CAUSES AND MOTIVES OF RADICALISATION AMONG CENTRAL ASIAN LABOUR MIGRANTS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Joint research

Moscow
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This report is principally authored by the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IOS RAS). The overall project was delivered in cooperation with Search for Common Ground, IOS RAS, Royal United Services Institute of Great Britain (RUSI), National Academies of Sciences of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as independent researchers from Central Asia, who all had some input into the different versions of the report, but ultimately each one is responsible for their iteration. IOS RAS is the principal author of the Russian one, RUSI for the English one, the Central Asians each respectively for theirs.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 4

Chapter 1. LABOUR MIGRATION FROM CENTRAL ASIA TO RUSSIA: STATUS, DYNAMICS, SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXTS............................................. 7

Chapter 2. INFORMATION ABOUT RESPONDENTS................................. 11

Chapter 3. CONDITIONS AND RESILIENCY TO THE RADICALISATION OF LABOUR MIGRANTS FROM UZBEKISTAN.................................................. 13

Chapter 4. CONDITIONS AND RESILIENCY TO THE RADICALISATION OF LABOUR MIGRANTS FROM KYRGYZSTAN.................................................. 20

Chapter 5. CONDITIONS AND RESILIENCY TO THE RADICALISATION OF LABOUR MIGRANTS FROM TAJIKISTAN ................................................. 26

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. 31
INTRODUCTION

The Institute of Oriental Studies (IOS) of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IOS RAS), the British Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) and the International Non-Governmental Organization, Search for Common Ground (SFCG) carried out this research project jointly. The Kyrgyzstan office of SFCG was responsible for the overall management and coordination of the project.

The research team is fully responsible for the content of the report. The document is the result of the work of an international team of scientists and reflects their opinions, assessments, and views, and may not coincide with the official opinion of the governments of Russia, the UK, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, or Tajikistan.

The study was carried out in stages.

In the first stage, the team determined the objectives of the study and the tasks necessary to achieve them. Considering these objectives, the Kyrgyzstan office of SFCG identified experts from among the scientists of the institutes of national academies of science and political scientists of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to participate in surveying labour migrants in the field.

In the second stage, from May 29 to June 1, 2017, researchers attended an orientation in Moscow at the offices of the IOS RAS. The first part was devoted to discussing the extent of labour migration from Central Asian countries, the factors affecting it, problems existing in this area, the importance of labour migration from Central Asia to the Russian economy and the socio-economic stability of the countries of the Central Asian region of the CIS, and labour migration trends in the short and medium term.

Participants from RUSI conducted the second portion of the seminar. It was devoted to a discussion of the methodology for the study and content of the questionnaire developed by British researchers, based on the framework proposed by J. Khalil and M. Zeuthen in 2016 and used by RUSI in carrying out research projects and programs related to radicalisation. For the convenience of collecting and processing primary information, four general sets of factors were identified which, in the opinion of British researchers, influence the radicalisation of individual labour migrants:

**Individual incentives** (II) are specific personal factors that can attract people to radical ideas or groups. For example: adventurism, belonging, status, material temptations, expected rewards in the afterlife, etc.

**Structural motives** (SM) - this is the background environment surrounding a person, which can become pivotal for the beginning of radicalisation. These include repression, corruption, unemployment, social inequality, discrimination, hostility between groups of differing identity, and interference by external states in the affairs of other countries.

**Enabling factors** (EF) are circumstances that facilitate, but do not motivate an individual to accept violent extremism. For example: the presence of "radical" mentors (including religious leaders, people from social networks, etc.), access to "radical" online communities, social
networks, access to weapons or other materials, comparative lack of state influence, lack of family support, etc...

**Resilience** (R) is the ability of people, groups and communities to refute and reject the proponents of terrorism and the ideology they promote. At an individual level, this includes: personal experience, personality, relationships, beliefs and values, family and friends, access to resources, and personal qualities such as confidence and self-esteem, work, religion, etc. In communities, this is the relationship between families and friends; trust.

Finding consensus, the project participants formulated a base version of the questionnaire, allowing the researchers themselves to make the necessary adjustments in their interviews and conversations with respondents. At the end of the meeting, SFCG - Kyrgyzstan led in working out necessary organizational and logistical issues. IOS RAS took upon itself to coordinate with relevant authorities of the Russian Federation in Moscow and in the field, handling the problems of field work, which allowed international teams of scientists to conduct the research unimpeded in all eight federal districts of the Russian Federation.

Researchers obtained primary information, which served as the basis for the final report, through interviews (individual interviews and focus groups) held in seven of the eight federal districts of Russia in the areas with the greatest concentration of labour migrants from Central Asian countries: The Far East (Khabarovsk), Siberia (Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Novosibirsk), the Urals (Ekaterinburg), Privolzhsky (Samara, Saratov), the South (Astrakhan, Krasnodar, Sochi), Central (Moscow and Moscow region), and North-Western (St. Petersburg and Leningrad region). Researchers also used materials on labour migration from state bodies of the Russian Federation, public and non-governmental organizations in preparing this report.

- Sites of field research

(Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Novosibirsk), the Urals (Ekaterinburg), Privolzhsky (Samara, Saratov), the South (Astrakhan, Krasnodar, Sochi), Central (Moscow and Moscow region), and North-Western (St. Petersburg and Leningrad region). Researchers also used materials on labour migration from state bodies of the Russian Federation, public and non-governmental organizations in preparing this report.
Two groups of researchers simultaneously conducted field research from June 1 to June 28. Each group consisted of a representative of the IOS RAS (who acted as group leads, handled logistics, and maintained contact with local authorities), as well as researchers from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, who conducted the interviews.

On average, each researcher conducted at least 21 interviews and focus groups.

In total, 232 people participated in the study. However, there was only enough data for a complete analysis of 218 people (34 women). The sample included 96 citizens of Kyrgyzstan (15 women), 55 from Uzbekistan (including 10 women), and 67 from Tajikistan (9 women). Considering that the sample included leaders of diasporas, brigadiers, imams and assistants to imams, employees of consulates and official representations of Central Asian countries in the Russian Federation, and non-governmental organizations, who could speak not only of their own experience, but also about many of their compatriots, field team researchers managed to create a more complete picture of the situation of their compatriots in Russia; their problems, interests, aspirations and hopes.

Immigrants from Central Asian countries who have received Russian citizenship and work permanently in the Russian Federation, seasonal labour migrants, as well as students studying at Russian universities were among the respondents. Some respondents were willing to participate openly, since they considered it important, through personal involvement, to convey their views on the topic. Others would only participate under the condition that their personal data and information about their family members remain completely anonymous.

All three groups of respondents are representatives of various cultures and languages. This impacted the responses and behaviour of respondents.

Considering the factors of subjectivity and bias of respondents, and the limited time allocated for field research, this final document does not claim absolute objectivity of the information received during field work.

The final report is the result of joint efforts of the IOS RAS, RUSI, and SFCG with the active participation of researchers from Central Asian countries who conducted field research and participated in a September seminar in Almaty (Kazakhstan), where the initial findings of the study were discussed. The Russian version of the report (this report) was prepared by the IOS RAS. It reflects the comments and opinions of RUSI experts. The English version (RUSI Report), taking into account the opinions and commentary of the IOS RAS, has been prepared by our British partners.

The team of researchers expresses deep gratitude to all government officials from the Russian Federation, thanks to whom it was possible to conduct such a large-scale study in Russia, as well as to the labour migrants, community leaders, imams of mosques who trusted the team members and agreed to take part in the study. This research would have been impossible without them.
Chapter 1.

LABOUR MIGRATION FROM CENTRAL ASIA TO RUSSIA: STATUS, DYNAMICS, SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT

Migration from the countries of Central Asia (CA) to the Russian Federation is one of the most stable in Eurasia and the world. The main stream of this migration is for labour. According to expert estimates, it accounts for 10-16% of the economically active population of Central Asian countries. Of the approximately 11 million foreign nationals officially registered annually in the Russian Federation, about one third are citizens of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

In Russia, which is experiencing serious demographic problems, labour migration makes it possible to compensate for the shortage of domestic labour resources. This affects mostly construction, manufacturing and mining, agriculture, and public utilities.

In recent years, there has been a growing need to attract highly qualified specialists of various profiles, including on a long-term basis, to various sectors of the Russian economy. A certain number of labour migrants, having received Russian citizenship, successfully adapt to the realities of Russian civil society.

For the countries of Central Asia, where a high level of unemployment persists against the background of steady population growth, decline in production, and the spread of poverty, labour migration to Russia can substantially reduce the level of unemployment and, consequently, internal social tension.

Remittances from Tajik labour migrants significantly exceed the scale of foreign direct investment and international assistance programs in Tajikistan. The volume of remittances from Russia to the Kyrgyz Republic (KR) in the first half of 2017 is comparable to one third of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). Official data from the Kyrgyz authorities show that remittances reduce poverty in the national definition by about 6-7%. According to First Deputy Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan Joomart Otorbaev, "transfers of Kyrgyz migrants play a huge role in balancing the country's macroeconomic budget, maintaining the Som and reserves of the National Bank. They reach more than 60% of the revenues of the national budget".

The economic slowdown in Russia at the end of 2014 and throughout 2015, due, in part, to the introduction of economic sanctions against the Russian Federation by the United States and the European Union, has led to a decrease in demand for attracting labour resources. As a result, the flow of labour migrants from the countries of Central Asia has slowed, leading to a

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3 The volume of remittances from Russia to Kyrgyzstan has reached a third of GDP. Fergana international news agency. 2017. June 7. - http://migrant.ferghana.ru
significant decrease in the volume of remittances (60% less in 2015 than in 2014). Nevertheless, even according to the data of the Eurasian Development Bank, the main recipient countries of remittances from Russia in 2015 were Uzbekistan (12.7%), Tajikistan (12.7%), and Kyrgyzstan (10.6%). These transfers were made mainly in three currencies: the Russian Rouble (67.6%), the US dollar (28.5%), and the euro (3.7%) (see Appendix 1, Figure 1).

According to the Central Bank of Russia, in 2016 the situation regarding labour migration has improved somewhat. As a result, the volume of remittances from Russia to Central Asian countries for the year totalled $6.98 billion. This is $1.915 billion or 24.7% more than in 2015. At the same time, Uzbekistan sent $2.741 billion, Tajikistan - $1.929 billion, Kyrgyzstan - $1.743 billion (see Appendix 1, figure 2).

Since early 2017, there has been a revival of economic activity in Russia. As a result, the flow of labour migrants from the countries of Central Asia, primarily from Uzbekistan, began to recover (their growth since the beginning of 2017 exceeded the previous year by 10% according to the data of the migration control bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation), as well as from Tajikistan. As of June 1, 2017, there were 1.92 million Uzbek citizens in the Russian Federation (for comparison, in the Republic of Korea there are currently about 16,500 Uzbek citizens), 1.06 million citizens of Tajikistan and 0.62 million citizens of Kyrgyzstan. In 2017, Moscow and the Moscow oblast, St. Petersburg and the Leningrad oblast, Krasnodar Krai, Sevastopol and the Republic of Crimea were the main centres of attraction of labour migrants from Central Asia. The flow of labour migration to Siberia (Siberian Federal District) and the Far Eastern Federal District have also begun to increase.

In the short and medium term, Central Asia expects an increase in the scope of external labour migration. The population of the region is relatively young. The average age of citizens of Central Asian countries is about 26 years old. Those able-bodied, from 15 to 64 will make up on average 65-67% of the population of Central Asia for the foreseeable future, which means maintaining the burden on the labour market in the long term.

According to the forecasts of the National Institute for Strategic Studies of Kyrgyzstan (NISI), the number of residents of Central Asia will reach 96 million people by the year 2050. That is an increase of 30 million people compared to the population in 2015. The population growth will be especially noticeable in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, the

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11 In Russia, an increase in migration from Central Asian countries was noted for the first time since the economic crisis (data by countries). Central Asian news service. 2017. March 17. - - http://ca-news.org.
12 Babaev: Russia is trying to move the flow of migrants from the center to the regions. Sputnik Uzbekistan. 2017. July 5. - http://ru.sputnik-uz.com
13 Andrey Zubov. What will Central Asia be in 30 years - a forecast. - https://365info.kz.
working-age population will increase in Uzbekistan by 6.4 million people, in Tajikistan by 2.8 million, in Turkey by almost one million, in Kyrgyzstan by 600,000. (see Appendix 1, Figure 3).

Even with the accelerated development of the economies of these states, there is not enough work for all able-bodied people there. The main flow of labour migrants from Central Asian countries will be focused, as it is now, on Russia. No other significant alternative labour market for migrants from Central Asia has emerged. The countries of the Middle East, where citizens of Central Asian countries have begun to travel in search of work in recent years, are now dangerous. Of those who went to work in Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries, then in Syria and Iraq, many found themselves in the ranks of the Islamic State and groups that profess the ideology of Al-Qaeda.15

It should be noted that labour migration to Russia for citizens from Central Asian countries is more attractive in comparison with other countries in terms of adaptation to living conditions and will remain mutually beneficial for the foreseeable future. Due to labour migrants, Russia is building up its labour market, primarily in places where local people do not particularly want to go, for various reasons, and the Central Asian countries solve the unemployment problems associated with their demographic situation and, consequently, the possible emergence of internal social and political problems.

Russia has learned lessons from the uncontrolled migration of the 1990s. Since the beginning of the 2000s, there have been vigorous efforts to develop and improve the migration legislation of the Russian Federation.16 It has become an integral part of domestic policy and complies with foreign policy interests and the country's values. The Eurasian integration project contains the most dynamic and consistent work in this regard. Significant progress has been made in codifying the labour and social norms and rights of labour migrants and members of their families through this system of diverse rules, norms, and laws regulating the work and living conditions of migrants in member countries. The achievement of a number of legislative and legal agreements between them contributed to the formation of a single policy on the hiring and dismissal of labour migrants, their medical support, social insurance, taxation, etc. Section XXIV "Labour migration" of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) reflects this.17

The introduction of a free procedure (not requiring permits) for attracting citizens of the EAEU member states to labour migration, according to which employers have the right to enter into employment contracts with them without considering the relevant restrictions on protecting the national labour market. According to the new rules, to terminate an employment contract, a labour migrant from the member-states of the EAEU only need submit to their employer the documents stipulated by the labour legislation of the state of employment, as well as documents confirming his or her legality to be in the given country. At the same time, if he gets a job in Russia, he is not required to pass an exam for knowledge of the Russian language, history, and legal structure of the Russian Federation. He is given the right to work not only under labour contracts but also under civil-law contracts, which considerably expands the fields of attainable employment. They pay the same income tax in Russia as Russian citizens. Additionally, the Treaty of the Eurasia Economic Union provides mutual recognition of the diplomas of citizens of member states. However, from Central Asian countries this applies only to Kyrgyzstan, which is a member of the EAEU.

17 Signed in Astana on May 29, 2015, with amendments and additions entered into force on February 12, 2017 - www.consultant.ru
Chapter 2.
OVERVIEW OF THE RESPONDENTS

Researchers from Uzbekistan interviewed 55 people during field research, including 10 women. The composition of respondents who differed in age, education, marital status, career, and regions of origin in Uzbekistan helped to significantly improve the quality of the research.

Of the total respondents, 15 were between the ages of 20-30, 13 between 30-40 years old, 6 between 40-45, 6 between 45-50, 3 between 50-55, 9 between 55-60, and 3 over the age of 60. (see Appendix 1, Figure 4).

By education: with higher and incomplete higher education - 33, secondary special - 11; secondary - 7. Approximately one third of respondents with higher (including incomplete higher education) had received Russian citizenship or have a residence permit (see Appendix 1, Figure 5).

The fields of work in Russia among the respondents are quite diverse (see Appendix 1, Figure 6). Those who have lived extensively in Russia and received citizenship, or a residence permit have made a successful career. This suggests that the citizens of Uzbekistan, especially those who received their education during Soviet times, are quite in demand in the labour market in Russia and can compete with Russian citizens.

During field research, representatives of the Kyrgyz Republic interviewed 91 people, including 15 women. Researchers from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan interviewed 5 additional Kyrgyz citizens. Thus, a total of 75 Kyrgyz citizens were surveyed, including 12 women. Their age representation was the following: 2 under the age of 20, 26 between the ages of 20-30, 9 between 30-40, 22 between 40-50, 11 between 50-60. (see Appendix 1, figure 7).

Of the total Kyrgyzstanis surveyed - 59 were ethnic Kyrgyz, 31 Uzbeks. Educational background: with higher and incomplete higher education - 24 people, secondary special - 1, secondary - 18, incomplete secondary - 1, religious - 1 (see Appendix 1, Figure 8).

Representatives of the Republic of Tajikistan (RT) interviewed 61 people, including 8 women. Researchers from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan interviewed an additional 6 Tajik citizens. Thus, the total number of Tajik citizens interviewed was 67, 9 of whom were women.

The ages of Tajik participants in the study are as follows: 1 under the age of twenty, 26 between 20 and 30 years old, 15 between 30-40, 9 between 40-45, 4 between 45-50, 5 between 50-55, 5 between 55-60, 1 over 60 years old (see Appendix 1, Figure 9).

Of the Tajik citizens interviewed, 64 were ethnic Tajiks, 3 Uzbeks. The level of education of respondents from Tajikistan was as follows: with higher and incomplete higher - 33, secondary special - 4, secondary - 29 (see Appendix 1, figure 10).

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18 Researchers from Uzbekistan also interviewed six citizens of Tajikistan, which will be included in the section on labour migration from that country.

19 Film director - 1, journalist - 1, education - 2, medicine - 1, construction - 7, hotel and restaurant sector - 3, service sector - 14, private entrepreneurship - 11, university education - 4, pensioner - 1.

20 Some have become quite famous in the Russian Federation in cinema, television, and show business. These do not generally communicate with labour migrants, but are interested in what is happening in their historical homeland.
The fields of work in Russia for respondents from Tajikistan were diverse\(^{21}\) (see Appendix 1, figure 11). However, the predominant sectors are construction, the service sector, and trade in the markets. Seasonal labour migrants work mostly in these industries. Those who have already been living extensively in Russia and received citizenship or residence have managed to find a good job and take up good positions. Generally, these are people who studied during the Soviet era and have the professional skills to compete in the labour market with Russian citizens. Tajiks who have received Russian citizenship also serve in the Russian army, including as officers, and positions of command staff in law enforcement agencies. In general, almost all the respondents from among migrant workers from Tajikistan noted that in Russia one can always find a job, and with a specialty - a well-paid job.

Thus, it can be stated that most of the respondents were young people aged 20 to 30, including those with higher or incomplete higher education. This suggests that the shortage of jobs at home causes the most active citizens, who have the necessary knowledge, to leave and seek work in Russia.

\(^{21}\) Engineering and technical staff - 2, education - 2, sports - 1, medicine - 2, construction - 6, hotel and restaurant sector - 1, service sector - 26, private entrepreneurship - 6, university education - 4, work in organizations of compatriots - 5, private security company - 1, prisoner - 1 (convicted of participation in terrorist activities).
Chapter 3.
CONDITIONS AND RESILIENCIES TO THE RADICALISATION OF LABOUR MIGRANTS FROM UZBEKISTAN

Study participants represented 10 regions of Uzbekistan (out of 14): Tashkent - 5 people.; Andijan Region - 10; Bukhara region - 3; The Jizzakh region - 2; Qashqadaryo region - 4; Namangan region - 1; Samarkand region - 3; Tashkent region - 1; Fergana region - 4; The Khorezm region - 2 (see Appendix 1, Figure 12).

Their marital status: married - 36 (5 of them women); unmarried - 11 (2 women); divorced: 1 man, 1 woman. Seasonal workers come to Russia alone, without their families.

As surveys show, labour migrants have certain preferences in choosing regions of Russia. Thus, according to the head of an Uzbek NGO in Irkutsk, many citizens of Uzbekistan travel to this region of the Russian Federation from Qashqadaryo region. According to a leader of the Uzbek diaspora in the Astrakhan region, about 65% of labour migrants in this region are residents of the Khorezm oblast. Many people from this region come to work in Novosibirsk. According to one of the leaders of the Uzbek "Union of Uzbekistan" diaspora from Khabarovsk, in the Far Eastern Federal District the number of people from the Samarkand region has recently increased due to the lack of work there.

Most labour migrants from Uzbekistan are seasonal workers, among whom there are people with higher and special secondary education (teachers, economists), but they are few. In recent years, most of the seasonal migrants who come to Russia, do not have high qualifications – mostly coming from rural areas. According to the leader of the Uzbek diaspora in Krasnoyarsk, the main flow of labour migrants to this city (about 80%) is made up of villagers whose main purpose in coming to Russia is to earn money to support their family. Seasonal labour migrants are primarily engaged in construction, service, trade (in markets), and agriculture.

There are also those among labour migrants who come to Russia because it seems more interesting to them than sitting at home in the remote areas of Uzbekistan. These are primarily youth. In addition, there is a noticeable historical and political inertia, within which Russia perceives migrants as part of the former USSR, where the borders between the republics were provisional. The surveys indicate that this circumstance allowing migrants from Uzbekistan to adapt more comfortably in Russia, and more quickly overcome the language barrier.

According to most respondents, it is easier to go to Russia for work than to Turkey or the Republic of (South) Korea. In Russia it is recommended to have $100 in an account or in cash upon arrival, in South Korea - $5,000, and you need to know English. In Russia, if migrants do not have the financial resources to pay for a patent, it is easier to borrow from compatriots, and then to pay them back over time. It is more difficult to do that in Korea. In Russia, even with all the complexities and bureaucratic delays, there are fewer costs and less paperwork for the preparation of the necessary permits.

According to labour migrants in Khabarovsk, they can make about $100 per month working at home. In Khabarovsk, a worker can send home an average of $400 per month.
Another respondent from Moscow where he works with his father and four brothers said that he sends a similar sum home to his family in Uzbekistan.

Most respondents listed the opportunity to find work and provide for their families among the main positive moments of their arrival in Russia. According to one of the foremen working in Moscow (higher education, at home he worked as an engineer), now most construction companies which employ migrants, (if they are not illegal and not temporary workers) have started to appreciate their work, professional skills, and reliability. Considering these qualities, managers take on their costs for legalization and even insurance. (A respondent from Moscow said, "It is easier and more reliable with migrants. They are unpretentious, and have learned to do their work. Many have found a profession here.") The leader of the Astrakhan "Cultural Centre of Uzbeks and Uzbekistan" confirms this. According to him, Uzbeks are respected for their work ethic and the fact that they "traditionally respect authority".

People who have lived in Khabarovsk and Irkutsk for a long time with their families are happy with the fact that their children could study in Russia. Similar occurrences, as the surveys indicate, are not uncommon and indicate a serious cultural and social adaptation of the main part of this "class" of labour migrants from Uzbekistan and other countries of Central Asia. The customs and culture of local peoples are perceived without the former alienation, are evaluated positively. In general, they strengthen tolerance and form an immunity against radicalisation.

According to most interviews, most of the labour migrants from Uzbekistan worry about Russia, condemn the sanctions of the West which cause them to receive less pay, perceive events in the Middle East as a concerted attack on the faithful Muslims, and Russia as their defender there.

All respondents, without exception, indicated that there is no religious persecution in the Russian Federation (according to respondents from Irkutsk and Moscow, "in this regard, there is freedom in Russia"). Almost all Imams interviewed, as well as their assistants and ordinary believers from among the migrant workers noted a real freedom of religious belief in the Russian Federation, sometimes more than in their homeland. Any instances of discomfort or incorrect actions of the authorities relate to the improper execution of laws locally. However, the surveys indicate that these are limited to isolated cases. Nevertheless, the reaction of the Russian authorities is positive and is aimed more at correcting the situation, including because local diaspora leaders maintain working contacts with law enforcement bodies and can resolve emerging problems.

As for the factors directly attracting a person to radical or extremist actions (individual vulnerabilities), among them, the respondents listed:

- The presence of extremist-minded individuals among migrants, most often religiously motivated. They become an effective tool for intermediating in the process of recruiting their compatriots. Especially often they are found among religiously-minded Uzbeks from Kyrgyzstan - from Osh or Jalalabad. Individual citizens of Uzbekistan fall under their influence.

- Incorrect behaviour on the part of certain officials of migration control bodies when processing documents and police officers in Russia when checking documents (as one of the leaders of a construction team (Moscow) noted, "...they wore us out with these endless inspections. The head of the firm did not manage to settle matters with law enforcement agencies before another raid was carried out during the heat of the working day. They do not look at permits. They say we will sort things out at the precinct. They load the migrants into buses with guns and the entire work day is lost. Basically, there is plenty of injustice.") According to another labour migrant (Samara), "Each raid ends in bribes. They will deport you if you do not pay a
bribe. Because of high fees, many do not get patents, but instead work in villages. You don't need a patent there. You can handle the issue with the local police officer”).

- Legalization in Russia and obtaining work patents has become very expensive (according to the estimates of most respondents, the cost of obtaining all necessary permits is equal to one or two months' earnings), while the attitude towards migrants has not improved. The time allotted for applying for all the required permits is short. Not everyone does it in time, thus becoming “illegals”.

Recruiters take these circumstances into account. They, like experienced psychologists, identify those who, for various reasons, have found themselves in a difficult financial position or a hopeless situation, and begin to purposefully and skilfully cultivate their victim. An analysis of the surveys (see Appendix 1, Figure 13) shows that recruiters primarily use material factors (this was noted by 55.3% of the total number of respondents). Next, the lack of religious upbringing and dire situations (18.4%), and finally, the desire for adventurism along with instability of the psyche and moral impairment (according to 7.9% of respondents). At the same time, unmarried youth under the age of 20 are at risk. For this reason, most of the team leaders interviewed try not to hire them onto their teams and they are sent home at the first signs of changes in behaviour.

Thus, traditional socialization (see Appendix 1, Histogram 1), which dominates in the homeland (family, kinship, mahalla, etc.) and forms the social and personal ethics of youth has transferred in a peculiar form to the environment of labour migrants in the Russian Federation (in the form of brigades, working groups, local and kinship communities). Social networks, with their behavioural norms, hierarchies, and rules of subordination have become a serious counterbalance for the young people involved in extremist and radical groups. At the same time, most local authorities (including law enforcement agencies) have tacitly assessed the benefits of a natural social organization within migrant brigades and are willing to contact their brigade leaders (sometimes through heads of diasporas), pointing out sources of danger and threats. Such use of the natural social organization has shown its own effectiveness and can be recommended for the continued improvement of nonviolent and effective methods for preventing the radicalisation of labour migrants. On the other hand, interviews indicated the vulnerability of the so-called "savage" workers (without family or brigade networks) arriving without formal invitations or the invite of relatives and close acquaintances, and are therefore excluded from established networks of migrants.

Among the factors enabling (Enabling Factors) the radicalisation of labour migrants, most respondents mentioned (see Appendix 1, histogram 2):

- Relatively free access to the Internet in Russia, in comparison with Uzbekistan. A significant number of the respondents believe that most cultivation of labour migrants is carried out through the Internet (most often using the messaging app Telegram). According to the surveys, recruiters' method starts with sending innocuous messages at first, which are used to gradually pull the victim into the network of recruiters. Some of the respondents noted that migrants receive links to Internet games with missions to destroy military equipment with Russian or United States insignia.

- Bad imams (a respondent from Astrakhan: "they do not think about the souls of people, but only think about money, bringing it up all the time") and religious extremists, both from among labour migrants and "Caucasians" (as respondents call all natives of the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation) who act as recruiters (a respondent from Astrakhan: in the Red Mosque young Caucasians, Tajiks or Uzbeks approach young and inexperienced kids and
offer good money, allegedly for work. But this is a lie. First, they will give 2-3 thousand dollars for a "warm-up", and then they say that "there" [in Syria] you will receive more, and they persuade you to go. Few people bite on it, but there were cases when young guys came across such manoeuvres”).

Interviewees indicated that most imams are conformist in the political sense and rather tolerant. However, among the imams, there are those who fail to control the situation in their mosques (it is possible that they are also interested, depending on their place and school of instruction). In other words, we must deal with the ideological program and messages, which they learned in foreign Islamic centres. These, as a rule, endorse "correct" Islam ("pure/purified Islam"), which corresponds to fundamentalist attitudes and encourages the transition of believers into extremist Jamaats. These imams have learned to play in the public space and adapt to local authorities and even to cooperate with them. This topic requires separate research.

- Little control over the private life and contacts of compatriots in Russia in comparison with Uzbekistan.

- The sense of injustice due to the inappropriate treatment of labour migrants by certain local officials and police officers (Diaspora leader from Astrakhan: "You cannot create enemies from those who are loyal to you"). There deceit of labour migrants by intermediaries, including their compatriots.

According to a respondent from Irkutsk, "everyone profits off labour migrants: migration authorities, police, medical institutions, those who take the examination on the knowledge of the Russian language, etc., organizations of compatriots", while he compared the "labour migrant with a harvester from which a pack of officials feeds".

Respondents in other regions mentioned this as well (a labour migrant from Moscow: "scammers, including from among their compatriots, are making businesses out of the problems of labour migrants." A labour migrant from Samara: "Mediators make money on migrants. Both Uzbeks and Tajiks are among them, as well as Russians").

According to another labour migrant from Moscow (a taxi driver) who has lived in the Russian capital extensively, "migrants should not be cornered by artificial barriers and obstacles both in legalization and in their basic rights. We need to respect their human dignity, not humiliate them with raids and treat them like prisoners in concentration camps ... in doing this, security officials delay not only assimilation, but also the regular adaptation of migrants and engender their internal hatred. After these raids and arrests, they become angry and take a long time to recover from this anger. Is it dangerous. Their tolerance is strong, but it shouldn't be tested constantly."

- Difficulties in obtaining legal support and protection from the diplomatic institutions of Uzbekistan in Russia (a respondent from Moscow: "The embassy cannot manage. It does not care for compatriots. Even if a person is arrested, [the embassy] does nothing. The "hot line" is busy both day and night. The impression is that they disconnect it on purpose. To diplomats, a migrant is just an ordinary labourer. You can't get consular services from them.").) and official communities of compatriots who profit off labour migrants. (A Moscow respondent: "The Congress of Uzbeks and Uzbekistanis does not support migrants, but "milks" them, earning money through legalization or consular services." A Respondent from St. Petersburg: "Such organizations, which profit off migrants, are geared toward business affairs"). A respondent from Samara: "They have turned helping migrants into a business");

- The level of education of most migrants is catastrophically low. According to most of the surveyed leaders of diasporas and work foremen, these become the first victims of any
recruiter. (A brigadier from Moscow "Those who studied in Soviet times are more or less literate, they can independently fill out some of the forms, take the Russian exam without preparation, and so on. Those who were educated after independence have a huge problem. Not just ignorance of the language, but overwhelming illiteracy. And it's not even that they are all writing in the Latin alphabet, although even that is with enormous mistakes. It seems that they are people who have never attended school. This creates problems for them, and for those Russian authorities who deal with them, for example, the migration authorities and the police."

A respondent from St. Petersburg (a student): "Compared with Russia, our education is weak". Mostly young and inexperienced people fall into extremist networks. It is easier to pitch them a line, especially since we have had a sharp decline in education, and they come here without knowing anything”).

Among the structural motivators - most respondents named (Table 1):

- Deception by employers (non-payment of wages).
- Competition with Tajik citizens for jobs (Samara, Novosibirsk).
- Unemployment in the homeland and the inability, within the established time frame, to obtain all necessary permits for legal job placement in Russia.
- Difficult living conditions.
- Western sanctions against Russia (in all regions of the Russian Federation, due to Western sanctions and the falling Rouble exchange rate, have begun to receive less pay, and, therefore are able to send less money home.

As a result, it is often necessary to work two or three jobs).

As factors which help a person counter and prevent radicalisation (resilience), most respondents brought up (see Appendix 1, Histogram 3):

- The presence of a good mentor in Russia (most often brigadiers, heads of some diaspora centres, and, to a lesser degree, imams - supporters of traditional Islam), who has influence over labour migrants and who can explain, in a language they understand, what is happening in the world, in Russia, at home, in the Muslim Ummah (community). Traditional social networks, customary in the homeland, in an environment of migrant workers in Russia have new forms, built on labour cells (brigades, squads, and other forms of work organization). Such social networks have proved to be successful forms of internal control and resistance to the desocialization of migrants, preventing their involvement in extremist Jamaats, etc.

- Work only with official labour contracts, avoidance of the process of applying for necessary permits with the help of intermediaries, who profit from the problems of labour migrants.

- Effective state and public control over employers to enforce compliance with labour contracts entered into with labour migrants.

- Good secular education, an understanding by labour migrants of Russian and the fundamentals of Russian migration legislation.

- Targeted information and explanatory work of local authorities in the field of labour migrants.
- Glasnost (transparency) and consistency in the fight against corruption in public authorities (a diaspora leader from Astrakhan: "I notice some distrust of migrants towards the authorities, fear toward them. But it is no substitute for respect of the authorities. As a result, migrants do not want to deal with the authorities and turn to intermediaries, including “black intermediaries”. This breeds corruption. The law must be respected, and we should not be afraid of those who enforce it. As a result, the government loses more, without realizing it").

- Integration of efforts of government bodies and civil society institutions with national diasporas in combating instances of xenophobia (labour migrants should know the basics of Russian history, traditions and customs of its peoples. Russian citizens in turn should receive regular information on the processes occurring in Uzbekistan, the state, problems, and prospects of bilateral cooperation).

  Based on interviews with labour migrants from Uzbekistan, we can conclude that the conditions for radicalisation do exist (see Appendix 1, histogram 4). This includes, among other things, shortcomings on the part of state authorities, both in Russia and Uzbekistan. At the same time, it cannot be said that this phenomenon is of a mass nature, motivating large numbers of migrant workers to leave the Middle East to join terrorists. Citizens of Uzbekistan who work in Russia are generally law-abiding and traditionally respect authorities.

  To eliminate the conditions for the emergence of radical sentiments, most respondents believe that labour migration from Uzbekistan to Russia must be streamlined and organized. The corresponding state structures of Uzbekistan should participate in this. It is necessary to unite the efforts of both states. This should begin at home, and above all, to raise the level of general education in Uzbekistan, particularly in villages. According to the observations of respondents from among the intellectual elite among migrants, it is weak secular education that often causes migrants to become involved in networks of radical communities, as it makes them susceptible to the ideology of extremists and radicals.

  To prepare migrant workers for work in Russia, it is necessary to involve the opportunities of the mahallah, the media, influential and competent ulema (theologians). Labour migrants should learn Russian, get acquainted with the requirements of the Russian migration legislation, a list of documents that they will need to prepare upon arrival in Russia in the time allotted for this purpose, and it is obligatory to have means for a patent, so as not to fall into debt bondage from the very first day. People, especially young people, should know that money must be earned by honest work. According to diaspora and association leaders, labour migrants, especially young people who do not yet have their own families, traveling to Russia for the first time, need to have explained to them what difficulties they may encounter, how to avoid being influenced by recruiters, where to seek help if they find themselves in a difficult situation. Immigrants should also learn prior to departure from home that in a foreign country they should respect the customs and traditions of the host country, and to comply with Russian laws. At the same time, migrants should see that in Russia their personal dignity is respected, that their national culture, religion and human rights are not encroached.

  It is desirable that diaspora and association leaders, who really hold influence over labour migrants work in close contact with local authorities and are members of public councils that function with law enforcement agencies. In several places, such a system of interaction exists and yields positive results.

  Almost all interviewed citizens of Uzbekistan highlighted simplified conditions for the legalization and placement of citizens of Kyrgyzstan in the Russian Federation. Most understand the reasons for such a situation, which was the result of the entry of Kyrgyzstan into the EAEU.
At the same time, migrants from Uzbekistan do not fully understand the complex political and other aspects of this process, although they naturally have become supporters of their country's entry into this form of economic relations with Russia. At the same time, they perceive changes in their own country mainly in the context of their own problems, which, they believe, should be solved by the new Uzbek President, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, whose rating among migrants is still quite high. Migrants are waiting for the creation of new jobs in Uzbekistan by authorities. At the same time, most respondents understand that due to the complicated demographic situation in the republic, this will not be possible in the foreseeable future.

Regarding the fight against terrorism, respondents believe that it is necessary to start with the fight against poverty and corruption in Russia and Uzbekistan, with creating jobs in their homeland, destroying the financial basis of recruitment, which organized criminal groups have turned into a lucrative business. It is necessary to severely punish the recruiters themselves and their accomplices.
Chapter 4.  
CONDITIONS AND RESILIENCE TO THE RADICALISATION OF LABOUR MIGRANTS FROM KYRGYZSTAN

Those polled represented all regions of Kyrgyzstan: Bishkek - 6 people, Batken oblast - 2, Osh - 45, Talas - 5, Chui - 3, Jalalabad - 14, Naryn - 4, Issyk-kul oblast - 4 people. One ethnic Kyrgyz - from GBAO Tajikistan (see Appendix 1, figure 14). Most respondents were southerners. This trend has developed since the very beginning of labour migration.

It should be noted that Russia is home to the largest Kyrgyz community in the world, outside of Kyrgyzstan. Their fields of work in Russia are quite diverse. The first to come to Russia were those who were engaged in agriculture. When that industry declined labourers came. After the two revolutions, members of the intelligentsia; doctors, teachers, and scientists began to arrive. Government officials have also started to come, in recent years. Kyrgyz migrants work mainly in the service sector and in construction. Since the beginning of mass labour migration from Kyrgyzstan to Russia, about 10% of Kyrgyz from the total number of migrants are firmly on their feet and earn well.

Most labour migrants come to Russia primarily because of the lack of employment at home. They mainly stay in Russia to earn money to sustain their families, as well as parents, younger brothers and sisters, and sick relatives.

The entry of Kyrgyzstan into the EAEU significantly simplified the employment and life of labour migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic in Russia compared to citizens of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Effective January 1, 2015, the Russian migration legislation was amended. All foreign citizens are now required to obtain a work permit or a patent within 30 days after entry into the Russian Federation. However, this does not apply to labour migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic. To stay in Russia, they only need an employment contract between the employer and the citizen of Kyrgyzstan, which determines the time of his stay in Russia. When applying for a job, they do not need to take Russian language, history, and law exams. Kyrgyz people are no longer considered "migrants". They have the same rights in labour relations as Russian citizens. Labour organizations of Russia no longer fear fines for hiring Kyrgyz workers without the necessary documents (respondents in almost all cities note that they are hired for work just like Russian citizens, children can be enrolled in preschools, schools, Universities, and secondary specialized educational institutions).

A citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic has the full right to apply for a job in the specialty which is indicated on his diploma. The exception is only the pedagogical, legal, and medical practices, which require licensing. He has the right to own, use, control, and protect his property. He also has the right, on equal footing with citizens of the Russian Federation, to join

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professional associations. Kyrgyz citizens receive social security and insurance in the same manner and under the same conditions as Russians, except for pension.

Soon, within the framework of the EAEU, the issue of pension provision will be resolved, to the benefit of citizens of all member states of this organization. This was discussed on August 14, 2017 in Astana at a meeting of the Eurasian intergovernmental council. Now, the draft pension agreement is under approval. After its entry into force, citizens will have the opportunity to work in any country of the Eurasian Economic Union without loss of tenure or pension for the period of employment in another state.23

It is noteworthy that, according to many respondents, at home they did not understand why Kyrgyzstan had to join the EAEU. Only when they arrived in Russia did they understand the advantages that this gives to simple people.

Many of the respondents are now Russian citizens. Some of those who do not have citizenship said they will think about how to connect their life to Russia in the long term. However, there are also those who intend to return home (a respondent from Yekaterinburg: "we are going to live 2 to 3 years in Russia to earn money for a house and maybe a used car"). A respondent from Krasnoyarsk (a graduate of Osh University): "I could not get a job at home. In Russia, I want to save up for marriage and livestock to continue my farm in Kyrgyzstan"). According to the estimation of staff at the Kyrgyz consulate in Novosibirsk, after the entry of Kyrgyzstan into the EAEU, the tendency to obtain Russian citizenship has somewhat decreased ("citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic now have almost the same rights as Russians").

Kyrgyz people note the opportunity to find work as a positive aspect of life in Russia. According to a respondent from Moscow, who works in the shopping centre as a sales manager for office equipment, there are more opportunities in the Russian Federation than at home. A different level of salary. Specialists, such as doctors, are in high demand. A respondent from Moscow, a doctor, a candidate of medical sciences works in a regional out-patient department and can also work a second job. His wife is also a doctor, works in her specialty. Both note that work collectives in Russia are international, which is why there are no "eastern schemes" inherent for the countries of Central Asia. In Russia, the conditions for work and study are much better, infrastructure is better developed, and free access to information is better.

Respondents in Khabarovsk and Novosibirsk who have lived in Russia for a long time and obtained citizenship noted that their children received good education in Russian universities and were able to find well-paid work, according to their valuation. Respondents in Samara and Khabarovsk believe that Russia has more order than Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyz, unlike Uzbeks and Tajiks, are much more relaxed and tolerant about religion. There are those, especially along the more educated, who do not care about religion. Some consider themselves atheists altogether. According to most Kyrgyz respondents, religious leaders and mosques do not play any role in radicalisation.

The Kyrgyz have respect for those who can really help those who are weaker; solve problems with local authorities, police, and criminal groups.

They obtain information from all available sources. First and foremost, they are interested in what is happening in the homeland. And those who have received Russian citizenship follow economic news which primarily affects the interests of labour migrants, particularly, the Rouble exchange rate against the Dollar and the Euro. Usually, they condemn Western sanctions against

the Russian Federation, believing that ordinary people suffer from them the most. They condemn US policy in the Middle East. They support Russia's policy in Syria, believing that "ours" (a respondent from Samara, 25, a student of the Kyrgyz National University, a citizen of the KR, by ours, means Russia) are helping the Syrians destroy ISIL." They condemn public murders of people in Syria and Iraq. They are convinced that these atrocities have nothing to do with Islam. They regard this as the deliberate discrediting of Islam, the pitting of some Muslims against others for mutual destruction. They believe that you should not show violence on television.

Kyrgyz citizens who are ethnic Kyrgyz condemn the explosion in the St. Petersburg metro, which was performed by an ethnic Uzbek from Osh, believing that it cast a shadow on all Kyrgyz people.

Kyrgyzstan's ethnic Uzbek citizens keep to themselves. They do not take part in events organized by public organizations of Kyrgyzstan, which function in Russia. Some of them are trying to connect with citizens of Uzbekistan. However, Uzbeks from Kyrgyzstan do not particularly accept the latter, according to one of the leaders of the "Union of Kyrgyzstan" from Khabarovsk, a native of Osh.

A respondent from Krasnodar (the head of a construction brigade) noted that Kyrgyz citizens deported from Russia for violating migration legislation or for other reasons are forced to return home. Once on the "black list" to enter Russia, they moved from Kyrgyzstan to work in Turkey, where some of them later went to Syria.

The factors that attract a person to radical or extremist actions (individual vulnerabilities), most commonly referenced are:

- The social stratification of the Kyrgyz society into rich and poor, the rich not being held accountable for violating laws (a respondent from Khabarovsk "all should be equal before the law").

- Radicalisation (see Appendix 1, Histogram 5) of Kyrgyz citizens takes place chiefly among Uzbeks, mostly young people, in their home country (a respondent arriving in Russia from Osh region, ethnic Kyrgyz, higher education, 24 years old: "It is necessary to separate the Uzbek youth from radical preachers, to enthral them with something more useful, rather than walking into questionable mosques." One of the leaders of the Kyrgyz diaspora in Khabarovsk (a native of Osh) believes that the radicalisation of views begins at home. According to him, mostly Osh Uzbeks leave [to Syria], who have found themselves in a situation where they became strangers to Uzbekistan and their homeland - Kyrgyzstan.

- Actions of fraudsters, including from among compatriots who profit on the problems of labour migrants (a respondent from Krasnodar).

- The feeling of loneliness in large cities, where it is difficult for labour migrants to communicate with each other due to many objective reasons (busy schedule, long commutes). At the same time, most respondents noted that the Kyrgyz are more independent (see Appendix 1, Histogram 6). Unlike Uzbeks and Tajiks, they do not seek to live in Russia as a mahalla community and to communicate closely with their compatriots (a respondent from Ekaterinburg: "Communication is mostly limited to a circle of fellow countrymen and relatives").

Respondents mentioned the following (see Appendix 1, histogram 7) factors enabling radicalisation (enabling factors):

- Impossibility of finding work in the homeland.

- Illiterate imams who do not have a classical religious education (a respondent of Khabarovsk: "A local imam talks about the right things, but he's weak, ... asking for money all
the time"), or they studied abroad, where they themselves came under the influence of radical ideas.

- Freedom of actions in Kyrgyzstan of religious extremists a respondent from Khabarovsk: "In Russia, they are strict with such people. They are immediately detained by the police").

- Corruption in Kyrgyzstan and the misuse of money in the republic.

- The absence of a permanent source of income and accepting employment without an employment contract, because of which people in the beginning fall into debt bondage, and then they are recruited by recruiters (respondents from Irkutsk, Yekaterinburg, Krasnodar).

- Religious illiteracy.

- Lack of education, specialty and ignorance of the Russian language (respondents from Moscow, Yekaterinburg, Khabarovsk, Krasnodar).

- The struggle between the diasporas from the countries of Central Asia for profitable work and financial flows (a respondent from Samara).

- Division into northerners and southerners, determining who they are and what clan they come from (a respondent from Khabarovsk, 49 years old; a respondent from Khabarovsk, 53 years old; a resident of Krasnodar, 47 years old; a respondent from Krasnodar).

- Latent discrimination in Russia based on ethnicity (respondents from Moscow, Yekaterinburg, Krasnodar) and the continuing tension between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks (respondents from Ekaterinburg, Moscow, Samara, Khabarovsk, Krasnodar).

As a respondent from Khabarovsk noted, these factors are skilfully used by recruiters. Usually they start small - first they give money to a person in need, so that they have something to send home. Then, once a person has become dependent, they begin to dictate conditions to him, turning him gradually into a submissive performer.

The following were named among the common factors and phenomena (structural motivators) contributing to the marginalization of individuals (Table 2):

- The unwillingness of individual labour migrants, especially young people, to comply with the laws of Russia (a representative of the leadership of the Kyrgyz diaspora in Irkutsk: "Russia's migration legislation meets the current requirements for ensuring the national interests and security of the Russian Federation." The problems arise because migrant workers do not want to comply with it.... They try to get around the laws, offering bribes someplace in matters of registration, stay, or employment. They think that they will be able to circumvent laws by paying bribes or go without documents at all." A representative of the leadership of the Kyrgyz diaspora in Khabarovsk: "We Kyrgyz have the worst feature - failure to comply with the laws within set deadlines." A respondent from Krasnoyarsk: "In Kyrgyzstan, interference of religiously minded individuals into affairs and life is common. In Russia, this will not work").

- Absence of a clear state social and economic policy, acute social and economic problems in Kyrgyzstan itself (a respondent from Moscow: "Thus, the state itself creates a
target audience for recruiters". A respondent from Khabarovsk: "There are no good politicians in Kyrgyzstan, they have stopped paying attention to the people"). However, according to most respondents, young people are the most vulnerable group. Kyrgyz respondents believe that this applies primarily to Kyrgyz citizens from among the Uzbeks who come from the Osh region. Many respondents stated that it was they who joined the ranks of terrorist groups in Syria which share the ideology of Al-Qaeda (a respondent from Samara: "We have three young Uzbeks from Osh who left for Syria. They all died there." A respondent from Krasnoyarsk: "Two years ago a young Uzbek from Osh left for Syria"). Uzbeks themselves acted as the recruiters in this case. Some of the recruits believed they were going to work in Russia, but in fact ended up in Syria. Turkey was named as the main transit country to Syria (Consul of the Kyrgyz Republic in Yekaterinburg: "In 2016, in Ekaterinburg, seven members of a group belonging to ISIL were arrested and preparing for terrorist attacks. Along others, it included Kyrgyz citizens from among the Uzbeks. ... The recruiter came from Turkey and was their compatriot").

At the same time, a native of Chui oblast (a respondent from Samara, 25 years old) cited the example that not only Uzbeks but also Kyrgyz people go to the ranks of ISIL and Al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq, including directly from the republic itself ("they went to Syria and died there").

- The traditions of the Kyrgyz are being destroyed (the former respect for the elders and parents is eroding. Young people are eager to make money quickly by any means, even illegally).

- Kyrgyz citizens from among the Uzbeks keep their distance, reluctant to contact even representatives of diplomatic institutions of the Kyrgyz Republic (consuls of the KR in Novosibirsk and Yekaterinburg, activist of the Kyrgyz diaspora in St. Petersburg). They are more eager to contact Uzbeks from Uzbekistan (a respondent from Samara).

As noted by focus group participants in Krasnoyarsk (seven participants), the psychology of Kyrgyz citizens in the absence of state ideology or national idea, is changing rapidly under the influence of radical preachers. In their opinion, soon it will be possible to refer to Kyrgyzstan as a Muslim state with the rules of the Middle Ages.

According to respondents, the main motives of recruitment (see Appendix 1, Figure 15), both in Russia and Kyrgyzstan, are: material factors (so say 65% of all respondents), targeted treatment and deception as well as predicament and despondency (13.3%), religious motives and religious illiteracy (6.6%), propensity for adventurism and violence against others (1.6% of respondents).

According to respondents, the peak of the exit to Syria was in 2014-2015. After the beginning of the operation of the Russian military, the flow of those wishing to fight in the ranks of terrorists fell sharply (respondents from Irkutsk and St. Petersburg).

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Among the factors that help a person to resist and prevent radicalisation (resilience - R), the following were most often mentioned (see Appendix 1, Histogram 8):

- Russian citizenship.
- A good leader who helps the labour migrants, especially those who have come to Russia for the first time, to adapt to the conditions of life, to find work and solve problems at first (respondents from Moscow).
- Having education and a specialty, as well as knowledge of the Russian language, to find a well-paid job. As a respondent from Moscow said, his good Russian language allowed him to quickly join the team and feel confident both at work and elsewhere.
- Coordination of the work of Diaspora leaders with local authorities and law enforcement agencies.
- Knowledge of migratory legislation of the Russian Federation by labour migrants.
- Prohibition of the activity of mosques in Kyrgyzstan in which violence is promoted.
- Creation of jobs in Kyrgyzstan, so people could live and work in their homeland (respondents from Ekaterinburg).
- Informing diasporas about the circumstances of the deaths of immigrants from the countries of Central Asia in Syria and Iraq.

As noted by many respondents (Moscow, Yekaterinburg, Samara, Astrakhan), the socioeconomic factor plays a major role in preventing the radicalisation of labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan. Many left their homeland for economic reasons.

There are those who, having obtained Russian citizenship and, though they are already quite well settled, yearn for their homeland and would return to Kyrgyzstan, but only on condition that life would improve there, as in Russia. As one of the respondents in Astrakhan who received Russian citizenship in 2009 and is generally happy with life in Russia noted, "we think eventually to move to Kyrgyzstan. The Motherland is still the Motherland." There are many people who would return home, but with one obligatory condition - that there is work in Kyrgyzstan and a person could earn as well as he earns in Russia.
Chapter 5.
CONDITIONS AND RESILIENCY OF THE RADICALISATION
OF LABOUR MIGRANTS FROM TAJIKISTAN

The marital status of respondents: married - 48 people; single (unmarried) - 15 people; divorced - 1, widow - 2. Seasonal workers come to Russia alone, without families.

The respondents represented all regions of Tajikistan: Dushanbe - 9 people, Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region - 7, Sughd Province - 12, Khatlon Region - 11, Districts of Republican Subordination - 21 people. (see Appendix 1, Figure 16).

For the clear majority of labour migrants, the main reason for coming to Russia is the lack of work or low wages at home. The main purpose of being in Russia is earnings with which they sustain their families, as well as parents, younger brothers and sisters, sick relatives (a respondent working at a construction site in the Moscow region: "I have been working in Russia for 8 years. I support my wife and two children, parents, brother's family and younger sister. Two years ago, in Russia, I bought a used "Volkswagen-Passat" and together with four other fellow countrymen who also bought used cars, drove to Tajikistan. Now I'm saving money for my sister's wedding." A respondent from Irkutsk: "Compared with Tajikistan, Russia has good wages. You can support yourself and send money home." A respondent from Krasnoyarsk: "If you have a specialty and education, you can find a good job. Sometimes the salary is small, but they pay steadily. I also support my family in Tajikistan").

Some of the respondents said that they are generally satisfied with life in Russia and they would like to obtain Russian citizenship. Respondents in Khabarovsk and Novosibirsk, who had come to Russia long ago and have since received citizenship noted that their children received a good education in Russian universities and were able to find well-paid work, according to their valuation.

Their fields of work in Russia are quite diverse24 (see Appendix 1, Figure 17). The most prevalent are construction, services, and trade in markets, where seasonal labour migrants are most often employed. Those who have long lived in Russia and obtained citizenship or a residence permit, have managed to find decent work. As a rule, those who received education during the Soviet Union and are capable professionals can compete in the labour market with Russian citizens. Tajiks who have received Russian citizenship also serve in the Russian army, including as officers, and in law enforcement agencies. In general, almost all respondents from among migrant workers from Tajikistan noted that in Russia one can always find a job, and if you have a specialty - a well-paid one.

Labour migrants from Tajikistan are more interested in the economic issues affecting their lives, cooperation with Russia in terms of improving the situation of Tajik citizens in Russia

24 Engineering and technical staff - 2, education - 2, sports - 1, medicine - 2, construction - 6, hotel and restaurant sector - 1, service sector - 26, private entrepreneurship - 6, higher (university) education - 4, work in organizations of compatriots - 5, private security company - 1, prisoner - 1 (convicted of participation in terrorist activities).
and finding employment, and the situation at home. They closely follow all summits within the CIS looking to see what they will get out of agreements made there, as well as changes in the exchange rate of the Rouble, Dollar, and Somoni. They believe that Western sanctions against Russia are painfully hitting labour migrants (respondents from Khabarovsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Moscow: "There is less work, and because of the fall in the Rouble exchange rate, wages are decreasing in terms of Dollars"). They envy the citizens of Kyrgyzstan, who, according to the Tajiks, are given huge employment opportunities in Russia within the framework of the EAEU.

As for events in Syria and Iraq, as well as in the Middle East generally, the clear majority of respondents believe that there is a purposeful war of interested Western countries and their allies from the countries in the region to destroy Muslims for the sake of achieving their geopolitical interests in this region of the world with rich reserves of energy resources. To this end, they pit Sunnis against Shiites, so that they kill each other and thus free up the territories for others. In their opinion, those who commit the murders of Muslims and call themselves defenders of Islam, are not really defenders of Islam. Violence and Islam are incompatible.

Labour migrants obtain information from interpersonal communication (see Appendix 1, Histogram 9) (in labour collectives, at the market, during visits to the mosque, on holiday with relatives and friends, at weddings), the Internet, electronic and print media, and social networks. The latter are actively used by young people, who create a network of like-minded people more often based on kinship or compatriotism. Almost all migrants note that in this respect it is much easier in Russia than at home.

Among the individual vulnerabilities (Individual Incentives – II), which include factors that attract people to radical or extremist actions, most respondents named (see Appendix 1, Histogram 10):

- The aspirations of individuals (respondents from Khabarovsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Moscow), especially young people, as well as those who have just arrived from Tajikistan, to earn money in an unjust way, including through violence against others, and to impose their own vision of Islam and call to unconstitutional actions, both in Russia and in Tajikistan.

- Skilful use of dissatisfied radical preachers, including among Tajiks who have studied abroad in private Islamic schools.

- Aggressive propaganda of violence through the Internet under the guise of protecting Islam and Muslims.

The most problematic group is, according to respondents, young people under the age of 20, who do not have families, with a low general education, without professional skills, who do not know Russian well. Such people most often bring discord to the migrant communities and respond more easily to the persuasion of recruiters.

According to respondents, the main motives for recruitment, not only in Russia but also in Tajikistan are: financial motives (noted by 60.8% of the total number of respondents), religious reasons (25.3%), hopeless situations (7.6%), adventurism and a predisposition to violence (3.7% of respondents) (Figure 18).

Among the organizers of the recruitment, respondents listed: people from the North Caucasus and, in one case, Dungans (a respondent from Samara), and Tajiks do the direct work of recruiting. According to the majority, recruiters are paid for each person they bring in. For them, this is a business, a form of human trafficking. At the same time, all respondents said that they had only heard about all this (rather than having first-hand experience).

Respondents named the following factors enabling radicalisation (Enabling Factors) (see Appendix 1, Histogram 11):
- The presence in Russia of citizens of Tajikistan, who have come under the influence of radicals (a respondent from Moscow "After the terrorist attack in the subway, they prayed not for the souls of the victims, but for the terrorist, calling him a Shakhid." A respondent from Irkutsk: "Salafism preaching is used by recruiters as a lure for those who are dissatisfied with their position").

- The lack of basic knowledge of the youth about Islam, because of which they fall under the influence of radical preachers.

- Difficulties in the registration of documents, especially accompanied by ignorance of Russian and a lack of relatives who live in Russia and are capable of rendering help accordingly.

- Failures at work, debts.

- The prejudiced attitude of individual employees of migration authorities and police to labour migrants (a respondent from Samara).

- Cheating by some employers (a respondent from Irkutsk: "They may not pay at the end of the job and it turns out that a person worked for nothing for a whole month").

The main structural motivators leading to marginalization are (Table 3):

- Unemployment, low wages, social stratification and inequality in Tajikistan.

- Low general education and ignorance of the Russian language.

- Violation by some young people of the rules of conduct in Russia, which they would not dare to do at home (respondents in almost all regions where the surveys were conducted: "Disrespect of the elders, riotous way of life, the desire to earn quickly, even without giving much thought about the possible legal consequences").

- The State not taking responsibility for its citizens, who are left alone with the problems that have fallen on them.

- Ignorance by the labour migrants of the fundamentals of the migration legislation of the Russian Federation, because of which they do not apply for the necessary permits for staying in Russia and working for a fixed term on time (respondents from Irkutsk, Moscow, Samara).

- Dependent attitudes (a respondent from Moscow: "There are labour migrants who think that the Russian authorities should loosen the requirements when issuing the necessary permits").

- Competition within labour migrant communities, including among the Tajiks, for well-paid work.

- Mistrust in several places of labour migrants (a respondent from Krasnoyarsk).

- The presence of intermediaries among the citizens of Central Asia, including Tajikistan, who profit off labour migrants while filling out permit applications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Motivators</th>
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<th>Low general education and ignorance of the Russian language</th>
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Table 3. Structural Motivators According to Respondents from Tajikistan
In general, as analysis of the conducted surveys shows, this process begins in Tajikistan.\textsuperscript{25}

The main reason for radicalisation is that it is impossible to protect one's rights by the ways adopted in the Republic of Tajikistan in conditions of growing social tension and inadequate state policy. Overall, radicalisation in the republic covers certain social groups and has a social protest character.

Among the factors that help migrant workers to resist and prevent radicalisation (resilience), the overwhelming majority named (see Appendix 1, Histogram 12):

- Tajiks organize themselves into communities, headed by an authoritative leader based on kinship or shared home community (\textit{a seller on the market in Khabarovsk:} "Migrants gather in groups based on kinship or community and choose a leader who solves problems with local authorities". \textit{A seller on the market in Irkutsk:} "Migrants from every region of Tajikistan here have created their communities and have their leaders who find work and solve all organizational issues.").

- The presence of compatriots who have received Russian citizenship, who are, in their opinion, successful in Russia (businessmen, doctors, teachers, lawyers), and are able to protect the rights of labour migrants and help those who are in a difficult situation (more often this is a business owner). Such people, according to most respondents (Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Moscow), have the greatest influence. Senior relatives who have been living in Russia for a long time, who have Russian citizenship and know Russian laws are also considered to be influential.

- Competently issued permits through official structures (\textit{a respondent from Khabarovsk:} "When all the documentation is in order, you can work freely and there will not be any problems").

- Compliance with Russian legislation, respect for the culture, customs and traditions of the host country (\textit{respondents from Moscow, Novosibirsk}).

- Responsibility for a family, the realization that your wife and children, as well as elderly parents rely primarily on you and no one else in this life will help them but you (\textit{a respondent from Moscow}).

Respondents (\textit{a leader of the association of labour migrants from the Gorno-Badakhshan region in Khabarovsk, a representative of the migration mission in Irkutsk, a leader of Tajik students in Krasnoyarsk, a business owner in Novosibirsk}) note that, from their contacts with fellow countrymen, they knew of instances of recruiting Tajiks from among migrant workers to the ranks of IS and Al-Qaeda, not only in Russia, but also in Tajikistan itself. Most often, they say this took place in 2014-2015. The main transit point was Turkey.

\textit{A respondent from Moscow} reported that his brother left for Syria via Turkey in 2015. He died there in 2016. As the respondent believes, his brother found himself on the radar of recruiters through the Internet in Tajikistan. Another \textit{respondent from Moscow} admitted that one of his sons (\textit{a native of Khatlon region}) was recruited and left for Syria join IS. Who and how he was recruited - he does not know (or did not want to say). He did not want for anything, went to the gym, where he communicated with people from the North Caucasus, as well as Kyrgyz and Uzbek. The fate of his son is unknown to him.

Similarly, not wanting for anything, a well-known athlete, a member of the Russian national wrestling team, Suleiman, left Novosibirsk for Syria.

Initially, the recruits went to Russia under the guise of labour migrants. It is much easier to leave from the Russian Federation to Turkey (see Appendix 1, Figure 19) on a tourist visa, since Russian law enforcement authorities have no right to detain such travellers without probable cause.

Recruiters are usually Tajiks trained in Islamic schools in the Arab countries and Pakistan, and carrying out their destructive activities in their homeland, in Russia, and via the Internet from abroad (respondents from Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Moscow). Those labour migrants who have relatives who have left for Syria believe that the recruiters are good psychologists. They manage to find the weak points of their potential recruits, gradually and inconspicuously drawing the victim into the virtual world, from which there is often no way out.

According to the common opinion of almost all respondents, beginning on September 30, 2015, the military operations of Russia in Syria, as well as frequent reports of the deaths of Tajiks there and the active preventive work of the authorities of the Russian Federation and Tajikistan in the field, Islamic theologians, and the public, the number of people wishing to travel to the Middle East has begun to decline sharply. Now, as a seller at the Khabarovsk market noted, most Tajiks have a real idea of what is happening in Syria and Iraq and believe that this has nothing to do with religion. Respondents from Krasnoyarsk, Novosibirsk, Moscow, and Astrakhan noted that the Tajik community sympathizes with the families of those who left for the Middle East and died there in a war that was alien to them. Relatives and loved ones were left without a breadwinner, which further worsened their economic and social positions.

A respondent from Irkutsk said that he knew that Tajiks joined the ranks of extremists in 2015, while still in Tajikistan. During his time working in Russia, he says, he allegedly has not come across such instances.

In general, respondents – both citizens of Tajikistan and Tajiks who have received Russian citizenship - were more open during interviews than labour migrants from Uzbekistan. At least five named specific instances of recruitment of relatives and their departure (or attempts to leave) to Syria and Iraq.

Labour migrants from Tajikistan believe that Russia is, and at least for the foreseeable future, will remain the only country where Tajiks find stable jobs and where they protect their rights within the framework of Russian legislation. Also, if you have a specialty and knowledge of the Russian language, you can get a permanent job and earn a stable income. At the same time, there is less corruption in Russia, more freedom of speech, no need to pay bribes to get a good job.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We can highlight the following among the general factors contributing to the radicalisation of labour migrants:

**Structural Motivators:**
- Lack of adequate employment at home;
- Unwillingness of individual labour migrants, especially young people, to comply with Russian legislation, having dependent attitudes;
- Competition between migrants for jobs in Russia.

**Enabling factors:**
- Low educational levels among young people coming to Russia in search of work, as well as ignorance of the Russian language;
- Illiterate imams who do not have suitable education and are not in control of the situation in their mosques;
- Misguided attitude towards migrants from certain local officials and police officers.

**Individual vulnerability:**
- The presence among migrants of extremist-inclined and religiously motivated individuals;
- Weak control by the youth's elders (elders of the diasporas);
- The activities of grifters, including fellow countrymen, who earn money by intermediating to "solve" the problems of labour migrants.

**Resilience:**
- The presence of a mentor who takes care of newly arrived migrants and can integrate them into the Russian reality;
- Having a good education, specialties, and knowledge of the Russian language;
- The effective work of national diaspora centres;
- Having a family.

Labour migration from Central Asian countries to Russia is mutually beneficial, at least for the foreseeable future. It allows Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to solve serious unemployment problems related to the worsening demographic situation and the inability to provide all its citizens with employment, which helps to reduce the severity of domestic social and economic problems. Russia uses labour migrants to build up its labour market.

The overwhelming majority of labour migrants from Central Asian countries came to Russia to make money and solve the financial problems of their families, relatives, and friends. In most cases, they are men. A significant number of labour migrants note that it is always possible to find a job in Russia which, even if it does not pay well, allows you to receive a stable salary. If you know Russian and have a specialty, you can get a well-paid job. Some labour migrants use their time in Russia to learn a specialty, including those in high demand from employers.

Many migrants come to Russia for seasonal work. Some of them plan to stay in Russia permanently. More Kyrgyz and Tajiks express the desire to obtain Russian citizenship, along with, to a lesser extent, some Uzbeks.
Most of the migrants who gain Russian citizenship successfully integrate into their new environment. Their children receive a good education and the opportunity to climb social ladders. However, there are also those who prefer to live their lives communicating primarily with people in their own circle. These are a minority. This model of behaviour requires a separate study on how to reduce the risk of repeating the migration mistakes of EU countries, where third and fourth generation children of migrants, including those from well-off families, are beginning to subscribe to radical views.

Labour migrants from the countries of Central Asia are industrious and independent. Qualities like arrogance and selfishness are uncharacteristic for them. Employers appreciate this about them.

According to migrant workers themselves, there is less corruption in Russia, more freedom of speech, you do not need to pay bribes to get a good job, there are no religious persecutions. The main requirement is not to violate local laws.

Tajik respondents, including both labour migrants and those with Russian citizenship, were more open during interviews than labour migrants from Uzbekistan.

The Kyrgyz are generally much more relaxed and tolerant about religion compared to the Uzbeks and Tajiks. There are those, especially with higher education, who are not interested in religion. Some consider themselves atheists altogether. Most Kyrgyz respondents say that religious leaders and mosques play no role in radicalisation. At the same time, they believe that the religious factor plays a role in the Uzbek environment of the South of the country.

Education levels of people from Central Asia decreases each year. The number of those who speak Russian is reduced to those who adapt to a new society without much difficulty.

Most labour migrants learn about the news from the electronic media and the Internet. Relatives and compatriots create communities on social networks.

The processes of radicalisation taking place in the modern world and often leading to large-scale armed clashes that have developed into civil wars in several countries of the Middle East, have also affected labour migrants from Central Asia. This process is complex and is many objective and subjective factors influence its formation. However, the radicalisation of labour migrants from the countries of Central Asia in Russia is not happening on a large scale. At the same time, this topic is often the subject of speculation, and sometimes of explicit pressure on CIS countries by forces pursuing specific political goals in the struggle for power, most often in the pre-election period in a country or in an attempt to slow down the integration processes developing in the post-Soviet space.

There is no unequivocal answer to the question of where the radicalisation of labour migrants from Central Asian countries takes place. Judging by the results of this study, the conditions for radicalisation are laid in the homeland of labour migrants. The most vulnerable group is young people under the age of 20, not burdened by families, with a low level of general and religious education, striving to have everything now and all at once without giving much thought to moral norms and principles. These most often become the objects of recruitment.

The main reasons for radicalisation are: poverty, social stratification, and the inability to find a job at home which allows for sustaining a family. This is enabled by: the state's refusal from its social function, the drop in the level of general education; the emergence of socio-cultural barriers within formerly collective countries, and the destructive activity of religious groups whose preachers profess radical views. This is most evident in Kyrgyzstan, primarily in the South, as well as in Tajikistan.
Involvement in extremist and terrorist groups relates to the peculiarities of the evolution of the religious situation, the persistent instability and uncertainty of the religious policy of the states of Central Asia.

During interviews, the respondents repeatedly noted that "Caucasians" are the organizers of the recruitment, while their compatriots [fellow Central Asians] most often perform the work directly. The mechanism and methods of recruitment, the forces and means involved, the financial component, the connection with the special services and organized crime, which have transformed supplying volunteers to terrorist organizations into a lucrative business, require a separate, comprehensive study.

As for the more rapid adaptation of labour migrants to the new conditions of life in Russia, it is necessary to take several measures in the countries of Central Asia. First, to organize courses on the study of the Russian language. Ignorance of the language leads to the fact that labour migrants cannot assert their rights when meeting with the police, correctly draw up permit documents and workplace relations with the employer, communicate in Russian society, and it is difficult for their children to communicate with their Russian peers, attend preschool and educational institutions.

At these courses, future migrant workers should study the basics of Russia's migration legislation, the procedure and rules for applying for permits. Their ignorance forces migrant workers to turn to various "black intermediaries", who defraud them and profit off their problems. As a result, those defrauded either become illegal immigrants, or, if detained with false documents, are deported and subsequently banned from visiting Russia for a certain period.

Labour migration to Russia should be streamlined. Relevant Central Asian state agencies should play an active role in this, and should work in close cooperation with federal and regional authorities of the Russian Federation.

Judging by reports arriving in 2017 from Uzbekistan, the new head of state resolutely intends to restore order in this Republic. In April 2017, an agreement was signed between the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Government of the Russian Federation "On the organized recruitment and attraction of citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan for temporary work in the Russian Federation". There are plans to open representative offices of the Agency for External Labour Migration of the Ministry of Labour of Uzbekistan in the cities of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, Belgorod, Krasnodar, Kavminvody, Volgograd, Kazan, Krasnoyarsk, Yekaterinburg, Tyumen, Novosibirsk, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostok in 2017-18. In turn, a Russian migration centre has been opened in Samarkand to recruit people to work in the Russian Federation, and in Tashkent there is a permanent representative office of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, which will also recruit candidates for work in Russia. The creation of these kind of mechanisms will undoubtedly help streamline migratory flows, target the hiring of specialists for relevant sectors of the Russian economy, identify individuals who advocate extremist ideas prone to adventurous and violent actions, and counteract the propaganda of radicalism.

The socio-economic aspect plays a major role in preventing the radicalisation of labour migrants from the CA countries. Many left their homeland for economic reasons. In this regard, it is desirable that the authorities of the countries of the Central Asian region of the CIS have clear plans for the economic development of their countries, aimed at ensuring the dignified life of their citizens.

As far as the fight against terrorism is concerned, in addition to combating poverty, social stratification, and corruption, it is also necessary to coordinate the work of the state authorities of the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, civil society organizations, and non-governmental organizations. These coordinated efforts should be focused on dismantling the financial foundations of recruitment, which has turned organized crime into a lucrative business, and severely punishing recruiters themselves and their accomplices.
APPENDIX 1

Figure 1. Allocation of money transfers sent from labour migrants in Russia in 2015, by currency.

Figure 2. Disbursement of financial transfers of labour migrants from Russia by country and volume in 2016.

Figure 3. Growth of Able-bodied Population in the Countries of Central Asia by 2050.

Figure 4. Age of Respondents.

Figure 5. Education Levels of Respondents.

Figure 6. Field of Work of Respondents.

Figure 7. Ages of respondents.

Figure 8. Education Levels of Respondents.
Figure 9. Age of Respondents

Figure 10. Education of Respondents

Figure 11. Occupation of Respondents

Figure 12. Geographical Coverage of Respondents from Uzbekistan

Figure 13. Disbursement of Vulnerability Factors, According to Respondents
Figure 14. Geographical Coverage of Respondents from Kyrgyzstan

Figure 15. Disbursement of Vulnerability Factors, According to Respondents

Figure 16. Geographical Coverage of Respondents from Tajikistan
Histogram 9. Socialization Factors

Figure 18. Main Routes for Travel to Iraq and Syria

Histogram 11. Enabling Factors

Histogram 10. Conditions for Radicalization

Figure 27. Disbursement of Vulnerability Factors, According to Respondents