Promoting Civilian Engagement in Security Sector Reform Processes in Tunisia

Mid Term Evaluation Report

Reporting Period:

October 01, 2015 to March 31, 2018

Report of the External Evaluator

Eya Jrad, Consultant
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables and Graphs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Context</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Project Summary</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 The Evaluation</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1. Objectives of the Evaluation</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2. Methodology</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Evaluation Findings</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Relevance</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Effectiveness</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Efficiency</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Impact</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Sustainability</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cross-cutting issues</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Challenges and Lessons Learned</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Conclusion</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KADEM</td>
<td>Al-Kawakibi Democracy Transition Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCE</td>
<td>No Cost Extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSISF</td>
<td>National Syndicate of Internal Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFCG</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables and Graphs

Table 1: Interviewees according to their profiles, regions and affiliations

Table 2: Project’s Achievements

Table 3: CSOs’ Level of Knowledge on SSR

Graph 01: Types of activities implemented during small grants

Graph 02: Level of interest/engagement in the activity

Graph 03: Percentage of communication and interaction within the groups

Graph 04: Percentage of project’s small grants beneficiaries reporting whether there was improvement in the police-citizen relationship

Graph 05: Project’s most useful feature according to project’s small grants beneficiaries

Graph 06: Evaluation of the project’s main features according to partner CSOs

Graph 07: Public knowledge of SSR initiatives in Ben Guerdene and Kasserine

Graph 08: Evaluating media coverage of SSR initiatives

Graph 09: Public perception of improvement rate of media coverage of SSR initiatives in Ben Guerdene and Kasserine

Graph 10: Project’s small grants beneficiaries having improved their understanding of the SSR efforts in Tunisia.

Graph 11: Degree to which the difference in status (security sector actors vs civil society actors) hinders activity implementation

Graph 12: Project’s small grants beneficiaries most significant learnings

Graph 13: Existence of a gender sensitive orientation of media reporting on security
Executive Summary

The project "Promoting Civilian Engagement in Security Sector Reform Processes in Tunisia” was implemented by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) in collaboration with Al-Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center (KADEM). The project aimed at facilitating the transition from a vertical security reform system within government to mechanisms involving civil society and media through the collaborative development and implementation of local initiatives.

The project sought to meet its overall goal through building and maintaining communication and collaboration between the security sector and civil society actors in four chosen localities. It also worked towards effectively engaging media throughout the process. Indeed, the project planned for capacity-building sessions both at the national and local levels on the role of civil society in SSR processes, which aimed at providing members of CSOs with the skills and knowledge necessary to understand key concepts of SSR, as well as their role in engaging the public in SSR processes. Then, in preparation of the dialogue fora held in each region, civil society representatives received training in dialogue techniques. The dialogue sessions, held at a rate of three per thematic and twelve per region for a total of forty-eight sessions, led to the development of action plans by security and community actors, which were turned into small grants to be collaboratively implemented. During the implementation of the eleven small grants and following a specialized training for national and local media actors, aimed at empowering journalists to constructively report on SSR, Tunisian media were mobilized to promote the ongoing collaborative projects and broadcast dialogue and discussion about security reform in Tunisia.

The evaluation followed specific lines of inquiry based on the OECD-DAC Evaluation Criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability) and focused on the engagement and collaboration among key stakeholders, namely, security sector actors, civil society actors, project’s small grants beneficiaries and partners, through an estimation of perception, attitude, and behavioural transformation among those actors to ensure a conducive environment for enhanced civilian participation in the security arena.
Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation methodology was based on SFCG requirements. It employed mixed qualitative and quantitative data collection approaches, as well as triangulation between several methods of data gathering.

The field visit of the evaluation was carried out from April 7 until May 3. Overall, thirteen (13) FGDs were conducted in the four governorates where the project was implemented. Participants in these groups varied in age and gender. In addition, sixteen (16) KIIIs were held to collect relevant data. Discussions were organized according to semi-structured, pre-prepared questionnaires. Different guides were prepared for the different target groups and can be found in the annexes.

Summary of Findings

On Relevance

Given the national context, and local needs and characteristics. The project was highly relevant. It was also relevant to the mandate of SFCG/KADEM. Furthermore, it succeeded in aligning international partners working on SSR issues in Tunisia, thus ensuring cost and efforts saving.

On Effectiveness

The evaluation showed that the project was successful in reaching its objectives and outcomes. It contributed to increasing the transparency of the security sector reform efforts by involving civil society, media and local authorities to improve communication between the public and security sector through collaborative development of local initiatives. However, the evaluator had limited access to journalists, which in turn had impacted the evaluation of the media component, which appears to be limited.

On Efficiency

The project was ambitious in its schedule and in the number of CSO participants, especially for the level of funding. Despite some challenges, which resulted mainly from shortage of human resources and meeting deadlines, the project was efficient in managing its budget and expenditure, as explained in the 2.3 section below.

On Impact

This evaluation highlights the project's positive impact on participants, both as individual participants (who have gained interpersonal and communication skills), or as organisations (who have acquired experience and visibility and built their capacities).
On Sustainability

Local CSOs and communities have acquired the technical expertise needed for the continuity of the project, and they have also expressed their desire and enthusiasm to participate in future phases of the project. The project appears to have enabled them to continue the work after funds end.

Recommendations Overview

The discussion around SSR in Tunisia must continue: the project sparked interest in SSR during the first phase, and it is important not to lose momentum to continue future phases of the project. Moreover, it is essential to build on and maintain the relationships with the organizations and partners that focus on civilian participation in SSR processes in Tunisia, which will require further strengthening the institutional capacities and technical expertise of CSOs regarding SSR processes as well as exchange mechanisms. Also, it is important to increase funding related to small grants. Also the evaluation recommends a greater focus on the media component (with regard to the choice of, engaged, journalists or bloggers as well as platforms with greater viewership).
1. Introduction

1.1 Context

The relationship between the Tunisian security forces and the public is characterized by deep mistrust and a history of antagonism. Former Tunisian president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali relied heavily on the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), and specifically the police, as instruments to consolidate his regime’s power. The army, however, was generally removed from politics and refused to fire on citizens during the revolution. Thus, while the public has come to see the army as an ally, they still harbor a deep mistrust of the police and National Guard. The public lack of confidence in – and even fear of – the police exacerbates the current security situation and hinders effective responses. Some civilians have also channelled their distrust into violence, as evident in two separate attacks that targeted security actors during 2014 and 2015, and a number of violent clashes between youth and security actors that have occurred in 2018.1 Good intelligence services are essential to preventing criminal activity and reforming the security sector more generally, but it is difficult to collect such intelligence when the citizens are wary of, and even hostile towards, the security sector.

Immediately after the 2011 uprisings, Tunisians’ hopes for comprehensive Security Sector Reform (SSR) were high, but the government’s steps toward reform have fallen short of public expectations. Despite replacing head officials of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and security-related departments, the rest of the institutional structure remains unchanged. The intelligence apparatuses continue to operate unregulated and uncoordinated, further complicating the collection of intelligence needed for SSR. Additionally, the threats of politically motivated violence – including the attacks in Tunis outside the Bardo Museum in March 2015 and the attack in Sousse in June 2015 – have also resulted in increased arrests and incarcerations, overwhelming the justice system. While a crackdown on

---

1 Below are the some of the key events further fracturing relationships between civilian and security actors during the last months:

On May 5, two young men have been pursued and beaten by police officers after a basketball game in Rades. The clash is filmed by neighbor and posted on social media a few minutes later: https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/entry/agressions-policieres-choquantes-apres-un-match-de-basket-a-rades-video_mg_5aeed592e4b0ab5c3d667d00?utm_hp_ref=mg-police-tunisie

On March 31, Omar Laabidi, 19 years old, dies by drowning while running away from police officers after a football game. Following this event, online lynching of security actors takes place using the hashtag “T3alem 3oum” (learn how to swim), mimicking what a police officer supposedly told him before his death: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/555703/societe/tunisie-mort-domar-laabidi-la-balle-est-dans-le-camp-des-autorites-juge-ghazi-mrabet/

On February 26, fifty (50) armed security actors representatives enter a courtroom in Ben Arous, requiring the liberation of five of their colleagues being judged for allegedly torturing a prisoner: http://www.businessnews.com.tn/affaire-du-tribunal-de-ben-arous--des-policiers-au-dessus-de-la-loi,519,78326,3
extremist violence in the country is of huge importance, a heavy-handed approach that does not ensure full respect for human rights will be counterproductive to repairing the relationship between the people and law enforcement officials. Finally, limited government communication about existing and future SSR strategies has led to fear among the public that the government does not have a comprehensive plan to address SSR or political violence in Tunisia.

The mutual distrust between security actors and Tunisian citizens underscore the need for a third-party mediator, such as civil society organizations (CSOs), to facilitate reform strategies related to developing greater democratic accountability over and transparency of security actors.

1.2 Project Summary

In September 2015, Search for Common Ground-Tunisia (SFCG-Tunisia) signed an initial twenty-two-month contract with the donor, for a project entitled “Promoting Civilian Engagement in Security Sector Reform Processes in Tunisia.” In early January 2017, SFCG requested a no-cost six-month extension to allow time to implement the project at a measured pace, accounting for potential delays. A supplementary six-month no-cost extension was requested in January 2018 to allow time for additional community intervention activities, as well as sufficient time to conduct the project’s external evaluation. Phase One of the project had a total duration of thirty-four months.

Through a two-fold approach, Search and KADEM facilitated dialogue and joint action between CSOs and security sector actors to increase civilian participation in SSR and governance processes, while leveraging media to highlight successes and ensure accountability. This project focused on strengthening the capacity of media actors and local civil society, including marginalized groups such as women and youth, to improve communication between the public and the security sector and to advocate for inclusive SSR in four Tunisian governorates: Ben Gardane in Medenine, Bizerte City in Bizerte, Kasserine City in Kasserine, and Sidi Hassine in Greater Tunis.

The project’s overall goal was to support local civil society’s ability to increase the transparency of SSR efforts in Tunisia through the following specific objectives and outcomes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific objective 1:</th>
<th>Specific Objective 2:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foster sustainable collaboration between the security sector and civil society actors in four Tunisian governorates</td>
<td>Engage media effectively to improve communication about and celebrate successes of security sector reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Under those outcomes, the project planned for capacity-building sessions both at the national and local levels on the role of civil society in SSR processes, which aimed at providing members of CSOs with the skills and knowledge necessary to understand key concepts of SSR, as well as their role in engaging the public in SSR processes. Then, in preparation of the dialogue fora held in each region, civil society representatives received training in dialogue techniques. The dialogue sessions, held at a rate of three per thematic and twelve per region for a total of forty-eight sessions, led to the development of action plans by security and community actors, which were turned into small grants to be collaboratively implemented. During the implementation of the eleven small grants and following a specialized training for national and local media actors, aimed at empowering journalists to constructively report on SSR, Tunisian media were mobilized to promote the ongoing collaborative projects and broadcast dialogue and discussion about security reform in Tunisia.

1.3 The Evaluation

1.3.1. Objectives of the Evaluation

The present assignment is a mid-term project evaluation to determine:

(1) How the project was implemented, whether it answered the identified needs, and to what extent the project objectives were achieved during the set period of implementation, and

(2) Whether those needs have been entirely met or still remain relevant, and how can project staff and partners best learn from these analyses and past experiences for the design of a phase II of this project.

As such, this mid-term evaluation aimed to review the activities that have been implemented for the past thirty-four months of the project, in order to assess their strategic design, implementation,
efficiency, effectiveness, and impact. This evaluation aims to help project staff and partners understand whether the key interventions are still relevant and needed for phase II programming, and if so, how they can best be designed and completed by additional elements to respond to the identified needs. In addition, this evaluation aimed to help the project staff and partners to make informed decisions on how to effectively communicate, collaborate, and cooperate with CSOs, media and security actors, and other participants on enforcing transparency of security sector.

The evaluation was based on the OECD-DAC Evaluation Criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability), investigating specific lines of inquiry, and utilizing and/or addressing the performance indicators described in the project document.

More precisely, the mid-term evaluation aimed to answer the following questions:

**Effectiveness**

a- To what extent was the project successful in reaching its objectives and outcomes?
b- To what extent was the project’s approach successful in increasing the transparency of SSR efforts by involving civil society, media, and local authorities to improve communication between the public and security sector through collaborative development of local initiatives?
c- To what extent was project design effective and impact oriented?
d- Which internal and external factors facilitated or hindered the achievements of expected results/specific objectives?

**Efficiency**

e- Was the project implemented in an efficient manner (time, personnel resources)?

**Relevance**

f- To what extent did the project design respond to the stated problems of security sector transparency, public awareness and support of SSR, and civilian engagement in security-related topics?
g- Are the stated goals and objectives relevant to respond to issues and problems central to SSR?

**Impact**

h- Were there any unintended or unexpected results (positive or negative)?

**Lessons Learned**

i- Determine lessons learned – what could have been done differently to make the project be of higher quality and of greater impact? How can project staff and partners capitalize on the
achievements of the project in future projects, and specifically within the framework of this initiative’s phase II

**Sustainability**

- Based on the available evidence, did the achieved outcomes lead to long-term improvements, and are they sustainable / replicable? What is the likelihood that the benefits of the project will be sustained upon its completion?

### 1.3.2. Methodology

In accordance with the Terms of Reference, the purpose of this study was to evaluate the design, implementation, and results of the project in relation to the criteria of: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability with particular attention to cross-cutting issues, such as gender and good governance. The project evaluation was conducted using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods; including a desk review, focus group discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews (KIIs), and surveys with local CSOs, project partners, the project’s small grants beneficiaries, and SFCG and KADEM project staff. The evaluation also integrated findings from quarterly reports and project documents.

**Desk Review:**

The desk review enabled the evaluator to make the best use of previous work and hence to learn from/about the experiences, findings, and mistakes from the first phase of the project.

The desk review included the following documentation:

- Project document, including budget and logical framework;
- Quarterly reports to the donors;
- Baseline Study - Understanding of the current level of civil society and security sector institutions knowledge of the security sector and its prospects for reforms;
- Newsletters and communication tools;
- CSOs proposals, action plans and calendars;
- Monitoring tools (when available): training reports and documentation, etc.;
- Media productions produced and disseminated;
- Activity and output tracking tools.

**Qualitative Methods:**
Qualitative methods consisted of open-ended information that the evaluator gathered through interviews and focus groups. The qualitative data allowed the collection of non-statistical data, such as words and/or behaviours to better understand the context, people and different interactions that they experienced.

In order to document impact and give voice to participants’ experiences, key evaluation questions were asked to different participants as detailed in the annexes. A variety of data collection methods were used including KII, FGDs, and phone interviews when participants were not available.

**Quantitative Methods:**

The quantitative methods consisted of close-ended information that included statistical analysis of data collected on the different surveys (annexed).

**Sampling**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Survey</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Response rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSOs surveys</td>
<td>10 CSO</td>
<td>9 CSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project’s small grants beneficiaries’ surveys</td>
<td>Questionnaires were sent to all partner CSOs to distribute to their beneficiaries. (total number of beneficiaries 80).</td>
<td>58 project’s small grants beneficiaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public perception surveys</td>
<td>The initial target was set for 384 persons. Considering the bias of non-respondents, the final size of respondents is fixed to 400 (100 in each governorate)(^2) set at 95% confidence level and 0.05 margin error.</td>
<td>85 public perception surveys were completed in Kasserine and Ben Guerdene solely.(^3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The objective of these tools was to collect numerical data and receive feedback from the various participating groups in the project. Surveys are doubly useful as they allow collecting valuable data by means of asking both closed-ended and open-ended questions to measure impact and in order to inform future programming.

**Data Collection:**

\(^2\) The target population will be randomly selected. The calculation of the sample size will be done using the below formula:

\[
N = \frac{t^2 p (1 - p)}{e^2}
\]

\(t = t\)-value (in this case 1.96 for 95% confidence level), \(p = \) percentage picking a choice. In this case, \(p\) presents the probability that a citizen can listen, read, or view an article about the project (\(P=0.5\)), \(e = \) confidence interval (\(e=0.05\))

\(^3\) Due to the sensitivity of the topic, the evaluation faced challenges in distributing public opinion surveys in Bizerte and Tunis, we were limited to those distributed in Kasserine and Ben Guerdene. Many people have refused to respond to the survey.
The field visit of the evaluation was carried out from April 7 until May 3. Overall, thirteen (13) FGDs were conducted in the four governorates where the project was implemented. Participants in these groups varied in age and gender. In addition, sixteen (16) KIIs were held to collect relevant data. Discussions were organized according to semi-structured, pre-prepared questionnaires. Different guides were prepared for the different target groups and can be found in the annexes.

For the case of minors, discussions were planned and attended by their respective teachers and educational staff.

Data collection was done according to the table below, which details interviewees according to their profiles, regions, and affiliations:

**Table 1: Interviewees according to their profiles, regions, and affiliations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total respondents</th>
<th>Gender distribution</th>
<th>Profile of the interviewees</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Data Collection method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ben Guerdene</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11 9</td>
<td>ABFID</td>
<td>(3) Members of the association</td>
<td>FGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stakeholders involved with ABFID</td>
<td>(1) representative of the Tunisian Association for the Protection of Road Accidents / owner of a driving school</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Irada and the Coalition</td>
<td>(5) Members of the association</td>
<td>FGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Beneficiaries of the small grants granted to Irada and the Coalition</td>
<td>(7) Pupils</td>
<td>FGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stakeholders involved by Irada and the Coalition</td>
<td>(1) Security sector representative</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>(1) Facilitator of dialogue sessions</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bizerte</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4 6</td>
<td>Young leaders</td>
<td>(1) President of the association (in charge of the project)</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stakeholders involved with Young leaders</td>
<td>(1) Representative of the municipality</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Youth and Skills</td>
<td>(1) Psychologist</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Beneficiaries of the small grants granted to with Youth and Skills</td>
<td>(1) Pupil</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ADD</td>
<td>(1) Executive Director</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stakeholders involved with ADD</td>
<td>(1) Member of Parliament</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Key Stakeholders</td>
<td>Small Grants Beneficiaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasserine</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Stakeholders involved with CIES: (1) Sociologist, (1) Teacher, (1) Activist</td>
<td>Beneficiaries of the small grants granted to CIES: (8) Pupils</td>
<td>Houna Kasserine: (2) Members of the association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Stakeholders involved with Houna Kasserine: (1) Security sector representative, (1) Media representative, (1) Representative of the local football team, (1) Promosport Kasserine, (1) Representative of President Promosport Kasserine</td>
<td>Beneficiaries of the small grants granted to Houna Kasserine: (3) Football supporters</td>
<td>Expert: (1) Dialogue Facilitator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Expert: (1) Dialogue Facilitator</td>
<td>OTCS: (3) Members of the association</td>
<td>Beneficiaries of the small grants granted to OTCS: (2) Beneficiaries</td>
<td>National: (1) Media expert consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>SFCG: (1) Project director, (1) Project Manager, (1) Senior Manager-Finance, Administration &amp; Human Resources</td>
<td>KADEM: (1) Director, (1) Project Manager</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.3.4. Limitations

During the planning for this evaluation, six significant limitations were identified. These limitations are due to contextual reasons. For instance, the evaluation took place during the national school holidays and a wide teachers’ strike\(^4\) which explains the low participation. Furthermore, at the time of the evaluation, Kasserine was on terror alert, as two incidents happened overnight\(^5\).

Limitations included:

- Unavailability of journalists that had participated in the project
- Limited availability of interviewees due to conflicting schedules, new project management teams, or reluctance to participate especially due to the sensitivity of the issue in question
- Challenges in mobilizing local CSOs for convening meetings and interviews with stakeholders and project’s small grant beneficiaries
- Challenges in mobilizing local CSOs to fill in surveys targeting CSOs and to distribute surveys to their project beneficiaries.
- Challenges in mobilizing local CSOs in Bizerte and Tunis to distribute public opinion surveys, and consequently, the evaluation was limited to those distributed in Ben Guerdene\(^6\) and Kasserine\(^7\)
- Low response rate, which restricted the information available to evaluate the achievement of outcomes, especially regarding objective two related to the media component.

\(^4\) Such information provides valuable lessons on data collection timing, that is to avoid data collection during exceptional times such as holiday seasons.

\(^5\) On the night of 11/04/18.

\(^6\) Only 78 surveys were filled in Ben Guerdene.

\(^7\) Only 7 surveys were filled in Kasserine.
2. Evaluation Findings

The present report is structured in accordance to the OECD-DAC Evaluation Criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability), investigating specific lines of inquiry, and utilizing and/or addressing the performance indicators described in the project document.

2.1 Relevance

This section concerns the extent to which the project’s activities were suited to the priorities of the target group and the government. Overall, the evaluation found the project very relevant as discussed in the subsequent sections below.

A. Relevance to national SSR challenges and efforts

Over the course of two years beginning in 2015, SFCG and KADEM built on previous initiatives and maximized the MoI’s willingness to reform by launching a thirty-four-month initiative to strengthen constructive civilian engagement in Tunisian SSR processes. From the beginning, the project sought a high national buy-in and input through regular consultation with the MoI as well as their participation in the different project’s activities.8

Overall, the objectives of the project were relevant and sought to address critical and identifiable needs. There was a clear need to involve civil society in Tunisia’s SSR Process. In 2016, The National Defence Institute (under the purview of the Tunisian Ministry of Defence) issued the white paper on Defence and National Security, highlighting the following priorities: traditional threats to territorial integrity; the terrorist threat; transnational organized crime; corruption; hostile foreign influences and interference; cyberthreat; threats targeting the national economy etc. Based on the documents provided, the project objectives correspond to national priorities and goals as they support good governance in the security sector. For instance, according to the project activity 1.4 Small Grants Project, “all projects will aim at reinforcing either effectiveness or accountability of security sector agencies and will require close collaboration, even joint implementation in some instances, with security sector agencies,” directly responded to national initiatives, which included the participation of NGOs in the discussions on security sector reform9. CSOs are well-informed, involved in community-based activities, and often possess a good network with which they collaborate to

8 For instance, the civil society training benefited from the visit and interventions of five MoI representatives. So, did the media training which was attended by several members of the Bureau of Public Relations and Communication of the MoI.

9For instance, in 2013, initiatives to strengthen the participation of civil society in reforming the security sector took place, including the International Conference on Police Reform (organised by Reform), a study day on “Security is the responsibility of all; a forward-looking vision” (organized by the General Directorate of Training of the Ministry of the Interior).
implement projects; thus, they are well-poised to identify and include individuals in and beyond the security sector and to support SSR.

Also, the project design took into consideration the vital role media has played in Tunisia post 2011, as it included activities aiming at building the capacity of media professionals and took into account the necessary provision of media spaces for civil society to present their initiatives within the framework of the pursuit of the development of a tangible and constructive local civic governance. The project objectives fit within national priorities working towards greater professionalization of media coverage in Tunisia that aim to provide a clear framework for action for Tunisian journalists, as there are pressing needs for an improved communication that the project overall goal aim to achieve.\textsuperscript{10} Indeed, discussions with the various groups of stakeholders and project small grants beneficiaries throughout the four regions have highlighted the importance of media in accessing information and improving communication of and about the security sector in their regions. A great emphasis was put on local medias, especially radios, in “multiplying and amplifying the activities’ effect,” as expressed by a male stakeholder in Kasserine.

Therefore, the project is highly relevant to the SSR efforts in Tunisia.

B. Relevance to organizational expertise and mandate

Also, the project fits in larger SSR efforts within the implementing organisations’ strategies and expertise. SFCG has extensive experience in the field, since in many countries, SFCG partners with police, military, and prison staff as part of the solution, for instance in Eastern DRC, Nepal and other parts of the world.

As the Direction of Projects at SFCG states, “The project ‘Promoting Civilian Engagement in Security Sector Reform Processes in Tunisia’ is a continuation of previous projects implemented by SFCG Tunisia. Indeed, in 2015, SFCG worked on a project on countering violent extremism, one of the most recurrent issues (driving VE) that came out of this project was the (negative) relationship between Tunisian youth and security sector professionals. This had caught our attention to the need to address this particular issue.”

Similarly, KADEM utilized their prior SSR research expertise to inform the project proposal, implementation and evaluation. “In 2015, we conducted a research titled “Civil Society Involvement in Tunisia’s SSR Process,” funded by N.W.O. with additional contribution from Saferworld, that

\textsuperscript{10} Examples can be found in the Carnegie papers on “Tunisian Media in Transition”(2012), The UNESCO’s “Assessment of Media Development in Tunisia” (2013), The DCAF “Media and governance of the security sector in Tunisia: collection of legal texts” (2016).
sought to shed light on the involvement of Tunisian CSOs in SSR since the 2011 revolution,” commented the KADEM Director of Projects.

It is worth noting that in 2015, SFCG and KADEM had previously collaborated on a project proposal related to SSR that was not selected by the donor. In this sense, the current project was an opportunity to refine and further refine their proposal.

C. Strategic Positioning

Multilateral international partners cooperation projects, including the European Union, United Nations Development Project (UNDP), and/or bilateral partners such as the United States and other projects of support and security cooperation, including Tunisian Institutional Reform (Reform)\(^\text{11}\), UNDP, DCAF, and the United States Institute of Peace and others focus on the issue of national SSR.

The project actively collaborated with the UNDP. Indeed, the project has utilized the Local Security Committees (LSCs), a body developed under an ongoing MoI and UNDP pilot project, as well as local community police stations currently engaged through this same initiative in Sidi Hassine. “LSCs had opened doors for us that, alone, we wouldn’t have been able to access,” commented one female local partner representative in Tunis. While, on the other hand, LSC creation and development was facilitated by the previous implementation of the SFCG-KADEM SSR initiative in Ben Guerdene, as attested by one male CSO member “when UNDP entered the picture in Ben Guerdene, they found that SFCG/KADEM had prepared the terrain for them. We were aware of the thematic as well as its challenges and opportunities.”

Following, SFCG/KADEM as well as their partners had maximised synergies, ensured coordination, but also reduced costs and avoided duplication of efforts. It also ensured that none of the partner CSO lose interest in the project.

In some localities, stakeholders had trouble distinguishing which project the evaluator was evaluating due to the multiplicity of actors working on, roughly, the same issues engaging nearly the same stakeholders. This misunderstanding requires project staff to work towards building a clearer identity for the project, so that it will not be confused with similar ones.

D. Activities’ Logic and Relevance to Objectives

The design strategy for activities responded to a logical sequencing, meaning that activities were relevant to outcomes and objectives, and depended on the result of previous ones. For instance,

\(^{11}\) Reform overall goal is to push for institutional transparency and accountability within the security sector in Tunisia while encouraging civil society to take a proactive role in political decision-making and reform through constructively engaging in dialogue with government institutions.
jointly implementing initiatives would not be as effective if not preceded by the joint identification of issues carried out during the community level dialogues.

It also appears that not all of the activities implemented focused on the project’s objectives, which also limited its relevance to achieving the project’s intended outcomes. Due to the sensitivity of the subject of civilian engagement in the security sector, (in fact, as evidenced through the data collected from the scorecards, 60% have rated the citizen-security forces relationship as highly sensitive) local partners have resorted to indirect methods. Indeed, many had to reformulate their projects without direct reference to ‘civilian engagement in SSR.’ Thus, they have argued for a subtler approach and indirect entry point.

Moreover, the media component provided complimentary features to the project, thus ensuring emphasized impact. Indeed, broadcasting local partner activities gave greater visibility to their activities which will guarantee a larger impact. Recognizing that outreach could be expanded via radio, this project involved two of the twelve partners as local radio stations based in Ben Guerdene and Kasserine.

### E. Relevance to the target populations, partners and local needs

In 2016, SFCG conducted a comprehensive assessment to understand and evaluate the ongoing and potential contribution to reforming the security sector in Tunisia. This assessment phase combined a research-oriented analysis and on-the-ground experience that informed the project’s implementation.

The project was implemented in four governorates: Tunis, Medenine, Kasserine and Bizerte. The scope of this project ensures geographic diversity, given that Medenine, Kasserine, and Bizerte are border regions and Tunis is the national capital, but all of the selected regions have experienced conflicts between citizens and security forces, thereby also ensuring the relevance of this project.

This project selected the beneficiary communities by consulting with the MoI and narrowing the target communities. During this meeting, project staff and the MoI also agreed that if the selected governorate also contained an LSC, SFCG/KADEM would collaborate with this body. This decision led to the selection of Sidi Hassine, Ben Gardane, Kasserine, and Bizerte, where no similar body existed.

Globally, the evaluation found that the procedures for needs assessment and choice of the communities within the intervention area are relevant and effective, since it ensured diversity, legitimacy (relying on actors who have proven their reliability to their local populations especially

---

12 See Graph below.

13 Especially projects of ABFID and CIES.
with the crisis marking state institutions) and efficacy (through collaborative work with existing initiatives).

Project staff also ensured the relevance of this project by conducting FGDs and KIIs, which confirmed motivation to participate in such a project both at the individual and organizational levels. The most common reasons for participation cited in the FGDs and KIIs were that individuals involved felt that project was relevant to their own work and had relevance from the perspective of making change to their local and national realities. Other common motivating factors included the opportunity to share good practices and the potential to inform the work of their organisations.

“We were very motivated in participating in this project so that we could put the foundations of a transparent security sector in Tunisia, especially because of the lack of public information available about the Ministry of Interior,” one female partner in Bizerte commented when she was interviewed.

The project was deemed very relevant by both CSOs and security sector professionals. “We welcomed them (local partners) with open arms, sign of our willingness to reform, as long as it did not regard the security specificities,” said one male representative of the National Syndicate of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) in Ben Guerdene when he was interviewed.

The active involvement of civil society is an essential part of SSR. Small grant beneficiaries in Ben Guerdene also highlighted the need for transparent, constant communication between citizens and security sector professionals, as noted by a female CSO representative from Ben Guerdene “Security seems like a dark cave that only civil society can shed some lights on.”

It was also noted that this project went beyond “elite” discussions and included everyday citizens. “The added value of the project is that it took the issue of reforming security sector to the street, to the common citizen, it is no more the sole prerogative of elites isolated in fancy hotels--it’s now everybody’s business,” as expressed by one male stakeholder in Kasserine.

The grants were a key component to support the engagement of CSOs in the SSR debate. Eleven CSOs had their activities funded, covering a wide range of topics:

- Promoting the image of female security actors;
- Drug consumption in the high school environment;
- Road safety;
- Improving the relationship between security forces and local population through the participation of CSOs;
- Decreasing violence in high school environment;
Decreasing violence in stadiums.

As shown in the graph below, activities during small grants took different forms and types. The majority were round table discussions (26.7% of total activities) and workshops (23.3%). 15% of activities were participatory activities aimed to develop strong relationships between citizens and security actors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of activities implemented during small grants (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing stronger relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round table</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication/mediation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These thematics were built on ideas and recommendations generated during the localized dialogues, thus ensuring the contextualized relevance of project activities and local ownership of initiatives.

“The uniqueness of the project was its approach. SFCG and KADEM didn’t impose the subjects nor the action plans, it was the complete responsibility of participants (CSOs and different stakeholders), which guaranteed the relevance and responsiveness to local needs and priorities. Action plans were different from one locality to another,” commented one of the expert facilitators when interviewed.

The participatory approach underlying this process influenced project priorities and activities. This approach was positively viewed by local partners. As expressed by one male CSO representative in Ben Guerdene, “setting and discussing issues and priorities by ourselves was important in helping to ensure that the projects started from a solid base.”

Similarly, the media expert noted that “when journalists attend the activities in the hope to cover both sides, they are sometimes disappointed not to find security sector representatives to interview.”
The evaluator was unable to assess the relevance of journalists’ trainings as it was unclear who is being targeted, how the participants are selected, the level of their existing knowledge, and whether they will put their learning into practice.

It is clear that the objectives have a high degree of relevance to implementing organisations (SFCG/KADEM). The project objectives were also relevant to the needs of civil society organizations in Tunisia. This was especially pertinent to those working and living in areas marked by conflictual police/citizen relationships. The project coincided with an official openness towards civil society in the security sector which increased its relevance.

2.2 Effectiveness

A. Reaching Objectives and Outcomes

After reviewing the project proposal, logframe and other related documents, it was clear that the project was successful in achieving its outcomes and objectives. For most indicators, the targets were met.

Also, on effectiveness, the project was rated as ‘good’ by 89% of local CSO representatives, since it “had reached its pre-set goals,” as explained to the evaluator during the evaluation by one male CSO member from Bizerte.

### Table 2: Project’s Achievements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Objective 1: Foster sustainable collaboration between the security sector and civil society actors in four Tunisian governorates</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1.1: Security sector actors, local CSOs, and local authorities collaboratively engage in community-level dialogues</td>
<td>% of CSO, security sector and local authority representative who recognizes an improvement of at least 30% in their collaboration with each other</td>
<td>At least 50% of CSO, security sector, and local authority representatives</td>
<td>100% of CSOs have recognized an improvement. The improvement rate was estimated at 35%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of CSO, security sector and local authority representatives who attend and actively participate in at least 3 out of the 4 dialogue sessions per fora</td>
<td>12 CSOs, Security sector and local authority representatives</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1.2: Security sector actors, local CSOs, and local authorities jointly identify reforms to enhance the security sector’s effectiveness and accountability</td>
<td>1.1 Localized Dialogue and</td>
<td>A report and action plan on reforms to enhance the security</td>
<td>4 reports in total</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

14 67% of the surveyed CSOs responded to the rate question
15 The original target of 4 was set in the vision of having one action plan per governorate. Programmatic findings and reflection led to the development of 12 action plans, one per dialogue process, as it allowed for better representation of ideas expressed by all counterparts
Diagnosis | sector’s effectiveness is produced for each governorate
--- | ---
# of thematic community level fora established | 3 fora in each selected governorate 12
# of consensus building forums (multi-party, civil/security sector, and/or civil/political) held with USG Assistance (USG indicator 2.3.1-7) | 4 dialogue sessions per thematic forum or 48 dialogue sessions 48

1.2 Capacity Building for CSOs and Security Sector | # of USG-assisted consensus-building processes resulting in an agreement (USG indicator 2.3.1-4)
--- | ---
# of participants representing CSOs present at the capacity-building sessions | 35 participants in each session 44
# of participants who reported integrating some of the techniques learned during the capacity-building trainings in their professional and civic lives | 45 participants 45
# of participants representing security officials and local authorities participating in the capacity-building trainings | 12 officials and 4 high level officials 8\(^{16}\)
# of groups\(^{17}\) trained in conflict mediation/resolution skills or consensus-building techniques with USG assistance (USG indicator 2.3.1-6) | 12 CSOs and 4 local government entities (at least 1 per governorate) 14

1.3 SSR Monitoring Score Card | # of training and introduction sessions on the scorecard
--- | ---
# of CSOs and local authorities who attended the introduction sessions on the scorecard | 12 13
# of CSOs who used the scorecard in the assessment of their activities | 12 12
# of CSOs and/or local authorities who stated that the score cards helped in their small grant reporting | 10 7

Outcome 1.3: Security sector actors and local CSOs jointly implement community projects based on reform plans developed through dialogue

|  | % of efforts deployed where security sector and / or local authorities were represented in joint community projects and reform plans that have been collaboratively implemented |
|  | 50% 54% |

1.4 Small Grants Project | # of small grants granted to targeted CSOs
--- | ---
|  | 12 11 |

\(^{16}\) Approximately 2 security actors attended all dialogue sessions per governorate - others attended 1 or 2 sessions according to availability

\(^{17}\) groups = participants belonging to the same structure (security institution, CSO, etc).
| % change in CSO perception of local authorities’ involvement and collaboration | 50% | 100% of CSOs reporting a change in perception |
| % change in CSO attitude of local authorities’ involvement and collaboration | 50% | 100% of CSOs reporting a change in attitude |

Strategic Objective 2: Engage media effectively to improve communication about and celebrate successes of security sector reform

Outcome 2.1: Tunisian media broadcasts dialogue and discussion about security reform in Tunisia

2.1 Development and Production of TV Shows

| # of Tunisians reached through broadcast of dialogues and discussions about security sector reforms in Tunisia | 15,000 people | 9042 |
| % of trained journalists that can approach the topic of SSR using the common ground approach | 80% | The common ground approach was not included as a separate training component hence difficult to be measured separately through a pre/post-test, as trainings focused on increased knowledge and best practices in journalism on SSR. |
| # of trained journalists at each training session | 60 journalists and 1 national and 3 local trainings | 39 journalists? |
| # of TV productions produced and aired | 3 productions | 3 |

2.2 Civil society briefing to the media on each theme

| # of press conferences held | 4 communication events | 1 |
| # of media appearance features that published or aired covering project activities | 30 media pieces | 41 |

Outcome 2.2: Tunisian media amplifies positive examples of civil society and security sector collaboration to promote SSR

| % of interviewed population that are of the opinion that Tunisian media convey positive message of the efforts by the different entities working to promote SSR | At least 40% | 24% |

2.3 Dissemination of Best Practices in SSR Collaboration

| # of media pieces (TV, spot, posters, social media campaigns) produced to highlight the model of improved transparency and collaboration on SSR matters | 2 media highlights | 4 |

A. The Project’s Design

18 Based on available video and segments online viewership
19 Based on surveys carried out in two of the 4 governorates (namely Ben Guerdene and Kasserine).
The project design provided a structured, logical model for identifying expected results and the inputs and activities needed to accomplish them. The logic model in the proposal\(^\text{20}\) indicated that an intervention begins with a set of inputs and activities that result in outputs, outcomes, and impacts.

- Inputs are used to carry out activities.
- Activities produce specific outputs.
- Outputs produce outcomes.
- Outcomes contribute to impacts.

The project consisted of nine activities per the two objectives. This has created a fundamental impediment to building and sustaining momentum. A lower volume and spacing of activities would have better enabled the ability of the project to be both immediately successful and sustainable over the long-term by improving upon quality and achievement of objectives, which, in turn, would positively impact the likelihood that the activity would be sustainable.

The project approach of supporting local CSOs was regarded as the most appropriate given the sensitivity of the subject. As a local partner representative in Ben Guerdene claims, “relying on local capacities to take the lead on the reform process is the most appropriate methodology and a vital step in establishing communication and collaboration between the security sector and civil society.” Moreover, the analysis of data captured and collected from the different evaluation processes indicated that CSO involvement is important in contributing to the ‘bottom-up’ reform process. Because CSOs work directly with individuals and communities, they are uniquely positioned to develop interventions which are people-centered, able to bring together multiple sectors, highly context specific, more comprehensive in nature and include prevention efforts. Their ability to pilot new approaches and respond to the specifics needs of participant groups also allows for innovations and creative approaches to emerge.

a. Building Local Capacities

SFCG/KADEM trained civil society members on the role of civil society in SSR processes, dialogue facilitation, and the dialogue design process to prepare them to lead local community dialogues, with the overall aim of fostering sustainable collaboration between the security sector and civil society.

- On SSR

\(^{20}\) Pg. 13.
The training on the role of civil society in SSR processes took place in Hammamet from September 24-25, 2016 and convened twenty-six participants from the four selected localities. The training aimed to provide basic and general knowledge about the security sector and its actors, as well as on SSR, its processes, and the role of civil society within reform efforts. The training gathered two representatives from each of the organizations participating in the project, as well as four facilitators and dialogue design experts who also supported the associations in the development and implementation of local dialogues. Participants also had the occasion to meet and debate with five MoI representatives, as well as with a UNDP community policing expert. Post-tests demonstrate an increase in knowledge and readiness to implement projects among participants. A preliminary evaluation revealed a fair knowledge about SSR issues in Tunis.

However, it should be said that the absence of a holistic view of the project at the level of the CSOs caused some of them to lose sight of the overall objective of the project and focus instead on their small grants solely. Second, because of the long time that elapsed since the training, almost all interviewees did not recall of this training, nor did they consider it as such, “It was merely an introductory workshop,” as stated by a male local partner in Ben Guerdene.

### Table 3: CSOs Level of Knowledge on SSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Male Pre-Test</th>
<th>Male Post Test</th>
<th>Female Pre-Test</th>
<th>Female Post Test</th>
<th>Average Male</th>
<th>Average Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1: Level of knowledge about the actors and institutions of the security sector</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2: Level of knowledge about the concept of SSR</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3: Level of knowledge about the mechanisms that encourage the participation of civil society in the control process and SSR</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4: Level of knowledge about previous SSR projects</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5: Capacities to participate in SSR activities</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Strengthening their capacities by facilitating access to information, as well as providing training and networking opportunities, would increase the civilian expertise on SSR issues in Tunisia.

● On Dialogue Facilitation and Design
Firstly, the findings indicate that almost all of the participants have good skills in terms of consensus-building techniques. However, misperceptions of dialogue as a practice of mutual exchange are always present among them. Indeed, some interviewees seemed confused when it came to separate certain dialogue characteristics from those of debates. For example, statements such as “defend your own point of view,” and “foreground your own arguments” were used. However, virtually all interviewed stakeholders showed an understanding of a useful dialogue process, as they all agree that “seek(ing) agreement, even when other people's arguments are contrary to your point of view, constitutes a key factor to have the dialogue succeed.” It would seem more relevant to conduct a second wave of trainings to refresh and consolidate learnings on dialogue design and facilitation.

● On Project’s Cycle
Since local partners did not receive specific project management trainings, many of those interviewed showed a lack of understanding of the project management cycle, especially the M&E component. It has been noted that local partners talk about the evaluation in a very superficial or marginal way, which may result from their lack of training on these types of skills. Providing technical assistance or building their capacities through trainings in M&E is vital in the next phase.

● On Knowledge Transfer
Training materials were not available for participants, which limited institutional knowledge and transfer of skills. Data collected from interviews revealed the quasi-inexistence of a strategy for knowledge transfer within almost all partner organizations, especially in the cases where the person attending the training is not present at the time of the evaluation interview. The limited transfer of knowledge could be due to the fact that CSOs members leading the project differ from those who were invited to participate in the trainings.

Security sector representatives however automatically debrief with their hierarchy and colleagues about the sessions that they attend, thus ensuring a greater dissemination of learning.

B. Communication and Collaboration between security sector and civil society actors
Communication and collaboration between project participants from various backgrounds grew stronger as the project came to an end. Furthermore, scorecards, named collaboration scaling cards

---

21 There are training opportunities available online.
22 This could be due to logistical constraints, such as limited available training spots.
were developed by the SFCG-Tunisia team to be used by local CSO partners to monitor security sector involvement and levels of collaboration during their initiatives.

The below graph shows the level of active engagement and participation evidenced by the data collected through informal monitoring and follow-up on the project’s activities:

**Graph 02: Level of Interest/Engagement of security sector actors in Activities implemented during small grants**

![Graph showing level of interest/engagement of security sector actors in activities implemented during small grants.](image)

It is worth noting that security representatives, when present at the activities, are often committed and actively participate in formulating initiatives or suggesting improvements to ideas expressed. This was proved and evidenced through some of the effective initiatives they were involved in (e.g., in ADD project or ABFID project) and other as well. Hence, dialogues were effective in breaking barriers between security officials and citizens.

Regarding attitudes, the participants bias of the differences in ideas/beliefs between themselves appears to be the first hindrance to dialogue. On the one hand, this may include prejudices: despite not having had much opportunity for discussion, participants, at first, judged the other party quickly. “First, stakeholders would refuse categorically to sit with policemen, relying on arguments of corruption and abuse,” as a female expert facilitator describes, “but after sitting with them and hearing their point of view, standing in their shoes... they begin to understand and feel empathy.” Similarly, a male CSO representative from Ben Guerdene confessed that “At first, we doubted the project will succeed. We always have held them [security forces] responsible for the closure of the border crossing, exchange of fire, and any incident at the borders.”
Considering the results achieved, it is very evident that the approach to focus on the “soft” aspects of reform constitutes a valid entry point for the SSR process and could generate longer-term commitment among the public, CSOs, media, and security actors. Although all issues related to ‘hard’ aspects should not be dismissed, it is important to ensure that these are not disconnected from questions addressed by local partners, and which lie at the heart of SSR. Indeed, for effective interaction with local security personnel, participants found it important to find concrete incentives to drive collaboration, such as focusing the discussion on value-neutral but locally relevant topics, like drug problems, road safety, and violence in the stadiums. This exchange creates trust and thus space for safe debates.

Graph 03: Percentage of communication and interaction within the groups

Evidence available from the surveys distributed to partner CSOs confirm these findings, as all interviewees contend there was a positive change in perception between civil society and security sector services at an average of 34%, while highlighting the early stages of this change and the need for “more efforts and time” to “improve the relation (between citizens and security actors)”, commented a female CSO representative from Bizerte. She continued, “the very acceptance of representatives of the security sector to be involved in the project is in itself evidence of a change of perception.” Which is certainly due to the novelty of such an approach to reform, as well as the technicality and sensitiveness of the issue in question.

Similarly, an average of 42% of local partners agree on the improved collaboration between civil society, local authorities, and security sector services. A male CSO representative from Kasserine

---

23 Data collected from the score cards.
noted the project’s added value, recognizing that “the participation of security forces in activities even if weak, was a positive sign of SSR.” The CSO representative continued to note that “security actors’ willingness to participate varied; some had shared with us their contact information, while others did not even attend events.” Additionally, the same CSO representative noted the “persistent somehow negative interaction between security forces and football supporters.”

On the other hand, five out of nine CSO representatives responded that they did not know if there was any improvement in police-citizen relations due to the absence of a follow-up monitoring system, while only four affirmed such improvement. Interestingly, 89% of the project’s small grants beneficiaries interviewed affirmed an improvement in police-citizen relations, as shown in the graph below. What had previously been a predominantly negative image of the security forces had begun to change as repeatedly indicated by the project’s small grants beneficiaries surveyed, who stated that the project helped them contextualize security forces behaviors and understand both operational and procedural constraints that they are facing. “We now respect and understand police conduct,” a young male project’s small grants beneficiary from Ben Guerdene indicated. However, a male small grants beneficiary from Tunis indicated the limited access to information, as “some aspects of their work remain unknown to the public.”

Another positive impact of the project is observed by a stakeholder in Sidi Hassine, noting that “children started calling policemen ‘uncle’,” testifying to the positive change in perception of police by citizens, including the younger generation. This statement was supported by one of the expert facilitators who affirmed that “new ideas are best channeled through children, because they will make sure to deliver the message not just to their families, but to everyone they know.”

Graph 04: Percentage of project’s small grants beneficiaries reporting whether there was improvement in the police-citizen relationship

24 CSOs small grants beneficiaries
89% of surveyed small grants beneficiaries report an improvement in the police-citizen relationship. Those same beneficiaries have rated this improvement, on a scale from 10% to 100%, to 52.5%, which suggests opportunities for further improvement. However, this project indicates the beginning of change, as one female project’s small grants beneficiary from Ben Guerdene says, “the relationship between citizens and police forces is now horizontal, contrary to what it used to be.”

On the scorecards, four out of eight CSO representatives who filled in the surveys rated them “moderately useful,” while three rated them “very useful,” and one CSO representative rated them as “not at all useful.” This new tool was not properly introduced nor explained to local partners, which limited their understanding of its use and usefulness.

Additionally, the level of efforts and involvement of local authorities varied from one locality to another. For example, one female CSO representative in Sidi Hassine acknowledged the newly formed collaborative relationship and the support provided by the delegate who “responded timely and positively to our requests and opened the ‘community’ doors for us.” However, in other regions, local actors tend not to intervene, as indicated by one female CSO representative in Bizerte who acknowledged the strained relationship and explained it as the “attendance for allowance syndrome” that might have deterred local authorities and security actors from active participation in the project.

The issue of varying organizational cultures between civil society and the MoI was raised as a source of frustration and misunderstanding for CSOs. While CSOs tend to be more flexible, the security sector involves a “rigid bureaucracy” and requires a “submission of a formal request to the general directorate fifteen days before the activity. But in many instances, while we respected the deadlines and regulations, we were faced by an administrative silence and not positively responding to our request” as noted by a female CSO representative from Kasserine.

This comment recurred throughout interviews with local partners... “Since we were in tight schedule, we didn’t have the ‘luxury’ to notifying the administration ahead of time. This resulted in the absence of security representatives from some of the activities,” as noted by another female CSO representative from Bizerte.

Overall, the project succeeded in triggering a positive change; however, a lot still needs to be done in order to generate the necessary level of change on a wider scale.

C. Community Level Dialogues

25 The Monitoring Score Card is a tool that aimed to engage and assess the current state of SSR and identify its good practices.
Most of those interviewed noted the project’s effectiveness in providing a safe space in which participants were able to express themselves and listen to the other parties’ opinions and arguments. These dialogue sessions were a novelty in most communities, with the particularity that they address daily problems that every citizen encounter, while also delivering messages of social cohesion. The project gave CSO participants the unique opportunity not only to interact in public, but also with security representatives, and to improve their lives through concrete actions.

**Dialogue** was rated as the most useful component of the project by 69% of project’s *small grants beneficiaries*, as indicated in the graph below. Motivation to dialogue was very high. The desire to know each other and communicate one’s own ideas seems to have been an important motivating component for participating in the dialogues. From the perspectives of civil society partners, the project was very successful in engaging community-level dialogues. “Many people showed interest in participating, [so much so], that sometimes we had to turn people away for logistical reasons,” one female CSO representative in Tunis stated. While motivation to dialogue was high, commitment to dialogue was challenging, especially from security representative side, as explained above.

**Graph 05: Project’s most useful feature according to the project’s small grants beneficiaries**

![Pie chart showing dialogue as the most useful feature with 69%](image)

Interestingly, **dialogue was rated as the second most useful feature by partner CSOs after the joint design of initiatives**, as outlined in the graph below. While the implementation of initiatives was rated as the most challenging aspect by 44% of partners. This could be explained by the difficulties that CSOs faced in mobilizing security sectors and ensuring their unwavering commitments through all stages of the project. Indeed, after high levels of mobilization, participants sometimes experienced a decline as they may become tired. Participants’ ‘fatigue’ is one possible interpretation, in addition to the specificities of security work. Also, the project schedule might have influenced this demobilization, because activities were implemented in the summer when most stakeholders and project’s small grants beneficiaries were away on holidays. All these elements
should be taken into account when planning, as they were foreseeable and could have been averted with stronger institutionalized collaboration. As it was the case for instance in Sidi Hassine, where the chief of police station “ensured that there was always a representative of the forces present at the activities through rotating personnel,” as indicated to us by a female stakeholder interviewed.

Graph 06: Evaluation of the project’s main features according to partner CSOs

On the other hand, security forces were more interested in “concrete actions on the street rather than discussions and dialogue.” Security actors interviewed proposed more “field-oriented actions to assess citizens perception of security actors,” as well. The collaborative implementation of the action plans was evaluated as the most successful action leading to a positive change in perception by security sector representatives. “Discussions were a starting point, but the real change happened on site. Painting the street together was a very positive proof of collaboration,” said one security actor in Ben Guerdene.

Another stakeholder in Ben Guerdene has explained that, “If we were alone campaigning in the street, drivers wouldn’t have stopped. Security force’s presence, along with civilians, intrigued them to stop and talk to us. Advice coming from a police officer [now] has a greater chance to be accepted and heard.”

D. Assessing the Media Component

26 One of the local partners in Guerdene (ABFID) painted pedestrian corridors with the participation of security actors, citizens, local authorities and other civil society members.

27 ABFID implemented an activity in downtown Ben Gardane to raise awareness of citizens, and especially street vendors, on visibility around circulation intersections and cross-roads, especially in zones near schools and youth centers. At each hub, ABFID members and security actors worked together to stop passersby, vendors, and drivers to distribute leaflets presenting good traffic safety related practices and give advice for ensuring their safety and the safety of those around them.
As per the second objective, it was evident from the FGDs and KIIIs that the success of this objective was only somewhat effective.

Media pieces featuring the project partners or staff seem to be limited to the project participants and did not reach a large audience. Based on online viewership, only 9,042 Tunisians were reached through broadcast of dialogues and discussions about SSR in Tunisia.

Regarding the media platforms, the chosen private network chosen to present local initiatives faces large boycott campaigns, especially from younger viewers.

The evidence collected through public opinion surveys suggests that opportunities exist to increase the general public’s knowledge about SSR efforts and processes in Tunisia through media platforms. 72% of the respondent’s report that they watch TV/listen to the radio or read written or electronic press, and 52% of them have seen or heard segments and/or read written or electronic press on national and local SSR efforts, as indicated in the graph below. This statistic highlights the need for a broader media coverage focusing simultaneously on traditional media, which remains an undisputed source of information, and social media platforms, that have gained ground.

Graph 07: Public knowledge of the existence of SSR initiatives in Ben Guerdene and Kasserine

While there has been a growing change in public expectations regarding what citizens want from security, that they wish to be fully informed and consulted on security implications for them. Media remains a weak link between security and the citizen. Indeed, the general evaluation of media coverage of SSR initiatives reveals a greater need for professionalization of media actors and further interest in the issue of SSR.

---

28 Public perception surveys were distributed in Ben Guerdene and Kasserine (respectively 78 and 7).
Survey respondents who have answered that they have seen/heard or read about the existence of SSR initiatives, have been asqued to assess the quality of the coverage of SSR. They have mostly evaluated the quality of media coverage of SSR initiatives in Ben Guerdene and Kasserine as medium (45%), while only 20% of the surveyed population indicated they thought media coverage was superficial and unprofessional. The graph below represents public evaluation of media coverage of SSR initiatives. This reveals the transformation of the media landscape by the breaking out the previous regime’s control. However, old practices die hard, and although the groundwork is in place for building a new relationship based on trust, the evolution of the media landscape will take time.

Graph 08: Evaluating the quality of media coverage of SSR initiatives

Nevertheless, in Kasserine and Ben Guerdene 52% of the surveyed population indicated an improvement in local/national media covering security sector topics, only 7% responded they did not see any improvement, while 31% responded that they didn’t know and 11% didn’t answer the question. In Ben Guerdene, most of the respondents have linked this improvement to the Battle of the 7th of March 2016. This means that, because it is dependant of the environment and context (Ben Guerdene and the Battleof 7th of March precisely), this perception of improvement is geographically limited to Ben Guerdene and is fragile.

---

29 The Battle of Ben Guerdane occurred on March 7, 2016 in the city of Ben Gardane in Tunisia on the border with Libya. Islamic State forces attempted to seize the city, but were repulsed by the Tunisian military, with support from citizens from Ben Guerdene. The clashes continued also on 8 and 9 of March in the area.
Regarding the media platforms, the private network chosen to present local initiatives enjoys a good viewership, but the National Channels (1 and 2) appear to garner the most viewership, especially the evening shows and broadcasting hours. “If was up to me, I would have chosen the National TV,” commented the director of projects at KAWAKIBI. This should be taken into account to achieve greater coverage in the next phase.

On another note, data collected from the media expert indicated that “among journalists, prejudice and stereotypes (against security forces) are still there.” Similarly, a male project partner from Ben Guerdene has noted that “journalists were not enthusiastic in covering (this) type of activities,” and they have attributed this lack of engagement to the fact that “journalists and media outlets usually look to cover ‘buzzworthy events’ through exclusive stories.”

Also, a female CSO representative from Tunis noted that a journalist presents to cover one of the dialogue sessions “reacted to the remarks of a security sector representative who accused the media of ‘purposely distorting police image.’” This reaction resulted in a mutual exchange of accusations during the session.

In the same vein, the media expert noted that the project “was implemented in a very sensitive period marked with high tension between police forces and journalists which might have hindered a real reform process.”

Despite all these challenges, the media expert also stated that, “local media was mobilized to anchor the positive examples of civil society and security sector collaboration to promote SSR.”
CSOs also resorted to media tools/outlets, especially Facebook, where they are publishing their initiatives or events in addition to using it effectively to market for their ideas.

The current evaluation notes that Facebook activists and bloggers who are particularly active in their monitoring of the security forces’ abuses were not included in the project. Thus, the evaluator recommends their involvement in the next phase.

For all the above reasons, the evaluation concludes that the media component was somewhat effective in contributing to support civil society in Tunisia to increase the transparency of SSR efforts in the country.

E. Perception of the Project

Beneficiary communities interviewed during the fieldwork were satisfied with the project activities and affirm to have greatly benefited from them. Community members believe that the project effectively responds to their needs in the areas of safety in and around schools, stadiums, streets and other public spaces. Many interviewees especially appreciate the multi-actor approach, which they perceived as meaning that the project focused on real problems or opportunities that local populations are facing. It also meant that partners with complementary types of knowledge – technical, practical and other – have join forces in the project activities from beginning to end.

However, a few remarks must be stated regarding the consistency of the project’s objectives with beneficiaries’ needs and expectations:

Security actors raised a concern about issues of national sovereignty and the fact that SSR should not be a justification for external interference in internal security affairs. This concern sometimes has led to losing sight of the project objectives and addresses what may be a side issue in the process. Nonetheless, this concern requires further bolstering CSOs’ legitimacy with security institutions, convincing security sector representatives and local officials of the importance of civilian engagement in SSR processes in Tunisia, as security actors remain quite doubtful of civil society becoming involved in SSR processes.

2.3 Efficiency

This section describes the project’s ability to deliver on its goal and outcome and if the project attained those goals using acceptable means.

2.3.1. Project Implementation

A. The Timeline
A central challenge to efficient project design is the high volume of activities to be achieved within the project cycle. The project sought to implement a high volume of activities in a twenty-two-month timeframe; however, delays in receiving buy-in from the MoI, in addition to ministerial reshuffling, resulted in the need to request a first six-month project extension to ensure project completion. Concerns were raised by the KAWAKIBI project director, who stated that, “Bureaucracy had delayed the launch of the activities of around 5 months. But we have opted for their high buy-in to ensure the project institutionalized impact.”

These concerns are fair and support statements made in the quarterly reports. Additionally, these concerns also support the notion that the process of achieving ministerial buy-in is inherently complex and takes time. The evaluation concluded that the objective was slightly too ambitious for a twenty-two-month project, specifically because of the difficulty to obtain ministerial buy-in.

“We had trouble coordinating with the media, security sector representatives, SFCG/KADEM staff, and each other regarding activities calendars. Because of the imperative of SFCG/KADEM presence at the activities, we (partner organisations operating in the same governorates) were bound to schedule activities on the same days; thus, many of our invited stakeholders could not attend both events (since they are basically the same working with all of us),” one female CSO representative from Bizerte affirmed when interviewed.

Another local partner representative also observed that the same “practical implementation considerations were given precedence over the presence of certain guests.”

“Media representatives were often confused between projects because of the resemblance and tight schedule between them,” commented the media expert interviewed.

Other delays in the implementation were also caused by the holy month of Ramadan and summer vacation. These events dramatically impacted the time allotted to CSOs to implement their small grants: “Summer vacation had compressed the actual implementation time of the grant to only two months,” observed one female CSO representative from Bizerte. Almost all interviewed CSOs commented that “The time frame was not sufficient.”

The distribution of roles between SFCG and KADEM staff was unclear from the beginning, which caused some delays in communication and possible duplication of work.

B. Human Resources

Staffing was a critical issue when implementing project activities.

30 2015 QR4 and 2016 QR2.
(1) The **difficulty to find expertise in both SSR technical support and project management skills** slowed the implementation and execution of project activities. Additionally, due to the sensitive nature of the project, finding the right profile to coordinate this project turned out to be challenging. The only serious candidates had government backgrounds, which for various reasons the team did not think was a good idea. This situation caused Tunisia’s Country Director and Project Director to take the lead and oversee the project start-up and implementation until the hiring of a Project Assistant. Moreover, the identification and recruitment of a strong SSR team is essential. Weaknesses identified within the project team include the lack of a Tunisian national with specific SSR expertise, the lack of Arabic language expertise, and the lack of relevant in-country knowledge, but the team had substantial experience in capacity development. A female stakeholder from Sidi Hassine commented, “**Language (barriers) sometimes prevented a smooth communication between SFCG team and local CSOs.**”

(2) The departure of the previous SFCG-Tunisia’s DM&E coordinator occurred at a stage within the project cycle when consistency was highly critical. This staff shortage impacted the project’s monitoring, since there were no pre- and post-knowledge assessments conducted for the media trainings.

The benefit of the role of national experts is clear and observed by almost all local partners. Indeed, the ‘quality of trainers’ was noted in the different interviews conducted with CSOs. “**The trainer had contributed to building relationships. It was the right profile for the mission,**” said one CSO representative in Ben Guerdene.

### 2.3.2. Budgeting

Overall, the budget was well-respected. Despite two NCEs, the project has efficiently utilized its resources. Moreover, a combination of external and internal circumstances has contributed to overcoming the financial pressure of the two NCEs and their pertaining costs, such as the budget’s share in the personnel, travel, running and supplies costs. As per the external factors, the devaluation of the Tunisian dinar has balanced the incurred costs. Additionally, the flexibility allowed in the budget to reallocate savings from one budget line to another ensured that no additional financing and/or a budget increase were required.

Financial changes also arose during project implementation that required budget reallocations but in general overspending in some of the budget items were covered by savings in other items. For

---

312016 QR4.
instance, increases in consultant fees (between 2015 and 2017)\textsuperscript{32} were deemed reasonable and fair due to the sustained increase in the price level of goods and services over this period of time in Tunisia.

The project’s budget was constantly reviewed, revisited, and re-forecast to keep it on track.

The project team was able to address deviations from the project plan. As SFCG Senior Manager of Finance, Administration, and Human Resources says, “the project team has acquired experience in managing large budgets. Moreover, in October 2016, we had received a financial inspection from the donor which has further clarified pending issues and procedures.”

Budget was used in accordance with the principles of sound financial management, namely in accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. As a matter of fact, spending project funds entails several steps before Search actually pays for an item, ensuring transparency and good governance. Typically, the process leading up to the disbursement of funds for goods and services includes the verification of the actual need for that item (through consultation with team members and experts), obtaining and comparing quotes for procurements above $1,000, which demonstrates value for money and ensures that the project meets its legal duties.

The design was ambitious in geographic scope and in the number of CSO participants, especially for the level of funding. This limited the number of activities that each CSO could undertake because it spread the funding out between so many different organizations and locations. It is hence important to note, however, that local partners have complained about the budget allocated to the implementation of their small grants. A female representative from Bizerte commented that “[The budget] was too little. We had to remove activities to be in line with the budget.” While another female representative from Kasserine noted that “We had to do financial acrobatics to respect the allocated budget.”

\textbf{2.4 Impact}

Impacts that appear insignificant to outsiders may represent decisive progress from a local point of view. Often this impact can only be achieved through patiently acquired confidence. The relevance of personal relationships, the long-term progress, and different perspectives on “success” must be considered.

\textsuperscript{32} Went from 200 TND to 350/400 TND. Actual consultant fees amounted to 24,000 TND while only 18,000 TND were projected.
One of the positive impacts of the project was the increase in knowledge and/or understanding of SSR efforts in Tunisia among project’s small grants beneficiaries. Indeed, 83% of surveyed project’s small grants beneficiaries indicated that the project improved their understanding of the SSR efforts in Tunisia, as represented in the graph below. As highlighted by many project beneficiaries, “the project helped correct many biases and stereotypes,” a male project beneficiary from Tunis affirmed that “It completely changed my perception of security work.” The project was successful in breaking stereotypes about security sector and had improved the general understanding of SSR efforts.

Graph 10: Project’s small grants beneficiaries having improved their understanding of the SSR efforts in Tunisia.

The youth age group has been neglected for so long and did not have access to civic engagement activities and interact with their communities closely, so they were very receptive to new opportunities and taking advantage of being offered something that was not available. Actually, this was considered as one of the key enabling factors that provided healthy atmosphere where the youth had the opportunity to exercise their rights to participate in meaningful platforms. This was mostly observed and noted in the projects involving youngsters, especially CIES in Kasserine and Youth and Skills in Bizerte. The project increased their confidence and strengthened their public speaking and expression skills.

2.4.1. Personal/Organisational Development
The CSOs’ engagement was aimed at supporting a more transparent security sector reform process. After three years of implementation, the early benefits of the project and emerging social change have already been witnessed at the individual, community and organizational level.

Also, project’s small grants beneficiaries have indicated that the project contributed to building their capacities in various fields: positive communication and leadership, conflict prevention and resolution, in addition to increasing or acquiring specific SSR knowledge and networking. The graph below represents the most significant learnings according to surveyed project’s small grants beneficiaries.

Graph 11: Project’s small grants beneficiaries most significant learnings

The data collected indicates that, so far, there are no intra-regional joint projects, nor any exchange or reciprocal invitations to events between local partners. However, a CSO representative from Kasserine affirmed that they “have received requests to duplicate the project outside of Kasserine, from Bizerte and Tunis.”

As shown in the graph, leadership and communication skills were the most valued skills acquired by the project’s small grants beneficiaries, and this was further demonstrated in FGD organised with beneficiaries, as expressed by a young female from Kasserine, “The project revealed my hidden potential and talents. I didn’t know I can speak in public. This [project] gave me the opportunity to express myself through poetry.”

Moreover, dialogues, action plans and implementation of activities were organized by local partners, where they had the opportunity to interact and communicate with the local security sector representatives and local officials without SFCG/KADEM interference. Actually, this resulted in gradual learning of managing such activities enabling them to be more empowered and deal with the challenges encountered using creative problem solving and diverse alternatives and plans.
added, “The project gave the youngsters a space to express themselves and escape their harsh and dangerous realities.” On a similar note, a male stakeholder in Kasserine added “such spaces of expression allow the growth and metamorphosis of youngsters who were [once] prey to criminal deviance.”

To demonstrate this notion further, 64% of the surveyed project’s small grants beneficiaries indicated that these learnings have impacted their work and daily lives, while only 12% indicated that these learnings have not impacted their work or daily lives. One female small grants beneficiary from Tunis indicated being frequently called to mediate conflicts in the school environment and her neighborhood. She recalls, “I resolved many conflicts before they escalated between neighbours, high school staff and parents…”

Overall, the data illustrates a very positive experience for partner CSOs. The small grants were an opportunity “to gain experience working with security forces, which is a new area of intervention that few associations have experience in,” as one female CSO representative from Tunis said. Also, the small grants were an exercise to strengthen “project management skills” and “logistics competencies,” as further indicated by CSO partners from, respectively, Tunis and Bizerte.

From discussions in Kasserine, it became evident that young small grants beneficiaries, who were once particularly shy, have gained confidence. In particular, being featured on national TV had boosted the youth’s self-esteem, who were very were ‘proud’ and ‘happy’ not simply for being on TV, but for contributing to creating a positive image of their region to the rest of the country and world.

The media component was successful, as it has resulted in positive indirect and induced effects. For example, as reported by the media expert, the private channel “Nessma” decided to “project a permanent media section on civil society” after featuring the work of the partner CSOs and receiving positive response in it. She added that “the segments caught the attention of other private channels to these regions; some colleagues have contacted me for contact info of some of the stakeholders in Sidi Hassine.”

Thus, the media component has directly contributed to the amplification of positive examples of civil society and security sector collaboration to promote inclusive and transparent SSR in Tunisia.

On conflict sensitiveness, field work indicated that in some localities projects did not represent adequately the communities. For instance, in Sidi Hassine, since partner associations did not have their own network, they had to rely on local teams to choose participants. Consequently, Sidi Hassine had, intentionally or non-intentionally, excluded participants from other localities. This
consequence is an important consideration to ensure addressing the community issues in all of the community sectors and groups. Adjusting activities, e.g. by involving actors who had felt side-lined and strengthening communication and feedback mechanisms with all groups will strengthen a conflict sensitive approach.

2.5 Sustainability

Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after funding is withdrawn and whether partners and project’s small grants beneficiaries can and would autonomously continue their efforts towards strengthening civilian engagement in the security sector.

2.5.1. Short- and Medium-Term Sustainability

The project’s strategy to ensure sustainability consists of training partners and stakeholders on SSR and dialogue facilitation and design, providing them with the needed expertise to skillfully facilitate meetings and discussions around this issue and develop action plans. In trying to build strong networks, trainings on facilitation techniques were extended to influential community members such as teachers, members of associations, to ensure the transfer of knowledge and short-term sustainability.

However, the evaluation showed that initial trainings were not enough because the training content was easily forgotten, and regular “refreshing” workshops would be required for the initial promising results to endure over time. Consequently, it would seem more relevant to conduct a second wave of trainings a year or two after the initial trainings, at a time when the community would have likely encountered some challenges.

Also, interviewed partners showed great interest and enthusiasm in participating in a second phase of the project to build on what has been acquired so far and to discuss steps moving forward.

2.5.2. Long-Term Sustainability

On the other hand, changing mindsets is very challenging, especially concerning behavioural changes. Practices such as mutual accusations, denial of responsibility, and provocation are so deeply rooted that many years of repeated sensitization are needed for changes to become durable.

Indeed, CSOs frequently mentioned the difficulty of mobilizing security sector professionals, which in their perception is due to a continuing resistance to change inherent to the security sector. As one male CSO representative from Kasserine said, “Security forces have their traditions, which are hard to change, especially from the outside”, adding that the security work conditions “prevent [security
actors from attending activities, especially activities that are planned in the citizens’ spare time, during which security actors usually work.”

To this end, nearly all local partners tried a more flexible alternative to mobilise syndicates mainly the National Syndicate of Internal Security Forces (NSISF). While being a practical alternative, NSISF does not guarantee institutionalized impact, as this syndicate is not the only union. Other unions exist, such as the Syndicate of Officers of the General Directorate of the Intervention Units (the largest national union), the National Union of Syndicates of Tunisian Security Forces, the Syndicate of Officials of the General Directorate of Public Security, the General Syndicate of the National Guard, the Syndicate of Customs Agents, and the Republican Security Union. That is to say that the syndicate mobilized have limited outreach by only including one syndicate, thus also limiting the project’s impact. “Syndicate members present at the activities did bring an added-value, but this value was hindered by the fact that they participate in their quality as active members of the civil society—not security sector representatives,” a female CSO member from Bizerte noted.

Also, the analysis of data collected indicates that there are two approaches followed in mobilizing security sector professionals: through personal networks or through official channels. It is worth saying that the above-mentioned findings show one of the fundamental aspects of the project—that local partners were given a lot of flexibility to act, which could contribute to CSOs’ empowerment in the long-term by ensuring local ownership of the project. Indeed, one of the local partners succeeded in overcoming mobilization challenges with a positive attitude, regarding it as an exercise for future projects. This positive outcome was indicated by a female CSO representative from Bizerte, as she stated, “We were not aware of the required procedures prior to implementing our activities, which had caused us some unfortunate encounters with the police, but we have managed to turn this ‘adventure’ into a learning experience, from which we have built our network and partnerships.”

Also, collaboration with some of the expert facilitators has continued after the project, as noted by one of the trainers when interviewed.

The project’s sustainability varies from one governorate to another:

In Ben Guerdene, for example, while CSO engagement is strong and human resources are available, they lack adequate technical and financial resources to effectively execute their responsibilities.

---

33 During the first phase of data gathering, police officers arrested members of the association while gathering information from residents, as they were not able to provide a specific authorization to conduct data collection on the street.
Also, the Coalition of Associations of Ben Guerdene created a committee to identify local conflict situations and intervene, which continued its work after the project’s closure. This committee mediated a conflict between traders and policemen in Ben Guerdene. Stakeholders have reported the success of this initiative and the will to work on other conflicting issues in the region.

In Tunis, similarly, a local group was born in Sidi Hassine out of the OTCS intervention, titled “Sidi Hussein for Security and Social Cohesion.” The group works closely with OTCS, as they currently provide them with strategic planning support. Stakeholders reported thinking about institutionalizing their existence through the formation of an association.

In Kasserine, a citizen’s club was created within Ibn Khaldoun school. However, the evaluation findings revealed that, while the club constitutes a key element of the project’s sustainability, there is absence of a clear/structured strategic plan guided by a clear vision/mission.

It seems that these bodies only started to develop the strategic plan that includes a vision, mission, among other components, when they started to think about applying for the official legal registration to become associations.

Sustainability in Bizerte seems problematic, as CSO projects were punctual and did not seem to plan for the future.

The human and relational components present another indicator for sustainability. Stakeholders were ready to develop personal ties with security actors, and by the end of the project, relationships were built. A stakeholder commented that, “If I needed anything, I would not hesitate to reach out to the policeman with whom we collaborated during the project, which I did, and he facilitated contact with the concerned authorities.”

Also, interviews with stakeholders revealed strong personal contacts between participants, as evidenced by the campaign launched at the end of November 2017 and led by a CSO in Ben Guerdene advocating for the reassignment of one of the active participants from the security sector who was allegedly ‘arbitrarily’ transferred out of Ben Guerdene. Local partners succeeded in pressuring the authorities to re-assign him back to Ben Guerdene.

Other relationships were reinforced, as was the case with the municipality and civil society. “We have previously collaborated with the association, and we were impressed by the level of commitment, hence we were confident when entering this project that we will constructively address community issues,” as one male stakeholder in Bizerte commented.

34 Organisation Tunisienne de Cohésion Sociale
It is worth mentioning that two of the twelve partner organizations were local radio stations with limited audiences. The media outlet’s audience partly determines its ability to disseminate information, influence public opinion, and affect social mobilization, thus ensuring sustainable change.

The project’s sustainability will be ensured over the long term, provided that participants clearly adopt the principles and values. It is important, however, that they continue to practice this methodology, and it would be interesting for SFCG/KADEM to continue working with the project’s partners on future projects. But overall, the project’s sustainability is satisfactory.

3. Cross-cutting issues

The analysis of several elements of the project shows that SFCG/KADEM took into consideration a certain number of cross-cutting issues throughout the project:

- Gender equity was addressed during the project. With respect to the project’s inclusion of women, field visit results, review of documentation, and interviews conducted during the evaluation, confirm that there was a real effort by the project team to translate these values into practice. The expert team was a gender-balanced, regionally diverse pool of Tunisian trainers. The local partner representatives were also gender-balanced. KADEM project director notes, “We have conveyed to local partners our goal to encourage women to actively participate in activities and promote empowerment of women associations to work on this issue.” However, mobilizing female security representatives was challenging, because the security sector remains a very male-dominated institution in Tunisia.

The increased numbers of female CSOs members to collaborate with and reach out to security officials also underscore the project’s success in including women. In three out of the four governorates, CSO representatives described how unlikely it was for a female to speak to security officials, not to mention, going to police stations, but this situation has changed since the project. Many female CSO members now regularly contact security representatives. Furthermore, women are the individuals keeping the contact information datasheets.

While 45% of the surveyed population in Kasserine and in Ben Guerdene noted gender sensitive orientations of media reporting on security, 25% disagreed, 22% did not know, and 8% did not answer the question. This data indicates a need to achieve more gender equality in media coverage on security issues, which can be achieved through equal representation, diversity of sources, and stories featuring women.
However, there has been no focus on the specific needs of **people with disabilities**. The project should have included approaches on how to include these categories among the small grants beneficiaries. Specific measures should be taken into account to ensure inclusiveness:

- Equal rights: persons with and without disabilities alike benefit from interventions and activities.
- Participation: Persons with disabilities and disabled people's organisations and pro disability organisations in urban areas and in the rural sector take part in all activities.
- Accessibility: Physical, communicative, intellectual such as providing adequate learning material.
- Experts with disabilities or representatives of disabled people's organisations are involved as trainers.

**4. Challenges and Lessons Learned**

The project was not free from shortcomings and faced many challenges during implementation:

- SFCG/KADEM role distribution was not clearly defined, which might have caused duplication and wasted efforts.
- The project encountered delays in its implementation, in part because SFCG/KADEM did not take into account summer holidays and the holy month of Ramadan, and in part related to the MoI bureaucracy and initial delays in gaining endorsement of the project activities.
- Lack of trust and/or transparency between CSOs and the security sector can make it difficult for CSOs to access key decision-makers. Also, the tradition of secrecy surrounding the...
security sector and national security concerns constrained CSO ability to engage in effective collaboration with the security sector.

- Misperceptions of dialogue versus debate were present among participants.
- Local partners have little knowledge about advocacy techniques and have little experience in reporting. This issue is relevant since the ‘institutional dimension’ is a key element for the project’s success.
- The new tool (scorecard) was not properly introduced nor explained to local partners, which limited their understanding of its use and usefulness.
- The project design did not focus on the peer learning element. "We wish we had the opportunity to discuss our projects with our colleagues and learn from their feedback and experiences," commented a male CSO representative from Bizerte.

5. Conclusion

It is critical in Tunisia, that we better understand the importance of civilian engagement in the security sector reforming process. Given the calls for greater accountability and transparency in the security sector, there is no doubt that the tools to deal constructively with the dynamics driving many tensions and conflicts in Tunisia are still insufficient. But the very awareness of this need suggests a strong foundation and desire to advance civilian engagement in SSR in Tunisia.

The goal of the project was to support civil society in Tunisia to increase the transparency of SSR efforts in the country. The project’s impact has adequately changed perceptions and improved collaboration between civil society, security sector services, and local authorities. A beginning of a positive change in the police-citizen relationship also took place, but it needs more time to take root and bear fruit.

This project came at a pivotal time to complement other, more top-down and institutional efforts to reform the black box that is the Tunisian security sector. This project has adequately contributed to these overarching goals of not only the government of Tunisia, but also the United Nations and other donors/actors who support SSR in Tunisia.

By managing to achieve almost all set targets, the project has performed positively; however, the second objective was less successfully achieved.

On Relevance

The project objectives were relevant to the mission of SFCG/KADEM which seeks to establish and maintain a transparent security sector. Addressing civilian participation at the local level is important since civil society have been active in that level. The evaluator was unable to assess the relevance of
journalists’ trainings as it was unclear who is being targeted, how the participants are selected, the level of their existing knowledge, and whether they will put their learning into practice.

On Effectiveness

According to data analysis, all of the activities were undertaken, and the project met its targets. The project was successful, between governorates that were involved in the project across different thematics, in increasing collaboration and communication between security sector and citizens. However, the effect of media was more limited due to little media presence, and thus limited coverage, on projects. The sensitivity of SSR issues was highly present among media actors, which also hindered the effectiveness of this component.

Due to the weak knowledge sharing activities between CSOs participants, there is not a greater dissemination of learning. However, security sector representatives are more engaged in knowledge-sharing activities, as they automatically debrief their colleagues.

On Efficiency

While there was some deviation between the planned and actual schedule, this had no incidence on budget and expenditure. Ensuring proper management and human resources for the project was challenging because of the difficulties in finding expertise in both SSR technical support and project management skills. Additionally, the project sought to implement a high volume of activities in a twenty-two-month timeframe.

On Impact

The evaluation concluded that the project succeeded in operating positive changes at the individual level, as citizens have increased knowledge of SSR, as well as conflict resolution skills, and trust in security actors. At the organisational level, CSOs have more experience and skills in managing SSR initiatives, and they have developed networks with other CSOs and stakeholders.

On Sustainability

The project managed to trigger an early change. It appears that the project was self-sustainable in nature since it has built the capacity of civil society and enabled them to work beyond the project funding period to promote transparency at the grass roots.

In conclusion, despite the challenges mentioned above, the project has achieved its goals and objectives. However, a change to culture cannot be realized in twenty-eight-months. As such, this
project only can be considered a first step towards operating a real and deep change in perception and collaboration.

Based on this review and assessment of the project, the evaluator concluded the following recommendations. Several of these recommendations have been informed by the different FGDs conducted, as well as the semi-structured interviews and the evaluator’s observations during the evaluation process.

6. Recommendations

The evaluation recommends the following:

On relevance

- The evaluation recommends the adoption of a logo and a graphic chart for the project in order to be easily identified and distinguished from other projects working on the same/close thematic.
- The evaluation recommends clearly identifying criteria of selection for participating journalists, preferably based on personal commitment and profiles.
- The evaluation recommends special attention to gender sensitivity in media operations and content regarding security reporting when training journalists.

On Effectiveness

- It is advised to have a specific mechanism in place that ensures the exchange of experiences and mutual learning, and sharing the best practices & lessons learned among local partners.
- The evaluation recommends more extensive trust- and team-building activities between journalists and security sector representatives in order to develop tolerance in phase II, especially in light of the latest annual report from the National Union of Tunisian Journalists on the safety of journalist’s assaults, which revealed that the majority of attacks committed against journalists were by security forces.

On Efficiency

- The evaluation recommends continuing the project, but the objectives were slightly too ambitious for an initial twenty-two-month project, because changing mentalities takes time and effort.
● The evaluation recommends a pre-set, clear implementation schedule that takes into account the political context and possible government reshuffles, as well as holidays and potential time-related delays.
● The evaluation recommends clearly defining responsibilities and tasks between SFCG and KAWAKIBI.
● The evaluation recommends providing for an adequate increase in budgets and time allocated for local partners for the small grants implementation.
● The evaluation recommends providing for a contingency budget to cover any known-unknown risks and uncertainties in the project, such as NCE, and to prevent cost overrun.

On Impact

● The evaluation recommends conducting a second wave of trainings for local partners to refresh and consolidate learnings on SSR and dialogue design and facilitation.
● It is highly recommended to include an organizational capacity-building component of local partners. In this regard, they should be trained on advocacy, fundraising skills, project proposal development, in addition to the project management cycle, including M&E activities.
● The evaluation recommends reviewing the platform and timing for the mediatization of the project, such as broadcasting on national TV in the evening, rather than broadcasting on Nessma TV.

On Sustainability

● Scaling-up opportunities: expanding opportunities geographically and to new target populations, such as increasing the number of partners CSOs and including, for example, bloggers and online activists.
● Encouraging CSOs to write joint funding proposals.
● The evaluation recommends, if follow-up capabilities exist, to develop a follow-up mechanism to track the progress of the initiatives developed from this project, such as conducting site visits and interviews with stakeholders. In this regard, it is advised to conduct a regular analysis of these small grants initiatives to assess the progress made.

35 As of July 2018, we are in the tenth government since January 14, 2011 and fourth consecutively since the 2014 parliamentary elections, with a rate of almost a change of government every 6 months. This governmental instability should be taken into consideration in the risk assessment.
## Appendices

### Annex 1: The Evaluation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
<th>Lines of Inquiry</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Data Collection method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td><strong>a</strong>-To what extent was the project successful in reaching its objectives and outcomes?</td>
<td>Desk Review</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>b</strong>-To what extent was the project’s approach successful in increasing the transparency of the security sector reform efforts by involving civil society, media and local authorities to improve communication between the public and security sector through collaborative development of local initiatives?</td>
<td>Project team, CSOs, Journalists, Experts/Trainers and facilitators, SS representatives, Local authorities, CSO’s + small grants beneficiaries + public perception surveys</td>
<td>KII, KII, KII, KII, KII, Surveys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>c</strong>-To what extent was project design effective and impact oriented?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>d</strong>-Which internal and external factors facilitated or hindered the achievements of expected results/specific objectives?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Efficiency</strong></td>
<td>Was the project implemented in an efficient manner (time, personnel resources)?</td>
<td>Desk Review</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent was the project budget designed on impact? Were all needs planned for appropriately?</td>
<td>Project team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What were the strong and weak points of this process?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Were the financial resources efficiently used to achieve results?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Impact** | Were there any unintended or unexpected results (positive or negative)?

Have SFCG and KADEM always been conflict-sensitive? Did the project development and implementation always respect the communities and do-no-harm approach?

Did the partners / beneficiaries progress as individuals / organizations? Have they developed new skills and capacities, and if yes, have they used them? | Desk Review
Project team
CSOs
Journalists
Experts/Trainers and facilitators
SS representatives
Local authorities
CSO’s | KII
KII
KII
KII
KII
KII
Surveys |
| **Relevance** | *a-To what extent did the project design respond to the stated problems of security sector transparency, public awareness and support of SSR, and civilian engagement in security related topics?*

*b-Are the stated goals and objectives relevant to respond to issues and problems central to Security Sector Reform?* | Desk Review
Project team
CSOs
Journalists
Experts/Trainers and facilitators
SS representatives
Local authorities
CSO’s+ small grants beneficiaries | KII
KII
KII
KII
KII
KII
Surveys |
| **Sustainability** | Based on the available evidence, did the achieved outcomes lead to long-term improvements and are they sustainable / replicable? What is the likelihood that the benefits of the project are sustained upon its completion?

Have new mechanisms been designed to continue any work initiated by this project | Desk Review
Project team
CSOs
Journalists
Experts/Trainers and facilitators
SS representatives
Local authorities | KII
KII
KII
KII
KII
KII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lessons learned</th>
<th>CSO’s+ small grants beneficiaries</th>
<th>Surveys</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a-Determine lessons learned – what could have been done differently to make the project be of higher quality, greater impact? How can we capitalize on the achievements of the project in our future projects, and specifically within the framework of this initiative’s phase II?</td>
<td>Desk Review</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project team</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experts/Trainers and facilitators</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS representatives</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local authorities</td>
<td>KII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSO’s+ small grants beneficiaries</td>
<td>Surveys</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2 - Interview Guides

1- Project team (SFCG/KADEM)

INTERVIEW PART I   |   BACKGROUND OF THE RESPONDENT
● First & Last Name
● Female/Male
● Title
● Organisation
● Age

INTERVIEW PART II |   PROJECT DESIGN
● Think back to when you first became involved with the project. What were your first thoughts?
● What was the overall goal?
● What was your exact role? what specific skills and competences did it require?
● What did you find most challenging in this role? Please explain.
● What was the background rationale and context for designing the project? How did it fit within the organisation' strategy and expertise?
● Please explain the reason behind seeking the SFCG/KADEM partnership?
● Please explain the role and resource distribution between of SFCG and KADEM in the project?
● Please describe the recruitment process for the project staff and SC members.
● Please describe the recruitment process for the trainers and facilitators.
● How many women were staff/experts/trainers/facilitators?
● What were the selection criteria for the expert/trainers/facilitators? Describe the profile of a typical expert/trainers/facilitators (years of experience, age, skills). What were his/her strengths? Weaknesses?
● Did any special factors impact expert/trainers/facilitators competency (e.g. rural/urban, education, gender, etc.?)
● What were the selection criteria for the local CSOs? Were these good criteria? Why?
● How did you decide on the kind of support and training CSOs needed?
● What was your strategy to achieve local and national buy in? was it a good strategy? why?
● What were the challenges to achieve local and national buy in? how did you overcome them? what could‘ve you done differently?
• How would you describe your relationship with SS representatives and local authorities at the beginning of the project vs now? What factors contributed to this? Could an alternative approach have been adopted? How and why?

• To what extent did the review mechanism improve project implementation? Please explain.

INTERVIEW PART III | EFFECTIVENESS

• To what extent are the stated outcomes on the project document achieved? Please be as specific as possible.

• What was the most effective component of the project? Why? What could be done for future improvement?

• What factors have contributed to achieving or hindering achievement of the intended outputs and outcomes? How did you overcome them? And if you didn’t, what could’ve been done or could be done in the future to overcome these challenges?

• Were there results achieved beyond the log frame? What factors contributed to that?

INTERVIEW PART IV | EFFICIENCY

• Was a needs assessment carried out, in which the needs were clearly identified before starting project’s activities?

• Do the program activities overlap and duplicate other similar interventions (funded nationally and/or by other donors?), how did you react in these situations? Did you expect this? If yes, did you pre-plan your strategy, or did you design it as long as you go? (In relation with the needs assessment phase/diagnosis phase)

• Were the inputs utilised as planned? If no, what extra resources did you require, why? Were there other ways for better utilization of resources at the time of implementation/in the future?

• Did the partnerships sought during the project and inputs pre-identified prove realistic, appropriate and adequate for the achievement of the results?

• Did project partnership SFCG/Kadem operate effectively, producing efficient results and synergies (in terms of reduced costs etc.)?

• Please explain the partnership rationale with UNDP? How did it work? Was it appropriate and effective? How?

• Were there other partnerships with other international/national organisations working on this issue?

• What were the challenges/opportunities of the multiplicities of actors working on the issue? How, if, did you coordinate your actions? Were there lessons learned for future improvement?

INTERVIEW PART V | IMPACT

• Please describe any positive or negative, intended and unintended effects of the project.

• What specific measures were taken to ensure that the project includes the marginalized groups, such as women, youth, and people with disabilities?
● Has the project contributed or is likely to contribute to long-term social, economic, technical, environmental changes for individuals, communities, and institutions related to the project?

● How would you describe relations between different actors at the beginning of the project? and now? What factor contributed to this change? could you have provided further assistance throughout the project?

● Best Practices/Lessons Learned

● What worked well in this project? why? please describe any success stories.

● Describe any challenges (legal/ practical) you have faced in implementing the project? what impact did they have on the project? how did you overcome them? what could’ve been done to anticipate and avoid or minimize these challenges?

● What worked less well? why?

● What are the recommended modifications (programmatic and/or operational areas/activities) and why?

INTERVIEW PART VI | RELEVANCE

● Was the project sensitive to local realities? how?

● Did security themes answer local needs? how?

● Was the project relevant to security sector challenges in Tunisia? how?

● How relevant is the project to target groups’, including SSR representatives and CSOs, needs and priorities?

● What could have been done to make it more relevant (in relation with activities, target population and partnerships)?

● How relevant is the project to other key stakeholders’ (executing agencies, partner organizations, including UN agencies, NGOs etc.) needs and priorities?

INTERVIEW PART VII | SUSTAINABILITY

● To what extent are the project results (impact if any, and outcomes) likely to continue after the project?

● Is stakeholders’ engagement and partnerships likely to continue, be scaled up, replicated or institutionalized after funding ceases? in what ways? What are the obstacles?

● What are the key factors that will require attention in order to improve prospects of sustainability of the outcomes and the potential for replication of the approach?

● How were local capacities strengthened at the individual and organizational level?

● How keen are donors on providing further and/or future funding, i.e. Both during and beyond the current implementation cycle?

● Are local CSOs committed and “own” the project? To what degree do they display a sense of commitment and ownership and is there any tangible proof for this that can serve as evidence?
INTERVIEW PART VIII | CONCLUDING QUESTIONS

● Do you have any suggestions for improving the project?
● Are there topics that should have been covered or given more attention?
● Is there anything we did not discuss, but you consider relevant for the current evaluation?

CLOSURE OF THE INTERVIEW

Thank you.

Notes (date/time of interview, phone number used...)

2- Small grants beneficiaries/ Participants to LD

INTERVIEW PART I | BACKGROUND OF THE RESPONDENT

● Governorate
● First & Last Name
● Female/Male
● Age
● Current organization/employer (if employed)

INTERVIEW PART II | GENERAL QUESTIONS

THE CONCEPTS OF SSR IN THE LOCAL CONTEXT

● What does ‘SSR’ mean to you? prior to the project what was your understanding of SSR?
● Have you had any opportunities, prior to community dialogues to freely discuss on SSR in your community? If yes, have other (local, governmental) partners been involved in such events? What have been the specific contributions of each partner? If no, why?
● What kinds of SSR projects exist in your region? During the last two years, you have been involved in SSR-focused activities supported by SFCG and/or implemented by local CSOs.
● How would you assess these efforts? please explain

INTERVIEW PART III | PROJECT DESIGN

● How was it that you first learned about the project?
● What motivated you personally the most as well as your organization to participate in SFCG project? What were you expecting from the participation in this project? Globally speaking, to what extent do you consider your expectations have been met? Please describe your involvement in the project? which phase?
● How did you get involved in the project? To which activities did you participate? What role did you play? Did you learn anything from your involvement? if so, what?
● Can you please explain the SFCG project, from the time of your involvement until today? Do you understand it? Would you change it? How? Why?
● What were your major likes and dislikes about the project?
• what was this experience like for you? What resulted from them?
• What is your opinion on the adequacy of these activities with your organization’s preoccupations? How much important is to you and your institution to engage in such activities with civil society organizations?
• If Participants to LDS: Please describe the process you went through to identify the security issue? what were the challenges/difficulties, you faced? did you overcome them? how?
• Please describe your colleagues at the activities, do you think they met the right profile for participation? why or why not? who do you think should’ve been involved?
• Are there any other stakeholders /institutions that you feel should be involved in the provision of SSR interventions?
• Have you previously participated in similar initiatives? please describe? what was the added value of this project?

INTERVIEW PART IV | EFFECTIVENESS
• As far as you know, how effective was the project? from your perspective, did it enhance communication and collaboration between security sector civil society and citizens? How?
• What factors contributed to this effectiveness/ineffectiveness?
• What could’ve been done for a better effectiveness?
• How has the project contributed in improving relationship between citizens and security sector? if you have observed such improvements, can you elaborate with examples? have the initiatives are ample enough to bring such change? what else could be done or needs to be done?
• If participant to local dialogue: How did the community level dialogues organized by SFCG affect you and your perceptions? Did they provide you with new knowledge? If, yes what is it? What was the major outcome of these dialogues? Have there any been any independent initiatives started as a result of the project initiatives? if yes, explain.

INTERVIEW PART V | IMPACT
• What are the most significant changes since the implementation of the project?
• Did the project impact your perception of security forces/civil society? how?
• Did the project foster trust and cooperation between citizens and security sector? How? Could it have been more effective? If yes, how?
• How do you assess the improvement of the degree of collaboration/trust between security sector and CSO in effort to increase the transparency of security sector reform effort? (describe before, during and after project implementation)
• Do you believe that the project initiatives have helped build relationships between local authorities, CSO, security sectors and other stakeholders? do you think that there is increased communication, trust among them? if yes, how? personally, has it helped you to build relationship and trust with other stakeholders?
• To what extend has the project contributed to improving the relationship between community and security sector?
Do you think there are changes in the police-citizen relationship? Explain
Do you think there is improvement in the collaboration between CSO, security sector and local authority representatives? Please explain
Have there been any unintended effects, either positive or negative?
If participant to LD: think back to the beginning of the dialogues, how would you describe the relationships between the different actor’s present? at towards the end? did it change? how? and why?
What role did the facilitator play in this change? how?
If project beneficiary, did you witness/have been part of incidents (positive/negative experience) between police/citizen? please describe
Has the project contributed or is likely to contribute to long-term social, economic, technical, environmental changes for individuals, communities, and institutions related to the project?
Best Practices/Lessons Learned
What worked well in this project? (best practices)? Why?
What could have been done better (lessons learned)? Why?
INTERVIEW PART VI | RELEVANCE
Was the project relevant to your local reality? to your/your organisations’ needs? please explain why?
How relevant is the SFCG and local CSO projects, from your point of view, to the need of the security sector and the community in your region?
What the issue selected relevant? if not, what could’ve been more relevant?
Were the activities relevant? if not, what could’ve been more relevant?
Do you think that the program on its own is sufficient to support the SSR process, including increased cooperation between citizens and security sector? (If not, what more is needed?)
Do you think local CSO organizations can play an effective role
INTERVIEW PART VII | SUSTAINABILITY
In your opinion, what are the possibilities for future collaboration with communities, CSOs, security sector in SSR or community dialogue related topics? Are there any concrete steps that you are willing to take (or have already taken) in such a direction?
Do you think different parties (SSR personnel’s/CSOs and local authorities) engagement likely to continue, be scaled up, replicated or institutionalized after external funding ceases? in what ways? What are the obstacles?
Have you remained in contact with others you met during the project? If yes, who? How do you communicate with them? Why these participants? Common context? Common challenges? …How often do you communicate with them?
With regard to your collaboration with CSOs in the SSR project and with SFCG office, what are the aspects of this partnership that you were most interested in, both at personal and institutional levels? How did this collaboration differ from other experiences you may have had with other CSOs or public/governmental bodies?

INTERVIEW PART VIII | CONCLUDING QUESTIONS

Do you have any suggestions for improving the project?
Are there topics that should have been covered or given more attention?
Is there anything we did not discuss, but you consider relevant for the current evaluation?

CLOSURE OF THE INTERVIEW

Thank you.

Notes (date/time of interview, phone number used...)

3- Experts/trainers and facilitators

INTERVIEW PART I | BACKGROUND OF THE RESPONDENT

Governorate
First & Last Name
Female/Male
Age
Current organization/employer

INTERVIEW PART II | PROJECT DESIGN

How was it that you first learned about the project?
Think back to when you first became involved with the project. What were your first motivation/impressions/expectations?
Please describe your involvement in the project? which phase? How does it fit in the overall project?
If trainer/facilitator: Describe the profile of a typical participant to the training/dialogue sessions? Did they fit the needed profile for the project? if no, what should have been the right profile? how many were women/youth/people with disabilities?
Was the kind of support they received adequate? what other areas could you recommend strengthening?
Were the training modules available for participants? Did they evaluate and give feedback of the sessions? were these feedbacks incorporated into the next sessions? please explain
Did the partners/beneficiaries progress as individuals/organizations? Have they developed new skills and capacities, and if yes, have they used them? how? Please give examples of cases where you have witnessed or heard about the use of these skills.

INTERVIEW PART III | EFFECTIVENESS
As far as you know, how effective was the project? did it enhance communication and collaboration between security sector and civil society actors/citizens? how?

If media trainer: As far as you know, how effective was the project? did it enhance participant’s journalistic perceptions? did it change the way they address security topics? how? please give examples.

What factors contributed to this effectiveness/ ineffectiveness?

What could’ve been done for a better effectiveness?

INTERVIEW PART V | IMPACT

To what extent were trainees aware of SSR efforts in Tunisia? How would you rate their pre and post training knowledge? (weak-good-excellent)?

As far as you know, what component contributed the most to the success of their activities (SSR training, dialogue training or both) and how?

As far as you know what were the most significant changes since the implementation of the project?

Have the skills participants gained contributed to this impact? how?

Do you think there is improvement in the collaboration between CSO, security sector and local authority representatives- between police and citizens? Please explain

Did the project impact the general perception of security forces? how?

If dialogue facilitator: How would you describe relations between stakeholders at the time of your involvement? and now (if you are still in contact)/ at the beginning and the end of your involvement? what factors contributed to this change? Success stories if any.

Best Practices/Lessons Learned

What worked well in this project? (best practices)

What factors contributed most to the success of this project’s?

What worked less well (lessons learned)? why? what could’ve been done for greater success?

INTERVIEW PART VI | RELEVANCE

Was the project relevant to local reality/ the needs and priorities of trainees/participants? what could’ve been done to make it more relevant?

Were the issues discussed relevant?

Were the training modules adapted to the local context/the needs and priorities of trainees/participants? how?

INTERVIEW PART VII | SUSTAINABILITY

To what extent are the project results likely to continue after the project? Please explain

Have you witnessed partnerships built? what factors contributed to building them?
INTERVIEW PART VIII | CONCLUDING QUESTIONS

● Do you have any suggestions for improving the project?

● Are there topics that should have been covered or given more attention?

● Is there anything we did not discuss, but you consider relevant for the current evaluation?

CLOSURE OF THE INTERVIEW

Thank you.

Notes (date/time of interview, phone number used...)

4- Partner CSOs

INTERVIEW PART I | BACKGROUND OF THE RESPONDENT

● Governorate

● First & Last Name

● Female/Male

● Age

● Current organization/employer

INTERVIEW PART II | GENERAL QUESTIONS

THE CONCEPTS OF SSR IN THE LOCAL CONTEXT

● What does SSR mean to you? prior to the project what was your understanding of SSR?

● Which kinds of SSR projects exist in your region? How does the project fit in? During the project implementation, did you have links with other organizations (CSO) for the provision of the interventions? Have you implemented any joint activities with partner CSO in the project? Are there any other organizations that you feel could become more involved with in the implementation / provision of interventions? If so, which?

● Do these efforts coordinate/ collaborate?

● How would you assess these efforts?

INTERVIEW PART III | PROJECT DESIGN

● How was it that you first learned about the project?

● Think back to when you first became involved with the project. What were your motivations/first impressions/expectations?

● Have you previously participated in similar initiatives? what was the added value of this project?

● How many personnel works in your organization? Men/women? How many have worked on the project? How have they been selected to participate in the project?

● How was your organization’s initiative planned and developed? Where does your intervention come from and is there a theoretical basis for its use and effectiveness?
Do you feel that you had sufficient time to develop and implement your project?

Do you feel that you have sufficient resources in terms of staff, finances or managerial support to be able to deliver the intervention effectively?

How confident do you feel in planning and carrying out work around SSR and community engagement?

Have you received any training for working in SSR themes? Explain.

Do you think you need further training or support in order to be effective in working with security sector and community engagement? What form might this take? How useful were the trainings? On a scale from 1-5 how would you rate your progress?

How useful was the collaboration scale card? Why? Please explain.

Is there anything else you would like SFCG to do to help you deliver SSR interventions?

How did the community level dialogues organized by SFCG affect you and your perceptions? Did they provide you with new knowledge? If yes, what is it?

What have been the specific contributions of each partner? If no, why?

What were the major outcomes of these dialogues sessions?

What activities during the course of the project were the

INTERVIEW PART IV | EFFECTIVENESS

Can you please explain the SFCG project, from the time of your involvement until today? Do you understand it? Would you change it? How? Why?

Do you think that the project on its own is sufficient to support the SSR process, including increased cooperation between citizens and security sector? (If not, what more is needed?)

Can you describe the activities carried within the project?

What has been the most significant learning from participating in the project?

Have these learning's impacted your work? How?

What have you found most useful in your everyday practice?

Please describe the most recent time you used one of the tools/skills you have learned/acquired during the project

What happened as a result of using this skill or tool?

To what extent did you find the project components suitable to your locality'/your organisation's needs? If no, what could've been done to make it more suitable?

To what extent do you think you were able to apply the skills and the tools you have learned in your organization on the ground?

How did the project measure this? (tests, demonstrations, observations)
• Was the knowledge, skills and tools you gained during the project helpful in implementing your action plan? Please specify the what tools/skills?

• How useful were the score cards in your small grant reporting?

• What were the challenges of using it?

• Do you think you can use it in other projects/activities?

• How does the project measure the skills of participants? (pre/post-tests, simulations, observation)

• How has the project integrated formal and informal media and messaging into their activities?

• To what extent did the media component of the project achieve its intended results?

INTERVIEW PART V | IMPACT

• What are the most significant changes since the implementation of the project?

• How can you describe the relationships you and your organization have developed with other stakeholders during the different level of the project? How can you assess their willingness to cooperate with your organization? Did this meet your expectations? Please detail per stakeholder (security actor, local authority, civilian partners and participants)

• How do you assess the improvement of the degree of collaboration/trust between security sector and CSO in effort to increase the transparency of security sector reform effort?

• How did the security sector and local authority respond to your initiative? How do you describe their participation and response toward the civil society initiatives to promote the transparency of SSR and foster the relationship between the community and security sector? Are they positive enough? What was the role played by local security representative to support the project?

• Are you satisfied with the level of collaboration and coordination with security sector, local authorities?

• What prevents collaboration with local authorities, security sector or local CSO? How could it be strengthened? Did you meet any challenge in communicating and / or collaboration with the security sector and local authorities? If yes, what were they? What did you do to address them? Did it work? Why?

• Do you think that the project has made you more aware of the role of the civil society in SSR? Could you explain?

• What did you learn about security sector governance? Do you use this knowledge in your daily work? If so, how?

• Did the project impact your perception of security forces? how?

• Did the project improve your understanding of the security sector challenges? How?

• Do you think there is improvement in the collaboration between CSO, security sector and local authority representatives- police/citizens? Please explain
● Do you think there are mutual changes in perception between the different stakeholders in this project?

● Have you noted an improvement in the police-citizen relationship? Please describe?

● What were the most apparent changes in community’s behaviour and attitude after the implementation of the project? What were people’s reactions about your activities?

● According to your experience, how receptive are community members to your activities in general, and to the SSR-focused project in particular? Before/after?

● Most successful and why? How did you evaluate successful implementation?

● Have there been any unintended effects, either positive or negative (SFCG and your project)?

● Have there been any positive or negative responses to the project from target population or the community (parents, youth)?

● What specific measures were taken to ensure that the project included the marginalized groups, such as women, youth, and people with disabilities?

● Has the project contributed or is likely to contribute to long-term social, economic, technical, environmental changes for individuals, communities, and institutions related to the project?

● Did any of you who received trainings have gone on to provide training independently to others? Provide success stories if any.

● Do you have feedback on how participants have benefitted from that training (e.g. using their knowledge or skills on the job)? Provide success stories, if any.

● Best Practices/Lessons Learned - Have there been any lessons learned that would apply elsewhere? (overall/target population group)?

● What worked well in this project? (best practices)

● What factors contributed most to the success of this project?

● Describe any challenges (legal/practical) you have faced in implementing the project? How did you overcome them? What kind of support could’ve been provided to help anticipate/minimize these challenges in the future?

● What could have been done better (lessons learned)? Why?

INTERVIEW PART VI | RELEVANCE

● Was the project relevant to local reality and target groups? How relevant is the SFCG project, from your point of view, to the need of the security sector and the community in your region?

● What could’ve been done to make it more relevant?

● Were the issues discussed relevant?

● How relevant is the project to other stakeholders operating in the region (other CSOs, UN Agencies, government, international organisations...), their needs and priorities?
INTERVIEW PART VII | SUSTAINABILITY

● What practices and behaviours promoted by your project are or may be sustainable after the project ends and why?

● Has your organization engaged in other SSR focused activities with these partners? How do you envision future collaboration with these partners? Have you received any proposals in this direction? What is your opinion about the next steps?

● Which steps are planned or have been taken to sustain the outcome of your project? To what extent are the project results likely to continue after the project?

● Do you think that SSR efforts are likely to continue, be scaled up, replicated or institutionalized after the project ceases? In what ways? What are the obstacles?

● How likely is it that you will have an opportunity to implement the ideas or solutions for reform developed during this project in the future?

● Have you remained in contact with others you met during the project? If yes, who? How do you communicate with them? Why these participants? Common context? Common challenges? ...How often do you communicate with them?

● Do you think that the training and support you received will continue to have impact after their closure of the project? Why?

● Are relationships built with other partners sustainable?

INTERVIEW PART VIII | CONCLUDING QUESTIONS

● Do you have any suggestions for improving the project?

● Are there topics that should have been covered or given more attention?

● Is there anything we did not discuss, but you consider relevant for the current evaluation?

CLOSURE OF THE INTERVIEW

Thank you.

Notes (date/time of interview, phone number used...)

5- Security Sector Services

INTERVIEW PART I | BACKGROUND OF THE RESPONDENT

● Governorate

● First & Last Name

● Female/Male

● Current organization/employer

● Title

● Age

INTERVIEW PART II | GENERAL QUESTIONS
THE CONCEPTS OF SSR IN THE LOCAL CONTEXT

- What does SSR mean to you? prior to the project what was your understanding of SSR?
- Which kinds of SSR projects exist in your region? where does the project fit in?
- How do you assess these efforts?

INTERVIEW PART III  |  PROJECT DESIGN

- How was it that you first learned about the project?
- Think back to when you first became involved with the project. What were your motivation/first impressions/expectations?
- Have you previously participated in similar initiatives? what was the added value of this project?

INTERVIEW PART IV  |  EFFECTIVENESS

- Please describe your involvement in the project? which phase?
- From your perspective, did it enhance communication and collaboration between security sector civil society and citizens? How?

INTERVIEW PART V  |  IMPACT

- What are the most significant changes since the implementation of the project?
- Do you think that the project has made you more aware of the role of the civil society/media in the SSR? Could you explain?
- Do you think there is improvement in the collaboration between CSO, security sector - police/citizens? Please explain.
- Do you think there are mutual changes in perception between security sector services, local authorities and civil society and between police and citizens? Please explain
- Have you noted an improvement in the police-citizen relationship?
- Has the project contributed or is likely to contribute to long-term social, economic, technical, environmental changes for individuals, communities, and institutions related to the project?
- Best Practices/Lessons Learned
- What worked well in this project? (best practices)
- What factors contributed most to the success of this project’s?
- What could have been done better (lessons learned)? why?

INTERVIEW PART VI  |  RELEVANCE

- Was the project relevant to local reality? How?
- what could’ve been done to make it more relevant
- was the issue chosen relevant? what could’ve been more relevant?
INTERVIEW PART VII | SUSTAINABILITY

● To what extent are the project results (impact if any, and outcomes) likely to continue after the project? in what ways? What are the obstacles?

● How likely is it that you will have an opportunity to implement the ideas or solutions for reform developed during this project in the future?

● Have you remained in contact with others you met during the project? If yes, who? How do you communicate with them? Why these participants? Common context? Common challenges? ...How often do you communicate with them?

INTERVIEW PART VIII | CONCLUDING QUESTIONS

● Do you have any suggestions for improving the project?

● Are there topics that should have been covered or given more attention?

● Is there anything we did not discuss, but you consider relevant for the current evaluation?

CLOSURE OF THE INTERVIEW

Thank you.

Notes (date/time of interview, phone number used...)

6- Journalists

INTERVIEW PART I | BACKGROUND OF THE RESPONDENT

● Governorate

● First & Last Name

● Female/Male

● Age

● Current organization/employer

● Type:

INTERVIEW PART III | PROJECT DESIGN

● How was it that you first learned about the project?

● Think back to when you first became involved with the project. What were your motivations/first impressions/expectations?

● Please describe your involvement in the project? which phase?

● Have you previously participated in similar initiatives? what was the added value of this project?

● How many personnel works in your organization? Men/women? How many participated in the project? How have they been selected?

INTERVIEW PART III | EFFECTIVENESS
● From your perspective, did the enhance communication and collaboration between security sector civil society and citizens? How?

● To what extent did you find the project components suitable to your/your organisation’s needs?

● To what extent you think you are able to apply the skills and the tools you have learned in your organization on the ground?

● How did the project measure this? (tests, demonstrations, observations)

INTERVIEW PART I | IMPACT

● What has been the most significant learning from participating in the project?

● Have these learning’s impacted your work? how?

● What have you found most useful in your everyday practice?

● Please describe the most recent time you used one of the skills you have acquired during the project

● What happened as a result of using this skill?

● To what extent did you find the project components suitable to your locality’/your organisation’s needs? if no, what could’ve been done to make it more suitable?

● To what extent you think you are able to apply the skills and the tools you have learned in your organization on the ground?

● How did the project measure this? (tests, demonstrations, observations)

● Do you think that the project has made you more aware of the role of media and civil society in the SSR? Could you explain?

● What did you learn about security sector governance? Do you use this knowledge in your daily work? If so, how?

● Did the project impact you/your thinking/your organization’s about SSR in Tunisia?

● Did the project impact the general perception of security forces? how?

● Do you have any feedback from viewers/readers/listeners on the way you are now treating security related issues vs before?

● Did the project improve your understanding of the security sector challenges? How?

● Do you think there is improvement in the collaboration between CSO, security sector - police/citizens? Please explain

● How did the project impact on your journalistic perceptions? did you change the way you address security topics

● Has the project had any negative effects? For example, within the organization, between members of the organization involved in the project and those not involved in the project?
Has the project contributed or is likely to contribute to long-term social, economic, technical, environmental changes for individuals, communities, and institutions related to the project?

Did any of you who received trainings have gone on to provide training independently to others? Is this in line with expectations? Provide success stories if any.

Do you have feedback on how participants have benefitted from that training (e.g. using their knowledge or skills on the job)? Provide success stories, if any.

Best Practices/Lessons Learned
What worked well in this project? (best practices)
What factors contributed most to the success of this project’s?
What could have been done better (lessons learned)? why?

INTERVIEW PART V | RELEVANCE

Was the project relevant to local reality?
what could’ve been done to make it more relevant?

INTERVIEW PART VI | SUSTAINABILITY

To what extent are the project results likely to continue after the project?
Have you remained in contact with others you met during the project? If yes, who? How do you communicate with them? Why these participants? Common context? Common challenges? ...How often do you communicate with them?

Do you think that the training and support you received will continue to have impact after their closure of the project? Why?
Are relationships built with other partners sustainable?

INTERVIEW PART VII | CONCLUDING QUESTIONS

Do you have any suggestions for improving the project?
Are there topics that should have been covered or given more attention?
Is there anything we did not discuss, but you consider relevant for the current evaluation?

CLOSURE OF THE INTERVIEW

Thank you.

Notes (date/time of interview, phone number used...
Annex 3: Surveys

1- CSO’s Surveys

PART I | BACKGROUND OF THE RESPONDENT

● Governorate
● Female/Male
● Age
● Occupation

PART II | EVALUATION QUESTIONS

1. Please rate the effectiveness of the project
   a. Ineffective
   b. Acceptable
   c. Good
   d. Excellent

Please explain your rating. ....................................................

2. What has been the most valuable part of project?
   a. Building capacities related to SSR
   b. Dialogue on issues initiatives related to SSR
   c. Jointly designing initiatives related to SSR
   d. Jointly implementing initiatives related to SSR
   e. Other, please specify

Please explain why. .........................................................

3. What has been most challenging part of the project?
   a. Building capacities related to SSR
   b. Dialogue on issues initiatives related to SSR
   c. Jointly designing initiatives related to SSR
   d. Jointly implementing initiatives related to SSR
   e. Other, please specify

Please explain why. .........................................................
4. Were you able to apply the skills and the tools you have learned in your organization on the ground
   a. Yes
   b. No
   c. Don’t know
   d. No answer
   If yes, please specify what tools and how………………………………………………

5. How useful were the score cards in your small grant reporting?
   a. Very useful
   b. Moderately useful
   c. Not at all useful

6. Overall, what impact has your participation in the project had on your projects and organization?
   …………………………………………………

7. Would you say that there is a mutual change in perception between civil society and security sector services?
   a. Yes
   b. No
   c. Don’t know
   d. No answer
   Please explain ………………………………………………………………………

8. If yes, in a scale from 10% to 100% how would you rate this change?
   Please explain your rating…………………………………………………………………………………………

9. Would you say that there is an improved collaboration between civil society, local authorities and security sector services?
   a. Yes
   b. No
c. Don’t know

d. No answer

Please explain …………………………………………………………

10. If yes, in a scale from 10% to 100% how would you rate this change?

Please explain your rating…………………………………………………………………………………………

11. Would you say that there is improvement in the police-citizen relationship?

a. Yes

b. No

c. Don’t know

d. No answer

Please explain …………………………………………………………

12. If yes, in a scale from 10% to 100% how would you rate this change?

Please explain your rating…………………………………………………………………………………………

13. Do you have any comments/recommendation for the project?

Thank you

2- Beneficiaries’ Survey

PART I | BACKGROUND OF THE RESPONDENT

● Governorate
● Female/Male
● Age
● Occupation

PART II | EVALUATION QUESTIONS

1. Did your participation in the project improve your understanding of the SSR efforts in Tunisia?

a. Yes

b. No

c. Don’t know

d. No answer

If yes, please specify how…………………………………………………………
2. If yes, in a scale from 10% to 100% how would you rate this change?
   Please explain your rating…………………………………………………………………………………………

3. What has been the most significant learning from participating in the project?
   …………………………………………………

4. Have these learning's impacted your work?
   a. Yes
   b. No
   c. Don’t know
   a. No answer
   If yes, please specify how………………………………………………

5. What have you found most useful in your everyday practice?
   a. Dialogue
   b. Identifying a common issue
   c. Developing a strategy
   d. Other, please specify
   Please explain ……………………………………………………………

6. Do you have any comments/recommendations for the project?

Thank you

3- Public Opinion Survey
INTERVIEW PART I | BACKGROUND OF THE RESPONDENT
● Governorate
● Female/Male
● Occupation

INTERVIEW PART II | GENERAL QUESTIONS
1. Are you aware of the existence of initiatives to reform the security sector in your region to improve the relationship between security and citizen?
   a. Yes
b. No

c. I do not know

d. No answer

2. If yes, please specify the initiative(s) ........................................ ................................  ...................................................... ................................

3. To what extent can these initiatives be considered effective in improving the relationship between security and citizens?

a. Very effective

b. Moderately effective

c. Not effective at all

Please explain .................................................. ........................................  ...................................

4. Do you watch TV/Listen to the Radio or read written or electronic press?

a. Yes

b. No

c. Sometimes

If yes, please specify platform and timing……………………………………………

5. Have you seen or heard segments/read written or electronic press on efforts of Security Sector on the national or local level?

a. Yes

b. No

c. Don’t know

d. No answer

If yes, please specify the initiative(s), platform(s) and timing(s)…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

6. How would you evaluate the media coverage of these initiatives?

a. Objective and comprehensive

b. Medium
c. Superficial and unprofessional

Please explain………………………………………………………………………………

7. Would you say these efforts existed 3 years ago?
   a. Yes
   b. No
   c. Don’t know
   d. No answer

8. Would you say that there is an improvement in local/national media covering security sector topics?
   a. Yes
   e. No
   f. Don’t know
   g. No answer

Please explain ………………………………………………………………………

9. How would you rate this improvement?
   a. Less than 20%
   b. Between 20% and 50%
   c. More than 50%

Please explain your rating……………………………………………………………..

10. Have you noticed gender sensitive orientations of media reporting on security?
    a. Yes
    b. No
    c. Don’t know
    d. No answer

Thank you.
Bibliography

It included the following documentation:

- Project document, including budget and logical framework;
- Quarterly reports to the donors;
- Baseline Study - Understanding of the current level of civil society and security sector institutions knowledge of the security sector and its prospects for reforms;
- Newsletters and communication tools;
- CSOs proposals, action plans and calendars;
- Monitoring tools (when available): training reports and documentation, etc.;
- Media productions produced and disseminated;
- Activity and output tracking tools.
Evaluator Biography

Eya Jrad is a consultant and a researcher, with a particular interest on security, social justice and the fight against violent extremism. She has worked with UNDP Tunisia, IOM, the United States Institute of Peace, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, as well as numerous local NGOs. Eya holds a BA in Legal Sciences from the Faculty of Legal, Political and Social Sciences, and master’s degrees in Common Law and Tax Law as well as an executive MBA from the Wharton School of Business, Philadelphia. She is currently preparing a PhD thesis on border security in North Africa. Eya has published numerous papers on security and presented at many international conferences and symposia and contributed to a variety of policy papers and briefs. Eya has participated in many academic exchange projects and was selected to represent her university at some of the most prestigious law competitions.