PLATEAU WILL ARISE! BUILDING AN ARCHITECTURE FOR PEACE AND TOLERANCE

Final Evaluation Report

August 2015

Jos, Nigeria

The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of Search for Common Ground and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.
CONTENTS

Executive summary ................................................................................................................. 5

1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 10
2. Context ................................................................................................................................. 13
3. Overview of the Plateau Will Arise Project ......................................................................... 16
4. The community perspective ............................................................................................... 18
5. Analysis of the Plateau will Arise ! Project ................................................................. 33
6. Key findings, conclusions and recommendations ............................................................... 37

Appendices

Appendix 1: List of people consulted
Appendix 2: PWA Results framework
Appendix 3: Summary of key findings from SFCG Conflict Mapping report (2013)
Appendix 4: Profile of the Consensus Research evaluation team
Appendix 5: Participatory Conflict analysis exercises

List of Tables

Table 1 Overview of the data collection process
Table 2 List of Focus Groups
Table 3 Summary of programme outputs
Table 4 Survey participants: Education levels
Table 5 PWA activities engaged in by survey participants
Table 6 Perceptions of intergroup relations over the last 2 years.
Table 7 Factors contributing to improved inter groups relations
Table 8 Relationship between the community and the security forces

List of Charts

Chart 1 Survey participants: Age
Chart 2 Survey Participants: Religion
Chart 3  Factors preventing people from participating in peacebuilding activities
Chart 4  Perceptions of inter group relationships over the last 2 years
Chart 5  Who Contributed to improved inter groups relations
Chart 6  Peace Radio programmes: Listenership details
Chart 7  Factors contributing to improved security
This project is funded by The European Union

MAP OF PLATEAU STATE
**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPP</td>
<td>Community Action for Popular Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOS</td>
<td>Community Based Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Community Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Christian Association of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU IfS</td>
<td>European Union Instrument for Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRT</td>
<td>Jos Repertory Theatre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSRP</td>
<td>Nigerian Stability and Reconciliation Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHRC</td>
<td>National Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAD</td>
<td>Peace Architecture Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFCG</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWA!</td>
<td>Plateau Will Arise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>Independent National Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPPN</td>
<td>Plateau Peace Practitioners Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCDC</td>
<td>Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSS</td>
<td>State Security Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOT</td>
<td>Training of Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCWS</td>
<td>National Council of Women Societies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive summary

Plateau State is recognised as one of the most diverse state in Nigeria with over 50 different ethnic groups and up to 40 languages. In many ways it is a microcosm of Nigeria and the conflict in the Plateau reflects wider divisions and tensions across the country. Plateau State, and in particular the main city of Jos has experienced several serious outbreaks of violence over the last 15 years, which have resulted in at least 7,000 deaths and the displacement of up to a quarter of a million people. The situation in the Plateau has implications for ethnic relations across the country, and in this context the work of Search for Common Ground (SFCG) is particularly important and has created useful models of work and valuable learning which are relevant to inter-community relations at national level. The key drivers of conflict in the Plateau are a complex mix of ethnicity, indigene-settler issue, political power struggles, land disputes, and discrimination, as well as criminality and cattle rustling. The situation is further complicated by the security environment, particularly the lack of capacity and poor discipline among sections of the security forces, combined with the strained relationship between the security forces and local communities. At the core of the violence in Plateau State is a struggle for power and control between the two main ethno-religious groups in the area – the mainly Christian “indigene” tribes and the Muslim “settler” tribes (the Hausa-Fulani) This competition has resulted in regular outbreaks of violence as ethno-religious identity groups vie for control of political, economic, and communal resources with land and grazing disputes a focal issue in the rural areas of the Plateau.

The Plateau Will Arise (PWA) project is supported under the EU Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace and was implemented by SFCG over a two year period (June 2013 - June 2015) It aimed to build locally owned and inclusive peace architecture in Plateau State and has been implemented in eight Local Government Areas (LGAs). PWA was implemented in partnership with two main local partners, the Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP) and the Jos Repertory Theatre (JRT) with objective of creating an improved climate of peace, strengthening the role of the State in providing security and supporting the Peaceful Elections Campaigns in the lead up to the 2015 Presidential elections. There was a strong focus throughout the programme on building the capacity of civil society and facilitating its engagement with the Government and Security Forces. The programme activities included, conflict resolution training for key stakeholders (civil society, local leaders, government and security sector personnel etc) media programs including radio drama, the establishment of an Early Warning System (EWS) and the development of Peace Architecture Dialogues (PAD) at State level and the Community Security Architecture (CSA) at the LGA level.

The situation on the ground in the Plateau as perceived by local communities has been very difficult with high levels of fear and ongoing tension and violence. However there is a clear view among those consulted that the situation has improved over the last two years with better community relations and less tension and fear. In Jos people are mixing more, particularly in the markets, which had become segregated after the last outbreak of violence and people state that there are now fewer “no go areas” in the city. However people are conscious that the city is heavily segregated and polarised, and those involved in community activity recognise that there

---

1 This evaluation was carried out over a two month period (May –June 2105) and included extensive consultations with stakeholders at local, state and national levels and a community survey in the four target LGA which involved almost 600 respondents.
are still tension and risks. The situation in the rural areas is more volatile with regular violent incidents leading to significant number of deaths, damage to property and ongoing displacement of people.

The findings of the survey indicate that people in both rural and urban areas feel that there have been improvements in a number of areas which are critical to stability and peace. Two out of three people surveyed feel that intergroup relations (i.e. relations between the two main ethno-religious groups, the Muslim Hausa-Fulani and the Christian groups) have improved despite the recurring outbreaks of violence. There is a clear consensus that the local communities themselves as well as traditional and religious leaders have played a central role in this and that increased skills levels among the communities was an important factor in improving relationships. The role of dialogue at local level is also seen as very significant as is the increased engagement of women and youth in peacebuilding. Those surveyed also feel that security has improved considerable over the last two years and the security forces are now viewed quite positively. Again the increase in the skills levels of the security personnel is considered to be an important contributory factor in this change.

There are some differences in how the two main communities (Muslim and Christian) perceive relationships and the situation the Plateau and there are also some differences in the perspectives of men and women. In general the Muslim community are more positive about intergroup relations and Muslim women are even more positive. The Muslim community is also very positive about the security situation and relationships with the security forces. On the other hand Christian women were more pessimistic about relations with the security forces although their male counterparts were quite positive.

Stakeholders are very positive about different elements of the PWA project particularly the dialogue processes (the PAD and the CSA), the training provided and the messages of peace disseminated at the training and via Peace radio. The PAD is recognised as a key aspect in the process of bringing stability to the Plateau and a range of stakeholders have commented on its value, the contribution it has made to peace and its potential as a building block for future reconciliation and stability. However communities are conscious of the fact that there are still major issues in the Plateau area and that fears and divisions run deep. They are also aware that there is ongoing violence and high levels of tension in several rural areas with regular incidents between farmers and grazers and major problems with cattle rustling. Other significant threats include a proliferation of weapons in both rural and urban areas, an increase in criminality, ongoing human rights abuses by elements of the security forces and a steady increase in Internally Displaced People (IDPs) both from the rural areas of the Plateau and from the North East where people are fleeing Boko Haram violence.

There are challenges in assessing the impact of PWA as it is a relatively short term intervention and the context in the Plateau region is volatile and dynamic. Nevertheless there are some indications that the project is having an impact on key issues and that the work is contributing to stability in the Plateau. People consulted during the evaluation stated that the situation had improved, that inter group relations had got better and that they felt safer due to improved security. PWA has intervened in several critical areas and it is clear that the work of the different project components are adding up and contributing to stability and peace. The evaluation has identified a number of key areas where PWA has made a positive contribution. In particular it has brought hope to the communities, given them a sense of purpose and
This project is funded by
The European Union

This project is funded by
The European Union

empowered them to try to build community relations and deal with these conflicts. It has also been a catalyst to bring people together in a safe space where they can rebuild relationships. Projects participants have gained confidence and feel that they can now play a constructive role in dealing with conflict in their communities and many appear to be committed to further work and want to use their learning. Another significant result is the change in the role of the security forces and the increased level of trust between the communities and the security forces, which can have long term benefits for both the police and the communities. PWA has promoted the involvement of women and youth and there is recognition that they have played an increasingly important role in conflict resolution processes. This work to promote more inclusive local peacebuilding processes and structures will have ongoing benefits for these communities.

The evaluation has found that the PWA project is highly relevant to the context in the Plateau and that the approaches adopted have been timely and geared to the realities on the ground. The strategy of developing local peace infrastructure such as the PAD and CSA are particularly relevant as these structure provide space to try to prevent and resolve conflict as well as building relationships between stakeholders –including groups who are directly involved in conflict. Building the capacity of both the local communities and the security forces to enable them to prevent and respond more effectively to conflict has been particularly effective as it encourages and facilitates local ownership and empowers communities to take on the role of peace builders at local level. Efforts to build the capacity of the security forces are particularly important given endemic weaknesses in these forces and the complex and volatile security situation across the Plateau and at national level.

There is strong evidence to suggest that the PWA project has been effective despite the fact that the levels of conflict remain high in several rural LGAs. A key factor in the effectiveness of PWA and one of its main achievements has been gaining the confidence of the local communities, the security forces and the local government. The PAD is seen as a particularly important mechanism by both the local communities and by Government and security actors and there is consensus that these structures have facilitated collaboration and helped develop more coherent responses to the conflict. The PWA intervention has contributed to an improvement in the overall security context and it is reasonable to conclude that it has contributed to a reduction in the level of violence and made a significant contribution to stability in the Plateau. There is considerable evidence that the PWA has been working on the right issues at the right time and that the strategies employed were effective with a good level of sustainability.

The core strategies of the project; building local capacity, developing peace architecture and promoting peace and reconciliation through the media have each made useful contributions to stability in the Plateau. PWA has built a good platform for further work and is well positioned to provide ongoing support to peacebuilding at an important time in the State. The factors driving these conflicts are complex and there are likely to be ongoing tension and regular outbreaks of violence. In this volatile context there is an ongoing need for the PWA programme and for increased focus on critical issues and on conflict hotspots in both rural and urban areas. In order to increase its effectiveness and impact PWA needs to strengthen its early warning system, respond more flexibly to potential flashpoints and to invest more time in working with the communities to build sustainable agreements. There is also a need for enhanced co-ordination with other agencies particularly the other EU supported projects working to address the conflict. The PWA has created good links with the different sections of the Government and should use this to integrate and mainstream peacebuilding into government programmes,
including strategies to ensure that all Government programmes are conflict sensitive and that they facilitate peacebuilding and where possible create a “peace dividend”. The nature of the conflict in the Plateau and the fact that new crises can emerge in different LGAs means that the PWA needs to be nimble and flexible and able to respond to these without weakening the core strategic work.

**Recommendations**

1. The PWA projects should be renewed by the EU and efforts made to secure more long term support for a sustained programme of work to address the many conflict issues in the Plateau.
2. The PWA project should retain its focus on building locally owned and inclusive peace architecture in Plateau State but should extend its remit to address conflict hotspots in neighbouring LGAs where this is considered feasible and appropriate.
3. SFCG should ensure that there are adequate financial and human resources to effectively implement the programme of work and to respond to any emerging crises.
4. The PWA should review and strengthen a number of its core programme activities to ensure they are as effective as possible. This includes the PAD, the mediation process at local level and the early warning system.
5. The PWA should explore if a regional PAD structure could be developed to address issues related to land and gazer/farmer disputes in a more strategic manner.
6. The PWA should work with relevant partners to develop a strategy to improve community relations in Jos.
7. The PWA should work closely with relevant government agencies to mainstream peacebuilding across different sectoral areas (education, health, agriculture and planning).
8. The PWA should build on the good relationship it has built up with the security forces and continue to build their capacity to work more effectively, to protect human rights and to “do no harm” in the communities.
9. The PWA should collaborate with the other projects funded under the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace and look for opportunities to link the work of these programme with its own work.
10. The EU should ensure that it provides PWA with the scope and resources to respond in a timely and effective manner to the conflict dynamics in the Plateau.
11. The PWA should disseminate the finds of the survey to other stakeholders through the PAD and CSA and use this to review and plan for future work.
1. Introduction

The Plateau Will Arise (PWA) project is delivered by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) in partnership with a number of local organisations and is supported under the EU Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace. It aims to build active, locally owned and inclusive peace architecture in Plateau State. The PWA! Project targets stakeholder’s including community residents and leaders, religious leaders, civil society, government officials, and security forces. The project has been implemented in eight local government areas in Plateau State; Jos North, Jos South, Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Bokkos, Qua’an Pan, Shendam and Wase.

PWA was an 18 month Project (July 2013 – January 2015) with a total budget of €1.35m and was extended by 6 mths. to July 2015 under a no cost extension. The project has been carried out in partnership with the Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP) and the Jos Repertory Theatre (JRT) and in partnership with the Office of the Special Adviser on Peacebuilding and the Plateau Peace Practitioners Network (PPPN).

SFCG has been active in the Plateau since 2011 and has previously implemented an EU funded programme entitled “Support in promoting confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation in Plateau State, Nigeria.”

The evaluation

The final evaluation of the PWA project was carried out by Consensus Research over a two month period from mid May to mid July 2015. The objectives of the evaluation were to:

- Assess the impact of the project by assessing the change in the conflict and peacebuilding context and the contribution of the project to those changes
- Collect the end-line indicators of success
- Draw lessons learned from the project experience; and
- Provide recommendations for an anticipated second phase of the project

Evaluation process

The evaluation process involved the following:

- A review of all relevant documents including PWA reports, SFCG reports and analysis as well as other analysis of the context in the Plateau
- Focus groups and key informant interviews including consultations with SFCG staff, PWA partners, project participants, local Government staff, community and religious leaders
- A survey in four LGAs with
- Production of a draft and final report.

Over 730 people in total were consulted over the course of the evaluation. This included Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with approx 140 people across four LGA plus 31 key informant interviews (KIIs) and the survey which survey almost 600 people. A full list of those consulted is provided in Annex 1.

The evaluation was implemented in 4 phases as follow:
(i) **Inception phase**: Desk research was carried out and an extensive set of project documents were reviewed including the baseline report, project document, interim project evaluations and monthly project reports. Evaluation questions were developed and plans drawn up for the fieldwork phase.

(ii) **Fieldwork planning phase**: A key component of the evaluation was the community survey – which surveyed over 559 people in four of the target LGAs. The design and planning of this survey was carried out during the first part of the fieldwork phase and involved; finalisation of the survey questionnaire, a training programme for surveyors and supervisors, field testing of the survey in Jos and logistical planning for conducting the survey in the four LGAs communities. The survey was designed to capture changes in the target communities and was based on the original baseline survey carried out by SFCG at the start of the project.

(iii) **Field work phase**: This phase comprised, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, site visits, and the community survey as well as further desk research.

(iv) **Data entry and analysis phase**

The process of checking and data entry of the survey data was carried out in SFCG offices in Jos over a 3 day period by a team of 8 data entry personnel. The evaluation team then carried out an analysis from the survey as well as data from the FGD, the KIIs and document review.

(v) **Reporting phase**

The reporting phase involved 2 steps. A draft report was drawn up and submitted to SFCG for review by the project team. Based on feedback from this review a final report was drawn up.

**Details of the fieldwork phase**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus group discussions</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key informant interviews</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community surveys</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1: Overview of the data collection process**

**Key informant interviews**: KIIs were carried out with SFCG staff, project partners, representatives of State governments, Federal institutions, NGOs and other informed third parties. A total of 31 people were interviewed broken down as follows;

**Focus Group Discussions**: FGDs in the target communities were a central component of the evaluation and in total the evaluation team carried out 14 FGDs. The average number of participant in the FGD in the communities was 10 giving an overall figure of 140 people consulted in this way.
Table 2: List of Focus Groups

Community and Religious Leaders in Jos

Community Security Architecture Participants; Jos

TOT Participants in Shendam

CSA Members Shendam

Bokkos Women’s Group

TOT Participants: Bokkos

SFCG PWA Project Team

TOT Participants Jos

Barkin Ladi Youth Group

Step Down Participants in Barkin-ladi

“Our Children are Talking” Focus Group

Peace Architecture Dialogue Participants

PWA project staff

PWA partners

Community Survey: The community survey was carried out over a 3 day period in the 12 communities across four LGAs by a team of 24 surveyors (6 per LGA). The surveyors worked in pairs (an interviewer and a note taker) the target was to interview 125 people in each community, the actual number of people interviewed was 559. The results of the survey are presented in section 4 below and the questionnaire is attached in Annex 5. The survey was carried out with a paper based questionnaires and the results inputted in survey monkey for analysis. Some key points on the profile of survey participants were:

- Location: Participants were drawn equally from the 4 LGAs (Barkin Ladi, Shendam, Bokkos and Jos South
- Gender: 52% male and 48% female
- Religion: 60% Christian and 40% Muslim
- Age: 18-25 (21%) 26-35 (30%) 36–45 (24%) and 46 and above 25%
2. Context

Plateau State is located in the centre of Nigeria (the Middle Belt) and is part of the North Central administrative zone. It has a population estimated to be around 3.5 million and is one of the most diverse states in Nigeria with more than 50 different ethnic groups and over 40 languages. The ethnic groups include Christian groups such as the Berom, the Anaguta, the Afizere, the Igbo, the Yoruba, the Boghom, the Tarok, the Ankwai and the Hausa–Fulani, who are Muslim. The main city and administrative capital is Jos with a population of over 1 million. While Plateau state has a Christian majority parts of Jos have a majority Hausa-Fulani (Muslim) population.

The recent history of the Plateau and other parts of the Middle Belt has been marked by ethnic tension and outbreaks of violent communal conflict. Plateau State has seen a dramatic escalation in ethnic tension and violence over the last 15 years with an estimated 7,000 killed in communal violence between 2001 and 2011 and up to 250,000 people displaced. The majority of deaths were in Jos city where outbreaks of violence resulted in over 1,000 deaths in 2001, a further 700 deaths in 2008 and in 2010 over 1,000 deaths. Over this period there have also been outbreaks of ethnic violence in surrounding rural areas, including the violence in Yelwa area, which left over 700 dead. The situation has stabilised in Jos since 2010 but the city is now heavily segregated into Christian and Muslim enclaves with limited scope for interaction between the communities.

*Ten years later, only the heavy presence of military and police forces ensures a fragile calm in the city. Tensions between ethnic groups rooted in the allocation of resources, electoral competition, fears of*
religious domination, and contested land rights have amalgamated into an explosive mix. The presence of well-organized armed groups in rural areas, the proliferation of weapons, and the sharp rise in gun fatalities within Jos all point to the real risk of future large-scale violence.

At the core of this violence is a struggle for power and control between the two main ethno-religious groups in the area—the mainly Christian “indigene” tribes and the Muslim “settler” tribes—the Hausa-Fulani. This completion has resulted in regular outbreaks of violence as ethno-religious identity groups vie for control of political, economic, and communal resources. The political and economic marginalization of recent migrants or “settler” communities has led to resentment and fear amongst both groups. The issue of “indigene-ship” is played out within the State and Local Government Area administrations (LGAs) where groups compete for land, economic, social, and political resources.

Both communities nurse a sense of grievance with the Christians tending to focus on the historical sense of exclusion by Hausa-Fulani and more recent violence, while the Hausa-Fulani feel that they are currently excluded from political and economic power and have also suffered in the recent violence.

“Indigene-settler conflicts are not new to Nigeria, but the country is currently experiencing widespread inter-communal strife, which particularly affects the Middle Belt. The Jos crisis is the result of failure to amend the constitution to privilege broad-based citizenship over exclusive indigene status and ensure that residency rather than indigeneity determines citizens’ rights.

Because the “settlers” are almost entirely Muslim and the “indigenous” people predominantly Christian, struggle over land ownership, economic resources and political control tends to be

---

3 Building an Architecture for Peace Tolerance and Reconciliation in Plateau State; Conflict Mapping Report (Sep-Oct 2013) Search for Common Ground
4 Curbing Violence in Nigeria (1) The Jos Crises. International Crises Groups (Dec 2012)
expressed not just in ethnic but also religious terms. The outbreaks of communal violence in Jos since 2001 and ongoing conflict in the surrounding rural areas has exacerbated the situation and polarised the two communities.

As violence recurs, spatial polarisation and segregation accentuate social and political divisions; people become more conscious of their sub-national solidarity and allegiances and are more forthcoming about expressing them.\(^5\)

The situation in Jos is further complicated by the fact that the Hausa-Fulani are the majority in some areas and for historical reasons see themselves as the indigenes. As a result they are aggrieved by their lack of access to power and their exclusion from decision making.

In the rural Local Government Areas (LGAs) of the Plateau the struggle for land is at the core of much of the conflict with increasing pressure from both farmers and grazers on a limited resource. “Alongside intercommunity tensions and Boko Harem-linked attacks, farmer-pastoralist tensions, armed banditry, and a heavy-handed military response have fuelled violence in rural areas outside of the state capital. Because farmers and herders involved in clashes are often “indigenous” farmers and “settler” Fulani herders, this violence is perceived as closely linked to the broader ethno-religious conflict.\(^6\)

PWA has been implemented in a complex and dynamic context which has been marked by a number of significant shifts which have shaped and impacted on the implementation of the PWA programme. The conflict mapping report carried out by SFCG at the start of the PWA programme (Sep-Oct 2013) provides a comprehensive picture of the situation in the eight LGAs where the programme was implemented and highlights how the conflict plays out on the ground and impacts on local communities. A summary of the key findings from this is provided in annex 5.

---

6 Building an Architecture for Peace Tolerance and Reconciliation in Plateau State; Conflict Mapping Report (Sep- Oct 2013) Search for Common Ground
3. Overview of the Plateau Will Arise Project

The PWA! project: Building an Architecture for Peace, Tolerance and Reconciliation is an 18 month (2013-2015) programme funded by the European Union’s Instrument for Stability (IFS) in Plateau State, Nigeria, with a total budget of € 1,350,000. It has been implemented by Search for Common Ground with the aims of building an active, locally owned and inclusive peace architecture in Plateau State. The PWA! Project works with a range of stakeholder’s including community residents and leaders, religious leaders, civil society, government officials, and security forces in eight local government areas: Jos North, Jos South, Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Bokkos, Qua’an Pan, Shendam and Wase. These areas are deeply affected both by recent and on-going violence.

The project has been implemented in partnership with two local NGOs, the Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP) and the Jos Repertory Theatre (JRT). SFCG has also worked closely with the Office of the Special Adviser on Peacebuilding and the Plateau Peace Practitioners Network (PPPN). The overall objective of the project is to “build an active, locally-owned and inclusive Peace Architecture in Plateau State”. The specific objectives of this work are to

1) Create an improved climate of peace in eight Local Government Areas and
2) Strengthen the role of the State to provide security for the population.

A summary of objectives, outputs and activities is provided an Annex 2. A cross-cutting objective was to reinforce the capacity and knowledge of local partners to implement this kind of programming. Two further activities related to the 2015 elections were incorporated into the project:

1. Support to Peaceful Elections Campaigns and Initiatives
2. Support to Community Security Architecture to Develop and Implement Violence Prevention Strategies during the elections

The focus of the PWA! Project is building local leaders’ and civil society capacities to both reduce violence and promote the consolidation of peace. The project also focus on supporting the emergence of a cohesive civil society network of peace builders and facilitating its engagement with the state government and security forces as well as integrating the unique role that women and children play as actors for peace in the region.

The key activities of the project include: training in advanced conflict resolution for key local leaders, government and security; transformational leadership training for women; media programs on TV and radio to debunk rumours and manipulations; and a children’s radio drama. The activities also include civil society led Early Warning System and Peace Architecture dialogues. In addition to these activities, two new activities (under OS 1.) were included under the No Cost Extension and they are support to peaceful elections campaigns and initiatives and support to community security architecture to develop and implement violence prevention strategies during the elections.
The target audiences for the project are community residents, including children, youth, men, women, and conflict victims; community and religious leaders and other influential actors, who can positively or negatively impact the potential for mediation and future conflict prevention; civil society and government leaders will be targeted both for capacity building, as well as for activities aimed to bring them together and local police and special task forces responsible for peace and rule of law.

Table 3: Summary of programme outputs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Outputs</th>
<th>Cumulative Outputs</th>
<th>Notes: Status as of 31/7/2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Mapping Report</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100 % Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Training of Trainers (TOT)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100% Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Women’s Transformational Leadership Skills Training</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100% Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Step-down Trainings for Real-time Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>100% Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Dialogues to develop local conflict response strategy</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>91% Completed;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Warning System Bulletins</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voices of Peace episodes</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 episodes of The Station</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100% Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52 episodes of children’s radio drama</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100% Completed,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Accompanying actions</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>88% Completed,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Multi-media case studies</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100% completed,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Security Trainings in each LGA</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100 % Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Conflict mainstreaming training for government officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100% Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Peace Architecture Dialogues</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>94% Completed –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Elections Innovations Workshop</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100% Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 CSO Non Violence Campaigns</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100 % Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Episodes of Talking Elections Radio Programme</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100 % Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Mobile Cinema Screenings</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>108% Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 CSA Meetings on Peaceful Elections</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>56% Completed – In all but Wase LGA, the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. The community perspective

This section provides an overview of the survey results from four of the eight LGAs where the PWA! has been implemented and the FGD and KIIs carried out in local communities. It explores the views and perceptions of these communities on key issues and examines the extent of change (both positive and negative) over the last two years (covering the approximate period in which PWA! has been implemented). The survey examined the following key areas;

1. Engagement with SFCG/PWA and the extent to which participants had been able to use/apply the learning
2. Intergroup relations in the Plateau
3. The role of SFCG Radio Programmes
4. Security
5. Co-ordination and relationships in the area

The results of the survey have been triangulated with the outcomes of the FGDs carried out by the evaluation team in the target communities. During the FGDs, communities were asked to identify and then rank the most significant change in their community and to map changes in relationship between stakeholder groups over the last two years. These participative exercise identified what the communities themselves considered important, the current peace and conflict trends and how they perceived the situation in their own area.

Focus Group in Bokkos

Profile of the survey participants
A total of 559 people were survey with participants drawn equally from across the four LGAs; Barkin Ladi, Bokkos, Jos South and Shendam. There was a good spread of ages and a gender balance among participants. A slightly higher number (30%) were in the 26-35 category. In terms of gender the split was 52% male and 48% female. The religious make up of participants was 60% Christian and 40% Muslim.
Three quarters of participants were employed/self employed with the majority (58%) stating that they were self-employed. Just over 40% of participants stated that secondary education was the highest level of education completed and over 25% stated that they had received tertiary education.

Table 4: Survey participants: Education levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never attended school</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical/Vocational training</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>answered question</td>
<td>508</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skipped question</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Level of engagement in peacebuilding
Twenty eight percent of respondents had participated in a PWA/SFCG activity which may indicate a fairly high level of penetration by PWA but could also be due to project participants being more willing to take part in the survey. Of those who had taken part in a PWA activity 40% had been involved in participatory conflict resolution, 36% in training, 37% in Peace Architecture Dialogue (PAD) and 21% in Community Security Architecture (CSA)

Table 5: PWA activities engaged in by survey participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PWA activities</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SFCG organised Training programme</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examples of how people were able to use these skills included

“I have been applying the skill and knowledge acquired in discharging my duties as security personnel by being professional in my conduct”

“By staying peacefully and making peace with others I called our people to discuss with them about peace and there are positive results”

“I do share the knowledge to people around me and I have been a peace ambassador in my community”

“I learnt how to mediate in times of conflict”

“It has helped in managing conflict in the society through series of dialogue organized between farmers and herders”

“He preaches on the need for dialogue among all followers in the mosque, it has helped reduce violent conflict”

“He was part of a team that calmed people down from formenting trouble during elections (2015)”

“I have settled cattle related disputes without bias and I have been preaching peace”

“I was able to settle conflict in Mongur over the blockage of a cattle route”
Those who took part in PWA activities felt that they have been able to apply the skills they have learned with almost three quarters of participants stating that they have been able to do this. Project participants were asked to rank the extent to which they were able to use these skills and a high percentage felt that they were able to apply these skills fairly regularly (38% used the skills very regularly and a further 25% stated that they used them regularly). Participants provided a range of examples of how they applied the skills in their personal and family life and in the wider community where they have been able to resolve conflict. A number of people stated that they had been able to intervene in conflicts about land and grazing; two of the key issues at the heart of conflict in the Plateau.

Over half of respondents (N=498) stated that they had taken part in other conflict resolution activities over the last two years and listed a range of activities that they had engaged in including:

- Town hall/community /tribal meetings
- Women’s peace activities
- Muslim /Christian peace activities
- School/youth peace programmes
- Security awareness/vigilante
- Dialogue and mediation

Those who had not taken part in peacebuilding activities were asked to identify the factors, which had prevented them from taking part. Of those who responded (N=235) 45% stated that they were not aware of the activities and a further 28% stated that they were not given the chance.

---

7 A number of participants referred to the work of other agencies including Mercy Corps and the Red Cross in this section
Chart 3: Factors preventing people from participating in peacebuilding activities

This would indicate that the majority of people are open to taking part in peacebuilding activities if given the opportunity and only a small number (11%) are not interested.

Inter group relations

The survey explored people perspectives on inter groups relations over the last two years and the factors which had either contributed to an improvement or a deterioration in relationships. Over two thirds felt that relationships had improved with 36% feeling they had improved a lot and a further 33% feeling that they had improved a little. Eighteen percent felt they had got worse while 10% felt they had remained the same.

The situation across the target LGAs in the PWA is complex with localised conflict and outbreaks of violence. There are also some difference in terms of how people perceive relationships between the two main communities and relationships between these communities and the security forces. This complexity also emerged in the Conflict mapping exercise carried out by SFCG in Sep-Oct 2013. This report referred to the fact that “the conflicts in Plateau state are diverse and should not all be understood as Christian-Muslim violence” It did highlight a number of specific problem areas where there had been serious violence and were inter-community tensions were high. (See summary of the situation in Annex 3) Overall the evaluation has found that the situation has improved despite some localised problems and the continued risk of renewed outbreaks of violence. There is evidence of some important shifts in relationships between the two main communities and between communities and the Security forces since the start of the PWA and there is potential to build on this. However the overall context is volatile and the nature of the conflict plus a range of external factors can lead to renewed outbreaks of violence which could easily undo a lot of positive work carried out under the PWA

---

8 Intergroup relations in the context of the Plateau refers to relationships between the mainly Christian indigene ethnic groups and the Muslim Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups.
There were a fair level of consistency across the four LGAs. Shendam was the most positive with three quarters of respondents feeling that inter group relations had improved (44% felt it had improved a little and a further 34% felt it had improved a lot) and only 9% felt it had got worse. There were similar figures in Bokkos. In Barkin-Ladi there was a more negative view with 32% feeling relations had got worse (24% felt it got worse and 8% a lot worse ) while 30% felt relationships had improved a little and 27% felt they had improved a lot. In Jos South 20% felt that relationships had got worse.

Table 6: Perceptions of intergroup relations over the last 2 years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have Inter group Relationships</th>
<th>Jos South</th>
<th>Bokkos</th>
<th>Barkin Ladi</th>
<th>Shendam</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved a little</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved a lot</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayed the same</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Got worse</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Got a lot worse</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey focused in on the factors which have contributed to either an improvement or deterioration in intergroup relations by asking who and what contributed to these changes. There is a clear consensus that the local communities themselves as well as traditional and religious leaders have played a central role. Three quarters of respondents felt that the communities themselves contributed while 78% felt that Religious leaders had played an important role. This view is reinforced by the fact that 62% felt that increased skills levels among the communities was an
important factor in improving relationships. There are a number of interesting aspects to the figures emerging from these questions.

- The role of the security forces is seen as quite positive with 43% stating the increased skills levels among the security forces was a contributing factor.
- The role of dialogue at local level is seen as very significant in improving relationships as is the involvement of women and youth in peacebuilding.
- The role of politicians and the Government is not considered to be a significant factor with only 3% and 10% respectively indicating that they played a role.
- Those who had participated in SFCG/PWA activities were slightly more positive about the situation with three quarters stating the relationships had improved (45% stating they had improved a lot and a further 33% stating that they had improved a little).

**Table 7: Factors contributing to improved inter groups relations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased skills among security services</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased skill in Government</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased skills in local communities</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement of youth in peacebuilding</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement of women in peacebuilding</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media messages</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased co-ordination/co-operation between agencies</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased co-ordination/co-operation between communities and Government</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased dialogue at local level</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondents are very positive about the capacity of the communities to resolve conflict peacefully with three quarters of people surveyed feeling that this was either good (48%) or very good (26%) and less than 10% feeling that this capacity was either bad or very bad.

**Chart 5: Who Contributed to improved inter groups relations**

Factors contributing to deteriorating community relations

- Lack of understanding, illiteracy, tribalism
- Lack of patience, and land dispute for pastoral purposes
- Land dispute between indigenes and settlers (Fulanis)
- Suspicion among the different ethnic groups and religion
- Lack of unity and understanding along ethno-religious lines
- Lack of job and lack of understanding
- Lack of understanding and also teachings to people (wrong teachings)
- Lack of trust, Lack of tolerance, Lack of proper communications
- The first problem is the politicians, there is a barrier in the security agencies in timely intervention in conflicts.
- Religion and tribalism
- The failure of the religious leaders, the government and local government
- No understanding between the ethnic groups
- Lack of putting heads together for peace and progress (unity)
The influence Peace Radio

There appears to be a good level of listenership of peace radio with 70% of respondents stating that they listened to some peace radio. Seventy percent of those that listened (N=319) listened to “Voices of Peace” and 38% listened to “Talking elections” while 15% listened to “Our Children are talking.” Around 45% of the audience are regular listeners with 22% listening on a daily basis and a further 20% listening a few times a week. Around half of the audience said that they listen occasionally.

Chart 6: Peace Radio programmes: Listenership details
The survey asked if Peace Radio had influenced or changed people in any way. A sample of the responses included:

- Learned how to behave and relate with others
- It made me live in peace with everyone and have the mind to protect even if he is not from my religion
- It makes me more enlightened and informed on peace and security
- It has made me to understand that we need one another. As a result, I have been appreciating others.
- knowing that both religions preach peace and not to be bias on one side only
- it has made me to tolerate and accommodate other people
- it made me to take up the challenge of participating in peace building
- I have learned how to live in peace with people of the other tribe
- It has made me to accept peace and say no to violence
- It has helped to encourage my children to be careful with rumours
- As a woman, she has been able to stop insulting cattle rearers even if they damage her farm products. She instead report to the authority within the village
- It has helped him to inform his church followers adequately on peace building in their community
- It has changed my perception on other groups, making me more accommodating

There were also a number of interesting comments about how to improve Peace Radio. A number of these referred to the need to have the programmes in other languages including Hausa:

- “The broadcast of the program in Hausa will increase its listenership”
- Adopt the use of dialects and pigin English

The programs should be aired more frequently including at weekends and should be on more stations and be more available in the remote rural areas;

- It should be aired on all local radio stations
- More time should be given for those programmes so that people can join them at any time”
- There should be better coverage into interior areas where these conflicts are prone
- The peace station should reach out to remote communities where the conflict is more.
- Radio peace problems should include issues of poverty and corruption

A number of respondents focused on the need to bring the programme “closer to the people” and to involve new and different people

- “Taking the radio Programme close to the people in the community”
- Through involvement of the grassroots in the programs
- The peace radio station should be brought closer to the community.
Security

There is a strong view that the security situation has improved with three quarters of respondents (N=490) expressing the view that security in their community has improved over the last two years. Thirty six percent felt it had improved a little and 40% felt it had improved a lot while only 10% felt it had got worse. The key factor in this is the work of the local communities with over 70% identifying this as an important factor. The work of CSOs/CBOs and NGOs is also seen as an important factor by around half the respondents – as is improved policing and security. Around a quarter feel that media messages are a factor.

Chart 7: Factors contributing to improved security

There is also a clear view among respondents that relationships between the community and the security forces have improved with three quarters of respondents stating the situation had improved.

Table 6: Relationship between the community and the security forces
This project is funded by
The European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved a little</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved a lot</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayed the same</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Got worse</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Got a lot worse</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However those who feel the security situation has not improved/got worse (N=55) place a lot of blame on the security forces. Factors causing a deterioration in the security situation included:

- Inability of the government to take prompt action or turning a deaf ear.
- Because security agencies don't care about peoples safety
- It is worse because the military in particular are not protecting us but killing us
- Security personnel especially the army have taken sides and don't respond promptly to distress calls of attacks
- The understanding between the security and the community members seized to co-exist

The view on relationships between the communities and the Government is less positive although over half of respondents feel this has also improved. (33% feel it has improved a little while 21% feel it has improved a lot) However almost 20% feel it has deteriorated.

**Ethnic and gender dimensions**

There are a number of important patterns emerging in the survey although it would be necessary to interrogate these figures further and carry out more consultations in order to get a more comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground in different areas. There are some notable differences in how the two main communities (Muslim and Christian) perceive relationships and the situation the Plateau and there are also some differences in the perspectives of men and women.

When we look at overall relationships 64% of Christian feel that intergroup relationships have improved (32% a little and 32% a lot) while the equivalent figures in the Muslim community is 78% (44% feel it improved a little and 34% a lot) In the Christian community nearly a quarter feel that relationships have got worse while the equivalent figure for the Muslim community is only 12%. The perspective of Muslim women (N=90) is even more striking with 80% feeling that relations had improved (55% felt relations had improved a little and a further 25% felt that they had improved a lot) Only 7% felt they had got worse while none felt they had got a lot worse.

On the other hand 30% of Christian women feel that intergroup relations have got worse (25% a little and 5% a lot) while 57% feel they have got better (34% a little and 23% a lot) Christian men are also more positive than their female counterparts with 71% of the view that relations had improved (31% a little and 41% a lot) while only 15% feel it had had got worse.

There are similar views with regard to security and relationships with the security forces. Over three quarters of Christian males feel that security has improved (37% a little and 40% a lot) and there are similar figures for the relationships between the security forces and the community (34% feel this improved a little and 40% feel it improved a lot) Only 8% feel it got worse. They are less positive about relations with the government with 58% feel it had improved, 26% felt it stayed the same and 15% felt it got worse.
Christian women are a little more negative than males about the security situation and relations with the security forces, with 12% of the view that security had got worse and just over two thirds of the view that it had improved. Only 24% of Christian women feel that relationships have improved a lot where as as the equivalent figure for males is 40%.

Muslim males are also positive about security with a quarter feel it had improved a little and over half (54%) feel it had improved a lot. Only 7% feel it got worse. A large percentage (86%) feel that relations between the community and the security forces has improved (40% a little and 46% a lot) However relations with the Gov. is less positive with a quarter feel it had got worse and just over half felt these had improved.

On the other hand female Muslims are very positive about security with 86% feel it had got better (50% a little and 36% a lot) while only 7% feel it had got worse. There are similar figures for the relationships between the community and the security forces with only 3% of Muslim women stating that they had got worse and 85% stating that they had improved (40% a little and 45% a lot) However almost 30% of Muslim women feel that relations with the Government had got worse and just over half felt these had improved.

This does show a change from the situation at the start of the project when the conflict Mapping Report was carried out and indicates that the PWA work with the Security sector and efforts to build relationships have been effective.

The exercise discovered varying levels of trust of government and security forces across the LGAs sampled. In some instances, respondents said there was no real government or security presence, and that communities were left to defend themselves. In other instances, respondents revealed that security forces were sometimes conflict participants or violated human rights abuses on the community. In other cases, the STF is credited with restoring order in the area. This complexity requires extremely localized efforts and approaches to the inclusion of security agencies in peacebuilding initiatives.\(^{10}\)

Engagement in peacebuilding

Overall there appears to be a lower level of involvement in peacebuilding activities among the Muslim community. However there are some interesting patterns when the figures are disaggregated by gender. Thirty percent of Christians consulted had taken part in SFCG/PWA activities while over half stated that they had taken part in other conflict resolution activities (54% of females and 52% of males) A positive development has been the increased engagement of women in peacebuilding. The PWA Conflict Mapping Report indicated that women were not very active at that stage and were not considered to be key players in peacebuilding.

\(^{10}\) PWA Conflict Mapping Report Final (Sep-Oct 2013)
While commonly identified as actors of influence, a majority of respondents did not specifically mention women as taking leadership roles in resolving conflicts in their communities.11

This is an important achievement for SFCG and other peacebuilding actors and provides a stronger platform for future peacebuilding work in Plateau State.

The figures for involvement in SFCG/PWA programme are lower in the Muslim community at 25% but considerably higher for other conflict resolution activities with 56% involved in these. Muslim women are less likely to be involved than their male counterparts with 21% involved in SFCG/PWA activities and 39% involved in other conflict resolution work. The relevant figures for Muslim males are 28% and 69% respectively. This is very high with over two thirds of Muslim males involved in some peacebuilding activities.

The main reason given for not being involved in peacebuilding activities was a lack of awareness of these activities and this is particularly the case among women with 52% of Muslim women and 49% of Christian women giving this as their reason for not engaging. This figure is even higher among young women with 70% of young Muslim females giving this as the reason for not engaging. Not being given the chance was cited as the second most significant reason for not engaging.

Key points emerging from the FGDs and KIIIs

Over the course of the evaluation the team carried out an extensive consultation process involving 14 FGDs and over 30 KIIIs with different stakeholders across 4 of the LGA where PWA is being implemented. This provides a reasonably comprehensive picture of the situation in Plateau at that time. However it is important to note that the conflict is volatile with regular incidents in rural areas and the context at local level can change dramatically in a short space of time. In addition the recent bombings in Jos in mid July could change the context although there is no evidence of an immediate negative impact on community relations.

The situation in the Plateau as perceived by local communities has been very challenging and dangerous with high levels of fear and ongoing tension and violence. People in both urban and rural areas referred regularly to “secret killings” the presence of “no go areas” land disputes between farmers and grazers, intimidation and harassment, and destruction of houses and property, rape and killings. They identified a range of causes including ethnic and religious tension and division, political division, land disputes, cattle rustling, discrimination, suspicion, misinformation and intolerance. They also highlighted neglect by the government and mistrust between the communities and the security forces.

11 ibid
There is a clear view among those consulted that the situation in the Plateau has improved over the last two years with better community relations and less tension and fear. In Jos people are mixing more, particularly in the markets which had become segregated after the last outbreak of violence in the city and people state that there are less “no go areas” in the city. The relationship mapping exercises indicates that there have been significant improvements in relationships between Christians and Muslim in Bokkia, Jos South and Barkin Ladi. These also demonstrate a change in relationships between the security forces and the local community in Yelwa.Shendam.(See Appendix 4)

A number of those consulted referred to the Congo-Russia area and highlighted the fact that this flashpoint was now secure and that Christians and Muslims were mixing freely and beginning to live peacefully together. Those involved in the work are very positive about the role of SFCG and attribute this stability to the work with the community and the focus on involving different sections of the community in peacebuilding. They also point it the improvement in relations in Jos between the community and the Security Forces.

The situation in the rural areas is more volatile with regular violent incidents leading to significant number of deaths, damage to property and ongoing displacement of people as a result of this violence. Despite this the communities consulted in areas such as Yelwa, Bokkos and Barkin Ladi feel that the situation has improved and that there are better relations between Christians and Muslims (farmers and grazers). People reported that there is increased levels of trust, a reduction in “secret killings” that people can move freely and that there is tolerance and acceptance of each other.

Stakeholders are very positive about different elements of the PWA project particularly the Peace architecture process including PAD, the CSA and other structures supported by PWAS such as Youth for Peace. They are also very positive about the training provided and the messages of peace disseminated at the training and via Peace radio. The PAD is recognised as a key aspect in the process of bringing stability to the Plateau and a range of stakeholders have commented on its value and the contribution it has made to peace. The membership in the PAD is recognised as a critical factor and the engagement of the government and the security forces in PAD is beginning to address one of the key issues in the Plateau and across Nigeria – i.e. the breakdown in relationships and the deep mistrust and suspicion between...
citizens and the security forces. There are a number of elements of PAD which were highlighted as being important:

- The fact that it is held in government offices indicates that it is being taken seriously by the Government and gives it credibility.
- The composition of the PAD itself is also key; particularly the involvement of senior security personnel indicates that the security forces want to work with the communities to deal with the security problems in the region.
- The fact that both the different ethnic groups and both Christian and Muslim are participating is also critical. A sense of exclusion is a key driver of conflict in the Plateau and the PAD provides one avenue for all sections of the community to voice their opinions and discuss key issues.
- A third factor is the fact that people feel it is a safe space to discuss sensitive issues which are at the core of the conflict.

A major problem in recent years has been reprisal attacks and a key factor in this has been misinformation and rumours which can be used to mobilise people and can lead to an escalation in violence and cause the situation to spiral out of control. A number of those consulted highlighted the role of PWA in combating rumours and misinformation and in spreading messages of peace.

A number of those consulted through the KIIs and FGDs have highlighted the skills they have acquired through the PWA training and in several cases they referred to situations where they could apply these skills to good effect. They also pointed to the benefits of joint training where there is a mix of ethnic groups and participants from both Christian and Muslim backgrounds. Participants highlighted the critical role these events play in rebuilding relationships and enabling people to start to live together again. These relationships are seen as critical in preventing small incidents from escalating and the involvement of youth in these activities is seen as particularly important. A good example of this is the Jos Youth for Peace group which has engaged young people from across the ethnic/religious divide and is considered to be an important element in reducing the levels of tension and conflict in Jos South.

Those consulted referred to the value of early warning systems and the fact that they feel they have someone to turn to when there is an outbreak of violence or deterioration in security. They also point to the improved relationships between the communities and the security forces including the links created through PAD as being critical in the increased confidence people feel in the security forces.
The fact that the recent elections were relatively peaceful in the Plateau is considered by many to be a key indicator of the increased stability in the region and a measure of the effectiveness of PWA in supporting the electoral process and in promoting messages of peace in the lead up to the election. The engagement of the INEC through PWA is seen as very useful as this improved trust in the INEC and the electoral process and reduced the potential for violence in the lead up to the elections. In the 2014 Local Government election the threat of violence forced the cancellation of these elections in Jos North and Wasse. However in the 2015 Presidential elections there was no violence in either of these areas despite the difficult and contentious political atmosphere which prevailed in the state.

However people consulted are conscious of the fact that there are still major issues in the Plateau area and that fears and divisions run deep. They are also aware that there is ongoing violence and high levels of tension in several rural areas with regular incidents between farmers and grazers and major problems with cattle rustling. The key issues identified by those consulted were:

- Jos is heavily segregated and polarised. While there is no violence and the on the surface the situation is calm those who are involved in community activity recognise that there are still tension and risks.
- There is an increase in the proliferation of weapons in both rural and urban areas
- There has been a steady increase in IDPs both from the rural areas of the Plateau and from the North East where people are fleeing Boko Haram violence. This put pressure on resources in the city and can be a cause of instability. While some NGOs are offering some assistance there is no co-ordinated or effective response to this potential crisis.
- There has been an increase in criminality and particularly in cattle rustling and this is a driver of conflict in rural areas.

Both the survey and the relationship mapping exercises carried out as part of the evaluation indicate that the target communities have increased capacity to deal with conflict, they have more confidence in their ability to address these issues, more people are now involved in peacebuilding and that the levels of tension and mistrust have decreased. However the problem of sporadic local violence continues across the Plateau with ongoing risk of further escalations and the real threat of more serious outbreaks of inter-communal violence.
5. Analysis of the Plateau will Arise! Project

**Relevance:** assesses the extent to which the objectives and activities of the intervention respond to the context in the Plateau, how well it addresses the needs of the communities and the key drivers of conflict. The conflict in the Plateau is connected to a wider conflict occurring across the Middle Belt of Nigeria and some elements of the conflict such as the settler-indigene issues is linked to a key national constitutional issue. The key drivers of conflict have been identified as a complex mix of ethnicity, land disputes, indigene-settler issue, political power struggles, discrimination, fear and mistrust, as well as criminality and cattle rustling. The situation is further complicated by the security environment and a range of issues related to the security forces particularly the lack of connection between the security forces.

The PWA has adopted a two pronged approach – working to build community relationships across ethnic/religious lines and building relationships and understanding between the communities and the security forces. This approach is highly relevant to the context in the Plateau and the approaches adopted have been timely and geared to the realities on the ground. The strategy of developing local structures, the PAD, the CSA and other fora such as the Jos Youth is particularly relevant these provide a space to try to prevent and resolve conflict related issues as well as building relationships between stakeholders –including groups who are directly involved in conflict. Another key element of the PWA has been capacity building of both the local communities and the security forces to enable them to prevent and respond more effectively to conflict. Again this approach is very relevant as it encourages and facilitates local ownership and empowers communities to take on the role of peace builders at local level. Efforts to build the capacity of the security forces are particularly important given endemic weaknesses in the security forces and the complex and volatile security situation across the Plateau.

The lack of awareness about the issues involved and about the other ethnic groups combined with the problems of rumours and misinformation has created a dangerous and volatile situation where small incidents can easily escalate into large scale and violent ethnic conflict. Therefore efforts to promote messages of peace, to raise awareness about the dangers of conflict and to dispel rumours are also very important and particularly relevant to the Plateau where there are still high levels of tension and the potential for violent conflict. Similarly early warning systems are also important to try to prevent situations getting out of control especially in the rural areas where there is limited or no security presence and poor communications.

**Effectiveness** refers to the extent to which the project has met its intended objectives, or is likely to do so. It provides an assessment of the performance of the PWA project and the extent to which it has succeeded in increasing the knowledge and skill of project participants in targeted communities to successfully develop and implement strategies to peacefully resolve conflicts.

There is strong evidence to suggest that the PWA project has been effective despite the fact that the security situation is very poor in some areas and the levels of conflict remains high in several rural LGAs. Project participants are very positive about PWA and state that it has been effective in building their capacity and helping them to respond better in conflict situations and to effectively intervene to prevent or stop conflict. There is a broad consensus that the situation in the Plateau has
This project is funded by The European Union

improved and participants in FGDs and KIIs highlighted significant improvements at local level in their own areas—some of which have been flashpoints in the recent past. The survey carried out as part of the evaluation found that over two thirds of those consulted felt that relationships had improved with 36% feeling they had improved a lot and a further 33% feeling that they had improved a little. Participants also indicated that there had been significant improvements in the security situation and that relationships between the security forces and the local community had improved. The key factors which have contributed to these were considered to be the increased capacity of local communities, the involvement of youth and women in peacebuilding and increased engagement and improved capacity among the security forces. This indicates that there is a strong alignment between the work of PWA and the improved situation in the Plateau. It also indicates that the PWA has been effective and that it has made significant progress towards its objective of building locally owned and inclusive peace architecture in Plateau State.

An important factor in the effectiveness of PWA and one of its main achievements has been gaining the confidence of the people. The communities are suspicious of the police and government and therefore it was important that SCFG developed a good relationship and gained the trust of the people. The strength of the relationship and the importance of the PWA project come out strongly in the FGDs and the survey. PWA also has the confidence and trust of the security forces and the local government which is reflected in the level of engagement by these actors in the PAD and other PWA activities.

The PAD is seen as a particularly important mechanism by both the local communities and by Government and security actors involved in these processes. The fact that it gets the “right people in the room” and that there is a good level of buy-in by the different stakeholder is considered to be the key factor in its effectiveness. A second key point is that it is inclusive and provides an opportunity for minority groups and those who feel excluded to participate as equals and to bring their issues to the table. Given the scale and dispersed nature of conflict in the Plateau it is difficult for the different actors to respond effectively and there is a huge need for co-ordination and sharing to ensure that scarce resources are used most effectively. The CSA and PAD are important in promoting collaboration across the different sectors (civil society, Local government and the security forces) and trying to develop more coherent responses. The work to prevent electoral violence around the 2015 elections was particularly effective and contributed to the peaceful running of these elections. It is difficult to isolate the contribution of PWA in this regard but stakeholders are very positive about the work of PWA and clear that it was an important contributory factor.

While the PAD is considered to be working well there are issues around it and scope to significantly improve its effectiveness. Some of the issues that emerged in relation to the PAD were;

- The meetings would benefit from some initial research and consultation to get a clearer picture of the problem in a particular area and to verify the facts of the case rather than presenting stories in an open forum which could inflame tensions.
- The format of the meetings does not facilitate dialogue and problem solving and appears to be more focused on reporting on the situation in different areas and discussing the most recent incidents. While this update and overview is important there is a need for more focus on the dialogue side with opportunities for the participants to spend time working together to identify possible solutions and ways forward.
• There is a lack of clarity about implementation, follow up and reporting back and a risk that issues will be raised but not actually addressed in any meaningful way.
• There is a lack of clarity about relationship between the CSA and the PAD and there would be value in each of the CSAs reporting to the PAD so that there is more co-ordination.
• The format of the PAD may not facilitate the engagement of some groups such as women and youth and for their voice and issues to be heard.

While the overall PWA project has been quite effective there are a number of areas where there are challenges and where aspects of the work have not been effective. One of the issues that emerged was the problem of communities not adhering to agreements that they make and violence recurring. There are always likely to be problems with the implementation of an agreement and a range of factors can derail things. However it may be necessary for SFCG to review the process which produces these agreements to try to reduce the number of agreements which collapse. One of the underlying issues is the fact that SFCG uses the “number of conflicts resolved” as an indicator which put the emphasis in getting an agreement. However the volatile nature of the conflicts and the fact that external factors can destabilise these communities means that it can be difficult to sustain and implement an agreement. The PWA project needs to review the process used in these agreements and invest more time in both in developing a sustainable agreement and in monitoring and supporting any agreements to ensure that they are adhered to by the parties.

The nature of the conflict in the Plateau and the risk of escalation mean that early warning and prevention mechanisms are important. PWA has developed an early warning system and there appears to be a reasonable level of awareness about this in the communities and contacts in these communities use the system and send in reports. However it is not clear how this information is used or how it links into other elements of the programme (the CSA and PAD) nor is it clear how this information is transmitted to the security forces and how they used it. These are concerns around the effectiveness of the system as there does not appear to be a mechanism to analyse and respond to the information that is coming in from across the Plateau.

Another area where effectiveness could be improved is in relation to co-ordination with other agencies particularly the other EU supported projects. There appears to be scope for closer collaboration with Apurimac around their Peace Education Network, vocational training programmes and Trauma healing work.

Impact: An assessment of impact looks at the wider effects of the intervention- positive or negative, intentional or unintentional. What changes have actually occurred due to the efforts of PWA?

There are challenges in assessing the impact of PWA as it is a relatively short term intervention and the context in the Plateau region is volatile and dynamic. Nevertheless there are some indications that the project is having an impact on key issues and that the work is contributing to a more stable society in the Plateau. The findings from the survey are very positive with a high percentage of respondents across the four LGA stating the situation had improved, that inter group relations had got better and that they felt safer due to improved security. PWA has intervened in several critical areas and it is clear that PWA is making a difference and that the work of the different project components are adding up and contributing to peace.
Probably the most significant impact is that SFCG has brought hope to the communities, given them a sense of purpose and empowered them to try to build community relations and deal with these conflicts. This is critical given the fact that conflict can break out over relatively minor local issues but quickly escalate into wider ethnic and religious conflicts with wider regional and even national dimensions. The combination of the different activities and the use of Peace radio has promoted these messages of peace and given people hope at a time when the environment was very negative. The PWA has been a catalyst to bring people together in a safe space where they can re build relationships. Those have engaged in project activities appear to be committed to further work and want to use their learning.

A second impact is the fact that projects participants (training programme participants, members of PAD and CSA) have gained confidence and feel that they can now play a constructive role in dealing with conflict in their communities. Another significant impact is the change in the role of the security forces and the increased level of trust between the communities and the security forces which can have long term benefits for both the police and the communities. However this work can be undone by the behaviour of the police or even by individual members of the force and therefore these relationships need to be monitored and supported.

Exclusion and discrimination along ethnic and religious lines are drivers of conflict and the exclusion of women and youth is also weakening efforts to resolve the problems of the Plateau. PWA has promoted the involvement of these groups in different areas of peacebuilding and there is recognition that they can play a vital role in resolving conflict. Over half of the survey participants stated that the involvement of youth in peacebuilding had been a factor in improving intergroup relationships. This work to promote more inclusive local peacebuilding processes and structures will have ongoing benefits for these communities.
6. Key findings, conclusions and recommendations

Through the conflict analysis and consultations process two different interpretations of the situation in the Plateau emerged. There is a strong belief that the situation has improved and that the communities can rebuild relationships and live together in peace. This is reflected in the very positive figures which emerge from the survey and the level of positivity in the FGD in both Jos and the rural LGAs. On the other hand there is a more realistic interpretation of the situation which points to a potentially dangerous situation in the Plateau which could quite quickly erupt into widespread violence. The key problems which still persist are;

- Ongoing farmer-grazer conflict and land disputes in the rural areas land which could spread into Jos and cause more serious violence,
- The proliferation of small arms
- The increasing number of IDPs in Jos from the rural part of the Plateau and the North East
- The lack of assistance for these IDPs and the residents of Jos who suffered in these outbreaks of violence.
- Ongoing human rights abuses by police
- The fact that Jos is segregated and polarised with separate schooling and limited real interaction between ethnic groups
- There have been significant shift in political power at both local and national level and the outcome of this may impact negatively on conflict dynamics in the Plateau

A number of people consulted referred to the fact that the conflict in the Plateau is a microcosm of the situation in Nigeria and that a resolution of this conflict would have implications for community relations across the country. On the other hand a deterioration in the situation in the Plateau could have a damaging spill-over effect on wider ethnic relationships. Therefore SFCGs work in the Plateau is particularly important and can produce valuable learning for community relations at national level.

Overall there is considerable evidence that PWA is making a relevant to the context in the Plateau and that it is reasonably effective in quite difficult and volatile circumstances. The core strategies of the project; building local capacity, developing a peace architecture and promoting peace and reconciliation through the media have each made a contribution and helped to stabilise the situation in the Plateau. SFCG has gained the trust of the different stakeholder groups (the different ethnic communities, the government and security forces) and has played an important bridging role by connecting people and providing opportunities for them to work together. The findings from the survey and the FGDs indicate that the situation has improved on a number of important fronts and that the communities value the work and contribution of SFCG.

PWA has built a good platform for further work in the Plateau and is well positioned to provide ongoing support to peacebuilding at an important time in the state. The project has a good profile and has the trust and confidence of the key stakeholders. It has created a pool of people across the state that is committed to building peace and improving the situation for their communities.
The factors driving these conflicts will be difficult to address and there are likely to be ongoing tension and regular outbreaks of violence. In this volatile context the PWA will be involved in ongoing conflict management especially in the rural LGAs where there is a lot of tension. In this context the PWA needs to strengthen its early warning system, respond more flexibly to potential flashpoints and to invest more time in working with the communities to build sustainable agreements. There is a concern that the programme has been too fixed and determined by pre set outputs and that it did not have the flexibility or responsiveness to deal with the volatile and changing situation on the ground.

In particular the early warning system needs to have a more structured response mechanism which would facilitate a co-ordinated response to crises situations by the relevant stakeholders (the community, the security forces and PWA itself) The problem of agreements not being kept would indicate that there is a need to review both the process of facilitating these agreements and the support systems in place to sustain them. A range of factors may contribute to an agreement collapsing including external factors outside the control of the parties. PWA should ensure that this investment is not lost and that efforts are made to keep agreements on track. PWA should develop a stronger support mechanism including monitoring and ongoing dialogue and facilitation to address the inevitable issues and problems that arise after a settlement. Another option is to look at the possibility of building in a “peace dividend” which would provide some assistance to communities and facilitate increased co-operation and a move towards conflict transformation. While the PWA itself does not have resources for this purpose there may be scope to work with the local government other agencies particularly the EU supported programme to create a co-ordinated programme of investment in these areas to support communities that have committed to peace.

The PWA has created good links with the different sections of the Government and should use this to integrate and mainstream peacebuilding into government programmes. This should include work on conflict sensitivity to ensure that government policies and programme are not causing or exacerbating the conflict but should go further to look at how Government programmes can facilitate peacebuilding and contribute to a “peace dividend”. Strategic investment by government, and/or other NGOs –even if relatively small could demonstrate the value of peace and provide incentives to them and to other communities to communities resolve conflicts.

The PAD is recognised by all stakeholders as a key element in the peace architecture of the Plateau but it is not as effective as it could be and PWA needs to strengthen and sustain this if it is to achieve its purpose. The PAD needs to be more of a process and less of a monthly event with increased focus on dialogue and problem solving and on ensuring that there is a real two way flow of information from the communities to the PAD and back out and more emphasis on follow up. There should also be clarity about how PWA is supporting the PAD and the roles and responsibilities in this regard.
The situation in Jos has been stable but there are fears that the issues which caused the outbreaks of violence have not been addressed and that new pressures are emerging which could exacerbate the situation. In particular the increased number of IDPs is putting pressure on the city and could cause tensions to spread from the rural areas. Consultations with stakeholders in Jos highlighted the need for a range of interventions including;

The conflict in the Plateau has resulted in over 7,000 deaths, and an around a quarter of a million people displaced. This indicates a need for a reconciliation process which can address the complex range of issues which are present and which focus on dealing with the past, creating new vision for the future and dealing with the issues that are causing conflict. These victims of conflict (both Jos residents and IDPs) are still traumatised by these events and need both humanitarian assistance and psychosocial supports.

There is a need for “shared space or common ground” and facilities where the two communities can interact more regularly. Markets are the main place for interaction at the moment but some of this is superficial and efforts should be made to create other spaces including clinics, schools, training facilities, sports and social facilities, water points etc.

A good starting point would be to carry out an audit of what is available and to look at how existing facilities could be managed and used to promote increased contact and improved community relations. This will require a co-ordinated approach by local government with the support of NGOs and civil society. The PWA project has the credibility and track record to facilitate a process of this nature which would provide a more integrated response to the situation in Jos.

One of the achievements of the PWA has been the development of inclusive processes, such as the PAD and CSA, where all stakeholders can interact and share ideas. The training programmes have also contributed to this as they brought people from different community’s together and provided space for people to discuss issues. There is a need to provide more opportunities for this and to ensure that other stakeholders are brought in and to increase both the quality and the quantity of contact. Religious leaders are a key group and there is scope to develop more sustained work between them with more ongoing interaction which would promote more proactive peacebuilding work. In some cases they appear to have played an active role in the conflict but in the main are forces for peace and a potentially vital element in peacebuilding. There are other stakeholders groups active in the area including a peace education/teachers network established under Apurimac and efforts should be made to co-ordinate the work of these groups and create another building block in the peace architecture.

The conflict in the Plateau is widespread and part of wider ethnic tensions and divisions in the Middle Belt of Nigeria and it is therefore difficult to address these issues without taking in this wider dimension. PWA selected 9 LGAs to work in but there are also problems in some of the neighbouring LGAs which can undo good work in the target LGAs. The PWA needs to have the flexibility to extend its work into neighbouring LGAs in Plateau to try to resolve these issues where this is considered essential to the over project goal. However care would need to be taken not to spread the project too thinly across the state. There is a proposal to bring together the different state level PAD into a national structure under the NSRP. Given the interlinked nature of the conflict in the Middle Belt it may be worth exploring the potential of a regional PAD structure where stakeholders in these states could share information and explore possible solutions together.
PWA is an ambitious project which is addressing very difficult and challenging issues. It requires a sustained commitment by SFCG and a strong staff team to ensure that the project achieves its potential. However there are concerns that the PWA project has been under resourced, that staff did not have sufficient experience or expertise for the roles they were undertaking and that staff roles and responsibilities were unclear. The priority areas of work are mediation and dialogue and capacity building in the rural LGAs where there are ongoing tensions and outbreaks of violence. However there is an imbalance in programme staff and limited capacity to work effectively across Plateau State.

It is also essential that sufficient resources are made available to the project in a timely fashion so that the work is not restricted. SFCG needs to review the overall management of the PWA project and ensure that it is fit for purpose and that resources get out on the ground were they are needed. At present the PWA project is implemented by SFCG in partnership with two partners organisations, the Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP) and the Jos Repertory Theatre (JRT) JRT is focused on the production of peace radio shows including “Our Children are talking” while CAPP has a wider remit. However there is also a lack of clarity about the roles of the PWA viz a viv CAPP and there is a need to review this and ensure that the skills and expertise of both CAPP and PWA are utilised most effectively.

The evaluation has found that the PWA project has made a valuable and relevant contribution to the situation in the Plateau and that it should sustain and deepen its work in key areas. The intervention has been timely and has contributed to an improvement in the overall security context –despite the challenges, the continuing violence in rural area and the persistent fear of a return to widespread violent conflict. The main programme interventions; developing peace architecture, building local capacity, and promoting peace, have been effective in their own regard and together they have made a significant contribution to peacebuilding in the Plateau. The PWA has build trust between groups of stakeholders, supported relationships building at local level and established a good platform for future work. However there are several key areas where the PWA needs to be strengthened and critical issues that need to be addressed and it is essential that PWA has the resources and the capacity to do this effectively. The relationship between communities and the security forces has improved overall but is still difficult with mistrust and suspicion especially in some rural LGAs. PWA should continue to work on this interface and to build the capacity of the security forces to be more effective and response to the communities. The nature of the conflict and the fact that new crises can emerge in different LGAs means that the PWA needs to be nimble and flexible and able to respond to these without weakening the core strategic work. The work to prevent election related violence appears to have been particularly effective and the elections were peaceful in Plateau state despite the previous history of violence and the tension in the lead up to the elections. It is difficult to identify the counterfactual and to gauge the success of preventative programmes in volatile contexts such as the Plateau. A lot of the PWA work was preventative particularly the work on the elections, the media programmes and the training and dialogue work with local communities. The situation is also complicated by outbreaks of violence and high levels of tension in some LGAs. However it is reasonable to conclude that PWA has helped to keep the level of violence down and that the project has made a significant contribution to stability in the Plateau. There is considerable evidence that the PWA has been working on the right issues at the right time and that the strategies employed were effective with a good level of sustainability.
Recommendations

1. The PWA projects should be renewed by the EU and efforts made to secure more long term support for a sustained programme of work to address the many conflict issues in the Plateau.
2. The PWA project should retain its focus on building locally owned and inclusive peace architecture in Plateau State but should extend its remit to address conflict hotspots in neighbouring LGAs where this is considered feasible and appropriate.
3. SFCG should ensure that there are adequate financial and human resources to effectively implement the programme of work and to respond to any emerging crises.
4. PWA should review and strengthen a number of its core programme activities to ensure they are as effective as possible. This includes the PAD, the mediation process at local level and the early warning system.
5. The PWA should explore if a regional PAD structure could be developed to address issues related to land and gazer/farmer disputes in a more strategic manner.
6. PWA should work with relevant partners to develop a strategy to improve community relations in Jos.
7. PWA should work closely with relevant government agencies to mainstream peacebuilding across different sectoral areas (education, health, agriculture and planning).
8. PWA should build on the good relationship it has built up with the security forces and continue to build their capacity to work more effectively, to protect human rights and to “do no harm” in the communities.
9. PWA should collaborate with the other projects funded under the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace and look for opportunities to link the work of these programme with its own work.
10. The EU should ensure that it provides PWA with the scope and resources to respond in a timely and effective manner to the conflict dynamics in the Plateau.
11. The PWA should disseminate the finds of the survey to other stakeholders through the PAD and CSA and use this to review and plan for future work.
Annex 1: Key Informant Interviews (KII)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chris Kwaja</td>
<td>Plateau State Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Oteh</td>
<td>JRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson Anaze</td>
<td>CAPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakubu Chung</td>
<td>Chairman, Plateau Youth for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammed Usman</td>
<td>DSS Official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullahi Abdullahi 11</td>
<td>Community Leader Yelwa/TOT Facilitator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miskoom T.D. Shaldas</td>
<td>Traditional Ruler /CSA Chairman Shendam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saf David Adake</td>
<td>Traditional Ruler/ TOT Facilitator Bokkos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishaku Issaq</td>
<td>Community Leaders /TOT Facilitator Barkin Ladi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar. Timothy Parlong</td>
<td>Peace Building or Director of SSG’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanman Jonah K.</td>
<td>Pad Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gad Peter</td>
<td>NSRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godwin Okoko</td>
<td>APURIMAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grace Jerry</td>
<td>Inclusive Friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Mwafuwai</td>
<td>NHRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs Persia Yawa</td>
<td>CAN Women Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajiya Mairo Sani</td>
<td>FOWAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyang Zi</td>
<td>CSA Chairperson Jos South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pam Gyang Tsok</td>
<td>CSA Chairperson Barkin Ladi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chom Bagu</td>
<td>SFCG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lantana Abdullahi</td>
<td>SFCG /PWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chima Onwe</td>
<td>SFCG/PWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmauuella Atsen</td>
<td>SFCG/PWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyendi</td>
<td>SFCG/PWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominika Sikorska</td>
<td>EU Instrument for Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Gambo</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Management University of Jos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chitra Nagarajan</td>
<td>Nigerian Stability and Reconciliation Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>Islamic Students Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oje</td>
<td>Islamic Counselling Institute of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Dixon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Ochaguwe</td>
<td>Institute for Peace and Conflict resolution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2: PWA Results Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OVERALL OBJECTIVE: Building an active, locally owned, and inclusive Peace Architecture in Plateau State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>O.S. 1: Improved climate of peace in 8 Local Government Areas</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER1.1: Key local actors, including women, in 8 strategic communities have enhanced knowledge and undertake initiatives to address conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER1.2: Public attitude is favourable towards a peaceful resolution of conflict are reinforced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER1.3: Increased numbers of successfully resolved conflicts in eight strategic communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER1.4: Examples of successfully resolved conflicts contribute to the success of other local peace processes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act 1.1.1: Identification of Sites, Conflicts and Mapping of key actors in 8 LGAs</th>
<th>Act 2.1.1: Developing a Capacity Building and Trainings Plan for Security Actors and State Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Act 1.1.2: Advance Conflict Resolution Training Workshop for key local leaders</td>
<td>Act 2.1.2 Conflict Resolution Trainings for security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act 1.1.3: Transformation Leadership Training for key women leaders</td>
<td>Act 2.1.3: Training in Conflict Mainstreaming skills for key government officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act 1.1.4: TOT and Step –down training for real-time conflict resolution within LGAs</td>
<td>Act 2.2.1: “Peace Architecture Dialogues”: Civil society security actors and state government Problem-Solving Discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act 1.1.5: Developing local conflict response strategy by key local leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act 1.2.1: Civil-society led EWS, report ad disseminating</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act 1.2.2: Airing of rapid responses on radio to debunk rumors and manipulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act 1.2.3: Re-furbishing and broadcasting existing TV programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act 1.2.4: Producing and airing child oriented radio drama series</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act 1.3.1: Planning and implementing local dispute resolution processes by local leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act 1.3.2: Accompanying actions within communities to enhance visibility and viability of local dispute resolution processes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act 1.4.1: Documenting of local peace process as Multimedia case studies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Summary of key findings from SFCG Conflict Mapping report (2013)

Barkin Ladi (Gashish/Ex-Lands and Barkin Ladi Town) - Barkin Ladi Town and Gashish have been home to recurring attacks leading to loss of lives and property. Barkin Ladi is made up of both Muslims and Christians but is fast becoming polarized along religious lines. Gashish has faced cases of farmer-herder disputes, and certain areas in the district have become “no go areas” for the indigenous people and Hausa settlers because of the frequent clashes.

Riyom (Bachit District and Attakar Ward located in Ganawuri District) - Bachit District has been hard hit by farmer-herder disputes leading to the loss of many lives including those of women and children, and loss of property. Attakar Ward bordering Kaduna State in Ganawuri LGA, has also been the site of recent clashes.

Bokkos (Mangor and Bokkos District) While the LGA has not been a scene for major bouts of violence, both communities have experienced cases of cattle theft and other forms of criminality, especially on market days. Bokkos LGA has a sizeable Fulani population that has lived in peace with the community until recently. As the Fulani herdsman population has increased, there have been increasing tensions with the farming communities.

Wase (Wase, Kadarko and Lamba Districts): These three districts have recently been engulfed in violent conflict resulting in a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The continued insecurity has made it difficult for farmers to return to their land.

Qua’an Pan (Kurgwi and Namu) Both communities were identified as having a history of violence – although both were peaceful at the time of the exercise—and have high levels of criminality. In Kurgwi, a predominately-Muslim community in a Christian majority LGA, there is a potential for conflict over the blocking of roads during Friday prayers, and manifestation of past tensions and a warning sign for potential conflict if not addressed. Namu has been hard hit by cases of criminality, which is breeding tensions.

Shendam (Kuka and Yamini) Both Kuka and Yamini have recently experienced a series of attacks. The violence, which is attributed to farmer-herder disputes, has limited movement in the area and hindered farming, the communities’ primary livelihood.

Jos North (Anguwan Rukuba and Nassarawa). These are neighbouring communities that became polarized along religious lines following the series of crises that struck the city. Even within the communities, areas are now segregated. Until recently, these were no go areas where residents of the opposite faith were unable to pass; however, trust is gradually being restored and there is need to consolidate the peace in the community.

Jos South (Bukuru and Gyel) Bukuru is polarized along religious lines, and there is suspicion and mistrust among the members of this community. Members of Bukuru community and its neighbour Gyel, a predominantly Christian community, have experienced deadly clashes during previous crises. Relative peace has returned to these areas, but there is a need to further ease tensions and reduce the risk of violent conflict.
Appendix 4: Profile of the Consensus Research Evaluation Team

**Sean Mc Gearty** has 25 years experience in peacebuilding as a practitioner, trainer and evaluator and has worked in a number of fragile and conflict affected regions including Northern Ireland, Afghanistan, Haiti and Liberia. He has worked extensively on conflict transformation and reconciliation initiatives in Northern Ireland including work with civil society, ex-combatants, political leaders and victims groups. Since 2010 he has worked on a peacebuilding initiative in Afghanistan including a programme to strengthen the engagement of Religious leaders in the peacebuilding.

Sean specialises in the evaluation of conflict and governance interventions and has conducted evaluations for the UNDP, the EU, the Humanitarian Dialogue Centre, the International Centre for Transitional Justice and Search for Common Ground. In 2013 he carried out an evaluation of the “Tomorrow is a New Day” project in the Niger Delta on behalf of SFCG. He has also carried out evaluations in Fiji, Afghanistan, Cyprus and Liberia. He also has expertise in conflict analysis, mediation and the facilitation of dialogue processes and is an associate at the Kennedy Institute of Conflict Intervention at Maynooth University (Ireland)

**Abidde Bekebi Benjamin** is an independent consultant from Bayelsa State with over 28 years experience of working in different capacities in the Niger Delta, North Central Region and outside Nigeria with particular interest in conflict mitigation, policy and grassroots advocacy and campaigning for biodiversity, environmental and human rights; sustainable development, project design and management; training and capacity building; environmental impact assessment, environmental education and management; alternative livelihoods, small business development and management; natural resources management.

He has extensive experience supporting civil society programmes and has worked on peacebuilding/conflict mitigation, grassroots advocacy and human right issues, environmental impact assessment as well as sustainable development and natural resource management. He currently provides technical advice and services to various clients drawn from government, local communities, the organised private sector, civil society, local and international donor agencies. He has carried out a number of evaluations and was a member of the team which carried out the evaluation of the Tomorrow is a New Day programme for SFCG in 2013.

Appendix 5: Participatory Conflict analysis exercises

**Venn Diagram Showing Existing Relationships**

**TOT Facilitators in Yelwa/Shendam LGA Venn Diagram**
Conflict Situation and relationships before 2012

Key Actors:
- Community leaders
- Youth leaders
- Religious leaders
- Shendam LGA
- Women leaders
- Security/Govt

Why is the situation so?
- Lack of trust
- Conflict and crisis
- Land disputes
- Religious differences

2015 Shendam/Yelwa TOT Facilitators – Venn Diagram

Key Actors; GOVERNMENT
- Beefing up security
- Facilitating NGOs
- Involving traditional/religious leaders in dialogue
The reason for this development in 2015
SECURITY;
- On ground to check violence
- Carrying out stop and search on people

OTHER NGOs;
- No Specific training
- No continuity

SFCG;
- TOT trainings
- Step down training to the local level
- Enlightenment campaigns and rallies on the need for peaceful election
Community Security Architecture (CSA) in Yelwa/Shendam
Conflict Situation and relationships before 2012

Key Actors;
- Community leaders
- Religious leaders
- Youth body
- JTF
- Vigilante
- Women leaders
- State Government
- LGA
- NGOs
- The Police

Reasons why key actors are apart
- Existence of conflict/crisis in the community
- Misinformation
- Distrust
- Political interest
- Land disputes
- Religious leaders
Community Security Architecture (CSA) in Yelwa/Shendam
Relationships in 2015

Key Actors
- The Police
- The Vigilante Group
- SFCG
- State/LGA
- JTF

REASONS FOR THE PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE

The Police: The relationship between the police and the community has improved tremendously to the extent that, we now work hand in hand with the vigilante through SFCG.

The Vigilante Group: the vigilante group, though in 2012 they were not active, but through the effort of SFCG they are now fully involved in the area of peace building in 2015.

Community/religious leaders: Because of the coming of SFCG, the community leaders and the religious leaders were able to together to achieve our common goal of peace in our communities.

SFCG: The NGO SFCG was far away in 2012, but now is fully and actively involved in 2015 and they are the reason why we are enjoying this peace and harmony in our communities now through different training programmes, peace rallies and dialogue.

State/LGA: Cordial relationship now exist between the local government, state and communities through the help of SFCG.

JTF: Because of the coming of SFCG and the training programmes the people now have confidence on the security agents.
BOKKOS LGA

WOMEN GROUP IN BOKKOS

TOT Participants and CSA members – Venn Diagram before 2012

Key Actors
- The natives
- Christians
- Muslims
- The tribes

The different religious and tribal groups were far apart in 2012 for the following reasons:
- Fear of the unknown
- No go areas
- Crisis and conflicts
- Violation of dignity
- Religious divide
- Cultural differences
- Values and norms
- No respect for life

BOKKOS LGA

WOMEN GROUP IN BOKKOS

TOT Participants and CSA members – Venn Diagram 2015

Key Actors
- Women leaders
- Traditional leaders
- Religious leaders
- The tribes
- Youth leaders
- CSA
- SFCG
The reasons for the difference in relationship in 2015 and the peace being experienced

- Awareness from SFCG
- Workshops and seminars by SFCG
- Campaign rallies by SFCG
- Youth peace rallies by SFCG
- Community security architecture
- Provision of some form of security by the government – the JTF
- Women peace organisation
- Improved role of traditional leaders
- Religious leaders more in charge of conflict resolution
- Presence and activities of other NGOs such as JDPC, INROP
- The church preaching the gospel of peace and harmony
- The mosque preaching the gospel of peace and harmony
2012 TOT FACILITATORS: BOKKOS LGA

The Venn diagram depicts the way the different stakeholders were relating back in 2012 and even before 2012.

Key Actors
- Christians
- Muslims
- Natives/farmers
- Hausa/fulanis/Herdsmen
- Govt/LGA/NGOs/Security/Others

Reasons why the stakeholders were far apart in 2012.
- Lack of trust
- Crisis and conflicts
- Fear of the unknown
- Religious differences
- Law disputes and superiority in tribes
- Religious differences
- Tribal differences
- Political divides
- Political interest
- Overreacting due to trespassing
- No go area
- Serious escalations
2015: With the intervention of SFCG the gap became much closer.

**Key Actors**
- Christians
- Muslims
- Natives/farmers
- Hausa/fulanis/Herdsmen
- Govt/LGA/NGOs/Security/Others

**REASONS FOR THE RELATIVE CLOSENESS**
- Government not willing to fully deploy security personnel
- State/LGA did show concern
- Politics
- Religious leaders
- Self-interest by government
- NGOs/CSO afraid of the situation back then.
- Traditional leaders

**Reasons why stakeholders are very close and peace in the community**
- SFCG intervention activities in the communities
- Peace rallies
- Dialogue
- Selfless interest
- Religious leaders preaching peace to their followers
- Political awareness
THE VISION OF BOKKOS LGA in 2015 and beyond

Key Actors
- State Government
- Local Government
- Security forces
- Christians/natives
- Fulani/hausa/herdsmen

Diagram:
- Fulanis/Hausa/Herdsmen
- Christians/Natives
- State/LGA Govt/Security forces/CSO-NGOs
BARKIN-LADI LGA: STEPDOWN PARTICIPANTS
2012 and years beyond

Key Actors
- Fulani/Hausa/Herdsmen
- Natives/farmers
- Christians
- Muslims
- State
- Security agencies

The reasons why stakeholders are far apart
Between the Natives and Fulani herdsmen are:
- Land dispute and superiority
- Tribal differences
- Overreacting due to trespassing
- No go areas
- Serious escalations
- Political divide
- Interest
- Religious differences
- Not willing to deploy security personnel
- State and LGA Govt did not show concern
- NGOs/CSOs are afraid of the situation back then
STEPDOWN BARKIN-LADI LGA
2015 the closeness enjoyed by the different stakeholders

Key Actors
- Natives/farmers
- Fulani/herdsmen
- State/LGA Govt
- NGOs
- Security agents
- Religious leaders

REASONS FOR THE CLOSENESS OF STAKEHOLDERS
In 2015, there is relative peace and closeness that exist with different stakeholder in our communities. Although communities outside of Barkin-Ladi enjoys peace but there is crisis within Barkin-Ladi community.

Internal security improvement
- The Government, NGO, security have been conversing to create awareness (mostly NGOs) eg. SFCG funded every activity.
- Political awareness by both parties
- Religious leaders have also been preaching peace to their followers in the church and mosque
- Youth football matches between Christians and Muslims has promoted peace in our communities
- Tribes are interacting and co-habiting together now
- Free movement to everywhere and no go areas again
- Economic improvement
- Less personal interest among people
This project is funded by
The European Union

TOT PARTICIPANTS: JOS SOUTH 2012

Key Actors
- Christians/ Natives
- Farmers
- Muslims/ hausa/Fulani
- Herdsmen
- Govt/Security/CSO/NGOs

Reasons why the different stakeholders are far apart in 2012:
- Conflict and crisis between natives/farmers/Christians
- Fulani/herdsmen/Hausa/Muslims.
- Govt/security were far apart because they were not concerned about crisis
- Political interest
- Land disputes
- Ethnic crisis
- Intolerance attitude of both the Christians and Muslims
- Not access to land
- CSO/NGOs were far apart back then for fear.
The reasons for the good relationship

In 2015 there is peace and no go areas again, the natives, Muslims, Christians co-habit peacefully now without conflict. These are attributed to the following:

- TOT training by SFCG
- Novelty football match
- Step down training
- Tolerance
- Formation of Plateau youth for peace
- Openness
- JNI and CAN peace rally
- CSA dialogue
- Forgiveness
- Election violence prevention campaign or dialogue
- Constant meetings by traditional rulers, herdsmen, Fulanis, Christians and hausa leaders.
- Peace and security committees by the LGC at the LGA level.
- Association of women groups were enhanced
- State government CSA headed by the Special Adviser to the Governor on security matters.
- Office of the special adviser on peace at the state level

RECOMMENDATIONS TO SUSTAIN THIS PRESENT SITUATION

- The present peace enjoyed should be sustained
- Step down should be step down to the interior villages and communities
- More skills acquisition training etc should be embarked upon.
- Leadership training to traditional rulers, women leaders, youth leaders, security agents, religious leaders etc.
- Rehabilitation centers and trauma healing centers

SOLIDARITY PROJECTS
The construction of a common project where the Christians and Muslims can have access to e.g. School, Hospital, Town hall, Water project or borehole etc.

PAD: PEACE ARCHITECTURE DIALOGUE
2012 and beyond the situation as it where, were the muslims/Fulani/Hausas/Herdsmen and the Christians/native/farmers and govt/CSO/NGOs/Security agents were living far apart due to crisis and conflict everywhere.

Key Actors
- Christians/Natives/Farmers
- Muslims/Fulanis/Hausas/Herdsmen
- Govt/CSOs/NGOs/Security

The reasons for this far apart situation in 2012:
- Insensitivity of state government
- Suspicion
- Settler ship
- Lack of trust
- Access to land (land dispute)
- Political recognition
- Difference in religious beliefs
- Jos crisis started first in 1994-2001
PAD: PEACE ARCHITECTURE DIALOGUE
The situation as it in 2015; When SFCG came into existence, they constituted the PAD group that is now carrying activities that promotes peace and the reasons why there is cordial relationship between the different stakeholders are as follow:

**Key Actors**
- Govt/CSOs/NGOs/Security
- Muslims/Fulanis/Hausas/Herdsmen
- Christians/Natives/Farmers

THE REASONS WHY THE CONFLICTS AND CRISIS HAS RESOLVED
- Government hosting PAD meetings creates a perception of govt representation in the peace process
- Awareness and sensitization on emerging issues where both Christians and Muslims attend.
- Confidence building between security and worrying interest groups
- The PAD has created a room for accountability on the side of security agencies.
- Build an atmosphere of moral peace building process on stakeholders including security, CSOs, NGOs and community leaders etc.

AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT
- Let PAD be hosted in different communities and not just in a particular venue.
- Stipends should be provided for participants to serve as reimbursement for transportation
- Expansion of involvement of more youth foot soldiers in all PAD meetings.