



**FINAL EVALUATION**

**Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika II**  
**A Dual Approach to Effective SSR**

**NOVEMBER 2020**

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## Abbreviations

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<b>ANR</b>	Agence Nationale de Renseignements (National Intelligence Agency)
<b>KAP</b>	Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey
<b>CdB</b>	Comités de Base (Base Committee)
<b>CCP</b>	Comité de Coordination Provincial (Provincial Coordination Committee)
<b>CDS</b>	Commission Défense et Sécurité (Defence and Security Commission)
<b>DME</b>	Design, Monitoring & Evaluation
<b>DGM</b>	Direction générale des migrations (General Directorate of migration)
<b>FARDC</b>	Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo)
<b>FG</b>	Focus Group
<b>KII</b>	Key informant interviews
<b>LMYS</b>	Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika (Today is a new day)
<b>KNSM</b>	Kesho Ni Siku Mupya (Tomorrow is another day)
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>PNC</b>	Police Nationale Congolaise (Congolese National Police)
<b>PROVAH</b>	ONG Promotion de valeurs humaines (NGO Promotion of human values)
<b>RSS</b>	Security Sector Reform
<b>RRSSJ</b>	Le Réseau pour la Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité et de Justice (The Network for Security and Justice Sector Reform)
<b>SCIFA</b>	Service de Communication et d'Information des FARDC (Communication and Information Service of the FARDC)
<b>SECAS</b>	Service d'Éducation Civique, Patriotique et d'Action Sociale (Civic Education, Patriotic and Social Action Service)
<b>Search</b>	Search for Common Ground (= " Centre Lololé ")

## Executive Summary

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### Introduction

This study is the final evaluation of the replication of the Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika (LMYS) II program in the provinces of Tanganyika and Haut Katanga with the support of the *US State Department's* Bureau of African Affairs under the name "**Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika II - A Dual Approach to an Effective SSR**".

The overall goal of the project is to improve Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) capacity to protect civilian populations through positive civil-military relations and increased understanding of and respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law<sup>1</sup>.

The project was implemented between October 2018 and October 2020 by the Kalemie office of Search for Common Ground (Search). It targeted, in the province of Tanganyika: the city of Kalemie, the territory of Kalemie, the territory of Nyunzu, the territory of Moba and, in the province of Haut-Katanga: the territory of Pweto and the territory of Mitwaba. Some activities were also performed in the training centers of the FARDC of Kamina and Mura.

The overall objective of this evaluation, as described in the terms of reference, is "**to examine the process of project implementation to determine its impact**". It is supported by the following specific objectives:

1. Provide information on the level of achievement of project objectives and expected results;
2. Understand the level of sustainability of the intervention;
3. Understanding the impact of the project in the SSR in Tanganyika and Haut Katanga".<sup>2</sup>

The study was carried out by a **team of consultants based in Switzerland and the DRC**. It follows a mixed method combining qualitative and quantitative data, based on:

- Analysis of project documents, activity reports and quarterly reports. This information was supplemented by exchanges with the project team.
- The conduct of a standardized questionnaire survey with 362 civilians and 120 FARDC soldiers.
- The conduct of 17 Focus Groups (FG) with civilians (men, women, Twa populations) and the FARDC (men or women).
- The conduct of 24 semi-structured interviews with key informants (KIIs) among administrative authorities, civil society, community leaders, and representatives of the security forces.

### Limitations

1. Due to a very ambitious schedule and financial limitations, **not all of the localities included in the project could be covered by this evaluation**. The data collection thus prioritized the localities with the highest volume of activities and for which data had been collected for the baseline study, namely Kabimba, Nyunzu, Pweto and Moba, as well as Kalemie, but only for the qualitative part.

2. The frequent and **important movements of FARDC** in the region represented the main limitation in the data collection process. A majority of the FARDC components that participated in project activities were no longer present at the time of the evaluation. This problem occurred mainly in Moba and Pweto. It had the effect of considerably reducing the FARDC sample, and thus the statistical robustness of the data collected.

3. On the whole, the quantitative **data collected benefit from strong internal consistency**. However, the wording of some questions may have caused significant interviewers' or social desirability bias. This concerns questions that had been kept as they were in the baseline study to allow for comparative analysis.

### Key Findings

The LMYS 2 project took place in a **very unstable political, security and health context** which negatively impacted its implementation. The efficiency analysis shows that despite these difficulties, **all the activities planned for the main components of the project could be organized**. These activities are the establishment and operationalization of Comité de Base (CdBs) (A.1.2), the production and broadcasting of

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<sup>1</sup> Proposal to Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (AF), Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika - A Dual Approach to an Effective SSR

<sup>2</sup> See Terms of Reference, "Consultant for final evaluation "Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika - A Dual Approach to an Effective SSR" published by Search

radio programs (A.2.1), the organization of civil-military activities such as cinema, sport and community work (A.2.1.2), and finally the coaching of civilian and military journalists (A.2.2.1).

These activities were implemented in the different project localities with a comparatively higher volume for the localities of Kalemie and Kabimba, for reasons of logistical access and security. The intervention was generally limited to the urban centers and few activities were carried out in the rest of the province, including in the FARDC operational areas where many cases of abuses are to be deplored.

**These activities reached a significant number of participants** (87 percent of civilians and 93 percent of FARDC interviewed on a random basis for the evaluation), including systematically a higher proportion of FARDC than civilians, with the exception of the radio program audience.

**The quality of these activities was judged favorably, with an average of 99% of the FARDC and 90% of civilians** expressing a "positive" or "very positive" opinion about them. Community work and soccer activities were particularly praised during the FG and KIIs as excellent opportunities to build interpersonal relationships between civilians and the FARDC. The data for the five outcome indicators for "civil-military" activities (A2.1) score an average of 46 percentage points higher than in the baseline study. However, in the case of FARDC sensitization via the CdB (A1.2), the average points obtained in a summary knowledge test do not show a significant improvement over the results of the baseline study. The indicator related to this activity even shows a decrease of two percentage points compared to the baseline study.

**The main challenge** encountered in the implementation of these activities **concerns the frequent rotation of FARDC elements in the** different localities, forcing Search to start over several times the work of constitution and training of the CdBs. This element can be considered an inherent part of any SSR program and should lead to a strategic adaptation of Search's programs.

**Other components of the project experienced more problematic implementation.** These are the validation and dissemination of the new SECAS training curriculum (A.1.1.1) as well as the advocacy work for SSR among parliamentarians at the national and provincial levels (A.2.3). Due to reorganizations and internal bureaucratic burdens within the FARDC, these activities were postponed throughout the project period, only to be partially implemented in the final weeks of the project. In the case of advocacy for SSR, due to a lack of internal expertise within Search, a partnership was developed with a local partner but the latter was not able to fulfill its commitments.

On the basis of the data collected between the baseline study and the final evaluation, **the impact analysis shows an undeniable improvement in the behavior of the FARDC (SO1) and a progress in civil-military relations (OG).** The values of the impact indicators covering these themes are on average 31 percentage points higher than in the baseline study and all but one indicator exceed the project's target values. Data from the focus groups and interviews allow for a clear causal link between project activities and the measured impact, thus validating the theory of change. **The mutual accountability (SO2) indicator is the only one to show a 17 percentage points decline from the baseline study.** This result is probably explained by the situation of legal impunity from which the FARDC are benefiting more than ever in the zone. Because the project prioritized issues of informal accountability through intervention with FARDC commanders and legal or traditional authorities, its impact was only partial.

The analysis of transversal criteria such as inclusiveness, "Do No Harm" and sustainability, however, highlight some problematic elements inherent in the design and implementation of the project.

It faces **significant limitations in terms of inclusiveness of women, less privileged social categories and lower-ranking FARDC.** This situation cannot be attributed to a discriminatory logic of Search, but to a design of activities that are more attractive to men, such as soccer and community work, or more easily accessible to educated people, such as local security diagnostics or open days at the military tribunal.

Despite the very unstable context in the area, **the project did not involve any recurring protection problems related to the interaction between civilians and the FARDC.** The purely civil-military relations logic of the intervention forced nevertheless the team to consider issues of social cohesion in an ad-hoc and reactive manner, generating marginal critiques of parity.

**Finally, the sustainability analysis demonstrates the project's weaknesses in this regard.** Only a minority of 33% of civilians participated in civil-military activities without Search's support, despite the high replication potential of soccer matches or community work. The CdB being the main structures in charge of organizing these activities, the rate rises to 72% in the FARDC. These results highlight the crucial lack of a local coordination structure for activities involving not only the FARDC, but also civil authorities and community leaders. In addition, the very short timeframe of 18 months, not counting the many

interruptions for political, security or health reasons, has largely limited the possibilities for creating sustainable behavioral change in the communities. Finally, it is unfortunate that the crucial component of national and provincial advocacy for SSR is only covered in the framework of this project, whereas this type of activity must necessarily be long-term to be successful.

# 1. Project Background

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## 1.1 Project Strategy

This study concerns a replication of the Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika (LMYS) II program in the provinces of Tanganyika and Haut Katanga with the support of the *US State Department's* Bureau of African Affairs under the name "***Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika II - A Dual Approach to an Effective SSR***".

The project aims to "Improve the capacity of the FARDC to protect civilian populations through positive civil-military relations and increased understanding and respect for human rights and international humanitarian law<sup>3</sup>."

The **Theory of Change** for this project rests on two pillars:

**If** the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) have a better understanding of civilian protection and can effectively put it into practice, **and**

**If** they are able and willing to interact constructively with civilians, holding each other accountable,

**Then** respect for human rights (HR) and international humanitarian law (IHL) will be improved, ultimately improving the relationship between the population and the FARDC and the FARDC's ability to protect civilians.

The project was implemented between October 2018 and October 2020 by the Kalemie office of Search for Common Ground (Search). It targeted, in the province of Tanganyika, the city of Kalemie, the territory of Kalemie, the territory of Nyunzu, the territory of Moba and, in the province of Haut-Katanga, the territory of Pweto and the territory of Mitwaba. Some activities were also performed in the training centers of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) of Kamina and Mura.

## 1.2 Baseline Study

A baseline study<sup>4</sup> was conducted during the launch phase of the activities with the objective of providing information on the initial situation in the implementation area, including basic indicator data. It was coupled with a "Survey on Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices" (KAP) aimed at examining in detail the specificities of civil-military relations in the zone. A risk and "Do no harm" analyses were also conducted.

The development of the tools and the collection of data in the field was managed by Search's EMR unit. Data analysis and writing of this report was then contracted out to an external consultant, in this case Lucas Grandjean, author of the present report. The data were collected between March and April 2019 using a mixed methodology combining an essentially qualitative questionnaire, Focus Groups (FG) and Key Informant Interviews (KII).

The main conclusions are:

- An extremely problematic relationship between civilians and the FARDC in the area characterized by the prevalence of abuses against civilians and a lack of mutual trust between civilians and the FARDC, including in day-to-day interactions.
- A very partial knowledge of the FARDC of their duties, including in terms of respect for human rights and International humanitarian law.
- Strong adherence to the project theory by both civilian (83.7%) and FARDC (99%) respondents.

The evaluation therefore concluded that the intervention was appropriate, while noting some important issues:

- Protection risks inherent in bringing civilian women into contact with FARDC elements and insufficient consideration of women in the design of activities.
- The limitation of a binary "Civilians vs. FARDC" approach that neglects the long-lasting problematic relations between the different communities in the implementation area.

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<sup>3</sup> Proposal to Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (AF), Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika - A Dual Approach to an Effective SSR

<sup>4</sup> Baseline study & analysis of knowledge, attitudes and practices, "Lobi mokolo ya sika II a dual approach to effective SRH", May 2019

- A partial match between the project strategy and the needs expressed by the FARDC, which are mostly structural and inherent advantages of their pay, equipment and deployment conditions.

The present study therefore aims to make a comparison between the situations before and after the project, particularly through the evolution of the data of the results and impact indicators.

### 1.3 Project Implementation

#### Background

Political situation:

The first quarter of the project (Q4-2018) was marked by the presidential and legislative elections. These took place in a situation of relative calm, with the exception of a notable incident in Kalemie when the visit of an opposition candidate led to violent demonstrations at the airport. However, the electoral context resulted in a delay in the start of almost all project activities during the last quarter of 2018. The delays and uncertainties in the establishment of the national and provincial assemblies, but also of the various parliamentary commissions, during the first quarter of 2019 have delayed the implementation of activities that require the involvement of parliamentarians.

Security situation:

During the entire period of implementation of the activities, most of the project areas were marked by a situation of insecurity. This is mainly due to clashes between armed groups among themselves and/or with the FARDC, in a context of very high community tensions between the Bantu and Twa/Mbote populations. After a phase of relative calm during the second half of 2019, the security situation deteriorated sharply again in 2020:

- The Kalemie-Bendera axis has been characterized by the presence of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba, who have been responsible for many cases of attacks, including against humanitarian workers. Movements were therefore impossible on this axis during most of the project.
- In the northern part of Nyunzu territory operate the Mai Mai Apa na Pale and Malaika, which have their rear base in the south of Maniema province. In addition, almost everywhere else in the territory, major clashes between Bantu and Twa communities were deplored between the 2nd and 3rd quarter of 2020. Most of the activities had to be suspended during this period and all international NGOs had to temporarily leave the area.
- In the Pweto-Mitwaba region, the presence of Mai-Mai Gideon troops has had an impact on movements between the two localities, especially from the 2nd quarter of 2020.
- In the city of Kalemie, a high level of criminality was reported. A network has terrorized the population since 2018 by practicing armed robberies, assassinations and other crimes, fueling waves of uprisings and popular justice. According to Civil Society, this network was largely composed of undisciplined members of the PNC and FARDC. It was eventually dismantled, but this situation greatly deteriorated the relationship between the population and the military.
- Finally, in the territory of Moba, the Zambian army's incursion into Congolese territory from the beginning of 2020 caused significant population movements and involved the massive redeployment of the FARDC affected in the area.

Covid-19:

In the context of global pandemic, most of the project's activities had to be suspended during the second quarter of 2020 before resuming with limitations in the third quarter of 2020. During the last two quarters of the project, the directives in force concerning the number of participants in events greatly reduced the volume of activities.

Fig 1: Major contextual events during the project implementation period

Territory	Q4-2018	Q1-2019	Q2-2019	Q3-2019	Q4-2019	Q1-2020	Q2-2020	Q3-2020
Whole area	Presidential Elections						Covid-19	
Kalemie	Urban crime							


Kabimba	Insecurity on the axis Kalemie - Bendera			
Nyunzu	Military operations in the north of the territory against armed groups May-May			Inter community clashes
Moba				Military incursion by Zambia
Pweto	Insecurity on the Pweto - Mitwaba axis			

**FARDC staff**

Given the very unstable and rapidly changing security context in the DRC in general, and in Tanganyika and Haut Katanga in particular, the FARDC elements deployed in the project locations were subject to significant and frequent rotations. In the third quarter of 2019, a significant portion of the infantry of the 22nd Brigade stationed in Kalemie, Nyunzu, Moba, and Mitwaba was redeployed to Beni. In the face of mounting insecurity resulting from the decline of the FARDC presence, other battalions were finally deployed to replace them in these localities. These troop movements had a crucial effect on project activities. In contrast to the infantry, the marine troops deployed in Kabimba, Moba, and Pweto are more stable and often have been in place for several years.

In addition, the very limited number (3) of military journalists assigned to SCIFA reduced the ability to cover all target areas in the coaching work for the filming of the program "Écho Militaire" (see Activity A2.2.1, below).

The data collected (Fig. 2) allows a better understanding of the composition of the FARDCs by locality. They illustrate that in Kabimba and Nyunzu the majority (67%) of the FARDC interviewed have been in post for more than 2 years. They are essentially naval elements, less subject to rotation than the infantry. In Pweto and Moba, however, 34% and 74% of the FARDC have been in post for less than 6 months respectively.



**Organizational Issues**

Initially developed for Kassaï, the LMYS 2 project was transposed to Tanganyika and Haut Katanga very shortly before the start of activities. From then on, the project strategy and the resources allocated to its implementation had to be progressively adapted to a much more complex context in terms of insecurity, infrastructure and inter-community relations. In the first phase of the implementation period, the field teams noted and reported a significant mismatch between the project's objectives and the resources allocated to different budget items. Despite internal administrative delays, the budget was finally able to be adapted to the operational and programmatic constraints of the implementation area.

Other challenges internal to the organization or related to the funding partner have caused delays:

- During the first quarter, recruitment and implementation of the baseline and CAP study was delayed by several months.
- The recruitment of a project manager was subject to significant delays due to difficulties in identifying candidates with sufficient expertise in Security Sector Reform (SSR). The finally recruited project manager resigned after a few months and the bulk of the project was implemented by project assistants supported by the Kalemie head of office.
- The donor contractually requires a vetting of all FARDC components participating in the project and receiving material or financial compensation. This process prior to each activity often took more than a month and complicated project implementation.

## 2. Methodology

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### 2.1 Evaluation Strategy

The objective of this evaluation, as described in the terms of reference, is "to examine the process of project implementation to determine its impact. This overall objective is supported by the specific objectives below:

- Provide information on the level of achievement of project objectives and expected results;
- Understand the level of sustainability of the intervention;
- Understanding the impact of the project in the RSS in Tanganyika and Haut Katanga".<sup>5</sup>

The evaluation is thus based on the three criteria of Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability as developed by the DAC<sup>6</sup> (Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)) to which the transversal criteria of inclusiveness and "Do No Harm" have been added. The list of research questions can be found in the appendix to this report.

#### Data collection and analysis

In order to respond to the limitations of movements related to the cause of COVID-19, as well as to the resources allocated to this evaluation, the evaluation was based on a remote collaboration between three experts:

- Lucas Grandjean, an independent project evaluation consultant based in Switzerland, was responsible for the overall coordination of the evaluation, the development of the tools and the writing of the report.
- Papi Muipatayi, an expert in conducting field studies based in Lubumbashi, managed the entire field data collection process.
- Jan Rosset, researcher in social sciences at the University of Geneva, brought his methodological expertise to the development of the sampling and data analysis.

As Lucas Grandjean and Jan Rosset wrote the baseline study and the Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices (KAP) study for this project using data collected by Search, the final evaluation is developed in a logic of continuity.

The study follows a mixed methodology combining qualitative and quantitative data. Four distinct and complementary methods were applied:

1. Analysis of project documents, activity reports and quarterly reports. This information was supplemented by exchanges with the project team.
2. The conduct of a standardized questionnaire survey with 362 civilians and 120 FARDCs using two separate questionnaires of 32 and 38 closed-ended questions (=> quantitative) and two open-ended questions (=> qualitative), respectively.
3. The conduct of 17 Focus Groups (FG) with civilians (men, women, Twa populations) and the FARDC (men or women). The FGs were conducted using 2 separate lists of 11 and 15 open-ended questions (=> quantitative);
4. The conduct of 24 semi-structured with key informants' interviews (KII) with administrative authorities, civil society, community leaders, officers of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), the Service d'Éducation Civique, Patriotique et d'Action Sociale (SECAS), the FARDC Communication and Information Service (SCIFA), and the National Intelligence Agency (ANR) (=> Qualitative).

In order to meet the challenges of the evaluation, a dual approach to selecting survey participants was developed (Figure 3). It is based, on the one hand, on a random selection from the "random route" model and, on the other hand, on the lists of participants in the activities. In selecting participants from these two groups, the interviewers tried to respect the gender, socio-economic and ethnic balance of the area.

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<sup>5</sup> See Terms of Reference, "Consultant for final evaluation "Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika - A Dual Approach to an Effective SSR" published by Search

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.oecd.org/fr/cad/evaluation/criteres-cad-evaluation.htm>

Fig 3: Sampling method by evaluation objective

	Random Sample		3. List of participants
	1. Non-participants in activities	2. Participants in the activities	
Effectiveness analysis and outcome indicators	X	✓	✓
Impact analysis and SO and GO indicators	✓	✓	X
Transversal analysis (durability, inclusiveness, DNA)	✓	✓	✓

The objective of this approach is to:

1. Ensure a sufficient number of participants in each activity for the effectiveness analysis.
2. But to avoid over-representation of participants in the impact analysis
3. To guarantee a maximum of information for the transversal analysis.


Conduct of the evaluation

For data collection, the team recruited, trained and supervised the interviewers and managed the data collection process.

- Recruitment: Taking gender into account, 4 interviewers (2 men and 2 women) were recruited. The principle was to recruit interviewers who already had experience with similar surveys. The team was thus able to use two databases, one from Search and the other from the Union de Congolais pour la Renaissance (UCR). After training, the interviewers were recruited based on the following criteria: gender, language, understanding of the tool, and understanding of the questionnaires.
- Training: In order to familiarize the interviewers with the survey tools, concepts, objectives and activities, the team conducted a one-day training session. The training was given by three people, including one from Search who was able to present the LMYS II project, in order to make the investigators aware of the project's objectives. The other two trainers were Search consultants who presented the survey tool, the objective, the methodology and the deployment plan.
- Conduct of the surveys: The surveys were conducted over 4 weeks between September 7 and October 3, 2020, on 5 sites, namely in order Kabimba (3 days), Nyunzu (4 days), Moba (6 days), Pweto (3 days) and Kalemie city (3 days).
- Interviewer supervision: To reduce the risk of harvest errors in the field, the team conducted
- Daily debriefings that helped to resolve some of the difficulties in the field. Investigators were provided with adequate logistical support to ensure the efficient conduct of the survey.


Quantitative Sample

The sample size for the quantitative sample of the population is 362 participants (Figure 4). The margin of error for this sample is +- 5.2% for a 95% confidence interval for the overall analysis. For the analysis by locality, this margin of error is approximately +- 12% with the same confidence interval.



Site	List of participants	Random selection	TOTAL:
Kabimba	20	72	<b>92</b>
Nyunzu	20	70	<b>90</b>
Pweto	12	78	<b>90</b>
Moba	10	80	<b>90</b>
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>362</b>

The sample of people interviewed for the quantitative part of the FARDC is 120 participants (Fig. 5). The margin of error for this sample is +- 9% for a 95% confidence interval for the overall analysis. For the analysis by locality, this margin of error is about +- 14% with the same confidence interval.



Site	List of participants	Random selection	TOTAL:
Kabimba	1	8	9
Nyunzu	21	33	54
Pweto	2	36	38
Moba	2	17	19
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>120</b>

Note: An analysis of the representativeness of the Qualitative sample can be found in the Appendix.

### Qualitative Sample

FGs were organized with civilian men and women, as well as with male FARDC in all localities. FARDC women were interviewed as part of FGs when multiple elements were present, or as part of KIIs when only one element was present. An additional FG was organized with members of the Twa community in Nyunzu in view of the very fragile security context in the area.

Fig 6: Distribution of FG by type of population and locality

		Kabimba	Nyunzu	Pweto	Moba	Kalemie	TOTAL:
Civilians	Civilian Men	1	1	1	1	1	5
	Civilian Women	1	1	1	1	1	5
	Civilian Men Twa		1				1
Security forces	FARDC Men	1	1	1	1	1	5
	FARDC Women		1				1
<b>TOTAL:</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>17</b>

KIIs were organized with civilian authorities and FARDC officers in all localities except Kalemie. Direct project participants such as journalists, SECAS, and SCIFA were also interviewed through this means.

Fig 7: Distribution of KIIs by Population Type and Location

		Kabimba	Nyunzu	Pweto	Moba	Kalemie	TOTAL:
Civilians	Civil authorities	1	1	2	2		6
	Civil society					2	2
	Mbote Representative	1					1
	Civilian Journalists		1			1	2
Security forces	FARDC Officers	1	1	2	2	1	7
	FARDC women			2		1	3
	SCIFA					1	1
	SECAS					1	1
	ANR	1					1
<b>TOTAL:</b>		<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>24</b>

## 2.2 Limitations

### Development of evaluation tools

Due to the very ambitious evaluation schedule imposed by Search and delays in recruiting the consultant, the tools developed could not be tested prior to data collection, in accordance with Search standard evaluation guidelines<sup>7</sup>. An important daily debriefing of the interviewers in the field made it possible to correct the formulation problems as much as possible. The data collected proved to be very usable and did not reveal any major problems in understanding the participants.

### Geographical coverage

<sup>7</sup> SFCG Guidelines for External Evaluation, Updated November 2011

For reasons of available resources, a selection of project locations covered by the evaluation was made, in agreement with Search (fig5).

- Although all the activities were implemented in Mitwaba, this locality could not be included in the evaluation due to the lack of logistical accessibility of the area by road. Data from the activity reports were nevertheless included in the effectiveness analysis.
- Since the military training centers of Mura and Kamina were only covered by the training of trainer activity on IHL (A.1.12), which allowed for weekly sensitization activities (A.1.2.3), on-site data collection was not considered relevant.
- The city of Kalemie benefited from a large volume of activities. However, as this was not covered by the baseline study, it was decided not to collect quantitative data in this locality. Nevertheless, a significant number of FG and KII were carried out there in parallel with the study of project reporting data.

Fig 8: Operational and M&E coverage of the project

	<i>Project Activities</i>	Project reporting	Core Study Indicators	Final Evaluation Indicators	FG and KII final evaluation
Kabimba	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pweto	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Nyunzu	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Moba	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mitwaba	✓	✓	✓	X	X
Kalemie	✓	✓	X	X	✓
Mura	✓	✓	X	X	X
Kamina	✓	✓	X	X	X

Analysis priorities by activity

This evaluation covers all elements of the project. However, given the data collected (see "sampling strategy" above), the level of detail in the analysis varies between activities. Activities that took place in localities not covered by the final evaluation, such as Mura or Kamina, could only be analyzed in light of the activity reports. The evaluation thus focuses on the two central groups of activities of the project strategy; namely, sensitization of FARDC soldiers on HR and IHL (A.1.2) and civil-military activities (A.2.1). The activities conducted in direct collaboration with SECAS (A.1.1) and SCIFA were analyzed only via FG and KII, due to lack of sufficient sample. Finally, most of the advocacy activities on SSR with the provincial and national authorities (A.2.3.2) only took place in the very last days of the project, i.e. after data collection. Their results cannot therefore be evaluated.

Fig 9: Data collected for the final evaluation by activity

	Project report	QUANTI CIVILS	QUANTI FARDC	FG Civilians	FG FARDC	KII FARDC Graduates	KII Civil Authorities	KII SCIFA + Journalists	KII SECAS
A1.1.1. Support for the finalization of the SECAS curriculum	✓								✓
A1.1.2. Training given to FARDC instructors									
A1.2.1. Establishment of TOT Committees	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓		✓
A1.2.2. Training given to TOT members									
A1.2.3. Sensitization Sessions									
A2.1.1. Production of Radio Programs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
A2.1.2. Mobile Cinema Sessions									
A2.1.3. Solidarity activities									
A2.1.4. Open House Days									
A2.2.1. Coaching Sessions	✓							✓	
A2.3.1. Dialogue meetings at the provincial level	✓								
A2.3.2. Dialogue meetings at the national level									

### Formulation of indicator questions

For reasons of methodological consistency, the questions relating to the indicators were kept as they were in the baseline study. However, the formulation of several of them is problematic in that it can induce significant social desirability bias. This is the case, for example, with the question related to indicator 2.1 "Is respect for human rights a priority in your role?" asked of the FARDC, as it is likely that the FARDC are reluctant to admit that human rights are not a priority.

### Presence and availability of the FARDC

Compliance with the originally planned FARDC sample of 360 participants posed significant challenges. The main problem was the redeployment of infantry to operational areas that were out of access or to other provinces.

- Kabimba: The infantry has been redeployed elsewhere, leaving only the elements of the navy, less subject to rotation. All the elements present have been interviewed.
- Nyunzu: The sample was almost met. All FARDC present were interviewed, the other elements being in operational areas. Only the infantry is present on the ground.
- Pweto: A large portion of the infantry elements involved in the activities were redeployed and replaced by newly recruited and trained units. All elements that had been deployed for more than a year were interviewed. A sample of 6 new elements was interviewed as a test group. The sample was composed equally of infantry and marines.
- Moba: Nearly all FARDC present and involved in project activities were interviewed. These included 15 infantry elements and 8 marine elements. It should be noted that 4 elements of the navy refused to participate in the investigation to protest against an alleged embezzlement of funds by the commander.

This sample has limitations, on the one hand, because of its small size and the large margin of error associated with it ( $\pm 9\%$  for a 95% confidence interval) and, on the other hand, because of the large disparities in terms of the number of people in each locality. It does, however, represent the best possible sample at the time of the survey since access to other elements of the FARDC was not possible. The question could be raised as to whether the FARDC who were not transferred or sent to the front and who were therefore able to respond to the questionnaire do not represent a specific population, which could lead to selection bias. However, to the extent that decisions to deploy or transfer are made at the level of military units and not individuals, there is no reason to believe that the individuals who may have been interviewed have systematically different characteristics from those in the FARDC who were not there at the time of the survey. It therefore seems consistent to compare the current sample to the one from which data was collected at the beginning of the project, taking into account the larger margin of error in the current sample.

### Representations of various ethnic groups

As the project was not oriented in a logic of relations between the different ethnic groups, this component was included as much as possible in the evaluation without constituting a main axis. For example, due to a lack of resources, it was not possible to add the dimension of ethnicity in the organization of the FG, already carried out in a differentiated manner between civilians and FARDC and between men and women.

Despite efforts to do so, including recruiting an interviewer from this community, the evaluation only partially succeeded in fully integrating people from the Twa/Mbote community and their representation in the sample is only 2%. This under-representation is probably explained by the fact that this population lives mainly outside the localities, in areas that are logistically and safely inaccessible to the evaluation team. This bias is partially offset by the FG conducted only with members of the Twa community in Nyunzu and by the KII conducted with the Mbote representative in Kabimba.

## 3. Results

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### 3.1 Effectiveness analysis

#### Activity 1.1: Support for the finalization of the SECAS sensitization manual (A1.1.1) & Training for FARDC facilitators/sensitizers (A1.1.2)

**Overview:** *The updating and distribution of the SECAS training curriculum has experienced very significant delays. The training of trainers in Kamina and Mura could be carried out and the CdBs were then able to sensitize the new recruits.*

#### **A. Implementation of Activity 1.1:**

Finalization of the SECAS study program:

The SECAS manual is institutionalized by the FARDC and used as the main tool in the Training Centers for recruits and in all units throughout the country. The finalization of the content of the manual was carried out in partnership with SECAS as part of an earlier project. This work consisted of revisiting the multimedia tools, revisiting the teaching guide, designing and producing the image boxes. Some more thematic elements such as the questions of the respective mandates between FARDC and PNC and the "Common Ground Approach" have been deepened. However, the process of validating the curriculum with the FARDC staff and then printing it and making it available to the Comités de Base (CdBs) was significantly delayed during most of the project implementation phase. These delays are essentially attributable to a lack of availability of FARDC officials and the cumbersome internal procedures of the institution. The decision was taken, in agreement with the FARDC hierarchy, to distribute and use the old versions to the CdBs. Therefore, during the implementation of the project, the sensitization had to be carried out on the basis of the old curriculum. Although Search considers these modifications to be minor, the SECAS members interviewed complained that this document is no longer adapted to operational realities.

*"We don't know why Search is making us wait to print the new updated module that will be better suited to operational activities." KII SECAS Kalemie*

The validation workshop could finally take place in early 2020 and the new curricula were distributed in the last weeks of the project.

**Activity Indicator:** The objective of the activity, which was to approve the Curriculum and then disseminate it nationally, has been achieved but well behind schedule.

FARDC Instructor Training

Due to contextual delays in the start of activities, particularly related to the vetting of participants (see "2.2 Limitations"), the training of FARDC trainers could only be carried out in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> quarters of 2019. According to the project activity reports, it consisted of two training sessions for 12 trainers who are members of the CdBs of the Kamina and Mura training centers. They conducted 24 sensitization sessions for Mura and 18 for Kamina.

**Activity Indicator:** The objective of the activity, which was to organize 96 training sessions, was partially achieved.

#### Activity 1.2: Establishment of CdB (1.2.1), CdB training (1.2.2) and sensitization session (1.2.3)

**Overview:** *A large majority of FARDC has benefited from the sensitization of the CdBs, without disparity between localities. These sensitization sessions were deemed relevant and adapted to needs. However, neither the results of the knowledge test nor the result indicator show significant progress in terms of knowledge.*

#### **A. Implementation of Activity 1.2:**

The implementation of the CdBs was done in two phases. In the first phase, during the first quarter of 2019, a committee was established in each of the project localities under the coordination of a CCP based in


Kalemie. In mid-2019, in order to best correspond to the identified needs, the decision was taken to create 4 additional CdBs in Kalemie, Moba-port, Mura and Kamina; bringing the total to 9 CdBs.

**Activity Indicator:** The activity target of 5 CoPs was exceeded.

All of the committees received training from SECAS and Search between Q3 and Q4 2019. The two Kalemie committees also received a refresher in Q2 2020.

**Activity Indicator:** The objective of training all CdB members has been achieved.



These committees then conducted sensitization sessions for the troops, mainly during the weekly military parade. According to project activity reports, a total of 327 sessions were held. An analysis by locality of the sensitization activities (Fig. 10) shows an average of 40.8 sensitization sessions per locality with a comparatively higher number conducted in Moba (98) and Kalemie (68). In the case of Moba, this can be explained by the establishment of two CdBs (Moba-Port and Kirungu) in this locality. For Kalemie, the presence of SECAS and the largest FARDC staff present has encouraged the organization of sensitization sessions.



**Activity Indicator:** The objective of the activity, which was to conduct 250 sensitization sessions by the CdBs, was therefore exceeded.


**B. Participation in sensitization sessions (1.2):**

The quantitative data from the final evaluation provide a good approximation of the rate of FARDCs sensitized by the project. With an overall rate of 70% at the end of the implementation phase, the result is therefore satisfactory. The qualitative data illustrate that all the elements present in the field have benefited from sensitization sessions, with a significant difference of 36 percentage points between localities (Fig. 11), mainly due to troop movements. The 19 point of percentage difference between senior officers and non-commissioned soldiers (Fig. 12) is more surprising and may indicate a reluctance on the part of the senior officers to participate in sensitization sessions as they consider themselves already sufficiently trained.



FARDC interviewees who report not having been sensitized are those who were deployed outside the localities, including in highly operational areas, at the time of the activities as well as those who have been recently transferred, such as in Nyunzu and Pweto.


A comparison of the number of sensitization sessions in which each FARDC participated illustrates that 89% of FARDC soldiers were sensitized at least twice during the 18 months of program activities (Fig. 13), with 48% sensitized at least 3 times. The differences between localities can be explained by the difference in the number of sensitization sessions and by recent troop movements, mainly in Moba. The data corroborates the activity reports and shows a comparatively lower number of sensitization sessions in Nyunzu and a higher number in Kabimba.



**C. Quality of sensitization (1.2):**

The FG data shows the quality of sensitization sessions, 94% of which is judged to be "good" or "very good", with no significant disparity by grade (Fig. 14). Opinions are unanimous on the adaptation of sensitizations session to the operational realities of the FARDC (Fig. 15). The FG corroborate this impression with no complaints made against a training that was considered too abstract or inadequate.

*"We understood from the video projection that the commander is doing with us here at the base." FG FARDC Moba Man*



The FARDC officers (3 colonels and 2 majors) interviewed as part of the KIIs also appreciate the content of the sensitization, which they feel is adapted to the realities on the ground. The distribution of course materials at the end of the sensitization was appreciated.

*"I really liked it because it allowed me to train my units and distribute the syllabuses, which were well adapted. The soldiers understood well and asked good questions about it." KII FARDC Colonel Kabimba*

These data thus demonstrate that the significant delay accumulated by the project in validating, printing and distributing the new sensitization curricula (activities 1.1.1) forcing CdB and SECAS to base their sensitization sessions on the old curricula has not had major consequences on the quality of sensitization as perceived by FARDC participants.

However, the question of the material support allocated to the CdBs is more problematic. Two officers interviewed in Moba and Nyunzu complained that they had received only part of the modules of the sensitization materials. This is probably due to the strategic decision (see "Implementation of Activity 1.1") to create one CdB per locality and not per unit. It is likely that some CdBs then shared the modules between units.

*"I have two modules and child protection modules; I'm waiting for 3 more modules to be sent to me." KII Major FARDC Moba*

The person in charge of the CdB Pweto also deplores the lack of Hifi equipment (microphones, speakers, projectors) to be able to give sensitization sessions to large groups during the parade.

*"We have experienced difficulties in sensitization equipment such as speakers, projector, microphone and other" KII Colonel FARDC Pweto*

A majority of the FARDC interviewed deplored the lack of CdB fuel support to travel outside the localities. This is explained by the lack of sensitization of the elements deployed outside of localities as part of the project strategy.

*"For lack of means, we had difficulties to go and raise awareness about other camps in the three territories we run." KII FARDC Colonel Nyunzu*

Confronted with large infantry rotations and specific problems related to navigation and fisheries issues, the Kabimba authorities recommend developing, on the basis of the existing curriculum, a sensitization program specifically adapted to marine troops.

*"The sensitization was appropriate for the infantry and yet we only stayed with the sailors, who I think it would be important to give them a sensitization session that was appropriate for them." ATA Kabimba*

Finally, the FARDC in Nyunzu deplore the fact that the emphasis is systematically placed on the moral and legal responsibilities of the military, without addressing those of civilians. They deplore the incivilities and lack of respect for civilians. They would like to see sensitization sessions for civilians, whether in person or via radio or cinema, more focused on the issue of civilians' obligations under Congolese law. This element is mentioned by 2% of the FARDC in the general evaluation of the project (see "3.2 Impact Analysis").

*"It is important to include civic and patriotic education to also allow civilians to understand the role of the military and to respect the military." FG FARDC man Nyunzu*

#### D. Results of activity 1.2:

*The analysis of outcome ER1.2 as set out in the log frame essentially aims to assess "the FARDC's knowledge and understanding of their role, rights and responsibility to protect civilians"<sup>8</sup>. In order to allow for a comparative approach both "before vs. after" the intervention but also "participants vs. non-participants" the evaluation proposes to use the results of 4 knowledge questions. These 4 questions were selected from the KAP questionnaires of the baseline study and reused in the questionnaire of the final evaluation.*

Q1: For the military, what is the minimum sentence for the perpetrator of gang rape or rape committed with the use or threat of a weapon?

Q2: Which article of the constitution guarantees freedom of peaceful and unarmed assembly subject to respect for the law, public order and good morals?


Q3: What is required to search an individual's home?

Q4: After how many hours must a person in custody be released or made available to a competent judicial authority?


The results are not very revealing between the baseline study and the final evaluation (Fig. 16). Sensitized FARDC elements obtain the same average (51%) as those surveyed before the start of activities. For questions 1, 3 and 4 the difference in score is less than 10 percentage points and cannot be considered significant. In the case of question n°2, on the article of the constitution, the result is much lower (14 percentage points) between the baseline study and the final evaluation. The comparison between sensitized and non-sensitized elements, free of interviewer bias, reveals only 3 percentage points of positive response rate for sensitized items, which can hardly be considered statistically significant.

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<sup>8</sup> Proposal to Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (AF), Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika - A Dual Approach to an Effective SSR



An analysis of the results by rank shows a slight trend of 13 percentage points in favor of senior officers over non-commissioned soldiers (Fig. 17), which corresponds to an intuitive logic of a better general level of awareness among the latter. The results were comparatively lower in Kabimba with 36% correct answers (fig 18). They confirm the difficulty in deducing a significant improvement in knowledge attributable to the sensitization carried out by the CdBs.




Evidence from qualitative data, both from the soldiers themselves and from their superiors, however, indicates an improvement in the FARDC's knowledge of crucial issues such as looting, sexual violence, collaboration with civilians, and the protection of minorities. The seven FARDC officers interviewed in the KIIs unanimously state that, as a result of repeated sensitization, the FARDC has a better understanding of its military duty and human rights obligations.

*"This is a good assessment because the military understands and is able to distinguish between civil and military offences. Also understand arbitrary arrest and the terms DH and IHL". KII FARDC Colonel Nyunzu*

The corresponding activity indicator (Fig. 19) shows a slight decrease (-2 percentage points) in the rate of FARDCs declaring IHL as a priority in their role between the baseline study and the final evaluation. However, the project outcome may have been absorbed by the strong social desirability bias inherent in the formulation of the indicator (see "2.2 Limitations").

The difference of 21 percentage points between participants and non-participants is significant and demonstrates an outcome attributable to the activity and not to contextual changes or survey bias.

These data illustrate the methodological difficulty of measuring the outcome of sensitization raising in terms of knowledge acquisition, hence the importance of prioritizing this dimension in project monitoring (see "Recommendations").



**Result Indicator:** *The objectives of the activity, as measured by the result indicator, were therefore exceeded. However, since the target value of 70% for this indicator was already exceeded during the baseline study, it should have been adjusted at the beginning of the project.*

Activities 2.1: Production of Radio Programs (A2.1.1), Mobile Cinema Sessions (A2.1.2), Solidarity Activities (A2.1.3), Open days at the military tribunal (A2.1.4)

Due to the wide variety of "sub-activities" included in Activity 2.1, the analysis will be done in a differentiated manner in terms of implementation, participation and quality for each of the sub-activities (Radio program, film screenings, solidarity activities, Open days at the military tribunal). The results analysis will nevertheless be common to the whole activity 2.1.

Activities 2.1.1: Radio programs

**Overview:** The project has established partnerships with at least one radio station in each locality and produced 40 episodes of a radio drama. The radio programs have a large audience among civilians and, to a lesser extent, the FARDC. These programs enjoy a very good level of appreciation from listeners, but some military personnel regret that the emphasis is not more on the obligations of civilians.

A. Implementation of Activity 2.1.1:

As part of the activities, partnerships have been developed with 10 regional (fig 20) and community radios for the broadcasting of Search programs. Within the framework of this partnership, the partner radios received laptops, recorders, solar panels and microphones according to the needs expressed, in order to improve their performance.

Fig 20: Geographical coverage of partner radios

Partner Radio	Cover
RTNC / Kalemie,	All locations
Radio Afia fm,	Kalemie-ville
Radio Television Grand-Tanganyika	Kalemie-ville
Radio KAOZE,	Kalemie-ville
Marungu Community Radio	Moba
Moba Community Radio,	Moba
Umoja Community Radio	Kabimba
Dynamic Community Radio Kapingi	Pweto
Community Radio of Katanga	Nyunzu
Mitwaba Community Radio	Mitwaba

Overall, the coverage of these radios was considered satisfactory by respondents at the FG and KIIs. However, in Kabimba locality, the community radio "Umoja" was widely described as non-operational at close range. Material support was provided by Search at the very end of the project, i.e. after data collection. Its effectiveness could therefore not be evaluated. In Pweto, the community radio station "Dynamic Kapingi " was struck by lightning in August 2020 and is no longer operational. At the time of the evaluation, Search was considering providing material support.

*Program Production*

As part of the project, a series of programs called KNSM were produced following a process of identifying needs and developing messages in partnership with communities. The 40 episodes planned in the project strategy were produced. Respect for human rights, civil-military relations, the protection of civilians and the responsibility of the army towards the civilian population are among the main topics addressed.

**Activity Indicator:** The activity objective of producing 40 episodes was achieved.


B. Radio Audience (2.1.1):

The data (Fig. 21) illustrates a high level of audience among both civilians (74%) and, to a lesser extent, the FARDC (53%). This confirms the relevance of the choice of radio stations as a vector for disseminating Search messages. The comparatively lower audience rates among civilians in Kabimba (55% for civilians and 50% for the FARDC) can be explained by the malfunctioning of the local community radio.


In contrast to other project activities, the audience is on average 21 percentage points higher among civilians than among the FARDC. This data is interesting in that radio listening is the only project activity carried out on a fully voluntary basis by FARDC elements. All civilian and military authorities interviewed in the KIIs reported listening to the radio, except in Kabimba, again due to the lack of a functioning radio partner at the time of the survey.

The main reason given at the FG for not listening to the programs is the lack of a functioning radio or the lack of availability due to housework or agricultural work. This issue was raised during the FG with members of the Twa community of Nyunzu and raises an important question of inclusiveness for this community. (see "3.3 Inclusiveness").

*"We're waiting to talk about it but we can't listen for lack of radio". FG Twa, Nyunzu*




The program "Kesho Ni Siku Mupya (Tomorrow is Another Day)" (KNSM) produced for the program is unsurprisingly the most listened to by civilian (63%) and FARDC (47%) faith radio listeners (Fig. 22). "Écho militaire" produced through SCIFA coaching (Activity A2.1.2) also enjoys a large audience. This program is listened to more by the FARDC (37%) than by civilians (19%), probably because of its editorial content aimed more at the military. It should be noted that the program "Jiraninindugu" produced in the framework of another Search project still enjoys a significant audience, especially in Pweto where it is listened to by 21% of civilians.



**C. Quality of radio programs (2.1.1):**

The programs are judged "instructive" or "very instructive" by 100% of the FARDC and 91% of civilians (Fig. 23). This small difference can be explained by the nature of the themes addressed in relation to SSR, which more easily concern the FARDC.

*"These are the programs that help the people of Moba on the issue of peaceful cohabitation, it is informative and adapted." FG Moba Man*



Minority but recurring criticisms from the FARDC, however, both in the FG and in the open-ended questions in the questionnaire, deplore the fact that the issues systematically cover the legal obligations of the soldiers but do not place enough emphasis on the legal obligations of civilians.

*"The mistake we see at Lokolé is that you only educate the military, but the respect of the military by civilians you don't give that. It would be important for your programs to think about that." FG FARDC Pweto.*

In addition, the participants of the FG in Nyunzu deplored the fact that radio broadcasts are only in Kiswahili. Although this language is spoken by the vast majority of the population in the area, it is not necessarily accessible to less educated populations speaking Kibemba (Pweto), Tabwa (Moba) or other local languages.

*"Perception has not changed because of language, because the programs and sensitization are not in our ethnic languages." FG civilian man Nyunzu*


### Activities 2.1.2: Mobile Cinema

**Overview:** Significant disparities were found in the organization of mobile cinema sessions between localities, depending on their security situation and accessibility. The rate of participants is proportionally higher among the FARDC than among civilians and the appreciation of the project is higher. The films were generally appreciated.

#### A. Implementation of Activity 2.1.2:

According to the project activity reports, a total of 55 screenings of the two films "Weapons of War" and "Ndakisa" were organized during the project implementation period. These programs deal with human rights in general, sexual violence, civil-military relations, the protection of civilians and the promotion of positive role models within the security forces. They were produced in the framework of another Search project dealing with the theme of SSR.

The 5 localities were covered by the projections with significant disparities in favor of Kalemie (20), which is more easily accessible for Search teams. On the contrary, the localities of Mitwaba (2) benefited comparatively from very few projections.




**Activity Indicator:** The objective of the activity, which was to organize 60 mobile cinema sessions, was therefore not achieved.

#### B. Participation in mobile cinema sessions (2.1.2):

The mobile cinema sessions enjoyed a good participation rate overall, with 55% of FARDC and 42% of civilians (Fig. 25). The proportionally higher rate of FARDC is found in all joint civil-military activities and is logically explained by the project's mode of operation. The latter is based on a logic of parity between civilians and the FARDC in activities, with the FARDC, comparatively fewer in number than civilians, having a higher participation rate.

The data is in line with the monitoring data, which shows that the activities decrease according to the accessibility from Kalemie. A double proportion of civilians (53%) participated in the activity in Kabimba compared to Moba (20%). The very large variations at the FARDC level can also be explained by recent troop rotations in Moba (6% participation) while these have remained stable in Kabimba (88% participation).




FG confirms that a significant proportion of the population and FARDC have participated in mobile cinema sessions. All civilian and military authorities interviewed at the KIIs had heard about the film sessions and most had participated directly.

The main reasons cited by civilians for not participating are lack of advance communication and afternoon hours that are not compatible with household or agricultural activities.

*"A lot of people didn't see this screening because we didn't do the press releases, but with soccer, there were the press releases."* FG Man Pweto


*"Films were often shown in the afternoons during my household activities."* FG Civilian woman Kabimba.

The data on films viewed (Fig. 26) corroborate the greater participation of the FARDC, the majority of which (62%) watched both films. The majority of civilians (59%) saw one or the other film. The film "Ndakisa" was comparatively the most watched film (+19 percentage points) among civilians.



**C. Film Quality (2.1.2):**

As in the case of radio broadcasts, the FARDC show greater enthusiasm for films than civilians. 80% judge them "very instructive" compared to 19% for civilians (Fig. 27). Here again, this result can be explained by the greater relevance of audio-visual products to the daily life and concerns of the military.




Overall, the FG data confirm that the films were appreciated by both direct participants and authorities. It should be noted that the film "Arme de guerre", initially produced for the Kivu, Ituri and Kinshasa context, was considered by the project team as not being adapted to the local context of the project. Indeed, this film was essentially focused on the theme of sexual violence, which is less present in the project area. In the activity report for the first quarter of 2019, they recommended that it not be used in the framework of LMYS II. However, due to a lack of sufficient budget, this film was widely used in the framework of the activities, while selecting preferably the episodes more adapted to the context.

Activities 2.1.3: Solidarity activities (sports, community work, local security diagnosis (DLS))

**Overview:** The number of solidarity activities organized has exceeded the objectives of the project, but again with significant disparities between localities. Soccer and community work are the most significant components of the project for the population and are on the whole very much appreciated. DLS and mediation activities are more marginally known. However, participants complain of a lack of sports equipment and tools. The authorities and the media note a lack of sustainability in the community work.

**A. Implementation of solidarity activities (2.1.3):**

According to the project activity reports, a total of 31 solidarity activities were organized (Fig. 28). As with the mobile cinema sessions, the analysis of the monitoring data illustrates significant disparities between the project localities. Both for reasons of security and accessibility, the localities of Nyunzu and Mitwaba benefited from comparatively fewer solidarity activities while, on the contrary, the localities of Kalemie and Kabimba were very largely covered. It should be noted that the localities of Mitwaba and Nyunzu did not benefit from any community work.



**Activity Indicator:** The objective of the activity, which was to organize 30 solidarity activities, was exceeded.

During the launch phase of the project, local safety diagnostics took place in each project location. They made it possible to develop an common analysis of civil-military tensions specific to each context and to develop strategies for conflict resolution.

Community work activities took different forms depending on the needs of each community. They are essentially road or airport tarmac rehabilitation work, cleaning of gutters, and sanitation work in certain public places such as markets. In Kabimba, for example, the participants carried out various maintenance works at the port and in Nyunzu, the construction/rehabilitation of showers as well as weeding of the hospital. They involved a variable number of people up to 300 people in Moba.


Civil-military soccer matches were unique encounters, see tournaments like in Kalemie and Kabimba. Women's soccer matches were also occasionally organized. The activity was aimed at both players and supporters, and a large civilian and military audience attended the matches.

Other mediation activities, specific to Search's intervention methodology, have been organized in an ad-hoc and reactive way in the following localities.

- A community dialogue in Mushaba during the second quarter of 2019 on the issue of access to water and tensions between civilian women and the wives of FARDC officers.
- A follow-up meeting with CSOs in Moba during the second quarter of 2020 was organized to discuss the evolution of the relationship with the FARDC following the tensions generated by the arrival of a new battalion.
- A mediation meeting in Nyunzu between the Twa and Bantu communities, was organized at the initiative of FARDC colonel who is also president of the CdB. This meeting had to be stopped during the inter-community violence and between Twa and Bantu militiamen that prevailed in Nyunzu territory in January 2020.

**B. Participation in solidarity activities (2.1.3):**

The data illustrates a comparable level of civilian participation between the different localities, ranging from 47% to 58% (Fig. 29). In contrast to cinema activities, there are few disparities between localities (Fig. 29) in terms of civilian participation. This difference can be explained by the greater potential for local appropriation of the activity, which does not require equipment and therefore the physical presence of Search. The significant differences in participation rates in the FARDC correspond to the length of deployment in the area, with mainly marine elements that have been present for a long time in Kabimba and significant recent personnel rotations in Moba. In addition, the Kabimba CdB has been very active and has organized several large-scale activities.




Among the participants in solidarity activities, soccer was the activity that most involved civilians and the FARDC with 79% and 83% respectively (Fig. 30). It should be noted that the notion of participation in soccer matches includes both players and spectators. During the FG in Moba, a civilian participant deplored the lack of transparency regarding the selection of players, regretting that motorcycle drivers were systematically approached.

Community work was the activity practiced by 34% of civilians and 79% of the FARDC (Fig. 34). The strong involvement of the CdB in its organization explains the high participation rate of the FARDC.

In the end, the local security diagnosis involved only a marginal proportion of civilian participants, with a limited number of up to 30 participants composed of military authorities, political-administrative authorities, civil society, and representatives of women's and youth associations.

It should be noted that a majority (58%) of the FARDC participated both in community-based work and in soccer, which is the case for only 11% of civilians.



The KIIs confirm the good knowledge, even participation, of military and civil authorities in solidarity activities. They are systematically aware and 4 of the 6 interviewed took an active part in the process.

*"Yes, whenever there is an activity I am always invited or I am told about it." ATA Kabimba*


Moreover, the activities were systematically covered by the civilian and military journalists involved in the project, allowing synergies between the project's components of activities.

*"We covered the trading activities of Twa and the Bantu, the Salongo at the Kilimani spring, the rehabilitation of the showers and toilets at the airfield". KII Journalist from Nyunzu*

**C. Quality of solidarity activities (2.1.3):**

Solidarity activities are judged "very good" by 79% of the FARDC and 35% of civilians (Fig. 31). Solidarity activities clearly represent the most appreciated component of the project and soccer and community work

are spontaneously mentioned as the activities that have made the most impact on the respondents during the FG or KII.



**Soccer:**

The LMYS 2 project is not the first attempt to organize civil-military soccer matches. But, according to the interviewees, these regularly ended in disputes and even violence against civilians. All the participants, both civilians and FARDC, were pleased with the friendly and respectful atmosphere that prevailed during the matches organized by Search. According to a FARDC officer, the soccer also had the positive effect of putting all participants on an equal footing regardless of their rank or social status. The public often turned out in large numbers during its activities, turning the occasion into a meeting place for the community.

*"Football has allowed us to play without it ending with fights, which has helped us understand that we can live together without fighting." FG Men Kabimba*

**Community work.**

The community work was generally appreciated. Public interest work is a common practice in the localities, but the project has made it possible to place it within an institutional framework that guarantees the voluntary basis and the mutually respectful conduct of the activity. Feedback from participants focused more on the notion of civil-military encounter than on the outcome of the community work as such. Several critics from the civil authorities and journalists criticize the work undertaken for being unsustainable due to a lack of equipment and planning. They deplore the fact that the activity sometimes seems to prevail over the result. According to them, the problem is that the work was essentially managed by the CdBs, even though it would have required a community-based needs assessment and activity planning process.

*"The observation is that the activities of rehabilitation approximation or shower constructions are not sustainable or are not finished, it does not give a good image to the public." KII Journalist Nyunzu*

*"We are working together with civilians to fight the flood, but we lack the tools." KII Commander FARDC Moba*

**Local security diagnosis and other mediation activities:**

The local security diagnostics and other mediation meetings were appreciated by the participants, particularly the mediation activity in Kabimba around the management of the water point and the creation of a Bantu-Twa mediation committee in Nyunzu. Although very punctual, these interventions made it possible to establish contact between antagonistic groups and to resolve latent tensions.

*"The association created for the Twa-Bantu rapprochement was stopped because of the disorder and yet we were already working together. It would be important to relaunch this with the help of the Lokolé center." FG Homme civil Nyunzu.*

The main criticism of solidarity activities concerns their management at the local level. As the project progressed, the bulk of the planning and organization of the activities was entrusted to the CdB, thus to purely military structures. The material for the activities was also handed over to them. Numerous complaints have been made by civilian participants and authorities about the way in which the CdBs have managed this material and cases of personal appropriation have been denounced, particularly in Kabimba and Kalemie.

*"Search has endowed some equipment under the management of the military and yet it should be managed by civilians. (...) The military does not donate this equipment when it is needed for a community activity." KII ATA Kabimba*

[Activities 2.1.4: Open House at the Military tribunal](#)

**Overview:** Although summarily analyzed due to the lack of data inherent to the limited audience covered by the activity, the open house to the military tribunal of Moba was appreciated. Participants in the FG deplored the fact that this activity was limited to military justice.


**A. Implementation of open houses (2.1.4):**

During the first quarter of 2020, two open days were organized with the military tribunal of Kalemie and Moba. Their purpose was to allow the public to better understand how the justice system works and to establish more personal relationships with members of the military judiciary. The activity took place in the court room with a limited audience. It was followed by guided tours of the military tribunal facilities.

**Activity Indicator:** The objective of the activity, which was to organize 3 open days, was partially achieved.

**B. Participation in open houses (2.1.4):**


According to the data collected, 13 percent of the civilians and 5 percent of the FARDC interviewed in Moba participated in the activity (Fig. 32), which is comparatively low compared to other activities and illustrates the less public dimension of this activity compared to community work and soccer.



**C. Quality of open houses (2.14):**

The general impressions of participants in both Moba and Kalemie are rather positive (Fig. 33). It should be noted that the sample of participants (only 1) at the FARDC level does not allow for statistically significant data. The main criticism addressed to this activity comes from the administrator of the Kabimba territory who deplores the fact that it is limited to military justice, reinforcing the impression among civilians that they are only subject to military justice.

*"We should also invite the public prosecutor's office. The military prosecutor's office defended that at its level it can deal with the entire file, even those concerning civilians." KII ATA Moba*



**4. Results of activity A.2.1:**


**Overview:** Both qualitative data and project indicators demonstrate the undeniably positive results of the various civil-military activities (radio broadcasts, film screenings, solidarity activities, open house). These have helped to create an interpersonal relationship between civilians and FARDC based on better mutual understanding.

*The analysis of Expected Result 1.2 as set out in the log frame focuses on assessing the evolution of "the understanding of each other's perspectives and their ability to hold each other accountable".<sup>9</sup>*

<sup>9</sup> Proposal to Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (AF), Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika - A Dual Approach to an Effective SSR


Both from civilian and FARDC participants, the improvement in collaboration largely prevails as the result of solidarity activities (Fig. 34). Interviewees are unanimous about the rapprochement brought about by soccer matches and community work between civilians and the FARDC. FG participants, both civilians and FARDC, evoke a moment of sharing that goes beyond their respective prejudices. The objective of creating personal links through these activities has clearly been achieved and qualitative data makes it possible to establish the causal link between participation in the activities and the improvement of mutual knowledge and understanding.

*"We organized: the soccer match, salongo (community work), the maintenance of the port. These activities have strengthened the relationship between military and civilian, he drinks together, he takes the beer together". Colonel FARDC Kabimba*



The data for the results indicators (Fig. 35) show the undeniably positive outcome related to the activity. For all indicators an average growth of 46 percentage points can be observed. Targets were achieved for all indicators with an average of 37 percentage points exceeded.

Non-participants can be considered a test group. Since the results are on average 21 percentage points lower than those of participants, this suggests that the improvement is not simply due to favorable contextual changes or interviewer effects. The very significant difference of 63 percentage points between FARDC participants and non-participants in the activities (indicator 10) should be noted. It may be an example of positive engagement with civilians. This demonstrates the crucial role the project played in civil-military relations.



**Result Indicators:** The objectives of the activity as measured by all the result indicators were therefore exceeded.

### Activities 2.2: Coaching Journalists

**Overview:** The sustainable work in support of SCIFA has enabled the production of a significant number of radio programs and has had an impact on their capacity to cover themes related to SSR. The program "Écho Militaire" enjoys a good audience, especially among the FARDC.

#### A. Implementation of coaching (2.2):

During the implementation phase a total of 22 coaching sessions were organized with SCIFA, resulting in the production of 21 episodes of the series "Écho militaires". In addition, 3 media forums were organized with the participation of the radio partners' directors. Finally, in early 2020, training for 16 journalists was organized.

**Activity Indicator:** The objective of the activity, which was to hold 24 coaching sessions for the SCIFA and 3 forums, was partially achieved.

#### B. Quality of coaching (2.2):

All civilian and military journalists interviewed for the KII expressed satisfaction with the material support received.

*"Thanks to the materials they have also provided us with, we are able to broadcast well. We have two microphones, a machine, a computer, a generator and a technician was trained in Kalemie." KII journalist Nyunzu*

The training was considered good by the SCIFA journalist interviewed, who was able to improve his coverage of issues related to peaceful conflict resolution.

*"This session was beneficial for me because we got into the issue of journalism in depth and on a media level, I learned a lot about peaceful data resolution." KII head SCIFA*

#### C. Result of activities 2.2:

Quantitative data shows that the program "Écho Militaire" enjoys an average audience share of 37% among FARDC and 19% among civilians who listen to Search programs (Fig. 27). The difference can easily be explained by the program's editorial choices, which are closer to the concerns of the FARDC than to civilians. According to one civilian journalist interviewed, the project has had an undeniably positive effect on the FARDC's accountability to civilians and on the confidence journalists have in practicing their profession.

*"On the Musebe axis, users used to have problems with barriers, for which they paid 2,000 FC per passage. We did a program on these cases, showing the harms of harassment in the locality". KII journalist Nyunzu*

### Activities 2.3: Advocacy for SSR

**Overview:** Lobbying activity at the national and provincial level has been very problematic, especially in collaboration with the implementing partner. A single advocacy meeting could only be organized at the very end of the project.

#### A. Implementing the Advocacy Activity (2.3):

In the absence of sufficient data collected on this activity, the only meeting having taken place in the last quarter of the project, the analysis is limited to reporting data.

The implementation of the advocacy activity has experienced very significant delays. Since Search did not benefit from in-house expertise, the organization of advocacy was entrusted to the partner "Réseau pour la Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité et de Justice" (RRSSJ). The latter carried out the activity through one of the members of the network, the national NGO "Promotion of Human Values" (PROVAH). However, despite extensive monitoring and coaching work, including an ad-hoc workshop, the partner showed little

motivation for the project, arguing that the remuneration was insufficient. At the end of the contract and due to a lack of sufficiently implemented activities during the first 15 months of the project, Search finally had to resort to the recruitment of 2 external consultants to strengthen the capacities of civil society partners on advocacy focused on SSR.

This enabled the conduct of an advocacy workshop at the provincial level, involving the provincial government, the provincial assembly and civil society. The workshop was an opportunity for civil society to present an overview of civil-military relations and an analysis of the main issues related to the implementation of the FARDC reform with a focus on the living and working conditions of the military.

This workshop was to be followed by another at the national level involving the Defense and Security Commission (CDS) and the political-administrative authorities including the Minister of Defense, the FARDC General Staff and the heads of the relevant specialized units. Due to a lack of time and resources, this meeting was not organized during the duration of the project.


At the national level, two preliminary advocacy meetings were held in Kinshasa with the vice president of the National Assembly's Defense and Security Commission and the president of the caucus of deputies from Tanganyika, respectively.

**Activity Indicator:** The objective of the activity, which was to organize 4 advocacy meetings at the provincial level and 3 meetings at the national level, was not achieved.

### 3.2 Impact Analysis

#### Impact Indicators

The study of impact indicators (Fig. 36) corroborates the positive outcome of the project. The values of these indicators are on average 31 percentage points higher than those of the baseline study. Indicators 2 and 3 illustrate the marked improvement in the perception that civilians have of the FARDC's action, which is now seen mainly as a stabilizing and protective presence for the population (see "Overall Objective" below). Civilians also note an overall decrease in human rights violations over the past six months (see "SO1" below). The notable exception is FARDC accountability, which, far from increasing, has actually declined by 17 percentage points (see "SO2" below).




**Impact Indicators:** The Specific Objectives and the General Objectives of the project as measured by the impact indicators have therefore been exceeded, with the exception of the indicator related to the accountability of the FARDC.

**Specific Objective 1: Implementation of human rights and IHL**

**Overview:** Respect for human rights by the FARDC improved during the project period throughout the zone. Qualitative data allow us to attribute this change in part to the project. However, harassment and abuse of civilians remains frequent.

The analysis of SO1 as set out in the logical framework essentially aims to assess "the improved level of knowledge of the roles, rights and responsibilities of the security forces in creating a safe and secure environment for the civilian population in the DRC with respect to IHL"<sup>10</sup>

The quantitative data shows a consensus both between civilians and the FARDC, between localities, and between men and women, with an average of 89 percent of FARDC and 93 percent of civilians noting an improvement in the FARDC's respect for human rights over the past six months (Fig. 37).



Whether on the barriers, during patrols or even when renting a house, civilians participating in the various FGs have noted a decrease in cases of harassment or even abuses by the FARDC.

"Since we started raising awareness, we have noticed that there are no more cases of sexual violence. We have also noticed a decrease in arbitrary arrests." FARDC Colonel Nyunzu

"Before, the military used to take by force the merchants' goods without paying, but nowadays they have changed a lot." FG Civilian men Moba

It is important to note that a decrease in the number of cases of human rights violations is by no means the same as an end to them. Although this report does not pretend to conduct a detailed analysis of the prevalence of human rights violations in the area, many civilian testimonies point to persistent harassment and even abuses by the FARDC. The behavior of several senior officers, primarily in Pweto, is described as particularly problematic.

"A lieutenant colonel of the naval force had a problem with a boy who works in humanitarian aid, he had tortured this man and his wife" FG Femmes Pweto

**Specific Objective 2: Improved mutual accountability**

**Overview:** The impact of the project on the ability of civilians to hold the FARDC accountable cannot be clearly demonstrated. Dysfunction within the military justice system has not been targeted by the project and a situation of impunity is deplored by survey participants. However, the qualitative data shows a relative improvement in the ability of civilians to complain directly to military and administrative authorities.


The analysis of SO2 as set out in the project strategy essentially aims to assess "the strengthening of FARDC accountability and collaboration between the FARDC and civilian populations".<sup>11</sup>

The data collected illustrates the situation of impunity that prevails in the localities of implementation (Fig. 38). The rate of people who believe that the FARDC are held responsible for HR violations is only 21 percent among civilians and 5 percent among the FARDC. This rate is extremely low and has even decreased since

<sup>10</sup> Proposal to Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (AF), Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika - A Dual Approach to an Effective SSR

<sup>11</sup> Idem

the beginning of the project, given that it was 38% for the baseline study. The LMYS II project itself adopts a very pragmatic approach to the concept of "accountability," prioritizing a logic of cessation of the offense, or even reparation of the harm caused. On the other hand, the project only very indirectly targets the very functioning of the judiciary, particularly the military.



The analysis of the FG confirms the prevailing civilian perception that the FARDC enjoys strong impunity within the justice system and that the situation has not improved during the project implementation period. Overall, however, a significant proportion of civilians and the FARDC report seeing a change in the ability of civilians to complain. Accountability as described by participants in the FGs and KIIs is not further pursued through civil or military justice, with the exception of Kalemie and Moba, where the open houses had a favorable impact on the ability to file complaints.

*"Before the military, without mission orders, bothered, but thanks to the activities at the military auditor's office, we got the number of the people in charge of the military auditor's office." FG men Kalemie*

Rather, the ability to complain and obtain redress is understood by participants in an extrajudicial logic. More than filing a complaint, it is a matter of taking steps directly with the FARDC hierarchy or with trusted intermediaries such as civil or traditional authorities or civil society. Numerous civilian testimonies report an improvement in the confidence to report misconduct by FARDC soldiers directly to their superiors. As such, solidarity activities have had a significant impact on the ability to make contact with FARDC commanders.

*"We used to be afraid of the military, but now we're starting to communicate well with the military and if there's a problem, we know how to accuse the leader, trusting that he'll make amends." FG women Kabimba*

However, particularly in Pweto, the risk of retaliation is perceived to be too great and civilians say they prefer to complain to the local authorities.

*"Here in Pweto, we go through the territory administrator. With the new commandments, if you leave to accuse the military at his chief's house, you risk being arrested." FG men Pweto*


### Global Objective: Civil Relations - FARDC

**Overview:** *The results of the evaluation demonstrate the clearly positive impact of the project on the civil-military relationship. However, the location and frequency of activities and the duration of the project are mentioned by participants as having limited the impact of the intervention.*

*The analysis of the MT as set out in the Logical Framework aims to assess "the improvement of the FARDC's capacity to protect civilian populations through positive civil-military relations and increased understanding and respect for human rights and humanitarian law"<sup>12</sup>.*


The results of the open-ended question in the questionnaires "What was the main change, positive or negative, in the civil-military relationship?" provides a general and objective impression of the respondents' opinion of the project's impact (Fig. 39). The analysis lists the elements of change mentioned, categorizing them as positive, negative, or neutral. These data illustrate the clearly positive impact of the project on civil-military relations, with 65% of civilian and 63% of FARDC responses being positive.

<sup>12</sup> Proposal to Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs (AF), Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika - A Dual Approach to an Effective SSR



**Positive impact elements mentioned**

The detail of the data collected allows a better understanding of the impact of the project (fig 40). A very large proportion of respondents, both civilians (48%) and FARDC (43%), noted an improvement in the relationship between civilians and the FARDC. The various other responses corroborate this finding by focusing on reduced harassment (9% civilians, 3% FARDC) and better overall behavior of the FARDC (2% civilians). A relatively large number of respondents note an improvement in peace and security in the area, without it being possible to attribute this to a contextual change or project impact.



**Daily civil relations - FARDC:**

A majority of testimonies report greater proximity and development of interpersonal relationships between civilian and FARDC participants in the activities. This includes time spent together during leisure time, sports, and good neighbors' relationships.

*"These activities have strengthened the relationship between military and civilian, he drinks together, he takes the beer together." Colonel FARDC Nyunzu.*

*"The outreach activity has resulted in a lot of change at the military level. We stay together and our children are getting familiar with the military." FG Moba Women*

The quantitative data also show a decrease in the number of cases of non-payment on the part of the FARDC in cases of renting housing on a per capita basis, an issue that was identified as highly problematic in the baseline study.

*"We live with civilians because there are no military camps, this training has helped us a lot to live together with civilians" FG FARDC Kalemie*

**Impact on the security situation in the area:**

According to the FG in Nyunzu, the project also had more indirect effects such as a decrease in incentives to join armed groups, which may have been motivated by the conflictual relations between some civilians and the FARDC.

*"In Nyemba, there were soldiers who arrested civilians and raped women, after that (the project), the civilians directly called the command, and yet before those civilians became rebels to claim." FG FARDC Nyunzu.*

In the climate of inter-ethnic violence in Nyunzu, Twa focus group participants mentioned that the rapprochement with the FARDC facilitated their protection by the FARDC during the crisis.

*"If there were no FARDC here in Nyunzu, the Twa would have to be exterminated by the elements (Bantu militiamen). We have a very good relationship with the FARDC and we like very much their outreach activities that have allowed us to survive." FG Twa Nyunzu.*

These elements of the project's indirect impacts on the security situation in the area present interesting programmatic perspectives for Search. As they are based on spontaneous statements, they should not be overestimated but would merit a more specific and detailed analysis.

**Negative impact elements mentioned**

The main criticisms made do not concern the nature of the activities, which are almost entirely perceived as positive (see "2.2 Effectiveness Analysis", above), but rather their location and duration.

According to a minority of participants, the project had no impact on the civil-military relationship. The FARDC is accused by 9% of civilians of maintaining a climate of harassment and exactions and 3% of civilians state that they have no relations with the FARDC (Fig. 41).


*"We won't know how to get closer, since all the time they are only with weapons and clothes, we are always afraid of them." FG women Pweto.*

A relatively large number of civilians (3%) deplore the fact that the activities took place only in urban centers and had little impact on outlying localities or villages in the bush. Civilians and several FARDC members noted that the most problematic behavior took place outside urban centers.

*"SFCG's activities were not as intense, and more importantly, did not cover all neighborhoods, nor did they reach a large portion of the population." Quest Civils Nyunzu*

The project duration of 18 months was regularly considered too short to produce a lasting effect. Due to a lack of significant logistical resources, the number of activities per locality was perceived as small and insufficient to allow for real change.

*"18 months won't transform everyone, sustainable development won't be achieved in 18 months, it was desirable that the project should continue" RTNC journalist Kalemie.*



### 3.3 Transversal Criteria

#### Inclusivity of the project

**Overview:** All the data on participation in activities show an over-representation of the most privileged social groups among both civilians and FARDC, including in terms of gender balance. This disparity is explained more by the design of the activities than by a discriminatory policy of Search.


The following data illustrate the participation rate in project activities according to different criteria: ethnic group and socio-professional category for civilians and rank for the FARDC. In order to neutralize important differences in representation between these different groups in the sample, the data should be understood, for example, as "the percentage of ethnic group X members interviewed who participated in the activities." This means that the margins of error vary from one criterion to another.

The objective of this section is to measure the access of different categories of populations to the activities. The methodological problem inherent in the data is that the evaluation suffers from the same access problems as the project. The data was mainly collected in urban centers and it was not possible to interview FARDC elements or civilians living away from them. Despite their relative statistical fragility, these data nevertheless provide a relevant analysis of the notion of the project's inclusiveness.

#### Civil Inclusivity

##### Men / Women:

The data on participation in activities show a large 13 percentage point difference between men and women (Figure 42). A lower female participation is found in all activities. The gap is greatest for participation in the soccer match, at 23 percentage points. This gender disparity is not found among the FARDCs, since 100% of the female FARDCs surveyed participated in the activities.




The main reasons given by participants for mentioning the disparities in access for women are based on a choice of activities mainly oriented in favor of men. Soccer matches are emblematic. Although women's matches have been organized, the majority of the matches have been male, with women being restricted to a supporting role. Several women suggested organizing volleyball or basketball matches as well.

*"(The project) does not include other sports such as volleyball, basketball for us women " FG Civils Femmes Nyunzu*

A negative perception of female participants in the activities, mentioned in the Kabimba civil women's GF, may also have had a deterrent effect on women's participation. (see "Do No Harm," below).



**Ethnic Groups:**



Although there are significant potential sampling biases, quantitative data show a disparity in participation among different ethnic groups (Figure 43). Significantly, given the project area, 100% of the Twa surveyed reported being able to participate in activities. Several testimonials commend Search's proactive policy in this regard. However, the average level of participation is lower among other groups such as the Luba (80%) and Bakalanga (76%).


**Socio-economic categories:**

A socio-economic analysis of participation (figure 48 4) illustrates a significant bias in favor of the most educated and privileged social categories. The participation rate is significantly lower among the less privileged categories such as the unemployed (78%) or miners (50%) than among more urban socio-economic categories such as government workers (100%) or hotel workers (100%). This disparity is regularly found in this type of project and can be explained by a prior level of education to be interested in the themes addressed, by a resolutely urban dimension of the activities, as well as by criteria of prior language proficiency. This analysis is supported by the difference in participation rates by level of education (Fig. 45) with a difference of 43 percentage points between those with a higher degree and those with no degree.



**FARDC Inclusivity**


**Military ranks:**



An analysis by rank (Fig. 46), illustrates a slight over-representation effect related to military rank, with a 9 points percentage difference in participation between senior officers and non-commissioned soldiers. As with civilians, these disparities can easily be explained by the educational prerequisites that facilitate access to and interest in this type of activity.

Perception of inclusiveness on the part of participants

It is important to note that the various biases noted above are not perceived as such by the civilian participants, who overwhelmingly do not see any particular gender, ethnic or socio-economic bias.



Qualitative data confirms this sense of an inclusive project, thanks to Search's efforts to reach all population groups.


- "We Mbote are represented even in the CdB, which proves that they have taken minorities into account." KII Mbote representative Kabimba
- "The soccer activities had involved the whole group in the village and even the women were indirect participants." FG FARDC man Moba
- "The communication tools in this outreach were adapted to the less educated and the educated with inclusion of everyone." FG Kalemie women

The project is therefore not marked by a discriminatory policy as such. On the contrary, Search has tried to be as inclusive as possible in the selection of participants for the activities. The significant bias of representativeness in favor of the privileged categories is explained by the very design of the activities, which are pro-masculine, urban and require a certain level of education.

"Do No Harm" and conflict sensitivity

**Overview:** Participation in the activities involved relatively reliable protection issues. However, cases of threats to participants were noted, especially in Nyunzu. Because the project did not strategically include a social cohesion component in its activities, the team had to deal in an ad-hoc way with issues of community tensions.

"Do No Harm"



The vast majority (72%) of respondents (both participants and non-participants) did not experience or hear of any negative consequences related to the participation in activities (Figure 48). The 24% reporting "don't know" is essentially the non-participants in the activities. However, 4% of the participants answered positively to the question and the few elements collected at the end of the GFs and questionnaires illustrate some of the issues inherent to Search's "Do No Harm" responsibility.

In Pweto, the problematic behavior of some FARDC elements resulted in safe exposure of project participants. Although Search cannot be held directly responsible for this type of event, the risk had been raised during the baseline study that, due to the nature of the activities, participants would be exposed to additional risks. Hence the importance of setting up a participant protection system for this type of project, including in partnership with actors specializing in this area.

*"There was a conflict between a military man and a civilian in a meeting between civilians and the military, Lieutenant Colonel XX had threatened a humanitarian agent during our meetings, and that is why we are now doing it separately with the military." FG Pweto Women.*

In general, the participation of women as spectators at soccer tournaments was mentioned by one participant as being negatively perceived by the community. This type of allegation should be specifically documented by Search as part of a proactive strategy to promote women's participation in civil-military activities.

*"Yes, because sometimes people in the community take women who watch the game and the screening as non-serious ("légères") women." FG Femme Kabimba*

### Conflict Sensitivity

The project took place in a context of extremely tense, even completely bipolarized, relations between the communities, favoring extremist currents of thought (see "1.3 Project implementation"). As the project strategy was entirely oriented towards the relationship between civilians and the FARDC, the issue of social cohesion was managed in an ad-hoc and reactive manner by the Search team, or in the framework of other projects' activities. Although the overwhelming majority of interviewees expressed a positive opinion of the project (see "3.2 Impact Analysis"), some interviewees complained about the way the project handled ethnic issues.

This is essentially the case in Nyunzu where, despite significant mediation efforts between communities, the project found itself caught in a logic of confrontation between the Twa and Bantu groups. Overall, Twa group representatives interviewed at a specific FG emphasized that their participation in the project had improved their sense of security and had not resulted in additional exposure. However, Search found itself accused by some participants at the FG of not adopting a neutral general attitude and of disadvantaging the Bantu population.

*"We have seen that their SFCG activities are the precursors of Twa violence against the Bantu, every time Search appears in a region it is not long before the Twa begin the killings.*

Three criticisms were also made of Search's film programs for not being sufficiently adapted to the local ethnic context and for fueling ethnic tensions against the Banyamulenge and Twa populations. As these dimensions are not specifically covered by the programs developed for LMYS 2, it is likely that such criticisms are directed at programs developed within the framework of other Search projects. They remain important to clarify for the Search media department.

*"Search's activities are reminiscent of the Bantu and Twa conflicts, which are also subject to misinterpretation and yet the conflicts are no longer here in Moba, it would be important for Search to change its communication." FG Man Moba*

*"The negative consequences were on their program entitled "DJIRANI NI DUKU" this program is not liked by the population, because it is as if Centre Lokolé is preparing the ground for the return of Banyamulenge in the territory of Moba." FG Moba Men.*


These allegations remain very marginal and do not point to systematic failures by Search in the design and implementation of the project. However, they do illustrate the explosiveness of the relationship between the communities in the area and the difficulty of maintaining a position of neutrality. Hence the importance for Search to systematically include a programmatic component of "social cohesion" in its SSR project strategy. (see "Recommendations" below).

### Sustainability of action and impact

**Overview:** *The project has significant weaknesses in terms of sustainability. The rate of replication of activities without the support of Search is low given the strong potential for ownership of solidarity activities. This is mainly due to a lack of means allocated to the CdB but mainly due to the absence of a mixed civil-military structure in charge of planning and management of activities.*

Data analysis illustrates the significant challenges in terms of sustainability faced by the project (Fig. 49). This is particularly true at the level of civilians, only 25% of whom reported having taken part in an

organized solidarity activity without Search's involvement. These figures must be put into perspective with the proportionally higher attendance of FARDC than civilians in mixed activities. They do, however, reveal significant gaps in terms of ownership on the part of participants.



**Means of the CdB:**

As the CdBs are the only local management structures set up under the project, the sustainability of the activities rests essentially on them. This explains why the FARDC more easily organized community work on their own initiative than civilians (38% versus 9%).

However, the lack of resources allocated to the CdBs to travel outside the localities or to organize solidarity activities is described by the FARDC in Nyunzu as the main obstacle to maintaining activities.

*"The weak means given to the CdBs do not allow Search's activities to be sustainable." FG FARDC Nyunzu*

**Role of local structures:**

The main factor to sustainability mentioned by civilians during the FG is the lack of structures put in place to organize activities and piloted by civilians. The CdBs are purely military and, in the absence of a joint management committee, civilians are not included in the planning of activities and in the management of distributed materials.

*"We need two core committees to maintain operations, one military and one civilian." FG Civilian Men Pweto*

Local authorities also complain that they are marginally included in CdB activities, which limits their ability to organize future activities, when their role should be central. The KII data illustrate their good knowledge and understanding of project issues. However, their role is not really decision-making, whereas it should be central, particularly in the organization of community work.

*"The territory can become an organizer, as for Search, the activities have stopped since they left. Club presidents can organize this with waiting." FG Men Kabimba*

In general, Search has been criticized for being overly centralized, at the expense of using local resources and talent, which greatly hinders the possibility of local ownership.

*"The Lokolé center comes with teams from other territories to carry out the activities, such as the theater, they bring the team from Bukavu, Kalemie and yet we have the local workforce"» FG Moba Men*

## 4. Conclusions

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The LMYS II project took place in a political, security and health context that was particularly complex and unstable, but unfortunately partly predictable. However, Search managed to implement the majority of the project activities taking place at the communities' level such as: sensitization to the FARDC, mobile cinemas, radio broadcasts and solidarity activities. As the project was not initially planned for Tanganyika and Haut-Katanga, its implementation involved many budgetary and organizational challenges, forcing the team to be pragmatic and flexible. The project was therefore managed centrally by Search, relying mainly on the FARDC Comités de Base ("CdBs") created in each locality and on SECAS. The consequence of this priority given to partnerships with the FARDC is the lack of development of structures that include the civilian population in the planning of solidarity activities.

The final evaluation demonstrates the overall quality of the different activities at the community level. The radio programs and films produced by Search were praised for their production and their relevance to the general concerns of the populations. However, an effort must be made to ensure their adaptation to local specificities, particularly in terms of ethnic dynamics. Solidarity activities are clearly the flagship of the project. The results of the survey undeniably demonstrate that the encounter between civilians and the military in a neutral setting such as soccer or community work ("salongo") helps to create interpersonal bonds that overcome issues of social status or power relations. Finally, the FARDC's outreach component produced less easily demonstrable results in terms of knowledge acquisition. Sensitization during parades allows the FARDC to better understand their legal and moral obligations. However, it does not replace daily supervision or in-depth training.

The components of the project involving the political and military authorities at both the national and provincial levels, namely the finalization of the new SECAS curriculum and advocacy for SSR, encountered major difficulties. Due to a lack of availability of the interlocutors concerned and following malfunctions in the partnership with the local structure, the activities were successively delayed during almost the entire project, only to be partially implemented in the last few months. The political context explains many of these difficulties. However, it is likely that Search was probably too ambitious in this respect, especially considering the duration of the project and the internal expertise available. Moreover, it is regrettable that such a long-term work that advocacy for SSR is not taken up by other projects.

Several elements inherent to the LMYS 2 project repeatedly come up against fundamental strategic issues. The most prevalent is the question of the frequent, and often unpredictable, rotation of FARDC elements. This forces the project team to repeat several times during the project all the relational work accomplished with the FARDC. It is illusory to hope to have an impact on the operational dynamics of the FARDC, but certain avenues are conceivable (see "Recommendations"). Another recurring problem concerns the inclusiveness of activities. Despite Search's important efforts, the data shows a strong participation bias in favor of men, privileged social categories and senior FARDC members. Greater involvement of participants in the choice and management of activities, particularly in a joint management committee, could reduce this tendency. Finally, the project faces the limits of its own internal philosophy. It is designed according to a binary "civilian vs. FARDC" reading grid and appears to be poorly adapted to situations of intra-community conflict, as is the case in the project area. It is crucial to include programmatic, and not just ad-hoc, elements of social cohesion in the design of the project.

The project had an undeniably positive effect on the behavior of the FARDC and on civil-military relations in the area. The data illustrates a decrease in human rights violations and an improvement in civil-military relations attributable to the project. The impact on FARDC accountability is more questionable. A tendency to complain more easily to military and administrative authorities was noted, but this does not compensate for the dysfunction of the judicial system. Due to the very short duration of the intervention, 18 months interspersed with suspensions, the LMYS 2 project was only able to plant the seeds of lasting change. Such ambitions would require at least 3 years. Otherwise, the sustainability of the action could be ensured by the communities, as activities such as sports and community work involve few resources and expertise. However, the lack of involvement of civilians and authorities in the management of these activities has had the effect of greatly reducing ownership and therefore the sustainability of the impact.

## 5. Recommendations

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### Strategic orientations:

1. Consider renewal of the project in the same area as a strategic priority in proposals to donors.
2. Conducting a reflection process, for example via an ad-hoc workshop, in partnership with SECAS and the FARDC hierarchy to identify solutions to adapt the project to frequent and systematic infantry rotations. Possible avenues for reflection could be:
  - a. a hierarchical decision to maintain CdB members in a specific zone,
  - b. a prioritization of marine troops in the CdBs,
  - c. the development of a database of CdB members to maintain collaboration in their new assignments.
3. Systematically include the dimension of social cohesion in the project theory. Provide for mediation activities between ethnic groups as well as consultations to ensure the conflict sensitivity of the audio-visual material produced.
4. Conduct a lesson learned exercise on the issue of CSO involvement in Search's SSR projects and harmonize approaches between different projects to foster partnerships with local stakeholders.
5. Systematically include other security services (PNC, ANR and DGM) in SSR projects.

### Solidarity activities:

6. Set up and form management committees (CoGes) in charge of organizing solidarity activities in each locality. These CoGes should include the FARDC, community leaders and civil authorities. They would be responsible for assessing needs, selecting participants and managing equipment allocations.
7. Adopt a more inclusive approach to activities by offering activities that are less traditionally considered masculine, such as soccer, and by increasing the number of non-mixed activities. Special attention should be given to less privileged social groups and lower-ranking FARDCs in the selection of participants.
8. Adopt a more ambitious approach to the problem of legal impunity of the FARDC and the malfunctioning of military and civil justice, particularly by generalizing open-door days at the public prosecutor's office and at the civilian prosecutor's office.

### Human Rights Sensitization:

9. Include a component to sensitize civilians on their legal obligations and the respect due to members of the security forces in the activities. Part of this sensitization could be carried out by the CdB.
10. Increase the provision of fuel and training materials to the CdBs to enable them to conduct sessions in all FARDC deployment locations.
11. Develop a specific sensitization module for SECAS and CdBs intended for marine units and covering topics related to fishing and lake transport.
12. Assess the relevance of allegations of misappropriation or appropriation of materials by CdBs in several localities and develop more binding control mechanisms.

### Collaboration with the FARDC:

13. Propose to the donor to adopt a vetting system per FARDC unit and at the beginning of the project, rather than per element and before each activity.

### Do Not Harm:

14. Conduct an investigation into the allegations shared in this report of audio-visual material generating ethnic tensions, even if it was created as part of another project.

### Advocacy for SSR:

15. Sustaining advocacy at the national and provincial levels through another Search's RSS project. Develop a medium to long term strategy based on the development of the organization's internal expertise and partnership with other actors in the field.

## 6. Appendices

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### Appendix 1. Evaluation Questions

#### Efficiency

- To what extent were the objectives and outcomes of the project achieved?
- Were the changes expected as a result of the project realized among the different target groups?
- How did the project approach gender mainstreaming in the program, and how was the gender issue taken into account in the objectives achieved?

#### Impact

- To what extent will the program achieve its theory of change? Have external factors compromised or contributed positively to the achievement of the theory of change?
- What were the expected and unexpected (positive and negative) outcomes (in terms of changes in norms and institutions) of the program?
- To what extent has the program actively contributed to improving the FARDC's ability to protect civilian populations through positive civil-military relations and better understanding and respect for human rights and international humanitarian law?

#### Sustainability

- What is the level of ownership of the program by the target groups and is it likely to continue after external assistance ends?
- To what extent is the project integrated into local and institutional structures?
- What is the level of ownership of the project's gender strategy by the local populations and targeted actors?

**Appendix 2. Logical Framework**


Global objective	Specific Objectives	Results	Activities
<p><b>MT: Improve the FARDC's ability to protect civilian populations through positive civil-military relations and increased understanding and respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.</b></p>	<p><b>SO1:</b> Improve the level of knowledge of the roles, rights and responsibilities of the security forces in creating a safe and secure environment for civilian populations in the DRC with respect to IHL.</p>	<p><b>ER 1.1:</b> FARDC instructors at the national level have the necessary knowledge and tools to effectively promote civilian protection and human rights within the armed forces.</p>	<p><b>A1.1.1.</b> Support for the finalization of the SECAS curriculum  <b>A1.1.2.</b> Training given to FARDC instructors</p>
		<p><b>ER 1.2:</b> FARDC members in the selected zone have knowledge and understanding of their roles, rights and responsibilities in the protection of civilians.</p>	<p><b>A0.</b> CAP study and kick-off and closing meetings  <b>A1.2.1.</b> Establishment of TOT Committees  <b>A1.2.2.</b> Training given to TOT members  <b>A1.2.3.</b> Sensitization Sessions</p>
	<p><b>SO2:</b> Strengthen FARDC accountability and collaboration between the FARDC and civilian populations</p>	<p><b>ER 2.1:</b> Civilians and the FARDC have a better understanding of each other's perspectives and their ability to hold each other accountable is strengthened.</p>	<p><b>A0.</b> CAP study and kick-off and closing meetings  <b>A2.1.1.</b> Production of Radio Programs  <b>A.2.1.2.</b> Mobile Cinema Sessions  <b>A2.1.3.</b> Solidarity activities  <b>A2.1.4.</b> Open House Days</p>
		<p><b>ER 2.2:</b> Members of the Communication Units have the capacity to communicate clearly through civil society dialogues.</p>	<p><b>A2.2.1.</b> Coaching Sessions</p>
		<p><b>ER 2.3:</b> The members of the Defense and Security Commission review national SSR policies taking into account the real needs of the FARDC and the community they serve.</p>	<p><b>A2.3.1.</b> Dialogue meetings at the provincial level  <b>A2.3.2.</b> Dialogue meetings at the national level</p>

## Appendix 3. Table of Indicators

		Indicateurs	GLOBAL:										Objectifs
			Kabimba	Nyunzu	Pweto	Moba	Femmes	Hommes					
Goal	1	% de civils qui sont d'accord avec la déclaration suivante: «Au cours des six derniers mois, les violences commises à l'encontre de civils par les FARDC ont diminué?»	Baseline	51%	50%	49%	64%	59%	51%	50%			
			Endline	93%	99%	93%	92%	88%	96%	89%			76%
Goal	2	% de civils qui perçoivent les FARDC comme une présence stabilisante dans les zones ciblées par le Projet	Baseline	43%	58%	53%	36%	44%	41%	45%			
			Endline	92%	96%	93%	92%	88%	94%	89%			65%
Goal	3	% de civils qui perçoivent que les FARDC travaillent pour protéger la population dans les zones ciblées par le Projet	Baseline	44%	51%	59%	45%	33%	42%	46%			
			Endline	95%	96%	94%	97%	93%	99%	91%			57%
Goal	4	% de civils dans les zones ciblées par le Projet qui croient que les FARDC sont tenus responsables pour les actes répréhensibles	Baseline	38%	38%	59%	13%	36%	35%	40%			
			Endline	21%	19%	27%	17%	21%	14%	29%			45%
ER.1.2	5	% des FARDC interrogés qui indiquent que le respect des droits de l'homme est une priorité dans leurs rôles	Baseline	98%	100%	97%	97%	100%	89%	98%			
			Endline	96%	100%	94%	100%	94%	100%	96%			70%
ER2.1	6	% de membres de la communauté qui croient que les FARDC sont dignes de confiance;	Baseline	23%	23%	30%	24%	24%	22%	26%			
			Endline	69%	64%	75%	69%	66%	66%	71%			26%
ER2.1	7	% de membres de la communauté qui pensent que les FARDC comprennent leur griefs;	Baseline	36%	38%	51%	29%	10%	33%	40%			
			Endline	51%	54%	44%	51%	53%	47%	54%			42%
ER2.1	8	% de membres de la communauté qui se sentent confortable de signaler des cas de violence aux FARDC	Baseline	12%	9%	21%	8%	10%	10%	13%			
			Endline	77%	72%	77%	79%	81%	78%	77%			60%
ER2.1	9	% de membres de l'unité des FARDC interviewés qui peuvent identifier au moins un exemple d'engagement positif avec les civils dans les trois derniers mois	Baseline	31%	32%	30%	26%	65%	28%	36%			
			Endline	76%	100%	85%	78%	33%	78%	76%			75%
ER2.1	10	% de participants interrogés pouvant identifier au moins deux manières de signaler un cas d'abus commis par les éléments FARDC	Baseline	27%	39%	45%	22%	21%	17%	37%			
			Endline	75%	83%	70%	74%	72%	74%	76%			33%




## Appendix 4. Sample Representativeness

### Representativeness of the qualitative sample Civil




The sample data show that the gender balance was satisfactorily respected with 48% of men and 52% of women, with little variation between localities.


In the absence of reliable demographic data, the assessment of sample validity is intuitive. The general impression is that the age pyramid, level of education and occupational categories of the sample are broadly representative of the civilian population of the area.



Again, in the absence of reliable demographic data, it is not possible to empirically assess the representativeness of the sample in terms of ethnic groups (Fig. 11). Since ethnicity data were not collected during the baseline study, a comparison with the baseline study is not possible. A major effort was made by the team during data collection to include the different groups. As mentioned in the "Limitations" section, members of the Twa ethnic group are probably under-represented with only 2% in the sample.



Representativeness of the qualitative sample FARDC



The proportion of women in the FARDC is extremely low and rarely exceeds 3 to 4 elements per locality. The strategy was to interview all of the female elements present, in order to have a sufficient sample size to ensure the robustness of the data. Female FARDCs are therefore over-represented in the FARDC sample with a weight of 8% which exceeds their actual representation.

The sample is likely over-represented among non-commissioned officers (39%) and junior officers (24%) compared to non-commissioned soldiers (29%). This bias is confirmed by the age pyramid, which indicates an over-representation of FARDC in their forties (55%).

