Gender Based Violence Emergency Response and Protection Initiative

(Technical Assistance Project: Nigeria Early Warning System)

Internal Evaluation

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<tr>
<td>ABA</td>
<td>American Bar Association</td>
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<td>ABA ROLI</td>
<td>American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative</td>
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<td>SFCG</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Civilian Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<td>EWS</td>
<td>Early Warning System, refers to SFCG EWS in Plateau State or ABA ROLI DRC EWS</td>
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<td>EWER</td>
<td>Early Warning Early Response System, refers to expanded system in Borno State piloting response mechanisms</td>
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<td>MMC</td>
<td>Maiduguri Metropolitan Council</td>
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<td>Local Government Area</td>
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I. Context and background

Political Context

In April 2014, 276 young female students from a secondary school in Borno state were abducted by the Islamist insurgent group Boko Haram. The kidnappings were representative of the high security risks that exist for vulnerable populations in Northern Nigeria, particularly women and girls. The April kidnapping was only one example of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram, who have also bombed police stations, looted homes, burned down schools and killed thousands. The Nigerian military’s response to Boko Haram has also too often threatened – rather than protected – communities, with reports of human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), committed by security forces.

Program Goal and Objectives

To address the gaps in the security sector’s capacity and will to respond effectively to insurgency and protect communities while recognizing the fast-growing threat of Boko Haram to community security in the Northeast, the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI) partnered with Search for Common Ground (SFCG) to deliver a program that would “improve Northern Nigerian communities’ capacity to identify and respond to threats to civilians, particularly women and girls.” To achieve this goal, the program pursued two objectives:

- First, the program sought to expand SFCG’s existing community-driven Early Warning System (EWS) to two areas in Northern Nigeria where women and girls are at particular risk. Through that EWS, community representatives equipped with cell phones use a Frontline SMS-based system to send rumors of tensions and potential violence to a central data hub. SFCG then works to mitigate the risk of conflict, such as by broadcasting local radio programs that seek to ease tensions or by asking a local community or civil society leader to intervene as a mediator.

- Second, the program sought to strengthen the response mechanisms linked to SFCG’s existing EWS in Northern Nigeria. Although SFCG’s EWS was an extremely effective mechanism to collect information and alert the population, SFCG’s assessment was that it was more successful in identifying threats to communities than in responding to them.

ABA ROLI Capacity in Early Warning and Response

Beginning in 2012, ABA ROLI worked with partners (the Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the UN Joint Human Rights Office, and the Congolese police) to design an SMS-based software platform and establish an Early Warning and Response System in territories of eastern DRC that were highly insecure and susceptible to attacks by armed groups. Since July 2012, the system has been expanded to new territories and its ownership has been transferred over to the local government body tasked with civilian protection. As of November, 2015, the system had received more than 1,522 reports from 83 remote villages in Walikale, Masisi, Fizi, and Beni territories and had coordinated more than 529 responses with the UN and the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC)
— at least 40 of which have thwarted rebel attacks on villages that are home to approximately 150,000 people.

To improve the response mechanisms present within SFCG’s existing EWS, ABA ROLI sought to leverage its experience in implementing the EWS in the DRC by conducting an assessment of existing response mechanisms; developing, in conjunction with local government and civil society organizations, potential new response mechanisms; and piloting those mechanisms, in the two areas covered by SFCG’s expanded EWS under Objective 1.

Program Summary

During three distinct phases (January, March and June 2015), ABA ROLI and SFCG conducted a rigorous assessment of the security threats to and protection needs of four communities located within Borno State, northeastern Nigeria. In June 2015, a workshop was convened to bring together stakeholders and community members who would participate in the expanded EWS, to analyze the findings from the March 2015 field assessment regarding security threats, identify target locations for the expansion, and design response plans to pilot during the remaining months of the project. In July 2015, ABA ROLI and SFCG presented a report providing a comprehensive review of the joint assessment’s methodology, findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Based on that report, ABA ROLI and SFCG identified two target communities in Maiduguri Metropolitan Council Local Government Area—Shehuri North and Gwange III—for the expansion of the EWS and response plan piloting. From July to December 2015, SFCG worked to expand the EWS and implement the pilot response mechanisms in these two communities.

As the expansion and response plan was a pilot project, in early December 2015, ABA ROLI and SFCG convened community stakeholders and participants to evaluate the Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) mechanism, including the effectiveness of data collection, information sharing, and pilot response mechanisms. The meetings also provided an opportunity to assess the extent to which the EWER mechanism contributed to a more coordinated response to security threats, and to explore ways of sustaining the EWER mechanism and expanding both observer and response networks.

II. Purpose of Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation was to (a) assess how the EWER was functioning in practice, (b) assess its contribution to achieving the program’s objectives of both improving the flow of information and strengthening the coordination among community leaders tasked with addressing security threats, and (c) provide recommendations for future EWER programming in northeastern Nigeria. The evaluation heavily involved SFCG program staff and EWER participants in the evaluation workshop, using evaluation findings to strengthen monitoring procedures and inform program design for SFCG’s follow-on phase of activities.

The intended users of the evaluation include ABA ROLI program staff, SFCG staff in-country, and all stakeholders participating in the EWER implementation and operation. In addition to program-specific staff and donors, ABA ROLI can use the findings to inform early warning programs in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa.

This evaluation report serves as an addendum to the project Final Report.

**Evaluation questions**

The evaluation intended to address five main questions:

1) *How is the EWER functioning in practice?*
2) *How much has the EWER contributed to achieving the program objectives?*
3) *What external factors have aided or inhibited the success of the EWER?*
4) *What are the current weaknesses of the program structure?*
5) *How can SFCG modify both the structure of the EWER as well as program monitoring to improve the system and maximize its impact?*

**Evaluation approach and methodology**

This evaluation used a combination of evaluation tools, among them contribution analysis², group discussions, individual interviews, literature review (of assessment report from July 2015, SFCG reports, ABA ROLI quarterly reports, and original project proposal), working groups, and participant surveys to understand the changes that have occurred in the time of program implementation in Borno State, and assess the effectiveness of the EWER design and implementation.

Data on key performance indicators came from program monitoring as well as from the records of implementing partners such as the database of reports consolidated and sent by the local consultants to SFCG. The evaluators also reviewed stationary sources, such as the Frontline SMS platform itself, during the field visit.

The target population of the evaluation included SFCG staff managing the program, stakeholders who actively play a role in the EWER process, and community stakeholders who did not necessarily play a defined role in the EWER but were often called upon to respond to cases and address community concerns. In these last two categories of stakeholders, participants included: community observers, consultants tasked with consolidating and relaying cases to assistance providers, traditional community leaders, religious leaders, members of formal and informal security (local self-defense/community policing groups), and leaders from among women and other marginalized groups.

The findings in this report are the result of five days of data collection in Jos, Nigeria conducted between December 7 and 11, 2015. During the first two days of the field visit, ABA ROLI met with SFCG staff collectively and individually to discuss the project and the current political context. This time was also used to examine the Frontline SMS platform through a presentation

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and demonstration of the system provided by the SFCG EWS operator. During the remaining days of the evaluation, ABA ROLI facilitated group discussions with all participants together, as well as 6 small group discussions with community members grouped by their affiliation or role in the EWER in localities where SFCG’s early warning pilot response mechanisms had been expanded. ABA ROLI also interviewed 7 SFCG staff members.

During the small group discussions, those not being interviewed were asked to work in groups (established by their role in the program) to develop a workplan for how to strengthen their engagement with the EWER mechanism. On the final day of the workshop, participants completed a survey developed by ABA ROLI and reviewed by the Design, Monitoring & Evaluation Assistant from SFCG to assess perceptions of the utility of the EWER and experiences in its implementation.

### III. Evaluation Challenges

The evaluation process did face some challenges and therefore may have limitations as a result. The challenges included the limited documentation of responses coordinated, as well as the short timeline of the project. At the time of this evaluation, the pilot response mechanisms had been implemented for only three months, and thus data provided in terms of its effectiveness with respect to incident reporting and response was limited.

Additionally, due to security concerns in the Northeast, the evaluators were not able to travel to the target communities Shehuri North and Gwange III in Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC) to conduct the evaluation. As a result, participants had to travel from the Northeast to Jos for the evaluation, thus limiting the number of participants in the program who could attend and contribute to the evaluation process.

### IV. Findings

#### 1. Roles and Responsibilities of EWER Actors

To understand how the EWER is functioning in practice, the evaluators asked each response group the same series of questions regarding how they learn about incidents and security issues in their community, what they do with that information, and to whom they transmit it.

The actors participating in the EWER can be divided into two groups: information suppliers and responders. Based on the responses gathered through these triangulated interviews, the roles are as follows:

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3 See Annex B, Participant List. The selection of these interviewees was made based on the consent to participate in an interview during the data collection period.

4 See Annex C, Evaluation Workshop Agenda. See Annexes D and E, EWER Participant Surveys.
Information suppliers:

- **Data collectors** (originally referred to in the proposal and official award documents as “community observers”)
  - These are community member volunteers tasked with collecting information on incidents or rumors in their communities and sending reports to local consultants. They are assigned specific territories for observation. They have standard guidelines for their reports (including time, date, and place of incident and who was involved). Reports are submitted through a variety of methods—SMS, phone call, or in person. Data collectors verify the details of their reports through their own networks in the community, including each other.

- **Local consultants**
  - These are university graduate volunteers who serve as the focal point for the data collectors to send in reports in real-time. They were nominated for participation by community leaders based on their ability to read, write, and use a computer to draft reports. To verify the report, the local consultant reaches out to his network of contacts in the community to validate the details of the incident. The consultant sends a consolidated weekly report to the SFCG Program Officer on the alerts that he received that week from the data collectors.

- **SFCG Program Officer**
  - This person, based out of Maiduguri, is tasked with reviewing the weekly report from the local consultants to make sure all necessary information is included and brings this report to the meeting of the Community Forum.

Responders:

- **Community Forum**
  - This forum is made up of traditional leaders. These people are respected authority figures and have strong relationships with their communities. They are able to mediate disputes and resolve conflicts among community members, as well as impose informal sanctions on troublemakers who are seen as a threat to the community. They meet monthly to discuss the issues presented in the report provided by SFCG staff and decide on a course of action to address the problem. If they are unable to resolve the issue, they forward the case to the Advisory Council on an as-needed basis.

- **Advisory Council**
  - This Council comprises religious leaders and high-level community members who are highly respected and have strong relationships and networks with the Civilian JTF and police. When a case reaches their level, they are able to involve formal security (police, military, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency) to resolve the issue. Results may include formal charges or the involvement of security forces.

- **Security representatives**
  - These are formal security (police, including National Security and Civil Defence Corps) officers, military, or members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a
non-state security group. These actors are called upon on an as-needed basis to advise the community leaders or to respond to more serious security threats.

- **Youth representatives**
  - These are leaders of youth associations and organizations. They double as responders and information suppliers. They have strong relationships with data collectors and may be called upon to verify information and incidents coming from the community. They may also be called upon to organize youth or deliver a message from the community leadership. They have not received training through this program, but they have attended some Community Forum meetings.

Figure 1 below illustrates the supply chain of information through the EWER as it works in practice.

**Figure 1. Supply chain of information regarding security concerns**

![Supply chain diagram]

2. **Types of security issues captured through reports**

Based on interviews and review of the reports sent in by data collectors, the security and safety concerns in the communities are drug trafficking and abuse, theft and burglaries, domestic violence, forced marriage, family abandonment and neglect, rape, accusations of witchcraft, business misconduct, prostitution, flooding, disease outbreak, property destruction, corruption by security forces, disturbance of the peace, and interpersonal conflicts. Strangers in the community

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5 Herua Grassroots Development Foundation (~7,700 members), Shehuri North Community Development Association (~4,000 members), Northern Youth Unity Forum, and National Youth Council of Nigeria. The youth representative present at the workshop started the Herua Grassroots Development Foundation in 2012 to provide trainings and workshops for youth on moral standards and ethics in the community and IT skills. All members are technically volunteers, paying a registration fee of 200 Naira (roughly $1), and weekly dues of 20-50 Naira (roughly $0.10-0.25).
were also a cause for concern by the data collectors, since the reason for their presence was unknown.

With regards to Boko Haram or other insurgent threats, a common perception that came through in the interviews was that the Boko Haram threat, while imminent and catastrophic in 2014, had long subsided in these two communities. Many interviewees attributed this to the new government’s strong initiative—during the first few months of Muhammadu Buhari’s presidency—to starve out Boko Haram in the region. The only related threat that participants cited were discreet meetings among Boko Haram defectors that raised alarm about their possible plans to reengage with the group. The acceptance by the local population of their reintegration into the community had been contingent upon their promise not to engage in surreptitious behavior, so this was a matter that had to be elevated to the community leaders for a response and warning.

Reports that are considered “urgent”—rape, ongoing robberies, violent conflict, public drug trafficking and consumption, etc.—are elevated immediately to the traditional leaders. Cases that can wait until the monthly meeting—harassment, interpersonal conflicts, etc.—get reported through the EWER process outlined in Figure 1.

3. Community Experiences and Perceptions of Context

Through interviews and focus group discussions, the evaluators built upon the political context assessed through the Final Report from July 2015 to account for developments during the last six months of the program.

Community Experiences of Conflict

a. Systemic problems of poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy are seen as the root causes of crime and violence within the communities. Youth, especially males, are more likely to become radicalized by groups such as Boko Haram. Final Report, p. 3. During every session of the evaluation workshop, participants cited the idleness of youth in the communities as a driving factor leading to rampant drug abuse, disturbances of the peace, property damage, and involvement in violent acts, including recruitment by Boko Haram.

b. Prior to the EWER expansion, surveyed community members cited the following incidents of violence or other security threats that was most prevalent such as property damage, theft, domestic violence, drug use and possession, assault or kidnapping; or violence by police and military personnel in the form of excessive use of force, ill-treatment, unlawful arrest and harassment. Final Report, p. 2. The types of incidents reported through the EWER over the course of the program implementation were consistent with these identified threats.

c. Over the course of the workshop, drug abuse and trafficking were cited as the greatest driver of conflict and instability in the community, largely perpetrated by the youth. Substances used and sold include cannabis, analgesics/painkillers (Tramadol), sedatives, cocaine, (embalming fluid sold to drug dealers by mortuary attendants⁶), and cough syrup with codeine. Police have been known to participate in the sale and acquisition of these drugs, extort money from drug dealers, arrest them, and then personally collect the bail

⁶ A data collector witnessed this transaction and reported it to the Health Commissioner.
money, profiting from perpetuating their activities and so making it difficult to take meaningful action against them.

d. Certain groups have reportedly taken advantage of Boko Haram’s violent campaign in the Northeast, setting up roadblocks and extorting money from travelers, relying on the tendency for the population to blame Boko Haram thus enabling them to operate with impunity.

**Political Context**

a. According to several respondents, while the project was intended to capture and respond to Boko Haram-related acts, levels of Boko Haram-related violence have decreased since the start of the project. Boko Haram has been “severely disabled” and forced to retreat to the forest area but continues to strike civilians using soft targets (such as individual suicide bombers).

b. While Boko Harm-related violence affecting community members may be decreasing, new types of threats are on the rise. For example, as of December 2015, northeastern Nigeria has over two million internally displaced persons. Respondents spoke about the increased prevalence, due to movements of displaced Nigerians, of involuntary prostitution of women and minors, child labor, disease occasioned by overcrowding at camps and in host homes, crime, poverty, and resource competition. This influx of displaced Nigerians to urban areas could result in new destabilizing risk factors for communities in Shehuri North and Gwenge III.

c. There is less sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims than there was previously in these two communities in Borno State and less than there is currently in other parts of Nigeria towards the South. Respondents attributed this to the indiscriminate violence and trauma caused by Boko Haram towards both Muslims and Christians alike, thus fostering the feeling among religious sects that the insurgents, and not each other, are responsible for perpetrating violence.

d. The Civilian JTF was created without establishing any accountability structures between the informal security groups and community leaders. As a result, these groups, while highly organized, operate outside the influence and control of community structures when setting up checkpoints, enforcing curfews, and deploying patrols; and at times these groups engage in blatant criminality and harassment. The new presidential administration, while recognizing their contribution to providing security yet also acknowledging the need to formalize their position and properly train them, has vetted and absorbed roughly 170 CJTF into the formal police, 240 into the military, and 50 into the secret service. Participants indicated that the CJTF are more trusted in the Northeast than the police and military stationed there, who are frequently from outside Borno State and less aware of the culture, customs, and ways to distinguish between civilians and combatants.

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8 *Final Report*, p. 21
4. Strengths and Successes of the EWER

The EWER was successfully expanded to Shehuri North and Gwange III—two communities in the Northeast that have been victims of numerous severe attacks by Boko Haram in the past—with supplies purchased (phones, chargers) and distributed to data collectors, and all participants trained on how to send and record information and how to identify threats in their communities. Sixteen data collectors were selected for training under the program—eight to cover Shehuri North and eight to cover Gwange III in MMC. Two temporary consultants were recruited, responsible for receiving and authenticating reports received by the data collectors. Data collectors were identified based on their affiliation with different groups in the community in order to keep a pulse on diverse populations within the community, including women, youth, community leaders, and informal policing groups. There was a single introductory training held for EWER participants as part of this project.

At the training, project participants were taught about the concept of early warning and how to use the SMS system to send in conflict reports, including how to identify threats, collect data, and analyze and present that data to the Community Forum and Advisory Council. Participants were given a brief training manual. The training manual laid out different risk factors that data collectors should report on: abduction; recruitment into Boko Haram; attacks by Boko Haram; killings by Boko Haram; destruction of villages; state of relationship with the police, military, vigilante/informal policing structures, community members, and other authoritative bodies; changes in people’s behavior; and others. Participants reported being generally satisfied with the training they received as part of the project and eager for future training opportunities.

Over the course of the expansion, 104 reports were sent in by data collectors. While some cases that were sent through the EWER were referred to the police or brought before other formal justice structures, most responses coordinated by the system were more “social”—that is, delivered through mediation and resolution by leaders in the community who were well respected and familiar with the parties involved. For instance, community elders will intervene, call the parents of a young man who is selling drugs to explain the dangers of engaging in such behavior and convey to him that his behavior will not be tolerated.

Illustrative examples of cases

To illustrate the range of coordinated responses as well as the diversity of identified “threats”, outlined below are some specific cases that came through the EWER over the course of the program.

- An elderly woman kidnapped a 6-year old girl and took her to the village of Gombe. The Community Forum intervened, gathered funds for transportation, traveled to Gombe to retrieve the girl, and returned her to her home. When the woman repeated the offense, the

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9 Only one of the two local consultants provided a complete report of all the cases received and followed from their communities, so the evaluation of the responses that were coordinated as a result was only conducted based on the one complete report. That local consultant received 43 reports over the course of the EWER expansion, and responses were initiated for 23 of them. Sixteen of these cases reached resolution. The remaining seven cases are being followed by the police and the Community Forum.
Community Forum members told her that if she did it again, they would call the police to arrest her.

- A religious leader was called upon to talk to the Muslim parents of a child whom they were trying to force into marriage. He sat the parents down and talked to them about how forceful marriage, though not illegal, goes against Islam and attempted to counsel them into letting their daughter choose her own mate.
- There was an outbreak of cholera in one community, observed by the data collector, who—sensing the urgency of the situation—immediately reported it to the local health manager who then deployed to the area.
- After the military established a curfew of 8 pm, they repeatedly went through the community beating and assaulting people who were in violation of it. The Advisory Council, having strong ties to formal security structures, approached the Senior Commander of the perpetrators and was successful in getting the men responsible to stop. Participants in the workshop explained that certain factions of the military see themselves as above the law and thus do not respond to community leaders. In this case, the high-level profile of the Advisory Council members was vital to resolve the situation.
- A donor agency (International Committee of the Red Cross - ICRC) providing humanitarian aid and supplies were delivering materials to state governors. One data collector who had participated previously in the government’s crime prevention initiative saw that these supplies were continually put into storage and the foodstuffs left to rot. He alerted the ICRC coordinator that deliveries were not reaching their intended recipients who in turn called the local government chairman to discuss the problem and, as a result, the ICRC designated the data collector as the person to assist with coordinating deliveries, which now go directly from ICRC to the IDP camps.

**Perception Survey Results**

Based on the responses to the perception survey administered to all participants on the final day of the workshop, the following conclusions were drawn:

- Information suppliers (data collectors, consultants, youth) were reporting more security incidents to authority figures through this program than they had previously.
- Information suppliers witnessed more responses to cases on security threats through this program than they had previously.
- Information suppliers were split on whether they preferred SMS or phone calls to send in reports. Both options should remain available.
- Response Coordinators (Community Forum members, Advisory Council members, security representatives, religious leaders) were receiving more reports on security issues during this program than they had previously.
- Most response coordinators were initiating responses to and resolving more cases during this program than they had previously.
- The two greatest obstacles to coordinating effective responses and resolving cases were a lack of community resources and the slowness with which reports reach them.
Support for the EWER from stakeholder participants

Despite the difficulties encountered during program implementation and the structural gaps described in the following section, all participants felt that this project had a positive impact and was an important step to empowering their communities to tackle the challenges they face, both socially and from a security perspective. Although the community leaders have other data sources available to them to learn about problems in the community, participants felt that this program and the organized EWER process

(1) provides a mechanism for stronger analysis of incidents and trends in insecurity
(2) provides a venue for leaders to unify their shared vision of peace
(3) gives the community a credible evidence base to support advocacy at the community or national level
(4) convenes a diverse group of people who, by engaging on a wide range of community challenges, begin to understand their role not as representatives of their respective groups’ interests to a peace process, but rather as representatives of peace to their communities
(5) creates focal points in the community for possible engagement from the government
(6) allows leaders to intervene in a contentious situation before it escalates and becomes urgent
(7) by involving respected leaders who understand the social context, inspires trust in the population that responders will hear both sides, explain the root causes of the problems, discourage retaliation, and promote reconciliation.

5. Challenges faced in program implementation

Structural gaps in the EWER process

   a. System Design

The EWER was designed to work in the following way:

   i. A data collector witnesses an incident and analyzes the incident considering several risk factors.
   ii. The data collector sends a message using an SMS that describes the incident or situation in detail
   iii. The reported message is received directly into the Frontline SMS software database
   iv. A SFCG staff person/central hub operator sees the message in the Frontline database and sends a text message of acknowledgement to the data collector
   v. The central hub operator authenticates the message by calling or visiting relevant parties.
   vi. “Urgent” cases are immediately forwarded on to the community forum for resolution.

10 Participants offered up as an example a potential internationally-produced report on security challenges and human rights abuses in the Northeast that the cases recorded through the EWER could objectively substantiate.
11 For example, when the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency came to the community to investigate drug trafficking, EWER stakeholders were able to assist in their investigation and lead them to the incident sites.
vii. At the end of the month, the central hub operator compiles “non-urgent” messages received into a report. The report is shared with Community Forum

viii. The Community Forum tries to resolve the matter at the community level.

ix. If they cannot, then the matter is referred to the Advisory Council. At this level, it is expected that if the matter requires political support, the Advisory Council has access to relevant authorities who can address the matter.

In practice, there were some deviations from this established structure, described below (and illustrated in Figure 1 on page 10 of this report).

- The Frontline SMS platform was not yet operational in Maiduguri because SFCG was awaiting the delivery of SIM cards. When consultants received reports through regular texts, phone calls, and in-person encounters, they recorded the information manually in their weekly reports that they then sent to the SFCG Program Officer. One local consultant had to go to the business center weekly to manually type up the reports and print them out for submission to SFCG.
- At the time of this evaluation in December 2015, there was no dedicated full-time staff person to serve as a central database operator; temporary consultants filled that role.
- The SFCG Program Officer, instead of the system operator, consolidated reports and brought them to the Community Forum.

During the small group interviews, the evaluators attempted to assess the different players’ understanding of their role. Those participants involved in the supply of information (data collectors and local consultants) described their work and their role as it is laid out by the EWER design. They work together closely to verify and complete reports and appeared to appreciate the opportunity they had to analyze the cases together.

In the interviews with responders, it did not seem clear to the traditional leaders, community leaders, religious leaders, security representatives, and ward heads what their roles were in relation to each other. The division between the Community Forum and Advisory Council did not seem established, as participants would use these terms interchangeably. Some respondents stated that, if a case cannot be resolved by the Community Forum, it is sent to the SFCG Program Officer or to the emir of the state or to other relevant authorities. Others mentioned the Advisory Council, but only after the evaluators mentioned it. In order to separate participants into groups for breakout discussions, the evaluators asked them to separate according to their affiliated group (Data Collector, Local Consultant, Advisory Council, Community Forum, etc.). At this juncture, it was not possible to distinguish among the various leaders and separate them into the Advisory Council and Community Forum. Even among themselves, they seemed not to know which category they belonged to.

Additionally, many participants in the “responder” groups were not aware prior to the workshop that there were community members playing the role of data collectors and local consultants, and did not know that those people were the suppliers of case reports.
Cases sent through the EWER were certainly resolved by the community, traditional, and religious leaders as well as by informal and formal security, but their engagement among themselves seemed more ad hoc than what had initially been envisioned by the EWER design.

b. Training and Division of Roles and Responsibilities

Coordination among EWER actors

General guidelines and a training manual provided at the training formed the basis for a common understanding of how participants would carry out their work. However, there were no clear and concrete protocols provided to outline the whole process of the EWER: (1) how information is collected and transmitted through all layers of the process, (2) how decisions are made, (3) how the actors coordinate with each other, (4) how to provide feedback, (5) how to track and keep a database, (6) how to decide which cases require a more serious response, (7) possible ways to intervene given the situation, and (8) how to monitor and assess participants’ work.

A lack of protocols posed a few challenges, namely:

- Each consultant defined for himself what constituted urgent versus non-urgent cases. Consultants stated that they had some sense: for example, urgent cases included rape, a burglary in progress, an ongoing fight or dispute; non-urgent cases included events that have already taken place as well as low-level yet persistent threats, such as “huge gatherings,” “reckless driving,” and harassment.
- There was no organized database to capture information from reports.
- Not all data collectors provided the same level of detail on cases in their reports.

Capacity-building of EWER stakeholders

A majority of respondents indicated that they would benefit from more training. Respondents generally wanted instruction on how to identify warning signs and triggers at the earliest possible stage; how to engage with security responders; and how to document and verify conflict incidents safely and securely.

Women and youth representatives had specific concerns. In particular, it has been challenging to recruit women to participate as data collectors. Some women data collectors stated that they would like more personal security training that focused on how to engage with people in the community to safely gather credible information. There were times they feared for their safety on their data collection routes when encountering a dangerous situation. For example, training on how to approach or interact with aggressive boys or men in a potential drug situation was requested. Presently, according to one of the women data collectors, she avoids reporting on such cases because it is too dangerous for her.

Several youth representatives indicated that a challenge to promoting peace among youth in a post-conflict setting is that so many of them are traumatized by the violence they have witnessed and experienced and are thus dangerous. The participants recounted a story of a young boy who approached a soldier and asked him for money to buy a gun and kill the man who killed his
father. Realizing that a culture of violence and retaliation was breeding criminals among their youth, the soldier began to cry. The youth representative, among his asks, requested training for how to counsel grief-stricken youth who do not understand why they have been victims of violence and foster healing. Additionally, the youth representatives requested trainings on how to encourage leadership among youth to empower them and how to train youth on societal ethics, moral standards, their responsibilities to their communities, and how to respect others and behave.

c. Program Monitoring

Data collectors did not receive any formal supervision while working in the field. Some received on-the-job guidance from consultants when messages were incomplete or needed to be corrected. Data collectors reported to have sent an average of between 7-12 messages each since implementation of the pilot. There have been a total of eight bi-weekly reports received by the Community Forum in both Shehuri North and Gwange III. Because there was no database, it was difficult to track the number and types of cases to date without doing a manual review of the local consultants’ reports\(^\text{12}\), tracking the responses to the cases, and recording the results.

All community participants are volunteers. Data collectors receive a small stipend for their work, which requires them to make daily rounds through their assigned areas. A challenge to motivate is common to volunteerism. According to several data collectors interviewed, they would be more motivated and engaged if they received feedback on their reports (at minimum, an acknowledgement of receipt from whoever operates the central hub), what actions were taken or decisions made at the Community Forum or Advisory Council level. Some data collectors even indicated that they would like to be included at Community Forum meetings. This would motivate them to be more proactive in gathering reports. To encourage reporting, SFCG may consider holding regular calls or meetings with data collectors to address any problems that arise or check in generally.

**Contextual Challenges**

Maiduguri is a high density area with tens of thousands of people between Shehuri North and Gwange III alone and covering significant ground with just a few data collectors per community has been a challenge for both data collectors and local consultants. They asserted that sixteen data collectors are not enough to cover the entire area and can only cover the eastern and southern parts of Maiduguri.

Stigmatization of SGBV continues to pose a problem to addressing it at the state or even community level. If a girl is raped, it is unlikely that she will tell anyone. If others find out, they might bring it to the attention of the Community Forum, but there is a stigma that leads to underreporting of these cases and very little self-reporting. If cases are brought to light, few are reported to the police, and in rare cases someone will be prosecuted. These cases tend to be resolved by traditional leaders. Illustrating this underreporting is the observation that, out of 43 cases (for which the evaluators received complete reports) reported through this program, 7 were related to GBV. Among those 7, 6 were related to forced marriage, abandonment of a wife,  

\(^{12}\) See Annex F, Local Consultant – Complete Case Report.
domestic violence, and a refusal from a husband to get divorced while he continued to lock his wives inside all day. Only one case was related to rape, and it was a case of attempted rape whereby the perpetrator was caught in the act, the victim herself did not come forward. The community leaders resolved this case by pressuring the man to promise to not do it again (he had previously been seen taking teenage girls to his house).

Community members are still afraid to report on military brutality. One woman spoke about military soldiers who set up a checkpoint on the road, harassed young women who passed by, and then systematically lined them up and raped them. She and the other women who witnessed and heard about this did not expose the crime for fear of retaliation.

_Appropriateness of EWER Mechanism_

When this program was conceived in June 2014, Boko Haram had just carried out one of their most destructive and public attacks on civilians by kidnapping 276 schoolgirls in broad daylight. At the time, and over the following months, the damage that Boko Haram inflicted on communities was catastrophic. Shehuri North and Gwange III were some of the most hard-hit communities in Borno State by Boko Haram’s campaign of terror and violence against civilians.

The program was initially designed to enable communities to detect early signs of movement by Boko Haram, secure their area, and protect vulnerable populations. In reviewing the consolidated case reports and discussing the nature of security threats in their communities, the evaluators remarked that very little reference was made to a Boko Haram or insurgent threat. The opinion of many of the participants was that the new president’s administration has been successful in its efforts to starve out Boko Haram, suffocating their capacity to mount organized attacks against villages, and forcing them to retreat into hiding in the forests, maintaining their public image through soft targets, i.e. young female suicide bombers.

Cases reported through this program were largely related to drug abuse and trafficking, business misconduct, assault, theft and burglaries, domestic violence, mistreatment of family and neglect, prostitution, disturbing the peace, violating community standards, rape and GBV, outbreaks of epidemic, and interpersonal conflicts.

To gauge the EWER’s effectiveness at addressing a potential threat from Boko Haram, evaluators posed the question to the group: If Boko Haram or another insurgent group were going to attack a community, who would be the first to know, and what would be their first reaction? Respondents unanimously said that anyone could know first, based on their location and proximity, but that this person’s first reaction would be to alert the CJTF or, if they did not have access to that person, their community leader who would direct the message to the CJTF, which would quickly mobilize to deploy and secure the area. Participants remarked that the EWER was too slow a mechanism to respond rapidly to such an imminent threat, so a data collector would still bypass the established EWER process and elevate a Boko Haram-related report immediately to the CJTF level.

Similarly, some of the illustrative cases described on pages 13-14 were resolved successfully due to direct action taken by the data collector (as was the case with the data collector reporting the
drug sale to the Health Commissioner, and the data collector going directly to ICRC to discuss the mismanagement of deliveries).
Lastly, the community and religious leaders were asked if, when they come to the Community Forum or Advisory Council meeting, the cases they receive are new to them. They remarked that sometimes they will hear about new cases in the meetings, but for the most part, by the time they meet monthly, they have already heard about these incidents from other sources.

The rationale for considering adaptation of ABA ROLI’s EWS model from DRC in northeastern Nigeria was based on the similarity of security threats (armed insurgents) and community needs (a way of communicating threats to people who can mobilize responses). Whereas in Shehuri North and Gwange III, the community seems to have quick access to the CJTF in the case of a violent threat, in DRC, the EWS was intended to fill a gap in the communication network between the community and the authorities capable of intervening. Over the course of the evaluation workshop, it was observed that, while the EWER has created a valuable forum for discussion and analysis of security threats and an essential venue for coordination among peace architects, it is not a fast enough mechanism in its current form (without the Frontline SMS platform functioning) to handle truly urgent cases. And the shifting political context has changed the nature of the security threat in MMC. Additionally, the infrequency of Community Forum meetings means that cases typically reach the ears of community leaders through other means over the course of the month.

6. Areas identified by participants for technical and strategic improvement

Increased Capacity-Building

- As stated previously, data collectors would like training on how to detect warning signs of violence at an early stage. The need for this training was discussed earlier on page 17 in the section on challenges faced by data collectors.
- As stated previously, data collectors would also like training on personal security and strategies for engaging with community members, particularly aggressive personalities, while minimizing threat to self. The need for this training was discussed earlier on page 17 in the section on challenges faced by data collectors.
- Traditional leaders and religious leaders indicated a need for trainings on settlement of disputes, reconciliation, and conflict resolution so that they could apply these skills in their work to disseminate peace and tolerance across religions, which they view as critical to address the root causes of the conflict. It was remarked that youths, given so much idle time, spend a lot of time coming to the churches and mosques. Religious leaders want to make sure they are sending out a message of peace.
- SFCG could also standardize its trainings and work to professionalize program participants; many indicated that they would like to have certificates of completion and/or identity cards to reinforce their work. Due to the insecurity and distrust within the community, the local population becomes suspicious and nervous when faced with people who are spotted near incident sites and who ask questions. Since data collectors often engage in this kind of activity, the ID cards were again requested as a form of protection if police or other security actors show up.
Technical Support

- Data collectors indicated that phones with camera or video capabilities would assist them in recording incidents, and providing important details such as time and date.
- Once the Frontline system is up and running, data collectors said it would be easier to extract reports for analysis and easier to input information. The SFCG EWS operator in Plateau State remarked that, especially around elections, there will be too many reports to enter in manually and respond to manually. There is a need for an automatic confirmation of receipt.

Report Feedback

- As stated previously on page 18 when describing challenges in program monitoring, data collectors would like feedback on their reports: what happened, what action was taken, what was the decision, and what was the result. It would help them stay motivated.

7. Opportunities for Synergy with Other Peacebuilding Programs

SFCG’s pre-existing EWS is one component of a larger program on conflict and atrocity prevention and linked to other SFCG programs, including a capacity building program for internally displaced persons (advocacy and resilience trainings) in Adamawa and Borno States and the Community Security Architecture (CSA) initiative and Peace Architecture Dialogue (PAD) in Plateau State. Through this synergy, EWS reports on cases are brought to the Peace Architecture Dialogue meeting—which convenes civil society, community, and government stakeholders—for review and discussion around problem-solving. During the meetings, participants give security updates, identify high-risk areas, and provide information on issues that government leaders may not hear about through TV or radio, such as silent killings, abductions, and disappearances. The bottom-up approach to information flow allows LGA representatives and other government authorities to know precisely what security and social challenges are facing communities, as reported by observers working there.

The PAD and CSA have been broadly supported by the Nigerian government, with the local and state governments planning to take over their facilitation and oversight in the future. Expanding this synergy between the EWER and the PAD to Borno State will help build government support for the EWER, which will be essential for its continuation.

SFCG has strong media programming across Nigeria, utilizing television and radio to disseminate messages of peace and tolerance. Media houses in Maiduguri have already been identified to partner with SFCG on its programming in Borno State. This relationship could be an interesting approach to informing local populations on security and human rights issues in their communities.

Additionally, the expansion of SFCG’s programming in Borno and Adamawa States will offer many other opportunities for integration across programs and synergy. SFCG is opening an office in Maiduguri, has hired full-time staff members who are based out of Maiduguri, has recently hired a new Deputy Director to oversee all of SFCG’s programs from a permanent post.
based out of Jos to ensure that programs across northern Nigeria are coordinated, and is working to establish civil society partners in those states.

V. Recommendations

Immediate and Short-term

Protocols for Engagement

The evaluators recommend that SFCG develop standard protocols that provide guidelines for engagement with the EWER, including

- A clear and concise description of the EWER process, outlining how information flows from the time of incident through to when the data collector collects information and transmits it to the relevant parties for action
- What types of cases and incidents to look out for in the communities, and how data collectors should conduct their observations
- What level of detail on the incident to include in the SMS or phone call sent through the system, as well as strategies for verifying the report\textsuperscript{13}
- How to record cases and track their progress towards resolution
- The division of roles and responsibilities of all actors at every level of information transfer (who collects information, who they send it to, how it is analyzed and reported to the next level of the process, who is involved in the Community Forum, who is involved in the Advisory Council, how are different responders—police, civil defense, CJTF, etc.—brought in to advise and respond)
- Methods for analyzing reports, how to categorize cases as “urgent” and “not-urgent”, how to decide what type of action or response would be appropriate for various situations, including possible avenues for intervention
- What feedback to give data collectors on action that was taken as well as how to provide feedback

If, as described previously on page 16, the roles of the Advisory Council and the Community Forum are fluid and the members shift based on the need, then SFCG should consider modifying the structure tasked with responding such that the Community Forum is the ultimate forum for reviewing cases, analyzing them, and deciding on what action to take. In this structure, the Advisory Council would instead be, essentially, an association of Advisors who are consulted based on the needs of situation at hand. Eliminating this extra layer of a Council that is supposed to meet in response to requests from the Community Forum—who already meet infrequently—would also speed up the process of responding to cases. In this scenario, the information flow would instead look like:

\textsuperscript{13} The SFCG Deputy Director suggested consulting SFCG’s Human Rights Monitors Guidebook for language on what level of detail to include when reporting abuses.
In this scenario, a Council of Advisors would still exist, but not as an additional layer of people who need to arrange a meeting at the Community Forum’s request. Rather, they would be brought into the Community Forum on an ad hoc basis, either individually or as a group, and could engage with each other to consult and advise on what actions to take.

However SFCG decides to modify the structure of the EWER, the roles and responsibilities of all actors should be clearly laid out in the protocols, so that all participants understand how they fit into the process.

Especially as SFCG plans to expand its early warning program to 6 additional communities in Adamawa State and Borno State, it is important to have standardized guidelines for all program participants to follow. For reference, included in the Annexes is a document used by the operators of ABA ROLI’s EWS in DRC that outlines protocols and delineates roles and responsibilities as information flows through the EWS.¹⁴

¹⁴ See Annex G, EWS Coordination Protocols - ABA ROLI DRC.
Database for Tracking Reports

There is currently no database or tracking system where all cases sent through the system are recorded. Cases are being tracked only in the local consultants’ own weekly reports that they send to the SFCG Program Officer. Upon reviewing those, the evaluators saw that different data collectors submitted a varying level of detail on their reports. The date of the incident was not always reported, and few cases gave information on case resolution. The latter is a function of there being no established feedback mechanism; data collectors do not know always how/if the case was resolved. Protocols and instructions for what level of detail to include in the reports could help to standardize the information collected. Additionally, as was noted by the Data Collectors, once the Frontline SMS system is operational, tracking cases will be easier since information is easily extracted from that system. It will be up to SFCG to assign the responsibility of who keeps a record of the case details, including what action was taken in response, and what the resolution was.

Participants in the workshop said that a key strength of the program was that it provided a credible source of data on problems facing communities in the Northeast. For this information to be readily available for analysis, a case database is an essential tool.

Continued Empowerment of Local Communities/Horizontal Information Flow

The evaluators recommend that SFCG continue to build the capacity of a people-centered early warning system that relies on the direct participation of those most likely to be exposed to conflict. The EWS operator in Plateau State indicated that she has seen a decline in enthusiasm from the data collectors there, due to fatigue in sending reports that receive no feedback and from frustration that the responses received on cases are not what the data collectors would have recommended. A database where all information on cases is recorded, as well as the establishment (and formalization through the Protocols of Engagement) of a practice whereby Data Collectors provide input on what action should be taken and receive information on what action was taken as a result, will help to sustain their motivation and engagement with the program.

To the extent possible, data collectors should be allowed to attend the Community Forum meetings (or at least be consulted on an ad hoc basis) in order to provide a contextualized recommendation for the desired response and maximize avenues for information exchange. Further, the Community Forum should be encouraged to report all their actions taken to respond to reports to the consultants/central hub operator. Closing this feedback loop will build the credibility of the initiative, as communities directly understand what the information is used for.

Capacity-Building

The evaluators recommend that SFCG consider and prioritize the training requests from the EWER stakeholders and, resources allowing, provide some of the most pressing ones. The requested personal security training would be among those that ABA ROLI would prioritize,

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15 See Annex H, Sample Database Template.
because without participants who feel safe going about their work, the program’s impact will be limited.

Long-Term

Consideration of Gender Perspectives

In developing early warning systems, it is essential to recognize that different groups have varying vulnerabilities according to gender or other characteristics that influence their capacity to effectively prepare for, prevent, and respond to conflict. Women and men often have different access to information in conflict situations. In selecting Community Forum and Advisory Council members, preference was given to those who held leadership positions and were trusted because of their familiarity and knowledge of their communities, including community chiefs and representatives of local organizations. The vast majority of participants were men. To enhance women’s empowerment in preventing conflict, SFCG should continue to prioritize the participation of women as data collectors and decision-makers throughout the project, acknowledging barriers to women’s participation and finding ways to incorporate their valuable perspective and experience.

For example, SFCG should be cognizant of the fact that some women may not feel comfortable discussing freely their experiences or observations in large groups or around other men, and should take care to hold small group discussions with only women when trying to hear their honest perspective on issues in the community.

Additionally, recognizing that women and men play different roles in the community and have varying degrees of access, the role of the data collector may need to be structured differently for men and women. While a female data collector does not feel comfortable approaching aggressive youths, a male data collector may feel better equipped to do that. As was discussed previously in the section on contextual challenges, SGBV is still highly stigmatized and women rarely come forward to report it to anyone. If a girl is raped and decides to tell someone, it is more likely that she will tell a woman rather than a man. A potential solution to the issue of different information access between men and women data collectors would be to have pairs of data collectors operating in the same area. While a male data collector has more access to certain settings where it would be too dangerous for a woman to go, a female data collector has more access to women who are experiencing problems in the community.

As stated previously in the section on contextual challenges, a woman witnessed a rape but was hesitant to report it to anyone for fear of retaliation. SFCG should establish a focal point in the community for very sensitive information—a trusted person who accepts to receive these types of reports in confidence and take it to someone who can help.

A Multi-Threat Approach

Where possible, SFCG’s early warning systems should link all conflict-based systems within its own programs. Economies of scale, sustainability and efficiency can be enhanced if systems and operational activities are established and maintained within a multi-purpose framework that considers all risks. A multi-threat early warning system will also be activated more often than a
single-threat warning system, and therefore should provide better functionality and reliability for
dangerous high intensity events, such as atrocities, that occur infrequently. Multi-threat systems
also help the public better understand the range of risks they face and reinforce desired
preparedness actions and warning response behaviors.

*Strengthening public trust in response providers*

At the start of the project and throughout the community needs assessment that was conducted in
March, it was noted that the relationship between communities and state responders is strained
and marred by distrust and historically contentious run-ins. Respondents confirmed that local
populations still are fearful of the security situation in their communities and are overwhelmed
by the challenges they face day-to-day. In reviewing the case reports, it is apparent that there
were instances when the police rightfully intervened in a situation, when a criminal was brought
to court for prosecution, and when the police came to investigate the case of a young girl who
was assaulted. Additionally, the community leaders were able to resolve more than 20 cases
through the program to the satisfaction of the involved parties.

The persistent mistrust in the face of acknowledged successful case resolution likely has multiple
causes: perhaps one of these is that the community is aware that its leaders and security providers
are taking their everyday struggles to heart and working hard to remedy them, but are often not
aware of successes and achievements in reconciling disputes and intervening in difficult cases.
Public dissemination of these successes (while honoring the desire for confidentiality and
anonymity on the part of some community members)—either through a bulletin or pamphlet or
radio broadcast—might contribute to helping these communities regain confidence in their
leadership to address concerns and build hope for the future of their communities.
Appendix A: Program Statistics

1. Summary of EWER Cases, disaggregated by type of case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Type</th>
<th>Number of cases reported</th>
<th>Number of responses initiated</th>
<th>Number of cases resolved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease (cholera)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal conflict</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prostitution</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug abuse/trafficking</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business misconduct</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although both local consultants submitted summary reports of the 104 cases cumulatively reported through the system, only one local consultant provided a complete report of all the cases received and followed from their communities, so the evaluation of the responses that were coordinated as a result was only conducted based on the one complete report. That local consultant received 43 reports over the course of the EWER expansion, and responses were initiated for 23 of them. Sixteen of these cases reached resolution. The remaining seven cases are being followed by the police and the Community Forum.

Appendix B: Initial Interview Questions

Although the EWER actors were asked varying questions based on the flow of conversation and what their own experience has been, each group discussion was structured around the same general set of questions.

Community Forum and Advisory Council

1. Assuming I have no prior knowledge of the project, and that I have never heard of SFCG or the EWS, how would you describe this project to me?
2. How did you become involved in this project? What was your role?
3. How did you hear about this project?
4. Did you receive any trainings? How many did you go to?
5. What did you learn at the training? Did you like the training? Was it useful to you?
6. How were the trainings different from each other? Which did you like better and why? (if applicable)
7. What kind of trainings do you think would be useful?
8. Did you receive any reports from SFCG as part of this project? What reports did you receive?
9. Were they sent to you directly or to another person you work with?
10. Did each person you work with have access to them?
11. How often did they come? Did they arrive in a regular, timely way?
12. Did the reports share information that was new for you or did you usually already know about what was in them?
13. Once the reports came into your office, who read them? How often were they read? By who? How long after the information came in would you read the reports?
14. What did you do with the information from the reports? Why? From which reports?
15. Overall did you find them useful? Informative? Which parts of the reports?
16. Going forward with the program, what would you recommend that SFCG do the same? Differently?
17. How many meetings did you attend?
18. Did you find these meetings useful? Why/not?
19. Did they help you to be more informed or you already knew everything going on?
20. Did you do anything differently as a result of these meetings?
21. Did these meetings help you at all in working more or better with other people who attended the meetings?
22. Did these meetings help you at all in your level of understanding about the conflict trends in your area?
23. Since you have been involved in this project, has the overall amount of information on conflict trends that you have received changed? What about the quality of information?
24. What was the role of the EWS, reports and meetings in these changes? Which were the most/least useful and why?
25. Overall, has your community been more, less, or about the same in its ability to respond to conflicts as a result of this project?
26. Have you heard of any other SMS early warning systems operating in Maiduguri? Do you use them? What is like having multiple systems?
27. Going forward, what would you recommend that SFCG do the same? What would you recommend they do differently?
28. Do you have any questions? Anything else you would like to add that I didn’t ask you about?
Data collectors and local consultants

1. Assuming I have no prior knowledge of the project, and that I have never heard of SFCG or the EWS, how would you describe this project to me?
2. How did you become involved in this project? What was your role?
3. How did you hear about this project?
4. Did you receive any trainings? How many did you go to?
5. What did you learn at the training? Did you like the training? Was it useful to you?
6. How were the trainings different from each other? Which did you like better and why? (if applicable)
7. What kind of trainings do you think would be useful?
8. How many people here have sent in an SMS? How many did you send? How many went through? What was the content of the SMSs? (data collectors) How many SMS texts have you received? What was the content of the SMSs? (consultants)
   - What did you think about them when you received them?
   - Were they useful? Were they helpful?
9. Did you have any network problems with the messages? How frequently?
10. What happened after you sent in your SMSs? Was there any follow up response? How people had this response? (data collectors)
11. What happened after you received the SMSs? Was there any follow up response? How many people had this response?
12. What was it like using the SMS system? Was it easy or confusing? Why?
13. In practice, were there incidents that you knew about that you did not report? Why? (data collectors)
14. How many of you shared what you learned at the training with other members of your community? Tell me about your experiences.
15. How many of you helped share posters, brochures, or announcements to other people?
16. Since you have been involved in this project, has the overall amount of information on conflict trends that you have received changed? What about the quality of information?
17. What was the role of the EWS in these changes?
18. Overall, has your community been more, less, or about the same in its ability to respond to conflicts as a result of this project?
19. Have you heard of any other SMS early warning systems operating in Maiduguri? Do you use them? What is like having multiple systems?
20. Going forward, what would you recommend that SFCG do the same? What would you recommend they do differently?
21. Do you have any questions? Anything else you would like to add that I didn't ask you about?