALYSIS

The table below shows the number of fatalities and conflict events in the eight LGAs targeted by the Participatory Early-Warning for More Effective Response to Religious Conflict in Plateau State (PEW) program during the pre-implementation phase, the implementation phase, and the post-implementation phase. The number of fatalities and conflict events increased only slightly during the implementation phase. Over the entire life cycle of the project, while the number of events per year decreased slightly, the number of fatalities per year increased by 58%.

Table 2. Trends of fatalities & conflict events for the PEW program (static view)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fatalities</strong></td>
<td>318</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>+58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Events</strong></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>+10%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6 below indeed shows increased violence and instability in the 8 target LGAs throughout the PWA program’s life cycle, with peak levels of fatalities in the post-implementation period.

Figure 6. Trends of fatalities & conflict events for the PEW program (dynamic view)

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61 Data exported from Acled tool, Nigeria: 2010-2020, see: www.acleddata.com. Numbers for reported fatalities and conflicts events during the implementation phase have been annualized to ensure comparability between the three phases and calculate variation.

62 Data exported from Acled tool, Nigeria: 2010-2020
Figure 7 below smoothes out the frequent peaks and monthly variations apparent in the previous figure but continues to clearly indicate an upward trend in fatalities over the period. By the end of the post-implementation period, the average of fatalities over the last six months had increased from 18 to 45 fatalities per month.

**Figure 7. Trends of fatalities & conflict events for the PEW program (dynamic view, 6-Month Moving Average)**

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**LINKING CONFLICT TRENDS TO PROGRAM IMPACT**

The project’s internal evaluation underlined a number of limitations to the program’s effectiveness, including an overly vague definition of the program’s objectives around short-term conflict response and long-term conflict prevention, limited budgeting for public outreach, limited analysis of early warning data, and a perceived lack of security mobilization in response to alerts. These findings suggest that the PEW pilot program was unable to provoke a significant decrease in conflict trends in the eight targeted LGAs. Two more elements underlined in the program evaluation also lead us to think that these conflict trends would not have been even worse in the absence of this program.

First, limited budget for public outreach meant that the EWS only received a very limited amount of messages over the entirety of the pilot, possibly due to a degree of “EWS fatigue” related to the existence of two other large scale EWSs in the Jos region, and therefore limiting possibilities for both short-term response and long-term prevention. Second, even the limited data that was gathered did not necessarily fit the needs of the stakeholders, as there was internal confusion on whether early warning data was being gathered for rapid response or long-term conflict prevention. This prevented NGOs and security bodies from conducting strategic long-term conflict analysis and prevention. It should also be stressed that the conflict dynamics in the eight LGAs targeted by this program were more complex and diverse than, for instance, in the LGAs targeted by the BBFH program.

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63 Ibidem

Indeed, at the onset of the program, instances involving violence against civilians represented only 66% of all fatalities, with the rest of fatalities were linked to battle, explosions and remote violence, and riots. By the end of the program, fatalities linked to violence against civilians had increased by 40%, those linked to battle by 50%, and those linked to explosions and remote violence by 358%. The latter type of event could hardly have been prevented by the PEW program, given that the EWS system was mainly designed to avert the escalation of conflict between Muslims and Christians and along tribal fault lines. These different factors shed more light on our analysis, and strongly suggest that the PEW pilot program made overall little contribution to peace and stability in the eight targeted LGAs.

CASE STUDY #3:
PLATEAU WILL ARISE - PHASE 1 AND 2 (SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND)

Program title: Plateau Will Arise!

Implementing organization(s): Search for Common Ground, in partnership with the local NGO Community Action for Popular Action (CAPP) and the Jos Repertory Theatre (JRT)

Targeted LGAs: Jos North, Jos South, Barkin Ladi, Riyom, Bokkos, Wase, Qua’an Pan, Shendam, and Langtang North (from July 2015 onwards)  Implementation period:  
June 2013 and June 2017 (4 years),  
Phase 1 from June 2013 to July 2015,  
Phase 2 from July 2015 to June 2017

Total Budget: $2,518,821  Yearly Budget: $629,705

Goal: Build an active, locally-owned and inclusive Peace Architecture in Plateau State

Objective 1: Creating an improved climate of peace in eight LGAs
Activities: Conflict resolution training for key local leaders, transformational leadership training for women; TOT and step-down training for conflict resolution, civil-society led EWS, media programs on TV and radio; children’s radio drama; violence prevention during the elections

Objective 2: Strengthening of the State’s role in security provision for the population
Activities: Conflict resolution training for key government officials and security personnel, Peace Architecture dialogues (civil society, security actors, and state government problem-solving discussions)

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This was the goal of the first phase of the PWA project. The goal of Phase 2 was to strengthen the locally-driven peace process in Plateau State, and ensure the sustainability of the Peace Architecture established in the first phase of the program, with most of its activities being continuations of activities launched in Phase 1.
CONFLICT TRENDS ANALYSIS

Table 4 below provides a static overview of conflict trends in the nine LGAs targeted by the Plateau Will Arise! (PWA) project during the pre-implementation, implementation, and post-implementation phase. In line with the findings of the program evaluation, the table shows an important reduction in both fatalities and events between the pre-implementation and the implementation phase. Overall, we note a 44% decrease in fatalities and a 25% decrease in conflict events.

Table 3. Trends in fatalities & conflict events for the PWA program (static view)66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Implementation (June 2012 to May 2013)</th>
<th>Implementation (June 2013 to June 2017)</th>
<th>Post-Implementation (July 2017 to June 2018)</th>
<th>Variation from pre-implementation to implementation</th>
<th>Overall variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>-59%</td>
<td>-45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>-48%</td>
<td>-24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8 below indeed shows a marked decrease in both fatalities and conflict events towards the second half of the implementation period, which is however followed by renewed violence and instability in the post-implementation phase, with a peak around mid-2018.

Figure 8. Trends of fatalities & conflict events for the PWA program (dynamic view)67

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66 Data exported from Acled tool, Nigeria: 2010-2020, see: www.acleddata.com. Numbers for reported fatalities and conflicts events during the implementation phase have been annualized to ensure comparability between the three phases and calculate variation.

Advancing the Conversation on the Cost-Effectiveness of Peacebuilding

Looking at figure 11 below, it is particularly interesting to note that even when the important monthly variations between June 2013 and mid-2015 are smoothed out, both fatalities and conflict events only start to significantly decrease around the beginning of the second phase of the PWA program. This could be an indication that Phase 2 successfully built on the achievement of Phase 1 to consolidate a climate of peace in the selected LGAs. However, even with the smoothing effect of the 6-month moving average, the peak in violence in the post-implementation phase remains very apparent.

Figure 9. Trends of fatalities & conflict events for the PWA program (dynamic view, 6-Month Moving Average)

LINKING CONFLICT TRENDS TO PROGRAM IMPACT

Based on the observations above, it is reasonable to conclude that the PWA program has contributed to a reduction in violence in the 9 LGAs it targeted. The final program evaluation (covering both phases) supports these observations. Indeed, it found that the security situation had improved across all LGAs, with over half of all respondents noting great improvements in intergroup relations. Our key informants for this program also stressed that there were no instances of fighting and attacks in the communities targeted by the program, and shared multiple success stories displaying communities’ ability to deal with conflict in non-adversarial ways. In particular, one key informant shared a success story of how a peace structure created as part of the project helped prevent the spread of violence that had erupted in the North of the country towards the LGAs targeted by the PWA program. Indeed, by mobilizing relationships with stakeholders, the platform created by Search was able to convince the local government to impose a curfew and local media to report on these events in a conflict-sensitive manner, for instance by inviting community and religious leaders on a radio show to have them spread a message of peace and tolerance. Two of our key informants for this project also stressed that PWA invested in communities that had previously received no attention from other organizations, and that the peace structures created by Search were unprecedented in the region. PWA was also one of the largest peacebuilding projects in the region at the time.

68 Ibid
It is however more difficult to say whether this reduction was sustained in the long-term. It is possible, as in the BBFH program, that the peak observed at the end of the post-implementation phase is linked to increased tensions between farmers and herders in several Middle Belt states following the adoption of the *Open Grazing Prohibition Law* in Benue State. It would be interesting to know whether this upward trend was maintained beyond 2018 in the 9 targeted LGAs, as it may provide additional information regarding the intervention's effectiveness and sustainability.

It should also be noted, in line with the program's midline evaluation that while “levels of conflict remain high in several LGAs […] the PWA intervention has contributed to an improvement in the overall security context”, for instance through trust-building between communities and security forces, and by empowering communities to build inter-group relations and deal with emerging conflicts. While these improvements may not necessarily prevent conflict from breaking into violence, they do have the potential to mitigate the effects of violence.

**CASE STUDY #4:**

**PREVENTING INTER-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN PLATEAU STATE (SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND)**

**Program title:** Preventing Inter-Religious Violence in Plateau State (PIRV)

**Implementing organization(s):** Search for Common Ground, in partnership with the Jos Repertory Theatre (JRT) and the Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies (CECOMPS) at the University of Jos

**Targeted LGAs:** Jos (capital city)

**Implementation period:** January 2011 and November 2012 (2 years)

**Total Budget:** $716,118

**Yearly Budget:** $358,059

**Goal:** Reduce the potential for inter-religious violence in Plateau State

**Objective 1:** Strengthening the capacity of religious leaders to promote mutual respect and prevent violence

**Activities:** Radio programming on key conflict topics and rumor management, leadership and conflict resolution training for key leaders, community interventions and dialogues
CONFLICT TRENDS ANALYSIS

The table below shows that both fatalities and conflict events drastically decreased both from the pre-implementation phase to the implementation phase, and throughout the life cycle of the Preventing Inter-Religious Violence in Plateau State (PIRV) program. Overall, between the pre- and post-implementation period, conflict events had decreased by 76%, and fatalities by 95%.

Table 4. Trends in Fatalities and conflict events for the PIRV program (static view)\(^{70}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fatalities</strong></td>
<td>222</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-68%</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Events</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-38%</td>
<td>-82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In figure 10 below, we notice significant peaks in violence at the beginning of 2010, corresponding to three inter-religious massacres which occurred in January and March of that year, as well as continued instability in 2011 and 2012. Yet, there were only infrequent conflict events and close to no fatalities in the city of Jos for most of the year following the implementation of the program, from December 2012 to November 2013.

Figure 10. Trends of fatalities & conflict events for the PIRV program (dynamic view)\(^{71}\)

\(^{70}\) Data exported from Acled tool, Nigeria: 2010-2020, see: www.acleddata.com. Numbers for reported fatalities and conflicts events during the implementation phase have been annualized to ensure comparability between the three phases and calculate variation.

\(^{71}\) Data exported from Acled tool, Nigeria: 2010-2020
Figure 11 below depicts even more clearly the downward trend in violence over the lifecycle of the conflict.

Figure 11. Trends of fatalities & conflict events for the PIRV program (dynamic view, 6-Month Moving Average)72

LINKING CONFLICT TRENDS TO PROGRAM IMPACT

The analysis above supports the positive findings of the PIRV program evaluation, according to which the program contributed to a great extent to reducing violence in Jos. It was indeed believed by a number of key informants who contributed to the final evaluation that Search’s intervention was “largely responsible for changing the way people in Jos work together” and consequently for a reduction in violent incidents.73 Moreover, as this program took place at a city level, it is easier to attribute the observed results to the intervention. Indeed, while local actors and organizations in Jos were most likely engaged in simultaneous peacebuilding efforts may have contributed to this trend, to our knowledge there were no concurrent interventions by other INGOs in the city of Jos between 2011 and 2013. Our key informant for this project also stressed that “at that time, Plateau did not have that kind of [interfaith] program”.74 We can therefore conclude with confidence that the PIRV intervention directly contributed to mitigating and defusing the cycle of inter-religious violence which had emerged in Jos.

72 Ibidem
74 Bentu, S. Interview with Ferbach, S. July 2020.
CASE STUDY #5: STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ETHNO-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE (SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND)

Program title: Strengthening Accountability for Ethno-Religious Violence

Implementing organization(s): Search for Common Ground in partnership with the Centre for the Advocacy of Justice and Rights (CAJR)

Targeted LGAs: Jos North, Jos South  Implementation period: September 2012 to September 2014 (2 years)  Total Budget: $671,737

Goal: Strengthen effective accountability processes to tackle ethno-religious violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective 1: Increase the skills of CSOs in monitoring, reporting, and advocacy for accountability processes (including by increasing dialogue and understanding of human rights and accountability issues)</th>
<th>Activities: Monitoring, reporting, and advocacy for accountability processes workshops; meetings between CSOs and local law and security agents; project themed radio programming to promote public engagement; community dialogues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective 2: Establish a platform between the National Human Rights Commission and CSOs for effective action on accountability</td>
<td>Activities: CSO joint strategy development workshops; CSO coalition-building meetings; CSO and NHRC joint strategy development workshop and follow-up strategy meetings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFLICT TRENDS ANALYSIS

In table 5 below, we can see that both fatalities and conflict events have decreased over the lifespan of the Strengthening Accountability for Ethno-Religious Violence program (ACCERV). Indeed, despite a small increase in fatalities between the pre-implementation and the implementation phase, overall fatalities have been reduced by 23% and conflict events by up to 3%.
Table 5. Trends in fatalities & conflict events for the ACCERV program (static view)\textsuperscript{75}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Implementation (Sept. 2011 to August 2012)</th>
<th>Implementation (Sept. 2012 to Sept. 2014)</th>
<th>Post-Implementation (October 2014 to Sept. 2015)</th>
<th>Variation from pre-implementation to implementation</th>
<th>Overall variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fatalities</strong></td>
<td>129</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>+14%</td>
<td>-23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Events</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12 below highlights a peak in fatalities around mid-2014, which mainly drives the increase in fatalities between the pre-implementation and implementation period.

Outside of this peak, which also appears clearly in Figure 13 below despite the smoothing effect of the 6-Month Moving Average, we do notice a relative stabilization of the number of fatalities in the post-implementation phase at a lower level than in the pre-implementation phase.

Figure 12. Trends of fatalities & conflict events for the ACCERV program (dynamic view)\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{75} Data exported from Acled tool, Nigeria: 2010-2020, see: www.acleddata.com. Numbers for reported fatalities and conflicts events during the implementation phase have been annualized to ensure comparability between the three phases and calculate variation.

\textsuperscript{76} Data exported from Acled tool, Nigeria: 2010-2020.
Figure 13. Trends of fatalities & conflict events for the ACCERV program (dynamic view, 6-Month Moving Average)

LINKING CONFLICT TRENDS TO PROGRAM IMPACT

As demonstrated by the figures above, the ACCERV program was correlated with a moderate decrease in violence in Jos North and Jos South. The program evaluation found that four of its five expected results had been completed, including improving skills and capacity of CSO monitor and report human rights abuses and advocate for more effective accountability. The project also promoted a relationship of trust and collaboration between communities, CSOs and local judicial and security actors, thus helping them to better fulfil their mission of protection and prevention of ethno-religious violence. The contribution of effective communication with security agencies and subsequent enhanced accountability to peace has indeed been articulated by several key informants. One, for instance, stated that “because people have access to security agencies [and] the capacity to document abuses, to vent their pain and anger, the incidence of physical retaliation was to a certain extent minimized”. This is further evidenced by a stark reduction in both battles between opposed identity militias, and in violence against civilians committed by identity militias over the program’s lifecycle, which suggest that ethno-religious conflicts were indeed increasingly solved through non-violent means as a result of the program’s implementation. Based on these observations, it is reasonable to conclude that the ACCERV program has at least partially contributed to the observed conflict trends.

77 Ibidem
79 Peter, G. Interview with Ferbach, S. July 2020.
CASE STUDY #6: COMMUNITY-DRIVEN PEACEBUILDING IN PLATEAU STATE
(COMMUNITY ACTION FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION)

Program title: Community-Driven Peacebuilding in Plateau State

Implementing organization(s): Community Action for Popular Participation

Targeted LGAs: Jos North, Jos South, Jos East, Bassa, Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Bokkos, and Mangu

Implementation period: May 2011 to November 2013 (2.5 years)

Total Budget: $250,000
Yearly Budget: $100,000

Goal: Build a Peace Architecture for sustainable peace in Plateau State

Objective 1: Build the foundation for sustainable peace in Plateau State by supporting a community-driven conflict prevention and peace architecture in vulnerable communities

Activities: Training of Trainers (TOTs) on Conflict Early Warning and Early Response, Step-Down training, the establishment of Community Peace Advocates (COPAs)

Objective 2: Cultivate a culture of tolerance among the diverse ethnic groups in the state through interfaith and inter-ethnic dialogue and confidence building

Activities: Media Engagement (Radio Discussion Program, Training on Conflict Sensitive Journalism)

Objective 3: Support the growth and assertiveness of a robust peace constituency encompassing government, security forces, civil society and the media, collectively working to prevent, mitigate, and manage conflict

Activities: Step-Down training, Town Hall Meetings

Objective 4: Promote the enactment of a peace policy in the state

Activities: Advocacy Visits at State and Local Government levels

Objective 4: Facilitate trauma healing among children, youth and women in vulnerable communities

Activities: Trauma Healing Workshops
CONFLICT TRENDS ANALYSIS

The table below shows that, except for a slight reduction in conflict events between the pre-implementation and the implementation phase, both events and fatalities have continued to increase over the life-span of the program. Overall, fatalities increased by 128%, and events by 24%, over the entire duration of the Community-Driven Peacebuilding in Plateau State (CDPB) program.

Table 6. Trends in fatalities & conflict events for the CDPB program (static view)80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Implementation (May 2010 to April 2011)</th>
<th>Implementation (May 2011 to Nov. 2013)</th>
<th>Post-Implementation (Dec. 2013 to Nov 2014)</th>
<th>Variation from pre-implementation to implementation</th>
<th>Overall variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>+31%</td>
<td>+128%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>+28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 14 below indeed shows continued instability before, during, and after the project’s implementation, although a slight decrease in both conflict events and fatalities is noticeable both at the beginning and at the end of the implementation period.

Figure 14. Trends of fatalities & conflict events for the CDPB program (dynamic view)81

80 Data exported from Acled tool, Nigeria: 2010-2020, see: www.acleddata.com. Numbers for reported fatalities and conflicts events during the implementation phase have been annualized to ensure comparability between the three phases and calculate variation.

81 Data exported from Acled tool, Nigeria: 2010-2020
Figure 15 slightly nuances the observations made above. Indeed, while we still observe peaks in conflict events in the implementation and post-implementation phase, the trend in fatalities remains relatively stable from 2011 onwards, following a sharp decrease in 2010. The CDPB program therefore seemingly prevented a return to the high levels of violence registered in 2010 and observable in the figure below.

**Figure 15. Trends of fatalities & conflict events for the CDPB program (dynamic view, 6-Month Moving Average)**

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**LINKING CONFLICT TRENDS TO PROGRAM IMPACT**

The analysis above suggests that while the CDPB program did not contribute to a reduction in violence, it did nonetheless at least prevent a return to the dramatic levels of violence experienced by the 8 LGAs it targeted in 2010. Indeed, while there was an increase in fatalities and conflict events over its lifespan, this increase remained moderate compared to the trends observable in 2010. The volatile security situation was actually underlined in the report as a challenge to the program’s successful implementation, as it forced some activities to be delayed, and others to be postponed indefinitely. Indeed, it should be stressed that the 8 LGAs targeted by the CDPB program were by far the most violent in the state - indeed, from 2010 to 2014, they accounted for 83% of all fatalities and 92% of all conflict events recorded in Plateau State. Furthermore, most of the increase in violence in those 8 LGA over this period was driven by an augmentation in explosions and remote violence committed by rebel groups, which was largely outside the scope of action of the program. Nonetheless, the program’s effectiveness in mitigating inter-communal conflicts seemed equally limited, as both conflict events involving violence against civilians by political and/or ethnic militias and related fatalities doubled between the pre-implementation and the post-implementation period of the CDPB program.

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82 Ibidem
CASE STUDY #7: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE STRATEGY FOR LASTING PEACE IN JOS, PLATEAU STATE (CENTRE FOR THE ADVOCACY OF JUSTICE AND RIGHT)

Program title: The Central Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Strategy for Lasting Peace in Jos, Plateau State

Implementing organization(s): Centre for the Advocacy of Justice and Rights

Targeted LGAs: Barkin Ladi, Riyom

Implementation period: January 2013 to May 2015 (2.5 years)

Total Budget: $75,000

Yearly Budget: $30,000

Goal: Strengthen the capacity of CSOs and Government Institutions in Barkin Ladi and Riyom LGAs

Objective 1: Bring together all relevant stakeholders in the peace process, increase their capacity & bridge the communication gap between communities, CSOs, and government

Activities: Training on Early Warning and human rights violations reporting; training in mediation; training with security agencies on conflict sensitive reporting

Objective 2: Increase knowledge and awareness of community members around the peace process

Activities: Community Theatre for Peace; training on Early Warning and human rights violations reporting

CONFLICT TRENDS ANALYSIS

Table 7 below shows that the program named The Central Role of Civil Society organizations in the Strategy for Lasting Peace in Plateau State (CR-CSO) was correlated with a 81% decrease in fatalities, and a 58% decrease in conflict events between the pre-implementation phase and the post-implementation.

Table 7. Trends in fatalities & conflict events for the CR-CSO program (static view)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fatalities</strong></td>
<td>255</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-34%</td>
<td>-81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Events</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-23%</td>
<td>-58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

83 Data exported from Acled tool, Nigeria: 2010-2020, see: www.acleddata.com. Numbers for reported fatalities and conflicts events during the implementation phase have been annualized to ensure comparability between the three phases and calculate variation.
In figure 16, we can see that the implementation period was marked by relative instability, followed by a stark reduction in conflict events and fatalities after the end of the project. This decrease is even more apparent in figure 17 below, with both monthly fatalities and conflict events averaging zero by the end of the post-implementation period.

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84 Data exported from Acled tool, Nigeria: 2010-2020
85 Ibidem
LINKING CONFLICT TRENDS TO PROGRAM IMPACT

The CR-CSO project was clearly correlated with a sharp decrease in both conflict events and fatalities. The key informant representing the CR-CSO program himself insisted that these positive conflict trends could not only be attributed to CAJR's work, but also to other organizations working in Barkin Ladi and Riyom around the same period on similar activities. Nonetheless, like for the ACCERV interventions, the program's emphasis on bringing a variety of stakeholders together, and more particularly on bridging communication gaps between communities, CSOs, security & government agencies were identified as having strongly contributed to a reduction in instances of physical attacks. Most of the decreasing trend highlighted above was indeed driven by a sharp reduction in instances of violence against civilians. These observations suggest that the CR-CSO project did positively impact conflict trends in the LGAs of Barkin Ladi and Riyom.

CASE STUDY #8: SECURITY, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND COMMUNITY PEACEBUILDING
(ISLAMIC COUNSELLING INITIATIVES OF NIGERIA)

Program title: Security, Good Governance and Community Peacebuilding

Implementing organization(s): Islamic Counselling Initiatives of Nigeria (ICIN)

Targeted LGAs: Jos North, Bokkos, Wase
Implementation period: December 2014 to May 2016 (1.5 year)
Total Budget: $138,927
Yearly Budget: $92,618

Goal: Improve participation of the community and traditional leaders, women, youth, and security groups to mitigate conflict and reduce violent conflict in the three LGAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective 1</th>
<th>Activities: Capacity-building training on Early Warning Response and Mitigation of Conflict for 40 stakeholders per LGA; Training on Conflict Management, Prevention of Electoral Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assess existing conflict management structures and facilitate the emergence of Community Peace Partnerships (CPPs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective 2</th>
<th>Activities: Women Peace Dialogue Workshop, Training of Security Agents and Media Practitioners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen civil society and security agencies capacity to participate in CPPs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective 3</th>
<th>Activities: Advocacy visits, step-down training, awareness campaigns, peace dialogues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support networking and exchanges between CPPs and create opportunities for coordination between them and SCMAs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFLICT TRENDS ANALYSIS

The table below shows conflict trends over the length of the Security, Good Governance and Community Peacebuilding (SGGCP) program. We can see that, over the lifecycle of the program, both conflict events and fatalities have been drastically reduced in the target LGAs of Jos North, Bokkos and Wase. In fact, there were close to no fatalities and no conflict events over the post-implementation period.

Table 8. Trends in fatalities & conflict events for the SGGCP program (static view)$^86$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Implementation (Dec. 2013 to Nov. 2014)</th>
<th>Implementation (Dec. 2014 to May 2016)</th>
<th>Post-Implementation (June 2016 to May 2017)</th>
<th>Variation from pre-implementation to implementation</th>
<th>Overall variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fatalities</strong></td>
<td>221</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-66%</td>
<td>-97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Events</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-31%</td>
<td>-69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This drastic reduction in violence is clearly apparent from late 2015 onwards in Figure 18 above, and in Figure 19 below from 2016 onwards, with monthly fatalities averaging zero for almost a year and a half.

Figure 18. Trends in fatalities & conflict events for the SGGCP program (dynamic view)$^87$

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$^86$ Data exported from Acled tool, Nigeria: 2010-2020, see: [www.acleddata.com](http://www.acleddata.com). Numbers for reported fatalities and conflicts events during the implementation phase have been annualized to ensure comparability between the three phases and calculate variation.

$^87$ Data exported from Acled tool, Nigeria: 2010-2020
LINKING CONFLICT TRENDS TO PROGRAM IMPACT

A report on the SGGCP program[^89] provides some evidence that the program did effectively contribute to the conflict trends observed above. Indeed, the program promoted capacity-building for community vigilantes groups, which helped secure places of both Christian and Muslim worship and prevent series of reprisals following attacks. There is also evidence that the targeted prevention and awareness efforts carried out by participants to the project in areas where electoral violence had previously taken place contribute to violent-free general elections in 2015, especially in the LGA of Wase, which had not seen peaceful elections in over a decade. These observations therefore suggest that the SGGCP intervention played a significant part in preventing violence in Jos North, Bokkos and Wase from late 2015 onwards, although the sustainability of that trend cannot be guaranteed by the analysis above. Assessing the relative cost-effectiveness of different types of peacebuilding interventions

[^88]: Ibidem
Assessing the relative cost-effectiveness of different types of peacebuilding interventions

KEY FINDINGS

1. There is no strict correlation between the amount of money spent on a program and its effectiveness. The cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions does not seem to depend on budget size, but rather on the adequate, intentional and strategic allocation of spending and resources across programmatic activities and needs.

2. Five out of the six effective interventions included in our sample had similar programmatic entry points, combining a training, dialogue and media component.

3. The factors which most heavily influence the effectiveness of interventions included in our sample are: geographical dosage; relational dynamics at play between the implementing organization and the target communities; the intentional, strategic and inclusive targeting of both “key people” and “more people”; and the sustainability of the intervention.

Figure 20. Overview of the cost-effectiveness of selected peacebuilding programs
Figure 20 above provides an overview of the relationship between budget size and effectiveness in reducing fatalities\textsuperscript{90} in our sample of peacebuilding interventions. The PEW and the CDPB programs, which both had budgets equal or below US$100,000, were left out of this figure as they were both associated with worsening conflict trends.

Looking at this figure, what immediately stands out is the absence of a strict correlation between budget size and program effectiveness. Indeed, while the PEW and CDPB programs both had a small budget and were seemingly ineffective in reducing fatalities, the CR-CSO and the SGGPB program also had limited yearly budgets, and yet were associated with more positive conflict trends than most of Search's costlier programs. Similarly, of the four effective interventions implemented by Search, the PIRV program, which is the most effective one, is also the one with the second smallest budget. Looking at the budget of Search's interventions in greater detail\textsuperscript{91}, the main difference between the PIRV intervention and the other four interventions, is that PIRV's budget is more evenly allocated across budget items. Spending on salaries and benefits, and on subgrantees' programmatic grants, are the top two budget items for all interventions, including the PEW pilot project. When combined, these two budget items only represent around 54\% of the overall PIRV budget, compared to between 60\% and 80\% of the budget for the other four interventions. These two observations suggest that the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions does not necessarily depend on budget size, but rather on the adequate repartition of spending across programmatic activities.

As shown in the figure above, many of the interventions in our sample actually have strikingly similar programmatic entry points. Indeed, they all combine three broad categories of activities: a training component (focusing either broadly on capacity-building in conflict resolution, mediation and human rights, or in a more limited manner on EWS), a dialogue component (either at the community level or at a more formal and institutionalized level), and a media component (usually radio programming). Based on this observation, we conducted a qualitative analysis of program evaluations, final reports and KIIs to identify a number of programmatic factors which affected the cost-effectiveness of the peacebuilding interventions included in this research.

\textsuperscript{90} Effectiveness is primarily understood as a program's effectiveness in reducing violence. In this section, the primary indicator used for effectiveness in reducing violence is the variation in the number of fatalities over the life cycle of a given program. However, we recognize that conflict events can be violent regardless of whether or not they have caused fatalities, and discuss other indicators and aspects of effectiveness throughout the study.

\textsuperscript{91} The author only had access to detailed budgetary data showing the repartition of spending across budget items for the 5 Search programs included in this research.
Figure 21. Overview of the 8 selected peacebuilding interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>LGAs</th>
<th>Communities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PIRV</td>
<td>Reconciliation</td>
<td>-100%</td>
<td>2 LGAs</td>
<td>18 comm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR-CSO</td>
<td>Reconciliation, SSR</td>
<td>-81%</td>
<td>3 LGAs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWA</td>
<td>Reconciliation, SSR</td>
<td>-44%</td>
<td>9 LGAs</td>
<td>8 comm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEW</td>
<td>Early Warning</td>
<td>+58%</td>
<td>8 LGAs</td>
<td>20 comm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGGPB</td>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>-97%</td>
<td>2 LGAs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBFH</td>
<td>Reconciliation</td>
<td>-61%</td>
<td>2 LGAs</td>
<td>18 comm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCERV</td>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>-23%</td>
<td>2 LGAs</td>
<td>15 comm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDPB</td>
<td>Reconciliation, Early Warning</td>
<td>+128%</td>
<td>8 LGAs</td>
<td>48 comm.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DOSAGE AND CUMULATIVE IMPACT**

Our sample suggests that interventions must target a number of LGAs and communities proportionate to available resources, in order to saturate the target stakeholders through their activities and to be most effective. Indeed, the two programs identified as being ineffective were implemented respectively in 20 (PEW) and 48 (CDPB) communities spread over 8 LGAs. Conversely, all of the effective interventions targeted either a limited number of LGAs (BBFH, ACCERV), communities (PWA) or both (PIRV). To some extent, this observation contrasts with the desire expressed by 6 out of our 9 key informants to see their organization’s activities expanded to a wider number of communities and LGAs. Moreover, considerations related to the proportionate dosage of program activities should not outshine the necessity of preventing spill-over effects from conflict in neighbouring LGAs and communities. In particular, several interviewees also underlined the importance of reaching out to communities usually described as “no-go areas”, in which few organizations usually implement projects.

Beyond the question of geographical dosage, our sample does not allow us to address the question of the cumulative impact of different types of peacebuilding interventions, such as programs focused on Reconciliation, Security Sector Reform (SSR), Violent Extremism or Early Warning. Several interviewees have stressed that peacebuilding impact is not based on the results achieved by one single project, but rather on “the cumulative...
impact over the years of different projects building different capacities, different relationships in different sectors.”

However, it remains difficult to discern how and which specific types of peacebuilding interventions add up to each other, in line with the findings of the CDA Collaborative Learning Projects’ work on the cumulative impact of peacebuilding efforts.  

### RELATIONAL DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONS AND THE TARGET COMMUNITIES

The dynamics at play between the implementing organizations and the target communities were cited by 7 out of 9 key informants as a central factor explaining a program’s effectiveness. For these interviewees, the existence of a relationship of trust between the target communities and the implementation organization is particularly important. Several Search program staff stressed, for instance, that Search had been awarded some grants thanks to its favourable reputation in Plateau State and the trusting relationship established with local communities. One interviewee eloquently compared this phenomenon to a “virtuous circle”, in which the positive perception of the organization’s work among the population ensures positive results, which themselves sustain its good reputation. To some extent, the issue of trust is also related to the question of dosage, as it is of course easier for an organization to gain the confidence of a smaller number of communities. This confidence is also earned through the establishment of working partnerships with local organizations. Indeed, one key informant explained that “people listen more, because these are their people, not outsiders telling them about peace”. Finally, interviewees have also described the role played by participatory decision-making and implementation in building trust between the implementing organization and the target communities.

The contribution of trust and local ownership to program effectiveness should not be underestimated - indeed, it may explain why the SGGPB and the CR-CSO programs, which were both implemented by local organizations, were correlated with such positive trends in fatalities, despite having much smaller budgets than most interventions carried by INGOs such as Search.

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92 Mulmi R. Interview with Ferbach S. July 2020.
94 Mulmi R. Interview with Ferbach S. July 2020.
95 Bentu, S. Interview with Ferbach, S. July 2020.
TARGET GROUPS

While we have limited information on how different types of peacebuilding interventions add up to each other, our sample does underline some complementarity between different types of peacebuilding activities. Indeed, all of the most effective programs in our sample strike a balance between activities which engage both “more people” and “key people”. On the one hand, many of our informants stressed the need to identify and target “key people” with their intervention. Key stakeholders are usually involved in capacity-building training which are then stepped-down to their communities, or in multi-stakeholders peace structures. For instance, CAJR purposely targets participants because of “the central role they play, either as perpetrators or as influential people in their community”. Two Search program staff, representing the BBFH and the PIRV, similarly explained that identifying “the right target really helped making the project effective”, underlining particularly the role played by women leaders as well as community and religious leaders.

On the other hand, it also appears clearly that focusing solely on “key people” can negatively influence the effectiveness of a peacebuilding intervention. For instance, the PEW program only targeted a limited number of Early Warning focal points and security, government and NGO key stakeholders. Although the program was also originally meant to include a public outreach component aimed at mobilizing community residents in support of peace, funding for this aspect was ultimately limited to only US$1000. As a result, the PEW program exclusively engaged “key people”, which partly explains its inability to positively influence conflict trends.

To counterbalance the focus on “key people”, 4 out of the 6 effective interventions used media programming to engage with “more people”. Two other interventions relied also on community engagement through participatory theatre, and one used awareness campaigns. Three media interventions relied on radio programming exclusively, with only one program involving mobile cinema screening and TV programming as well. Our sample suggests that media activities can greatly contribute to a peacebuilding intervention’s effectiveness, provided that those activities are implemented in a timely manner and benefit from high listener- and viewership. The radio programming broadcasted as part of the PIRV interventions, for instance, was very popular and benefited from high listenership, thus effectively contributing to enhanced understanding of the conflict among community residents. On the other hand, the effectiveness of media activities was clearly reduced in other interventions, due to either limited production and broadcasting time (BBFH, CDPB) or to low listener- and viewership (PWA, ACCERV). One informant stressed the need to take a cost-effective approach to designing media programs, based on a reflection on audience and reach. She underlined that “there is no point broadcasting through a media house that is cheaper but with a limited reach” but that, at the same time, her organizations had chosen to spend more money on broadcasting through a media house with expensive rates and limited reach, but whose main audience was among the key target group of the program.

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97 Peter, G. Interview with Ferbach, S. July 2020.
98 Bentu, S. Interview with Ferbach, S. July 2020.
### Refining our understanding of cost-effectiveness

The respondent quoted above was one of the few who clearly articulated a reflection on cost-effectiveness, which takes into account an intervention’s impact relative to the resources invested in it. Indeed, when asked about cost-effectiveness, most respondents looked at this issue solely from the perspective of economy and gave examples of how their teams had cut costs by saving on accommodation, food, or transportation services.

Yet, cost-effectiveness should not necessarily primarily be understood through this lens - cost-effectiveness is not about finding the cheaper option, but rather about intentionally and strategically choosing the option which ensures that resources are used efficiently, in a manner that guarantees that our interventions have the greatest impact possible. For instance, in the case of media activities, a cost-effective approach does not necessarily involve picking the cheapest radio station or TV channel to broadcast our programming, but rather the one which will help us achieve the greatest impact on our target population.

Finally, a program’s degree of inclusion in its choice of target group was also identified by 7 out of 9 of our informants as a key factor of effectiveness. Many of them stressed the need to work across group divides, and to engage with marginalized groups such as children and youth, women, and people living with disabilities. Beyond issues of inclusion, it also appears that interventions which make use of adaptive management in their selection of target groups are also more effective than others. For instance, the PIRV program, which was highly effective, had originally planned to include only religious leaders in training on conflict management. However, participants selection was then expanded to better address the evolving local conflict dynamics, and included women, youth, CSO representatives, journalists, security sector, and government officials. The PIRV program further adapted to also include motorcycle taxi drivers and young male petty traders, especially those affected by substance abuse, in its training and community initiatives. Similarly, staff involved in the implementation of the PWA and the BBFH program stressed that new actors were brought along in peace structures as the project went on, such as the local lawyers, market, or even road transport associations.

### SUSTAINABILITY OF THE INTERVENTION

Finally, and somewhat unsurprisingly, all interviewees considered that an intervention’s sustainability is a crucial factor for its effectiveness. Interviewees mentioned at least three ways in which an intervention’s sustainability can be guaranteed. First, making activities participatory can drastically increase the ownership and therefore the sustainability of the intervention. Giving the example of participatory theatre session, a CAJR staff member explained:

> “People of the community were trained in acting, they were then able to participate in the drama, which we felt would give them ownership in the process – if they are participating in the drama, they are both learning and educating themselves, and becoming agents of their future as well as peace agents and ambassadors in their communities.”

- Gad Peter, Centre for the Advocacy of Justice and Rights

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100 DFID. DFID’s Approach to Value for Money (VfM). July 2011.
Similarly, community members were often asked to participate directly in peace radio shows. Beyond these cultural activities, many interviewees also stressed the importance of involving key stakeholders and community members in the decision-making process and the design of the interventions. In particular, several Search staff members mentioned its particular emphasis on participatory design and local ownership.

Second, training and capacity building, either with CSOs or with community leaders, were not only a component of all of the 8 programs in our sample, but also recognized by 8 out of 9 key informants as a major factor contributing to sustainability and thus to program effectiveness. Several interviewees mentioned that one of the goals of their program was to ensure that, after its completion, communities would be able to plan a meeting, a project or a budget on their own, which ensures increased effectiveness both for current and future programs. Many capacity-building initiatives also focused more specifically on equipping communities with tools to address conflict in non-violent ways, such as community mediation and dialogue.

One final way to ensure a program’s sustainability and effectiveness is to promote the institutionalisation of the structures created as part of the intervention. There are at least two ways in which the institutionalisation of peace structures can be promoted by implementing organization. One way was to involve local or state governments in the activities and/or the implementation of the project, either as stakeholders in the peace structures, or as their official host. Favouring involvement and ownership by local authorities ensures that peace structures persist when project funding is no longer available, but also that skills and capacities are shared between peacebuilding organizations and governments. Finally, a number of organizations have also engaged in advocacy and political engagement efforts as part of their peacebuilding interventions. 2 interviewees in particular mentioned that their advocacy work had led to the creation of the Plateau Peacebuilding Agency in 2016.

Donors also have an important role to play in favouring the sustainability of the interventions they fund through providing flexible support and resources to their grantees. For instance, one interviewee described that her organization had received an extension of 9 million nairas (US $237,000) in order to continue to monitor the peace structures it had established and ensure that they had received sufficient training to remain in place and effectively prevent conflict beyond the end of the project.

“Most of the money should go to training, capacity building and empowerment of the community – as [...] the whole thing is upon them to manage. We believe in building community members’ capacities, so they can manage friction [themselves].”
- Nelson Ananze, Community Action for Popular Participation

“[When we think about] increasing peacebuilding effectiveness, we normally focus on project implementation, but my lesson learned would be that it always helps to build in an advocacy component – working not just at the level of horizontal but also vertical cohesion, trying to build a bridge between the policy and the practice”
- Rajendra Mulmi, Search for Common Ground
Assessing the return on investment associated with peacebuilding

KEY FINDINGS

1. While not all peacebuilding interventions are effective, well-designed programs can and do have a positive impact on conflict trends. As such, greater cumulative investments in peacebuilding can prevent the escalation of violence and reverse trends of conflict, as shown by the comparative example of Plateau and Benue State.

2. The return on investment of peacebuilding interventions is truly significant, as peacebuilding does not only save lives but also contributes to the return of displaced people and the mitigation of conflict’s impact on people’s livelihoods, income and access to primary services, thus clearly reducing the need for humanitarian interventions.

Building on the findings of the previous section of this study, we provide some preliminary reflections on the return on investment associated with peacebuilding. Of the 8 programs evaluated in the last section, at least 6 can be said to have effectively contributed to mitigating violence. While not all peacebuilding programs are successful in preventing conflict, it clearly appears that well-designed peacebuilding interventions can and do positively impact conflict trends and violence.

Considering the contributions to preventing violence made by individual peacebuilding interventions, it is reasonable to claim that a region which benefits from significant investments in peacebuilding should experience less violent scenarios of conflict than a region which hasn’t received such investments. Based on Figure 2 and 3 above, we know that significantly more efforts in favour of peace have been undertaken in Plateau State than in Benue State by local, state, national, and international actors alike between 2010 and today. We should therefore expect these states to have followed opposite trajectories of violence over this period.

Based on the two figures below, we can see that Plateau and Benue State have indeed followed opposite trajectories of conflict. While both states have experienced a peak in violence around 2018 and some degree of instability over the period, the trend lines indicate that monthly fatalities and conflict events have decreased between 2010 and today in Plateau State, while they have significantly increased in Benue.
These trends suggest that greater investments in peacebuilding do indeed prevent the escalation of violence and reverse trends of conflict, thus saving hundreds of lives, as shown by Table 6 below.

102 Ibidem
Table 9. Average monthly fatalities in Plateau and Benue State, 2010-2014 and 2015-2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010 to 2014</th>
<th>2015 to 2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plateau State</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue State</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is also evidence that there are now much more Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Benue State than in Plateau State. In December 2019, the International Organization for Migration indeed estimated that there were more than 180,000 IDPs in Benue, compared with around 103,000 in Plateau. Similarly, 4 key informants representative of 4 different programs mentioned that their intervention has led to the return of formerly displaced individuals and families back to their communities. Moreover, investing in peacebuilding does not only mean that lives are saved and casualties and forced population movements averted. Conflict in the Middle Belt has indeed also led to rising levels of food insecurity, property, and livelihood destruction, which trigger increased needs for aid. We have gathered evidence that those effects of violence can and are mitigated by peacebuilding interventions as well. It has been estimated that, in a scenario of peace between farmers and herders in the Middle Belt, Nigeria would gain up to US $13.7 billion annually in total economic growth, with individual households gaining between 64% and 210% in income. Our KIIs have further confirmed that peacebuilding interventions contribute to development and economic growth in the geographical areas they targeted.

At least 4 of our key informants stressed that economic activity had increased as a result of the opening of communities formerly referred to as “no-go areas”, which favoured free movement, business, and the reopening of shops. One project staff member on the BBFH intervention in particular linked the return of displaced populations to renewed economic activity, and explained that farmers who took part in the project had been encouraged to consider that “everyone that wants development should be inclusive”, which provided incentive for welcoming herders back in their communities. Our key informants for the BBFH and the PWA programs also stressed that children had started going back to school, and even that new schools were developed (including schools for nomadic children) in targeted communities.

Beyond this anecdotal evidence, the two figures below, which are based on data collected by the Afrobarometer public attitudes survey in Nigeria also shed light on the impact of peacebuilding in reducing the effects of violence. Indeed, while the population in both Plateau and Benue reports increasing difficulty of access to education and medical care since 2013, a lesser percentage of people experience such difficulty in Plateau State than in Benue State. While access to primary services worsened in both states between 2013 and 2019, the figures below suggest that greater investments in peacebuilding in Plateau did prevent the situation from worsening even further.

103 Ibidem
106 Chaimang, P., Interview with Ferbach, S. July 2020.
These different elements of evidence suggest that the return on investment associated with peacebuilding interventions is significant, as preventing conflict and violence not only saves lives but also averts forced population movement, contributes to the return of displaced people and mitigates conflict’s impact on people’s livelihoods, income and access to primary services. As such, investing in peacebuilding interventions can significantly reduce the need for humanitarian interventions as well. Yet, as indicated by the table below, most international donors and funders continue to spend only very minimal amounts of money on peacebuilding, compared with humanitarian aid.
Table 10. International spending on humanitarian aid vs. peacebuilding in Nigeria, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Nations</th>
<th>US Foreign Assistance&lt;sup&gt;107&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>European Union&lt;sup&gt;108&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
<td>$US 930,507,304&lt;sup&gt;109&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>US$ 394 M</td>
<td>€ 214,537,775&lt;sup&gt;110&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
<td>$US 2,287,148&lt;sup&gt;111&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>US$ 25 M</td>
<td>€ 11,385,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding (as % of spending on humanitarian aid)</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>107</sup> U.S. Foreign Assistance. Nigeria. Accessible at: [https://www.foreignassistance.gov/explore/country/Nigeria](https://www.foreignassistance.gov/explore/country/Nigeria)

<sup>108</sup> European Commission, EU Aid Explorer. Accessible at: [https://eufinder.ec.europa.eu/](https://eufinder.ec.europa.eu/)


<sup>110</sup> Combines: Material relief assistance & services, Emergency food assistance, relief coordination & support services.

Concluding remarks & recommendations

Finding #1:
There is no strict correlation between the amount of money spent on a program and its effectiveness. As such, the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions does not depend on budget size, but rather on the adequate, intentional and strategic allocation of spending and resources across programmatic activities and needs. Looking at which programmatic factors ensure that peacebuilding interventions have the greatest impact on the mitigation of conflict trends, we found that:

- Interventions which target a number of LGAs and communities that is proportionate to available resources are more effective than interventions which are more spread out.
- Organizations which maintain a relationship of trust with target communities tend to implement more effective peacebuilding interventions.
- Effective peacebuilding interventions strategically engage with both “more people” (especially through media programming) and “key people”, in a manner that is both inclusive and adaptive to the evolving context of the conflict.
- Sustainability goes hand in hand with effectiveness. It can be promoted through peacebuilding approaches which are participatory, promote capacity-building and empowerment among target communities, and develop institutional linkages with local authorities.

RECOMMENDATION #1: Impact-hungry peacebuilding organizations should implement interventions:

- which target a geographical area that is proportionate to available resources, in order to more easily saturate their target stakeholders and beneficiaries through their activities.
- which promote a relationship of trust with target communities, for instance through an emphasis on local ownership and participatory decision-making.
- which strategically engage with both “more people” and “key people” and intentionally foster inclusivity by making sure they do not only target the “usual suspects” or the easy-to-reach communities. In particular, in highly volatile conflict contexts, peacebuilding interventions should be flexible and adaptive enough to bring in new conflict actors and stakeholders as needs emerge throughout the implementation.
- whose design ensures sustainable impact, for instance through capacity-building and empowerment of target communities, but also through the promotion of vertical cohesion and institutional linkages with local, state and national authorities.

RECOMMENDATION #2: Donors should not only fund and support the peacebuilding interventions described above, but do so in a way that promotes adaptive management. Flexible funding can help peacebuilding organizations implement programs which are adaptable to volatile conflict trends and tailored to the specific and often changing needs of conflict stakeholders. In particular, supporting cost extensions and funding subsequent project phases can help ensure that peacebuilding organizations build on established foundations of trust and leave behind
sustainable structures and networks in support of peace. Donors should also promote an understanding of cost-effectiveness which does not necessarily prioritize spending the least amount of money possible, but rather emphasizes an intentional, strategic and smart allocation of resources across programmatic activities and needs.

**Finding #2:**
While not all peacebuilding interventions are effective, well-designed programs can and do have a positive impact on conflict trends. Considering the contributions to peace made by individual peacebuilding interventions, it is not surprising that Plateau State, which has received more investments in peacebuilding between 2010 and 2020, has experienced a decrease in violent conflict. On the contrary, Benue State, which has received significantly less investments in peacebuilding, has followed an opposite scenario of increasing violence. The return on investment associated with peacebuilding interventions is truly significant, as it does not only save lives but also prevents forced population movements and contributes to the return of displaced people and the mitigation of conflict’s impact on people’s livelihoods, income and access to primary services, thus clearly reducing the need for humanitarian interventions.

**RECOMMENDATION #3:** Donors should invest more heavily in peacebuilding, as it does not only mitigate violence and save lives but also reduces the need for humanitarian interventions. As such, it would be reasonable for donors to reallocate a portion of current spending on humanitarian aid to peacebuilding efforts, which currently represent only about 2% of total ODA to conflict-affected countries.

**Finding #3:**
The methodology tested in this research study indicates great potential for the use of conflict event data such as that provided by the ACLED dataset for the evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding. In particular, the use of data on predominant conflict actors and types of conflict events, as well as qualitative data from program evaluations and KIs can help us partially address the challenge of attributing observed conflict trends to a specific program. It however remains difficult to fully attribute those results to one intervention. We need to continue to test this methodology on a greater sample of peacebuilding interventions in order to draw stronger conclusions on the issue of peacebuilding cost-effectiveness and be able to compare more diverse approaches to peacebuilding.

**RECOMMENDATION #4:** Academic institutions and organizations engaged in research efforts should continue to promote the production and collection of granular data on conflict events and fatalities, if possible at the city or community level, in order to produce more substantive analyses of the contribution of peacebuilding interventions to conflict trends. Peacebuilding organizations can particularly support the production of such data by including more granular data in their program evaluations, through the differentiation of specific locations and communities of implementation. Granular data on social cohesion and access to primary services would also help better understand the impact of peacebuilding not only on violence, but also on its effects on society.
Future research on the issue of peacebuilding cost-effectiveness should also consider evaluating a larger sample of peacebuilding interventions, in order to both cover a wider range of peacebuilding categories and more easily compare the contribution of peace made by different types of peacebuilding interventions.

**RECOMMENDATION #5:** Donors should encourage peacebuilding organizations to share their program evaluation and cost data more openly, in order to support more collaborative and therefore more effective research on the issue of peacebuilding cost-effectiveness in the future.
Appendices

Appendix 1. List of Key Informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lantana Abdullahi</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
<td>Plateau Will Arise!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson Ananze</td>
<td>Community Action for Popular Participation</td>
<td>Community-Driven Peacebuilding in Plateau State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuella Atsen</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
<td>Plateau Will Arise!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah Bentu</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
<td>Preventing Inter-Religious Violence in Plateau State, Plateau Will Arise, Building Bridges between Farmers and Herders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patience Chaimang</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
<td>Building Bridges between Farmers and Herders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajendra Mulmi</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
<td>Building Bridges between Farmers and Herders, Plateau Will Arise!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alisho Ogbu</td>
<td>YIAVHA</td>
<td>Intergenerational Storytelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gad Peter</td>
<td>Centre for Advocacy of Justice and Rights</td>
<td>The Central Role of CSO in the Strategy for Lasting Peace in Jos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatima Suleiman</td>
<td>Islamic Counselling Initiative of Nigeria</td>
<td>Security, Good Governance and Community Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 2. Responses to conflict in Plateau State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Response description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialogue, Reconciliation and Peace Centre</td>
<td>Founded in 2011</td>
<td>Interfaith dialogue, peace education, women's empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Advocacy of Justice and Rights</td>
<td>Founded in 2007</td>
<td>Promotion of Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism, fundamental human rights, rule of law and good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Initiative Network</td>
<td>Founded in 2004</td>
<td>Peace Clubs for youth in schools and colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Founded</td>
<td>Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Peace Advancement in Nigeria (CEPAN)</td>
<td>Founded in 2004</td>
<td>Youth peace clubs; training of trainers in peacebuilding, conflict analysis and mediation; hosts the Plateau Peace Practitioners Network, a coalition of local and international NGOs working in Plateau State to prevent violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Action for Popular Participation</td>
<td>Founded in 1993</td>
<td>Community driven dialogue and peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interfaith Mediation Centre</td>
<td>Founded in 1995</td>
<td>Capacity building in peacebuilding, interfaith dialogue, Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Governance and Social Research (IGRS)</td>
<td>Founded in 1995</td>
<td>Capacity-building with security sector, community and religious leaders; Youth Peace Camps; Women for Peace groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Development and Peace Caritas</td>
<td>Since 2010</td>
<td>Promoting Community Participation for Conflict Management - joint projects, conflict management Early Warning System in conjunction with Operation Rainbow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Counselling Initiatives of Nigeria</td>
<td>Since 2006</td>
<td>Interfaith community peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Initiative Against Violence and Human Rights Abuses (YIAVHA)</td>
<td>Since 2016</td>
<td>Youth engagement for sustainable peace and development through peace building, protection of human rights, promoting good governance and research and documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Task Force - Operation Safe Haven</td>
<td>2010 to present</td>
<td>Deployment of military forces to address farmer-herder conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC)</td>
<td>Regular deployments of paramilitary forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conciliation Resources</td>
<td>Since 2014</td>
<td>Youth Peace Platforms; training in conflict analysis, peacebuilding and mediation for farmers and herders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>2014 to 2018</td>
<td>Women's inclusion, gender-sensitive media reporting, Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP (Jos)</td>
<td>Since 2013</td>
<td>Post-conflict rehabilitation; Early Warning System (Jos Peace Platform)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Dialogue Centre (Jos North, Jos South, Barkin Ladi, Riyom, LN, LS, Mikang, Shendam, Qua’an Pan, Wase)</td>
<td>Since 2013</td>
<td>Intercommunal dialogue with CSOs, federal, state and local authorities, business community, traditional rulers, youth and women (Jos Forum Inter-Communal Dialogue Process); Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Advancing the Conversation on the Cost-Effectiveness of Peacebuilding

UK Department for International Development

2012 to 2017

Nigerian Stability and Reconciliation Program (NSRP) - capacity building, conflict management, women's inclusion

Mercy Corps

2012 to 2016, 2013 to 2016, 2018 to 2019

Community-Based Conflict Management and Cooperative Use of Resource (CONCUR) - conflict mitigation, joint economic projects (Jos, Barkin Ladi, Riyom)
Inter-Religious Peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria (Barkin Ladi, Bokkos)
Community Cohesion in a Digital Space pilot

Search for Common Ground

Several programs from 2011 to 2018

Security sector reform, reconciliation, institutional strengthening, justice and accountability, early warning, violent extremism

Appendix 3. Responses to conflict in Benue State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Description of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Religion Initiative</td>
<td>March 2017</td>
<td>2-day leadership training with 47 young men and women in Makurdi, drawn from URI's Cooperation Circles (grassroots groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House of Hilkiah Foundation</td>
<td>Founded in 2016</td>
<td>Women's inclusion, capacity-building and training in peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Environmental Programme, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, UNDP</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Conflict mapping of farmer-herder crises in Guma and Makurdi LGAs, followed by a multi-stakeholder dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil organizations Research Advocacy and Funding Initiatives Development (CORAFID)</td>
<td>Since 2002</td>
<td>Community peacebuilding, children human rights protection, women's rights to public participation (Women's Situation Room Nigeria project with WILPF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue State Government</td>
<td>October 2017</td>
<td>Open Grazing Prohibition and Establishment of Ranches Law - law banning the unrestricted grazing of cattle and calling instead for cattle to be reared in ranches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue State Government</td>
<td>Since May 2015</td>
<td>Amnesty Program enable owners of illegal weapons to surrender their arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Whirl Stroke</td>
<td>Since May 2018</td>
<td>Deployment of military forces to counter &quot;herdsmen&quot; attacks and other criminal activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation AyemAkpatuma (Cat Race)</td>
<td>February to March 2018</td>
<td>Military raids on communities, groups, and persons suspected of violence or criminal activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International</strong></td>
<td><strong>Livestock Special Task Force</strong></td>
<td>Since 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Dialogue Centre and Clingendael Academy</strong></td>
<td>Since 2018</td>
<td>Mediation process, training of community mediators for AFAN (All Farmer Association Nigeria) and MACBAN (Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria) leadership in 9 communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNCHR - Benue NGO Network (BENGONET)</strong></td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1-day peacebuilding training on Strengthening Mechanisms for Sustainable Peace between farmers and herders in Nigeria for community leaders, youths and Civilian Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mercy Corps</strong></td>
<td>2015 to 2019</td>
<td>Engaging Communities for Peace - mediation training, dialogue forums, joint projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mercy Corps</strong></td>
<td>2012 to 2016</td>
<td>Community-Based Conflict Management and Cooperative Use of Resource (CONCUR) - conflict mitigation and joint economic projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Author’s biography

**Sarah Ferbach** is the Learning Agenda Fellow on the Institutional Learning Team at Search for Common Ground. In her current position, she contributes to research on cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding and supports various monitoring, evaluation and learning activities. Prior to working for Search, she co-authored a report on the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda for the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and conducted independent research on the inclusion of a gender perspective in the 2016 Colombian peace agreement. Sarah holds a B.A. in Political Science from Cardiff University and Sciences Po Bordeaux and is currently completing a Master’s degree in International Relations from Sciences Po Bordeaux.
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