Baseline Assessment Communicating for Peace in South Sudan: A Social and Behaviour Change Communication Initiative

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<td>Communication for Development</td>
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<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CRN</td>
<td>Catholic Radio Network</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>KAP</td>
<td>Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBEA</td>
<td>Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>PoC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilian</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>Probability Proportionate to Size</td>
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<td>SFCG</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
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<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
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1 Executive Summary

“Communicating for Peace in South Sudan: A Social and Behaviour Change Communication Initiative” aims to promote and strengthen social cohesion and resilience to conflict in South Sudan. The project is being implemented by SFCG, CRN and the Government of South Sudan, with funding from UNICEF and USAID.

Forcier Consulting was asked to conduct a baseline assessment to identify current knowledge, attitudes and practices of social cohesion and resilience amongst South Sudanese. In order to fulfil these objectives, Forcier Consulting acquired quantitative data through a household survey among 4074 respondents, and conducted a further 107 qualitative interviews.

KEY FINDINGS

Social Cohesion and Conflict Trends:

By Identity:
South Sudanese most commonly identify with their tribe, while only 16% value their national identity most. The former are most likely to use dialogue to resolve conflicts, while the latter express particularly positive attitudes towards social cohesion. Strong clan identity, however, is correlated with negative attitudes towards social cohesion, and high acceptance of violence against members of other tribes. Regardless of identity, nearly one fifth of the population sampled considers it acceptable to use violence against a member of another tribe.

By Gender:
The most common types of conflict are violence in the home and cattle raiding. Violence in the home is the most recent type of violence experienced by 16.2% of males, but 23.4% of females, highlighting gender based violence trends. Men, meanwhile, appear more likely than women to experience land disputes and attacks by the military/police, and are generally responsible for perpetuating conflict trends.

By Age:
When broken down by age, youth under the age of 25 are most likely to have been angered by conflict in the past week (24.1%, compared to 17.2% of 25-45 year olds and 15.2% of those over the age of 45), and most likely to fight in response to aggravations. Those aged between 25-45 are most likely to resolve conflicts through dialogue, and are generally more accepting of members of other tribes. Those over the age of 45, meanwhile, are least likely to resort to dialogue; they are also most likely to have recently experienced cattle raiding.
By County:
Knowledge, attitudes and practices of social cohesion and conflict vary across the country. Particularly conflictual tendencies are recorded in Bor, while those in Torit are most likely to attempt to solve conflicts through dialogue. Meanwhile, mistrust of the national government is highest in Yei River and Juba, and lowest in Tonj East. Types of conflict also differ: land disputes are most common in Malakal, disputes over access to resources in Tonj East, and cattle raiding in Bor.

By Beneficiary Type:
Direct beneficiaries are the most resilient to challenges, followed by indirect beneficiaries. Non-beneficiaries are unsurprisingly the least resilient group, with only 45.1% of non-beneficiaries able to manage challenges well. In general, direct beneficiaries and indirect beneficiaries display more positive knowledge, attitudes and practices of social cohesion and conflict than non-beneficiaries. However, non-beneficiaries are more likely to trust the national government.

Social Cohesion Composite Index:
According to the social composite index, respondents under 25 years old are more socially cohesive than the other age groups. Additionally, respondents without children score higher in cohesiveness as compared to respondents with children. Education influences cohesion: individuals with higher education levels also score higher in social cohesion. Similarly, respondents who feel confident in finding a job are more likely to score higher in social cohesion. Interestingly, respondents from Malakal and Bor score higher than any other county in cohesion, while Yei River scores the lowest.

Resilience Composite Index:
Age does not have a major influence in resiliency; however, respondents aged 25 to 45 years old score slightly higher than the other age groups. Further, respondents with children score higher in resiliency than respondents without children. Neither gender nor education has statistically significant findings when measured with the resilience composite index. Regarding counties, respondents from Awerial score the highest in resiliency while respondents from Yei score the lowest.

Triggers and Drivers of Conflict:
Cattle raiding or movement of cattle, access to resources (in particular water), land disputes, disputes over women and debt repayment are some of South Sudan’s major conflict triggers. However, underlying conflict drivers exist in parallel to these proximate causes. Such conflict drivers include discrimination, identity politics, poverty and resource scarcity – underlying politics must also be taken into consideration as a key conflict driver, since the current conflict is understood to be largely political.

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1 PBEA beneficiaries, broken down by direct beneficiaries, indirect beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
**Unifiers:**

Although South Sudan is marked by low national cohesion, with stronger importance generally attached to tribe, language or clan than to national identity, most South Sudanese perceive themselves to share the same religion, skin colour and agricultural/pastoralist traditions, and many express a sense of pride in being South Sudanese. Popular unifiers such as sport, games, music, church, school, intermarriage\(^2\) and cultural activities such as traditional dance have the potential to increase social cohesion and enhance nation-building efforts. Inclusive dialogue is also acknowledged to foster cooperation and promote peace; however, there is a lack of opportunities for dialogue, and some concern that solutions are not always effectively implemented.

**Key Influencers:**

Community and religious leaders, chiefs and elders are among the most influential people in South Sudan. Influential leaders are looked upon for conflict resolution and to promote peace in the community. Over half of the population surveyed would choose to consult with community leaders or elders in order to resolve intra-communal or inter-tribal conflict. In addition, although youth are broadly perceived to be responsible for conflicts, both youth and elders acknowledge that youth could be important drivers of peace.

**Communication Channels:**

Radio is the most popular means of communication in South Sudan. Other popular communication channels include television and mobile phone. In contrast, the population’s low literacy rates limit the ability to receive information from newspapers. To compensate for lack of access to the above-mentioned communication channels, existing communication channels can also include loudspeakers and megaphones, as well as traditional methods of communication such as dance, music and dramas.

**Radio for Peace:**

Radio is the major source of information on peace and conflict in South Sudan, and is perceived to have the potential to promote peace. However, radio access varies across the country. Radio access is highest in Yei River, but lowest in Tonj East. Arabic and English are the most commonly understood languages, but an array of local languages is required to ensure inclusiveness. Quantitative data analysis reveals that there is a strong statistical correlation between radio access and positive knowledge, attitudes and practices of social cohesion and conflict. People with radio access are somewhat less likely to address conflict with violence, more likely to resolve conflict through dialogue, and more likely to trust members of other tribes.

**Bor-specific Findings:**

Although the counties sampled were very different along most of the axes of comparison for this report, Bor County displays particularly negative knowledge, attitudes and practices in terms of

\(^2\) No statistics on intermarriage were collected for this study.
social cohesion and dispute resolution/conflict management. In Bor, most people do not consider members of other ethnic groups trustworthy (57.2%), and people are more likely to fight when aggravated than in any other county. While about half of the county’s population has access to a radio, contrary to the general trend, radio access does not correlate with more positive knowledge, attitudes and practices.

**KEY RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Encourage exchanges between different communities, clans and tribes, celebrating both cultural diversities and similarities.
- Provide a platform for female voices to speak up against gender-based violence and discuss the implications of disputes over women.
- Generate debate among youth on non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms, enabling positive youth influencers to share successful instances of peaceful conflict resolution.
- Encourage ‘truth and reconciliation’ themed public discussions on conflict triggers and underlying conflict drivers between ex-combatants, key influencers, women and youth in the aftermath of conflictual events.
- Devote airing time to discussions of positive perceptions of South Sudan and positive examples of inter-communal cooperation in order to increase feelings of national identity as part of a positive perception campaign.
- Increase opportunities for youth to engage in conflict resolution alongside community leaders by creating or enhancing community-level mechanisms for civic and social participation.
- Increase radio access where possible, and promote radio listenership groups in areas with limited access.
- Combine radio programming with local forms of media such as megaphones and dramas to ensure inclusiveness.
- Promote education and the continuation of education past the primary level. Higher levels of education are associated with more social cohesion and positive conflict resolution practices.
2 Study Design and Objectives

Project Overview

“Communicating for Peace in South Sudan: A Social and Behaviour Change Communication Initiative” is a 14-month Government of South Sudan project facilitated by UNICEF, SFCG and CRN. The purpose of the project is to promote and strengthen attitudes, behaviours and social norms conducive to social cohesion and resilience against conflict among South Sudanese individuals and communities.

The aim of this baseline assessment is to identify knowledge, attitudes and practices of social cohesion and conflict among South Sudanese. The assessment aims at identifying key conflict drivers and unifiers, as well as guiding future peacebuilding activities and radio programming.

The baseline contributes to the following objectives:\(^3\):

- To compile existing research on: conflict trends, drivers and unifiers; youth and conflict; constructive citizens able to contribute to peacebuilding; media consumption habits; and existing radio programming in South Sudan;
- To identify knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP) of conflict among diverse South Sudanese youth;
- To isolate conflict drivers (including resource mapping) and unifiers that exist at both the individual and community-level to develop creative entry points around which program content and activity outreach can be designed;
- To gather data against baseline indicators in order to satisfy requirements for iterative measurement and evaluation of the program;
- To capture conflict trends and perceptions related to C4D and PBEA; and
- To identify levels of social cohesion and resilience among respondent groups at individual, household and community levels.

3 Background Information

3.1 Situation Overview

After two decades of a devastating civil war, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005 between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Government of Sudan. The CPA granted South Sudan regional autonomy and formed the Government of South Sudan (GoSS). In 2011, a referendum was held and voters almost unanimously voted for the independence of South Sudan.

As an independent nation, South Sudan faces a wide range of developmental challenges. Despite the recognized value of education, as a result of major barriers such as lack of educational infrastructure and trained teachers, only 27% of adults over the age of 15 are literate, and only 1.9% of the population completes secondary education. 4 51% of the population lives below the poverty line on less than one dollar per day, and 21.5% of the population is projected to be facing crisis or emergency food insecurity by mid-2015. 5 Current president Salva Kiir acknowledges that, at the time of independence, South Sudan was marked by “a multitude of challenges, ranging from weak national institutions, inadequate physical infrastructure, limited human capacity and weak security mechanisms.” 6

South Sudan also faces significant internal political divisions, undermining nation-building and development efforts. In December 2013, political disagreements between president Salva Kiir and former vice-president Riek Machar erupted into conflict. By November 2014, over 1.4 million South Sudanese had been internally displaced and nearly 500,000 others had fled the country. 7

3.1.1 Triggers and Drivers of Conflict in South Sudan

One key conflict trigger in South Sudan is competition over resources, in particular water and pasture for cattle – cattle raiding itself is also widespread, and a key cause of insecurity. This competition over resources is due to a number of interrelated underlying factors, including resource scarcity, poverty and food insecurity. 8 This competition over resources is exacerbated

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by climate change, unemployment, and by new border demarcations or land boundaries, which affect the seasonal migrations of pastoralists. Moreover, due to the high number of small arms available within the country, competition over resources can rapidly escalate into deadly conflict. Widespread traditions of revenge and retaliation can also affect rapid spirals of violence.

Additionally, conflict in South Sudan is driven by “the manipulation of ethnic identities and loyalties for political and economic ends”. For example, in Jonglei, “local- and national-level politicians have manipulated the conflict for personal and political gain, while Jonglei-based militia groups have provided weapons to tribal fighters to further their own agendas.”

As such, it is important to distinguish between conflict triggers and conflict drivers: while conflict triggers are proximate causes, which act as direct catalysts for conflict, conflict drivers are underlying permissive conditions, which are often structural in nature. In case of wildfire, the match is the trigger, but the dry vegetation the driver – both are necessary, but neither sufficient for fire to catch. Likewise, conflict is a result of an intertwined set of underlying drivers and proximate triggers.

3.1.2 Unifiers in South Sudan

South Sudanese identity was long defined by its quest for independence and its opposition to the northern ‘other’. While this acted as a unifying force until independence, post-independence South Sudan is struggling to maintain national cohesion.

Religion however remains an important unifier, perhaps partly in continued opposition to predominantly Muslim Sudan. Qualitative data from this analysis reveals that other community bridging activities such as sports, music and school can also act as powerful unifiers. In addition, youth are believed to have substantial peacebuilding potential—youth in fact perceive themselves to be “agents for change”, capable of “establishing peace and bringing about

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15 “Country Case Study: South Sudan Support to Media where Media Freedoms and Rights are Constrained,” BBC.co.uk, accessed on March 8, 2015, http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/policybriefing/South_Sudan_FINAL.pdf.
development”. However, there is broad consensus among South Sudanese that youth are often responsible for conflict; youth, who constitute up to 70% of the country’s population, also lack opportunities to engage in the peace process.

3.2 Background on Media in South Sudan

In 2012, BBC Media Action argued in favour of “an inclusive national conversation that connects decision-makers and ordinary people and helps to shape a realistic vision of South Sudan’s future.” In the aftermath of the December 2013 conflict, the need for such a conversation is even more apparent, and the media has a key role to play in offering a platform for nationwide debate.

Despite its importance, there remains room for further development of South Sudan’s media infrastructure. At present, abuse and imprisonment at the hands of the government often pressure the press into censorship. South Sudan’s free press rankings have declined in recent years. In light of these challenges, in 2013, the National Legislative Assembly passed several pieces of legislation to ease tensions between media centres and the government. The legislation is intended to foster transparency, facilitate greater legal options for media crews and provide an opportunity to establish a public broadcasting service, as well as an independent authority to oversee the media industry.

3.2.1 Role of the Radio in South Sudan

Radio is a critical source of information for South Sudanese. In 2013, approximately 37% of South Sudanese owned a functioning radio, with a slight imbalance in radio ownership between urban and rural areas, with 40% owning a radio in urban areas, versus 35% in rural areas, reflecting both coverage areas and poverty levels. Overall, an estimated 45% had listened to the radio in the past six months, and approximately 60% of radio listeners listened to the radio every day. A majority of non-listeners are located in rural areas, and do not own or cannot afford a radio. Based on findings of this analysis, 48.3% of the population sampled now has a radio or access to a radio, and 78.7% of these listen to the radio every day.

17 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 2.
23 Ibid., 19-22.
24 Ibid., 19-20.
As of 2012, there were at least 30 radio stations in South Sudan covering issues including “news bulletins, educational material, public announcements, vox pops, dramas, and public health notices.”\textsuperscript{25} The most popular radio station appears to be UN-operated Radio Miraya.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 31.
4 Assessment & Methodology

4.1 Methodology

A combination of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), Key Informant Interviews (KIs) and a Knowledge, Attitudes and Practice (KAP) survey were used for the purpose of this baseline. A review of all relevant project documents including the desk review and conflict analysis was also conducted prior to the evaluation.

Forcier’s overall role was to design and execute sampling methodology, fieldwork, data analysis and report writing; a SFCG representative facilitated communication between UNICEF and Forcier, running training for researchers on survey tools. Throughout the research process, feedback was provided from a technical committee to ensure compliance with the baseline’s objectives.

A total of 96 enumerators were used for the KAP survey, under the direction of 16 Forcier Researchers. Enumerators responsible for administering the surveys participated in a two-day training, which included ethical guidelines on researching with children, sampling methodology, respondent selection and tablet data collection techniques. Meanwhile, the KIs and FGDs were conducted by 8 extensively trained Forcier Researchers, with the assistance of translators. The methodology was also informed by feedback from a technical committee throughout the research process.

Quantitative Data

Through key indicators, the quantitative KAP survey measures knowledge, attitudes and practices that are likely to be affected by SFCG interventions on social cohesion and resilience to conflict. Quantitative research was conducted in eight county-level sites across seven states: Central Equatoria (Juba and Yei River), Upper Nile (Malakal), Warrap (Tonj East), Western Bar el Gazel (Wau), Lakes (Mingkamen), Jonglei (Bor), and Eastern Equatoria (Torit). Disproportionate stratification at the county level was utilized, with each county receiving an equal allocation of interviews in order to facilitate cross-county comparisons. Bomas served as the primary sampling unit for the survey, and were selected with probability proportionate to size (PPS); Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites were also included in the county-level PPS selection, with their weight in the sample draw based on population size. In order to maximize the representativeness of the sample at the county level, the PPS sample of bomas was drawn with replacement, resulting in some bomas receiving multiple enumeration areas.

County-level population weights were applied when needed during statistical analysis to derive

27 All researchers receiving ESOMAR training before conducting the KAP survey. They also undertook “Do No Harm” training, and were given instructions and guidelines on research related to children based on "UNICEF Guidelines: Children Participating in Research, Monitoring and Evaluation".

28 Unless specified, ‘Malakal’ refers to the county, not the town.
valid estimates of aggregate trends, and to enable disaggregation by gender, age, etc. The quantitative findings presented in the report are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level and therefore unlikely to be the result of random chance.

The survey sample consisted of 200 enumeration areas (EAs), with 25 EAs per county and 20 household level interviews per EA. At the county level, the sample had the following characteristics:

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<td>Tonj East</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awerial</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yei</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wau</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torit</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,074</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The KAP survey was conducted as a household survey. Within each enumeration area, random route starting points were selected by researchers in such a way to ensure representativeness of the sample; enumerators then employed a ‘skip pattern’ along a route chosen at random to ensure random household selection. Within each selected household, one respondent was randomly selected by clock-time randomization from among the eligible household members, between 10 and 60 years of age.

**Construction of the Composite Indexes for Social Cohesion and Resilience**

The composite indexes for social cohesion and resilience were developed according to the exact instructions laid out by SFGC and UNICEF. The social cohesion indicator is a composite of over 25 variables from the survey, which were organized into 5 categories (Trust and Tolerance, Civic and Social Participation, Transparency in Governance Process, Attitude Toward Social Services, and Constructive Dispute Resolution). A composite index was made for each of these categories, giving equal weight for each question included, and then adjusted to ensure the responses were scaled, with a minimum of 1 to a maximum 5.

Once these categorical indexes were constructed, they were combined in proportions determined by SFGC and UNICEF (15% Trust and Tolerance, 30% Civic and Social Participation, 20% Transparency in Governance Processes, 20% Attitude towards Social Services, and 15% for Constructive Dispute Resolution). This construction resulted in a final composite index, which serves as an estimator for comparing the level of social cohesion for an

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29 Counties listed may include PoCs, e.g. Mingkamen in Awerial.
observation (interviewee). The rankings are on a scale, with 1 understood as the least ‘cohesive’ and 5 as the most ‘cohesive.’

The resilience index was created in the same manner with 11 variables distributed into 3 categories (Vulnerability, Coping Strategies for Dispute Resolution, and Support Mechanisms), composing 30%, 30% and 40%, respectively, of the final resilience index. The rankings are also the same, with 1 understood as the least ‘resilient’ and 5 as the most ‘resilient.’

The final index values are ranked from 1 to 5: if the score is greater than 4, the score is valued at 5, if the score is greater than 3 and/or equal to 4 (but not greater than 4), the score is valued at 4, and so on. Any values 1 and below are scored at 1.

**Qualitative Data**

Qualitative data collection, meanwhile, involved KIIs and FGDs. The target population for KIIs were members of ‘influencer groups’ including pastors, imams, community leaders, political leaders, and journalists. Overall, 76 KIIs were completed. The target population for FGDs, in contrast, were potential target audience for SFCG programs, divided into age clusters with maximal diversity in terms of gender and ethnicity. 31 FGDs were completed, generally consisting of 5-7 individuals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>FGDs Planned</th>
<th>FGDs Completed</th>
<th>KII Planned</th>
<th>KII Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bor</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malakal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juba</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonj East</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awerial</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yei</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wau</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td><strong>76</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.2 Limitations

In multiple instances throughout the KAP survey, question wording explicitly referred to “tribes” (e.g. “who do you consult on how to resolve conflicts with other tribes”). In the future, it would be advisable to base the distinction on community membership (i.e. within or between communities), with an additional question assessing whether conflicts between communities are based on identity dynamics. This is applicable to both the KAP survey as well as the qualitative tools.
Meanwhile, data collection was complicated by ongoing violence in some areas, in particular in Bor. Some villages were also deserted as a result of conflict. In Malakal, there were insufficient residents in some of the bomas to follow the random sampling strategy; as a result, some were substituted with other bomas in the area. In addition, the length of focus group discussions (approximately one and a half hours) was in some cases a barrier to participation, of women in particular (although this did not severely affect overall female representation). Finally, some survey fatigue was reported in Bor, where a number of surveys have been conducted with few tangible results for the community.

Regarding composite indicators: The way in which the composite indicators were constructed, certain responses hold more weight than others (see the explanation for the construction of the composite indicators in section 4.1) when cross-tabulated with variables, such as education levels or gender. Additionally, due to missing values in the dataset, the composite indicators have a downward bias, which is especially apparent if the question used in the construction of the indicators has a large proportion of respondents who did not answer the question. In this way, certain questions may hold an unrealistic weight in defining ‘social cohesion’ and ‘resilience’.

During analysis, the social cohesion index indicates that Bor is one of the highest scoring counties in social cohesion. However, this result counters the findings about Bor and social cohesion when counties are cross-tabulated with single (non-composite) social cohesion variables. For example, respondents from Bor are the most likely, when compared to other counties, to respond to a conflict by fighting. Moreover, both the counties of Bor and Malakal, which score the highest in social cohesion, are some of the most conflict-ridden counties in this study, which suggest that difficulties in social cohesion metric may exist, or that violence and social cohesion are inter-related.

Similar issues arise with the resilience composite indicator. For example, respondents who are the least confident in finding a job score higher in resilience than respondents who are the most confident in finding a job. Indeed, the results are not necessarily incorrect; however, the findings do not indicate a clear outcome. In general, the results of the composite indicators are difficult to interpret in what the findings imply. This ambiguity may be due to the fact that certain questions have a strong influence in the indicators, but these questions may inaccurately define ‘social cohesion’ and ‘resilience.’

30 Note: If only one variable is missing in an observation, the index was constructed assuming a score of 0. If more than one variable was missing in an observation, the index was not constructed for that entry. This occurred less than 300 times in a sample of over 4000 observations.
5 Findings

5.1 Social Cohesion and Resilience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SFCG Indicator 3a: Percentage of community members, children, and young people who cite non-violent means to address conflict drivers and conflict management.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SFCG Indicator 3.1b: Percentage of targeted communities that address their needs and interests through non-violent means.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBEA Country Level Indicator 3.1: Percentage of youth reporting a positive change in perception of identity (nationality), tolerance and respect for girls and other groups, self-awareness and self-confidence and related behaviours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the purpose of this report, analysis of social cohesion and resilience requires an understanding of the following domains:

- Attitudes around trust and tolerance;
- Attitudes toward social services;
- Vulnerability to shocks, coping strategies and support mechanisms;
- Inclusion in governance and decision-making processes; and
- Civic and social participation.

This analysis is facilitated by the KAP survey, which includes relevant questions such as “Members of other tribes can be trusted.” The discussion below offers holistic insight into knowledge, attitudes and practices of social cohesion and resilience in the South Sudanese context.

5.1.1 Trust and Tolerance

**Gender**

20.2% of males and 18.2% of females believe it is acceptable to use violence against a member of another tribe. Females are significantly less likely to interact with members of other tribes or clans. 29.3% of females have not interacted with a member of another tribe within the past week, compared to 23.3% of males; 12.5% of females have not interacted with people from a different clan within their own tribe in the past week, compared to 10.8% of males.

**Age**

Those aged between 25 and 45 are more accepting of members of other tribes, with 80.4% considering it acceptable to have a neighbour from a different tribe, compared to 78% of those under 25 and 77.3% of those over 45. In addition, 72.9% of those aged 25 to 45 socialize with friends from various tribes, compared to 66.4% of those under 25 and 64.2% of those over 45.

31 Likert Scale Responses.
Those aged over 45, however, are most likely to strongly agree that it’s okay for a member of their family to marry someone from another tribe, with 37.3%, compared to 36.1% of those aged between 25-45 and 31.3% of those under 25. 86.3% of respondents over 45 years old believe it is acceptable for their children to go to school with children from different tribes or clans, while 80.8% of respondents under 25 believe the same.

**Beneficiary type**

Direct beneficiaries appear significantly more likely to interact with people from other tribes and clans. 75.7% of direct beneficiaries socialize with friends from various tribes, compared to 68.6% of non-beneficiaries and 58.7% of indirect beneficiaries. Further, while 27.8% of non-beneficiaries and 27.3% of indirect beneficiaries have not interacted with people from a different tribe within the past week, this is true of only 15.4% of direct beneficiaries. Meanwhile, 17.6% of indirect beneficiaries have not interacted with a member of another clan within their own tribe in the past week, compared to 12% of non-beneficiaries and 9.7% of direct beneficiaries.

**Identity**

While 27% of KAP respondents identify most strongly with their tribe, only 16% most valued their national identity (see figure 1). Identity preferences vary strongly throughout the country: 94.4% in Malakal most value their tribal identity; 47.4% in Bor their clan; 52% in Awerial their language; and 36.1% in Tonj East their national identity. Preliminary research suggests that the current crisis has impacted these identity ties: “Dinka youth have been spurned to even greater levels of nationalism, during the current crisis, whereas Nuer youth have become more protective of their tribal identity.”

![Figure 1 Most Valued Identity of KAP Respondents](image)

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32 Direct beneficiaries have participated directly in the community-based PBEA outreach activities; indirect beneficiaries are located in communities that received PBEA outreach activities, and have knowledge of said interventions. Non-beneficiaries, however, are those that are located in communities that did not receive community-based PBEA outreach activities.

Knowledge, attitudes and practices vary according to identity. Strong clan identity, as such, is often tied to negative attitudes towards social cohesion. Indeed, 22.7% of those with strong clan identities consider it acceptable to use violence against a member of another tribe, compared to 17.8% of those who most value their tribe. Likewise, 27.8% of those who most strongly identify with their clan have not interacted with a member of another tribe within the past week; and 15.9% have not interacted with members of other clans within their own tribe. In contrast, 16.6% of those who most value their national identity have interacted with members of other tribes more than 10 times in the past week, while 23% have interacted more than 10 times with members of other clans within their own tribe. Meanwhile, 66.7% of those who strongly identify with their clan socialize with friends from a variety of tribes, compared to 73.3% of those who identify with their nationality.

Those who most strongly identify with their nationality often express comparatively positive attitudes towards social cohesion. While 12.3% of those who most identify with their language do not consider it acceptable to have a neighbour from a different tribe, this is the case for 9.6% of those who most strongly value their national identity. Likewise, of those who strongly value their national identity, 89% are in favour of schools with mixed tribes/clans, while this is the case for 84.2% of those who most value their clan. Finally, 82.4% of those with strong national identities consider it acceptable for family members to marry someone from another tribe, compared to 73.6% of those who most value their tribe.

**County**

23.8% of those in Awerial do not consider it acceptable to have a neighbour from a different tribe, compared to 6.8% in Malakal. In Tonj East, 52.3% have not interacted with a member of another tribe within the past week, compared to 10.9% in Malakal. In Bor, 21.1% have not interacted with a member of another clan within their own tribe within the past week, compared to 3.8% in Malakal. While in Awerial 61.4% consider it acceptable for a family member to marry someone from another tribe, this is true of 89.2% in Juba. Additionally, Bor, at 27.7%, has the highest proportion of respondents who believe their community accepts the use of violence against members of different tribes. Conversely, Wau, at 12.4%, and Torit, at 13.2%, have the lowest proportions of respondents who indicate the same.

**Education**

As education levels increase, respondents are more likely to agree that is it okay to have a neighbor from a different tribe: 90.3% of respondents with university education report this response, while 76.1% of respondents with no education report the same. This trend also follows when respondents were asked if it was okay for someone in their family to marry a member from a different tribe. 94.6% and 86.7% of respondents with university and secondary education, respectively, agree that someone in their family could marry a person from a different tribe. The same is true for only 74% and 76.3% of respondents with primary education and no education, respectively.

**5.1.2 Attitudes toward Social Services**
Age
Youth under the age of 25 are most likely to trust the national government: 57.6%, compared to 51% of those aged between 25 and 45 and 52.4% of those over 45.

Identity
There is little variation in the perception of schools as a social service between identity types. (68.8% of those who identify with their nationality perceive it to help in their daily lives, compared to 75% of those who most strongly identify with their clan).

County
The perception of school as a useful service varies substantially between counties. While 81.5% of interlocutors in Malakal believe that school helps in their daily lives, this is the case for only 55.2% in Torit. Only 45% of respondent from Wau trust their local government, while 63.8% from Juba respond the same. However, only 45% of respondents from Juba trust their national government, compared to 79% from Bor and 77.1% from Tonj East.

Figure 2 Positive Perception of School Services, by County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Juba</td>
<td>71.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yei River</td>
<td>70.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torit</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bor</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anerial</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malakal</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonj East</td>
<td>74.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wau</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meanwhile, trust in local and national institutions also varies significantly across counties. 83.9% trust their community leaders in Malakal, compared to only 60.9% in Anerial. Local government, meanwhile, is trusted by 74% in Bor, but only 45% in Wau. Finally, while 79% trust the national government in Bor, this is true of only 37.8% in Yei River.

Beneficiary Type
While 80.2% of direct beneficiaries perceive school provides a service that helps in their daily life, this is the case for 70% of non-beneficiaries and 68.2% of indirect beneficiaries. Non-beneficiaries are however more predisposed to trust the national government: 54.6%, compared to 44.7% of indirect beneficiaries and 43.3% of direct beneficiaries.

Education
61.6% of respondents in primary school, 56.1% with secondary education, and 57% with university education trust their local government. Moreover, 54% with primary education, 44.7% with secondary education, and 46.6% with university education trust the national government.
Gender
No major difference exists between males and females in their trust of the government. 58.5% of males and 59.9% of females trust their local government, while 52.6% of males and 54% of females trust their national government.

5.1.3 Vulnerability to Shocks, Coping Strategies and Support Mechanisms
Resilience is defined as “the ability of a system, community or society – including children, youth and the disadvantaged – when exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.”  For the purpose of this assessment, analysis is based on a series of questions included in the KAP survey, such as “I am able to manage challenges well.”

Gender
25% of males and 22.8% of females are not confident that the local authorities would help in cases of drought or flood; in contrast, 5.1% of males and 6.7% of females are very confident that they would receive help from the local authorities. While females appear more confident in local authorities, they are however less able to manage challenges than their male counterparts: 48.8% of males consider themselves able to manage challenges well, compared to 43.8% of females.

Age
Elder South Sudanese are more trusting in the ability and willingness of local authorities to help in cases of drought or flood: 9.2% of over 45 year olds are very confident they would receive help from local authorities, compared to 6.4% of under 25 year olds and 4.9% of 25-45 year olds. Moreover, while 24.2% of under 25 year olds and 24.6% of those between the ages of 25 and 45 are not confident they would receive help from local authorities, this is the case for 20.3% of over 45 year olds. Individuals aged between 25 and 45 appear best equipped to deal with challenges: 50.3% consider themselves able to manage challenges well, compared to 39.8% of those under the age of 25 and 46.7% of those over the age of 45.

Identity
8.9% of those who most strongly identify with their clan are very confident that the local authorities would offer assistance in the face of drought or floods, compared to only 3.3% of those who primarily identify as South Sudanese.

35.6% of those who most strongly identify with their clan asked the government for help the last time there was a flood or a drought. Differently, of those who most strongly identified with their

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http://learningforpeace.unicef.org/cat-about/key-peacebuilding-concepts-and-terminology
http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology

35 Likert Scale responses.
nationality, only 22.7% of those who most strongly identify with their nationality – 41.5% of whom sought assistance from aid agencies. In response to the last flood or drought, 75.6% of those who most strongly identify with their tribe had to sell at least some of their assets (e.g. livestock), compared to 48.4% of those who most strongly identify as South Sudanese.

Challenges are best managed by those who most strongly identify with their tribes, 53.3% of whom consider they are able to manage challenges well, compared to 41.3% of those who identify primarily with their clan.

**County**

People living in Bor are most trusting in the ability and willingness of local authorities to offer support in time of drought or floods: only 4.4% are not confident they would provide assistance, while 23.3% are very confident. In contrast, 39% in Yei are not confident that local authorities would provide assistance, and only 1% are very confident that they would do so.

Last time there was a flood or drought, 64.5% of respondents in Bor turned to the government for help, compared to only 7.8% in Yei, where 44.3% sought assistance from aid agencies. In Malakal meanwhile, 83.9% sought help from neighbors.

**Figure 3 Percentage Having Sought Government Assistance During Recent Flood/Drought, by County**

![Bar chart showing percentage of people seeking government assistance during recent flood/drought by county.]

In order to cope with the last flood or drought, 95.6% of interlocutors in Tonj East had to sell at least some of their assets, compared to 31.3% of those in Juba. There is substantial variation across counties, as demonstrated in figure 4.
Resilience levels contrast greatly across counties. Indeed, only 15.8% of respondents in Bor consider themselves able to manage challenges well, compared to 66.2% in Juba (see figure 5).

**Beneficiary Type**

As expected, resilience is higher among direct beneficiaries, followed by indirect beneficiaries – non-beneficiaries, unsurprisingly, display the lowest levels of resilience: 54.4% of direct beneficiaries and 52.9% of indirect beneficiaries are able to manage challenges well, compared to 45.1% of non-beneficiaries.
**Education**
66.9% of respondents with university education believe they can manage challenges well, while this is true for 55.0% with secondary education, 43.4% with primary education, and only 41.4% with no education.

5.1.4 **Inclusion in Governance and Decision-Making Processes.**

**Age**
Respondents over 45 years old have the highest proportion who believe their opinion matters in government decisions, at 46%. This answer was also indicated by 43.4% of respondents under 25 and 41% of respondents between 25 and 45 years old.

**Gender**
41.2% of males and 43.3% of females believe their opinions matter when the government makes decisions that affect them. 16.4% of males and 13.6% of females strongly disagree that their opinions matter.

**Identity**
61.3% of those who most strongly identify with their tribe believe their voice is heard when the government plans education services in their community, compared to 47.7% of those who most strongly identify with their nationality.

**County**
While 64.1% of people in Torit believe their voice is heard when the government plans education services in their community, this is the case for only 50.9% in Yei. Meanwhile, in Tonj East, 59% believe their opinions matter when the government makes decisions that affect them – however, this is the case for only 31.4% of people in Bor.
Education
Respondents with university education have the lowest proportion of respondents who believe their opinion matters in government decisions, at 33.3%. Comparatively, 43.8% and 44.3% of respondents with no education and primary education respectively, believe their opinion matters.

5.1.5 Civic and Social Participation

Age
25.5% of respondents under 25 years old report that they did not interact with members of a different tribe over the last week, while 14.5% of this age group interacted with members of a different tribe more than 10 times. Of respondents over 45 years old, 29.5% interacted with members of a different tribe in the last week, while 15.6% engaged with different tribes over 10 times in the last week. Respondents between 25 and 45 years old are the most likely age group to socialize with friends from their own tribe and other tribes, at 72.9% (compared to 66.4% under 25 and 64.2% over 45). The 25 to 45 year old age group also has the highest proportion of people as members of community groups, at 68% (compared to 62.1% of respondents under 25 and 64% of respondents over 45). Of the respondents who are members of community groups, they are most commonly involved in religious groups: 48.1% for under 25, 48.1% for those between 25 and 45, and 41.3% for over 45 years old.

Gender
Roughly half of male respondents and half of female respondents report socializing with their family and friends. Slightly more males than females socialize with friends from their own tribe as well as from other: with 70.9% males and 68.2% females. Regarding community group participation, 68.7% of males are members of a group, while this is true for 62.3% of females. More specifically, more males are member to a sports group, at 23.5%, compared to females, at 12.2%.

Education
Individuals with higher education are more likely to engage with people from different tribes. 89.8% of respondents with university education report socializing with friends from their own tribe and different tribes, while this is true for only 60.3% of respondents with no education. Moreover, 82.4% with secondary education and 67.5% with primary education report the same. Education also appears to be associated with community participation: 64.7% of people with no education are member to a community group, while the same is true for 72.5% of respondents with secondary education and 76.2% with university education.

County
Respondents from Wau socialize with friends from their own tribe and different tribes more than any other county, at 84.8%, while respondents from Tonj East are the least likely to do so, at 50.1%. Further, participation in community groups varies among the different counties, with the highest rate of participation in Tonj East at 94.2% and the lowest rate in Torit, at 43.8%. The types of community groups participated in also vary. For example, while 69.8% of people from Malakal and Awerial are member to a religious group, only 22.2% of respondents from Torit
indicate the same. Moreover, at 54%, respondents from Tonj East indicate being member to a self-help group most frequently compared to all counties (compared to the lowest proportions of respondents: 15.4% from Yei River and 17.6% from Wau).

5.1.6 Social Cohesion Composite Index

**Age**
Respondents aged under 25 years old are slightly more cohesive than the 25 to 45 age group and the over 45 age group, as measured by the composite index. 65.4% of respondents under 25 score a 4 or 5 in cohesiveness, while respondents between 25 and 45 and those over 45 years old score a 4 or 5 in cohesiveness equally, at 58.4%.

**Gender**
Gender does not have a statistically significant influence on the level of social cohesion among respondents, as measured by the composite index. However, whether or not a respondent has a child does seem to impact cohesion: 66.9% of respondents without children score a 4 or 5 in social cohesion, while 58.6% of those with children score the same.

**Education**
As education levels increase, social cohesion also increases. 66.6% of respondents with university education score a 4 or 5 in social cohesion, while 56.8% of respondents with no education score the same. 67.2% and 58.7% of individuals with secondary and primary education, respectively, also score a 4 or 5 in social cohesion. In this way, the data suggests that education is correlated with increasing levels of social cohesion. Further, 73.1% of respondents who felt most confident in finding a job after leaving school score a 4 or 5 in social cohesion. The same is true for 61.1% of respondents who felt the least confident in finding a job.

**County**
Despite recent conflict and high numbers of refugees and IDPs, Malakal, compared to all counties, has the highest proportion of respondents scoring a 4 or 5 in social cohesion, at 84.4%. Conversely, at 41.4%, Yei River has the lowest proportion of respondents scoring the same. Further, 54.7% respondents from Wau score a 4 or 5, 54.8% from Juba, 57.7% from Awerial, 59.7% from Torit, and 70.5% from Bor.

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Note: The construction of the composite indicator of Social Cohesion is explained in section 4, under methodology. Please also note the limitations of the composite indicator index (as described in section 4) in order to accurately understand the findings presented in this section. For the scale, a 1 is considered the least cohesive, while 5 is considered the most cohesive.
5.1.7 Resilience Composite Index

**Age**
Age has a slight impact on resilience, with the highest proportion of respondents, at 51.8%, aged between 25 and 45 scoring a 4 or 5. 49.3% of respondents over 45 years old and 47.2% of respondents under 25 score the same.

**Gender**
Like in the social cohesion composite index, gender in the resilience composite index has no statistically significant finding. However, respondents with children score higher in resiliency than respondents without children: 52.4% of people with children score a 4 or 5, while 47.3% of those without children score the same.

**Education**
Education levels in the composite index do not result in statistically significant findings. Even so, the data indicates that those with education are more likely to score a 4 or 5 in resiliency (at 60.6%), while roughly 50% of respondents without university education score the same.

**County**
The highest proportion of respondents, at 76%, to score a 4 or 5 in resiliency are from Awerial, while the lowest proportion, at 28.3%, from Yei River score the same. Additionally, 44.2% of respondents from Tonj East score a 4 or 5, 46.7% from Torit, 49.5% from Malakal, 52.9% from Juba, and 55.3% from Bor.

5.2 Conflict Trends

5.2.1 Conflict Trends and Dispute Resolution

**Gender**
Little variation in behaviour occurs across genders in aggravation scenarios. If cattle have been stolen or crops destroyed, males fight or shout at the perpetrators slightly more than females (10.6% of males fight and 1.9% yell, compared to 8.9% of females who fight and 0.9% of females that yell). If insulted meanwhile, 41.5% of males and 39.3% of females attempt to solve the conflict through dialogue.

Types of conflict recently experienced, however, vary by gender (see figure 6). 24.3% of females have most recently experienced violence in the home, compared to 16.2% of males, highlighting gender based violence tendencies. Meanwhile, males are more likely than females to have recently experienced land disputes or attacks by military/policemen. However, there is little

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37 Note: The construction of the composite indicator of Resilience is explained in section 4, under methodology. Please also note the limitations of the composite indicator index (as described in section 4) in order to accurately understand the findings presented in this section. For the scale, a 1 is considered the least resilient, while 5 is considered the most cohesive.
gender variation in cattle raiding and conflicts over access to resources, suggesting that resource poverty presents an underlying conflict driver across genders.

Figure 6 Most Recent Conflict, by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Type</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle raiding</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to resources</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence in home</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack by military or police</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land dispute</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FGD participants explained, “both men and youth are actively involved in these conflicts, but women are most affected.” Indeed, according to UN Women, approximately 40% of females in South Sudan have been affected by physical or sexual violence. In addition, it is interesting to note that “other” types of conflict identified in the KAP survey often relate to disputes over women, such as forced marriage and unwanted pregnancy (see figure 6). The economic importance of dowries, and the perception of females as sources of family wealth, is a major factor in disputes over women.

Age

Different age groups also experience different types of conflict. Those under the age of 25 are more likely to have recently experienced violence in the home than the other age groups, while those between 25 and 45 are more likely to have experienced attacks by military or police and those over the age of 45 cattle raiding (see figure 7). Percentages of those having recently experienced land disputes, in contrast, are similar across ages.

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38 “Other” types of conflict included issues such as power struggles, abduction of girls, forced marriage, unwanted pregnancy, rumour mongering, alcohol and debt repayment.
39 FGD with respondents aged 10-28 in Juba, Central Equatoria State during February 2015.
With regards to conflict trends, youth under the age of 25 are most likely to have been angered by conflict within the last week: 24.1%, compared to 17.2% of those aged between 25 and 45 and 15.2% of those over 45. In general, youth under the age of 25 are also most likely to fight in response to aggravations; those between 25 and 45 are least likely to fight, and most likely to attempt to resolve conflict through dialogue; those over the age of 45, meanwhile, are consistently less likely to resolve conflict through dialogue (see figures 8 and 9).

Age also plays a role in people’s understanding of conflict at the national level. Respondents between 25 and 45 years old are the most likely to believe that South Sudan is in a state of war, at 18.5%, as compared to 14.0% of respondents who are under 25 and 14.5% of individuals over 45 years old.

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42 “Other” types of conflict included issues such as power struggles, abduction of girls, forced marriage, unwanted pregnancy, rumour mongering, alcohol and debt repayment.
In line with these findings, quantitative data reveals broad consensus that youth are responsible for conflict; only younger FGD participants indicated that there were times where violence could be necessary.\(^{43}\) Overall, youth thus appear more conflict prone than their elder peers. In order to better understand these trends, it is important to consider that, unlike those “who participated in/remember the fight for independence”, many youth “have developed their political and personal awareness during the current conflict.”\(^{44}\)

**Beneficiary type**

In response to these recently experienced conflicts, 10.9% of direct beneficiaries chose to fight, compared to 9.3% of non-beneficiaries and 8.1% of indirect beneficiaries. However, 44.9% of

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\(^{44}\) Mckay, “Desk Review and Consulation Report for Search for Common Ground.”
direct beneficiaries attempted to solve the conflict through dialogue, compared to 43.4% of indirect beneficiaries and 35.1% of non-beneficiaries.

Reactions to aggravations generally fluctuate in relation to beneficiary type and type of aggravation. Roughly ten percent of non-beneficiaries (9.9%) and direct beneficiaries (9.8%) would fight in cases of stolen cattle or destroyed crops, compared to 6.2% of indirect beneficiaries. Of those who would talk to solve the conflict, 44.7% are indirect beneficiaries, compared to 36.5% of direct beneficiaries and 28.6% of non-beneficiaries. However, in case of disagreements, 6.1% of indirect beneficiaries would fight, compared to 4.8% of direct beneficiaries and 4.8% of non-beneficiaries. Meanwhile, 63.5% of direct beneficiaries would talk to solve the conflict, compared to 59.7% of indirect beneficiaries and 48.3% of non-beneficiaries.

**Identity**

Identity is also linked to conflict types. 25% of those who identify with their tribe were most recently involved in land disputes; 23.7% of those who identify with their clan recently experienced cattle raiding; 20.8% of those who identify with their language recently experienced conflict at home; and 20% of those who identify with their nationality recently experienced conflict over access to resources (see figure 10).

*Figure 10 Most Recent Conflict, by Identity*

- Clan
- Language
- National
- Tribe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Type</th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land dispute</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle raiding</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to resources</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack by military or police</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is thus a relationship between identity and social cohesion, and between identity and conflict; however, as will be discussed later in this report, this is mostly a result of manipulative identity politics. In addition, while much of the ‘ancient hatreds’ rhetoric surrounding the current conflict revolves around tribalism, these findings demonstrate that tribal identity is in fact linked more strongly to dialogue than to conflict.

**County**

In Bor, 29.6% would fight if cattle were stolen/crops destroyed, compared to 4.9% in Torit. Meanwhile, in Torit, 44.3% would attempt to resolve the conflict through dialogue, compared to 20% in Awerial. Overall, people in Bor are most likely to use violence in all three aggravation scenarios (see figure 11) whereas people in Torit are most likely to attempt to resolve the conflicts through dialogue (see figure 12).

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45 Three aggravation scenarios: cattle stolen/crops destroyed, insults and disagreements.
Meanwhile, different counties have different conflict experiences. 26.4% of people in Bor have been angered by conflict in the past week, compared to 8.6% in Malakal. The most recently experienced conflict is predominantly cattle raiding in Bor, violence in the home in Awerial, access to resources in Tonj East, and land disputes in Malakal (see figure 13).

**Figure 13 Most Recent Conflict, by County**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Type</th>
<th>Juba</th>
<th>Yei River</th>
<th>Torit</th>
<th>Bor</th>
<th>Awerial</th>
<th>Malakal</th>
<th>Tonj East</th>
<th>Wau</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle raiding</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to resources</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land dispute</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each county is subject to a specific set of circumstances that affect knowledge, attitudes and practices of social cohesion and conflict. Relative geographical isolation is one factor which may impact reported levels of social cohesion. Stability and security should also be taken into consideration: while Bor has been at the frontline of the recent conflict, Wau is not currently affected by violence and does not have a large displaced population. Interestingly, although respondents from Bor have experience more recent conflict, only 38.5% believe South Sudan is in a state of war, while 61.5% of respondents from Malakal believe the same.

Location also appears to impact respondents’ reactions to certain scenarios. When asked how they would respond if a 14 year old female was forced into marriage, only 2% of respondents from Juba would fight, while 14% from Bor would do the same. Further, while only 41.4% from Awerial would go to the military for help, 71% of respondents from Malakal would do the same.

**Figure 14** Percent of respondents who believe South Sudan is in a state of war, by county

![Figure 14](image)

**Figure 15** Percent of respondents who believe South Sudan is in a state of peace, by county

![Figure 15](image)

46 Because of Bor’s peculiar trends, it will be the subject of a case study later in this assessment.
**Education**

52.16% of respondents with a university education believe that South Sudan is in a state of war, while this is true of 45.7% of respondents with no education, 47.4% of respondents with secondary, and 47.4% with primary education. Interestingly, respondents who indicate confidence in finding a job after finishing school are more likely to believe that South Sudan is in a state of peace than people who feel less confident. Moreover, 61.1% of students who say they will finish school believe South Sudan is at peace while only 45.7% who say they will not finish school indicate the same.

**5.2.2 Drivers and Triggers of Conflict**

There are many different sources of conflict in South Sudan. Prior conflict analyses have argued that root causes of conflict in Jonglei State include high bride price, abduction of women and children, competition over resources, economic interests, marginalization, and politicization; in Unity State meanwhile, it has been argued that conflict is linked to cattle raiding, competition over water and grazing lands, attacks by rebel militia groups, border conflicts, attacks and abductions of children, inter- and intra-clan fighting, unemployment and food insecurity.

This assessment suggests that fighting does often result from competition over access to resources, in particular water. FGD participants reveal that “many people try to get resources all at one time” and that “if one group has power they will try to take resources of another.”

However, conflict can also be triggered by cattle—not only through cattle raiding but also through the movement of cattle and competition over grazing rights. Indeed, “if the cows need more land sometimes people will let their cows go on to other people’s land causing disputes.”

In addition, conflict can originate from fights over women in the aftermath of elopement, lack of dowry, rape or unwanted pregnancy. One interlocutor explained that “women and girls are considered resources, so if anything happens to them people in the community react immediately” – clearly, household level disputes can rapidly snowball into intra- or even inter-communal conflict. Meanwhile, group (e.g. tribal) affiliation can result in inter-communal

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47 Note: Rankings of confidence was on a scale of 1-5 (5 being most confident). Rankings were as follows: Of respondents who indicated 5 in confidence, 35.4% reported South Sudan at peace. Of respondents who indicated 4, 53.0% reported South Sudan at peace. Of respondents who indicated 3, 42.8% reported South Sudan at peace. Of respondents who indicated 2 and 1, 27.5% and 25.3% reported South Sudan at peace respectively.


49 FGD with respondents aged 10-14 and 25-45 in Warrap, Tonj East during February 2015.

50 KII with Journalist in Warrap, Tonj East during February 2015.

51 KII with Pastor in Warrap, Tonj East during February 2015.
conflict if “negative things (are) spoken about the community” or in case of perceived discrimination.\textsuperscript{52} Debt collection, finally, can also be a source of disputes.

As such, in South Sudan, conflict triggers can include cattle raiding, access to water points, elopement, debt collection, etc. These triggers are well documented, reflecting the above-mentioned findings.\textsuperscript{53} Conflict drivers, however, must also be taken into consideration—addressing conflict drivers is crucial in any peacebuilding endeavour, but the distinction is often lacking in existing literature on South Sudan.

Qualitative findings suggest that South Sudanese conflict drivers can be broadly grouped into five interlinked categories: politics, discrimination, identity politics, resource scarcity and poverty (see figure 15). As such, a conflict triggered by disputes over cattle raiding is in fact underlined by poverty (as cattle is a source of wealth) and identity politics (due to the manipulation of tribal/clan dynamics).

\textsuperscript{52} FGD with respondents aged 13-36 in Juba, Central Equatoria during February 2015.
The desk review remarked that “though identity politics have been used to fan the flames of the current conflict, there is a remarkably high level of awareness, in urban and rural areas, that the current conflict is largely political.” This is consistent with qualitative findings. Indeed, a journalist in Wau alluded to the political nature of the conflict by referring to a popular African proverb: “where two elephants are fighting, the grass becomes the victim.” Meanwhile, FGD participants in Malakal argued that “those who have money, they need people to be in conflict.”

Participation in conflict is thus “more related to the perceived lack of equitable resource allocation than to any genuine racial hatred.” Overemphasis on tribal or clan dynamics is

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54 McKay, “Desk Review and Consultation Report for Search for Common Ground.”
55 KII with Journalist in Wau, Western Bahr El Ghazal during February 2015.
56 FGD with respondents aged 25-45 in Malakal, Upper Nile during February 2015.
57 McKay, “Desk Review and Consultation Report for Search for Common Ground.”
therefore poorly justified. President Salva Kiir himself admits that "the conflict in South Sudan is purely a political struggle for power, not an ethnic conflict as it has been reported."58

5.2.3 Youth and Conflict

Reflecting the quantitative findings aforementioned, qualitative data reveals broad consensus, including among youth, that youth are responsible for conflicts. Youth are perceived to have a role to play in the defence of their families and communities; in addition, problems are exacerbated by unemployment and alcohol abuse. FGD participants in Wau explained that “if they have nothing to do, they will look for a way forward to survive.”59 Meanwhile, quantitative findings indicated that youth under the age of 25 are most likely to have participated in conflict within the past week, and generally more likely to fight in response to aggravations.

However, elders and political leaders often influence youth.60 One FGD participant in Malakal even reported that on some occasions, “big leaders give small drink[s] [to youths]” to fuel conflict.61 In addition, the desk review also argues “community elders scapegoat youth to explain violence.”62 As such, some nuance needs to be introduced to the concept of conflictual youth.63

Interestingly, age does not appear to influence if a respondent would fight if their cattle was stolen or their crops destroyed: 10.5% of those under 25 years old and 10.7% of those over 45 would respond by fighting. However, age is a factor if someone is called a ‘bad name: 11.5% of respondents under 25 would react by fighting, while this is true for 7.6% aged 25-45 and only 6.1% of respondents over 45.

Education also seems to influence responses to aggression. Respondents with no education are the most likely to fight someone who has stolen cattle or destroyed their crops, at 14.2% while only 3.8% of respondents with university education reported the same.64 Further, if someone calls the respondent a ‘bad name, 9.5% of those with no education would respond by fighting while 2.9% of those with university education would respond in the same way. However, overall, 40.8% of people would respond by talking in order to resolve the conflict. Education appears to be less indicative of how individuals react when asked how they would respond if a 14 year old was forced into a marriage. 5.2% of respondents with no education said they would respond by fighting, while 3.2% of respondents with university education said the same. The majority of people, at 57.6% would go to the military, with little variation found among the different education groups.

59 FGD with respondents aged 25-45 in Wau, Western Bahr El Ghazal during February 2015.
60 FGD with respondents aged 10-15 and 25-45 in Yei River, Central Equatoria during February 2015.
61 FGD with respondents aged 25-45 in Malakal, Upper Nile during February 2015.
63 There is no evidence or reportage on financial transactions for conflict.
64 Note: 6.4% and 8.0% of respondents with secondary and primary education respectively, indicated that they would fight if their cattle was stolen or their crop destroyed.
5.3 Peacebuilding

5.3.1 Unifiers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SFCG Indicator b: Percentage of community members who report increased opportunities for engagement in conflict resolution within their communities. Conflict resolution works to address the underlying causes of conflict by finding common interests and goals.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PBEA Country Level Indicator 3.2: Percentage of youth and “officials” trained in sports demonstrating a positive change in behaviours related to relationships with others and alternative means of resolving conflicts on the sports field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4D Principles: Facilitating enabling environments that create spaces for plurality of voices, promote narratives of communities, encourage listening, dialogue and debate and the active and meaningful participation of children and women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFCG Indicator 2a: Percentage of key group members participating in capacity building activities who have improved attitudes towards the use of peaceful mechanisms for conflict resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBEA Country Level Indicator 2.2: percentage of target teacher/education personnel who have increased confidence and capacity to apply skills (including development of materials) in the provision of LS/PB and conflict sensitive services.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Qualitative data reveals that common interests exist amongst South Sudanese that are useful for bringing people from different communities together. The most common community-bridging activities are traditional dance, music, sports (football), church, intermarriage and school. Community members identified “football to be a unifying factor,” enabling people to gather and have discussions.65

Amongst the things that all South Sudanese have in common, FGD and KII participants most commonly identified with religion, skin colour, pastoralism and agriculture, as well as shared traumatic experience and pride. However, participants also identified shared negative/undesirable (non-positive) traits: “South Sudanese are stubborn people and they don’t understand easily especially when it comes to violent conflicts, most of them are non-educated. They take revenge as a priority option.”66 In addition, some interlocutors across the country believed that South Sudanese have nothing in common at all. A community leader from Tonj East contended that “every place has their own culture. Some send their kids to school, while others don’t. Some use cattle as currency, others don’t. There is nothing they all have in common.”67 Others in Awerial believed that South Sudanese had nothing in common “because

65 KII with Pastor from Wau, Western Bahr El Ghazal on February 4, 2015.  
66 FGD with respondents aged 13-36 from Juba, Central Equatoria on February 4, 2015.  
67 KII with Pastor from Tonj East, Warrap during February 2015.
they belong to a different tribe.” This pessimism is could very likely be shaped by the recurrence of conflict, a result of years of unrest: one FGD participant, when queries on the most positive things about South Sudan stated “nothing because of the war.”

Despite some negative perceptions of national cohesion, community members nevertheless reported a number of positive perceptions about South Sudan as a country. Natural resources and fertile land are viewed particularly favourably. FGD participants argued that “South Sudan is a rich country full of different types of natural resources, fertile lands for agriculture and cattle grazing.” A community leader from Tonj East also praised “rich lands for cultivating and the amount of wildlife” – this was likewise reported in Wau, Yei and Juba. In addition, FGD participants in Tonj East, Torit and Yei expressed positive perceptions about existing infrastructure (such as schools, roads and health facilities) and economic opportunities – in the South Sudanese context, any available infrastructure and opportunity appears to be viewed in a positive light.

However, in some individual cases, perceptions of South Sudan have also been altered by conflict: one KII interlocutor in Wau stated that “there is no natural beauty in this country, have you seen it? Beauty is not a big concept here, they are burning everything. There are no animals. There is nothing here that makes me think positively.”

While Southern Sudanese were historically united by their quest for independence and their opposition to Khartoum, independent South Sudan lacks strong unifiers with which to forge national cohesion; nation-building, moreover, has been further undermined by conflict. However, community-bridging activities including music and sport do have the potential to enhance social cohesion across groups; in addition, there is potential to enhance feelings of national identity by focusing on shared history, religion and traditions.

### 5.3.1.1 Inclusive dialogue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SFCG Indicator a: Percentage of public in targeted states who state they are currently engaged in inclusive dialogue on key issues relating to ongoing local conflicts.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PBEA Country Level Indicator 3.1: Percentage of youth reporting a positive change in perception of identity (nationality), tolerance and respect for girls and other groups, self-awareness and self-confidence and related behaviours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4D Principles: Facilitating enabling environments that create spaces for plurality of voices, promote narratives of communities, encourage listening, dialogue and debate and the active and meaningful participation of children and women.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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68 KII with Political Leader from Aweriel, Lakes State during February 2015.
69 KII with Community Leader from Wau, Western Bahr el-Ghazal February 2015.
70 FGD with respondents aged 13-36 from Juba, Central Equatoria on February 4, 2015.
71 KII with Pastor from Tonj East, Warrap during February 2015.
72 KII with Pastor from Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal, during February 2015.
Many community members emphasized that inclusive dialogue fosters cooperation in the community. A community leader from Tonj East stated that inclusive dialogue “fosters cooperation, and really shows the opposing party that you are serious about peace.” An FGD participant from Juba also reported that face to face discussions can help people “cooperate and discuss issues that can minimize conflicts and disagreements and will reach to possible solutions.” Other FGD participants noted that peace could be promoted through such discussions.

Quantitative data shows commitment to dialogue. Indeed, in response to the most recent conflict experienced, approximately 36% of the population sampled chose to resolve the conflict through dialogue, with little variation between genders. However, likelihood to resolve conflict through dialogue decreases with age: 37.5% of those under the age of 25 attempted to resolve their most recent conflict through dialogue, compared to 36.6% for those aged 25-45 and 31.9% of those over the age of 45.

A pastor from Tonj East explained that “peace is important because it brings people together. It stops violence and leads to marriages leading to more peace between communities.” As such, there is a need for increased opportunities for inclusive and constructive dialogue within and between communities on key issues relating to ongoing local conflicts.

5.3.2 Key Influencers

A number of individuals influence knowledge, attitudes and practices in communities across South Sudan, and have the potential to shape behaviour and attitudes about peaceful conflict resolution.

Interlocutors participating in KIIs and FGDs consider local elders, community leaders, local religious officials, community chiefs, local authorities to be amongst the most influential community members in South Sudan. Some participants also highlighted the role of women leaders; however, women leaders were identified less often than others. One KII participant in Awerial noted that “on rare occasions [that] women participate, […] they have wise ideas.”

Key influencers are often looked to in times of conflict and community members follow their lead in solving their troubles. Indeed, community members consider key influencers to be in a position to promote peace and stability in the community. FGD participants from Juba noted that it was important for “religious leaders [and] elders to encourage unity among different

73 KII with Journalist from Tonj East, Warrap during February 2015.
74 FGD with respondents aged 13-36 from Juba, Central Equatoria State during February 2015.
75 KII with Pastor from Tonj East, Wararp during February 2015.
76 KII with Community Leader from Awerial during February 2015.
Quantitative findings indicate that over half of people would choose to consult community leaders or elders in order to resolve conflicts within communities (55.9%) or between tribes (57%). Religious leaders and government officials are also influential in conflict resolution, in particular between tribes, while friends and relatives are more often consulted during intra-communal than inter-communal conflicts (see figure 16).

**Figure 17 Key Influencers in Conflict Resolution**

![Bar Chart showing influence of different groups in conflict resolution]

Community leaders and elders have the greatest influence in communities across South Sudan, both in cases of intra-communal and inter-tribal conflicts. Indeed, “community leaders are (...) respected individuals and the fathers of the community” – the use of “fathers” is telling, illustrating the limited role of female leaders. Community leaders are most relied upon for conflict resolution in Tonj East, Bor and Torit; conversely, they are less consulted in Yei River and Awerial (see figure 17).

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77 FGD with respondents aged 10-28 from Juba, Central Equatoria on February 3, 2015.
78 FGD with respondents aged 24-45 from Warrap, Tonj East during February 2015.
Meanwhile, government officials are most influential in cases of conflict with another tribe. FGD participants confirmed that they would appeal to “government officials if disagreement with nearby community [sic].” Reliance on government officials however varies across counties—it is particularly high in Tonj East with 63.3% of the population relying on government officials in cases of intra-communal conflict, and 76.70% if the conflict is inter-tribal. However, individuals in Juba, Yei River and Malakal are substantially less likely to appeal to government officials for assistance (see figure 18).

Like community leaders, religious leaders are sought after in both intra-communal and inter-tribal conflicts (see figure 19). “Religious leaders [are] the peace keepers who keep the young people on the road to education.” People in Malakal have the greatest likelihood of looking to religious leaders: 57.6% in cases of inter-communal conflict, and 57.6% during inter-tribal conflict.

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79 FGD with respondents aged 18-24 from Western Bahr El Ghazal during February 2015.
80 KII with Pastor in Wau, Western Bahr El Ghazal during February 2015.
Key influencers, especially community leaders and elders, have a critical role to play in conflict resolution, and are generally perceived to “create or support opportunity for interaction.” In order to resolve conflicts, “the community members will gather together and the victims of the violent conflicts will explain the source of the problem. Then the local community leaders, elders […] will discuss the matter and come with the best solution so that everyone feels they are not ignored and […] people will reconcile and forgive each other.” However, it is important to note that key influencers can also have a negative impact on knowledge, attitudes and practices, for instance by inciting violence among youth or preventing them from engaging in the peace process.

### 5.3.2.1 Youth as Peace Builders

**SFCG Indicator 3.2b:** Youth Influences (including parents, teachers and community leaders) that are able to identify youth leaders who support conflict resolution.

**C4D Principles:** Ensuring that children are considered as agents of change and as a primary audience, starting from the early childhood years;

**C4D Principles:** Building the self-esteem and confidence of care providers and children.

Elders and youth jointly acknowledge the importance of youth in peacebuilding. Although youth are overwhelmingly assigned responsibility for conflict, both youth and elders recognize that youth could be important drivers of peace. When asked if there are ever times when violent conflict was necessary, most youth interviewed reported that there were not. Youth are eager to help solve conflicts; however, as one FGD participant indicated, “we are not given [the]

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81 FGD with respondents aged 10-15 in Yei, Central Equatoria during February 2015.
82 FGD with respondents aged 10-28 in Juba, Central Equatoria during February 2015.
opportunity, I wish we had such opportunities but our opinions are undermined by the community leaders.”

This statement highlights the potentially detrimental impact of certain key influencers mentioned above.

While some leaders are wary of involving youth in peacebuilding processes, others are more willing. In Tonj East for example, the chief of the Makuac Boma appoints youth as cattle leaders charged with watching cattle while they are in grazing lands. Additionally, he also delegates youth to attend meetings between neighbouring communities and selects a young person to be an ambassador to another community. Youth unhesitatingly accept and perform such duties, underscoring their inclination and capacity for peacebuilding. In Awerial, young FGD participants were indeed proud to report opportunities “to sit together with youth and leaders to discuss issues concerning peace building in the community.” However, preliminary research indicated that “women were more likely to feel that there were limitations to their abilities to act as peacemakers”, and that “only older women feel able to influence inter-communal peace.”

Impact of Peace

Education plays a role in people’s perspectives on the impact of peace. Of respondents with no education, 31.9% consider development to be the most important impact of national peace. The second highest proportion of respondents with no education, at 13.6%, consider reduced violence to be the most important factor. Respondents with secondary and university levels of education, also consider development to be the most important impact of peace, at 22.6% and 24.4% respectively. However, the second highest proportions differ: 21.9% with university education believe reconciliation to be most important, while 19.9% with secondary education believe better education for their children to be the most important.

Interestingly, respondents with children, at 14.2%, are less likely than respondents with no children, at 21.1%, to select better education for children as the most important impact of nationwide peace. Even so, respondents under 25 years old commonly report that better education would be the most important impact of peace, at 24.1% (contrasting with 25-45 year olds, at 12.8% and over 45, at 13.6%).

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83 FGD with respondents aged 13-36 in Juba, Central Equatoria during February 2015.
84 FGD with respondents aged 10-14 and 24-45 in Tonj East, Warrap during February 2015.
85 FGD with respondents aged 10-14 and 24-45 in Tonj East, Warrap during February 2015.
86 FGD with respondents aged 15-19 in Awerial, Lakes State during February 2015.
5.4 Role of the Media

5.4.1 Communication Channels

Given the differing levels of development and wealth across South Sudan, there are several means by which information is spread. Radio is typically the preferred means of spreading information - while 48.3% of the population sampled has a radio or access to a radio, 85.3% actually report getting information on war and peace from the radio. However, the cost of owning a radio, or the lack of necessary infrastructure, can sometimes put radios out of reach, requiring people to rely on alternative channels of communication.

Mobile phone possession varies, but is greater than radio access in some areas; therefore, some people favour receiving information via mobile phones. Another popular method of spreading information is by affixing a loudspeaker or megaphone to the back of a boda-boda (motorcycle) and having the driver move between communities. In other circumstances, the most effective means of information delivery is through high-level members of the community or government officials who spread the information to their communities by word-of-mouth.

In quantitative data, television prevailed as a relatively popular means of acquiring information on war and peace, second only to radio – approximately 45% of the population sampled receives information on war and peace from the television. In qualitative interviews, however, few indicated that they owned a television or watched one regularly. In fact, an imam in Wau indicated that “families don’t have TVs, just a minor group are in possession.” Likewise, the Minister of Information and Communication in Wau says “TVs are limited, as is electricity.” Indeed, there appears to be strong variations in access to televisions across counties: 19.4% receive information from the television in Yei River, compared to 85.4% in Malakal.

Newspapers are also a potential source of information. While newspapers are cheap to produce and purchase, they are not particularly popular. This is because in some places, “media influence is very limited [and] reading capacity is little so people still bank on the radio and announcements.” The radio can also serve as a tool to bring families and friends together, and can therefore serve as a community unifier.

In some communities “traditional music, cultural activities, traditional dances, [and] dramas” are also said to be good ways of spreading information. Such activities draw large groups of people in and between communities together and are a good way to spread information to many people at once. Communication channels in South Sudan, as such, are by no means limited to the radio.

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88 This suggests that the question “Do you have a radio or access to a radio?” may have been narrowly interpreted.
89 KII with Imam from Wau, Western Bahr El Ghazal during February 2015.
90 KII with Minister of Information and Communication in Wau, Western Bahr El Ghazal during February 2015.
91 KII with Pastor in Wau, Western Bahr El Ghazal during February 2015.
92 FGD with respondents aged 10-28 in Juba, Central Equatoria during February 2015.
5.4.2 Radio Consumption

As mentioned, 48.3% of the population sampled has access to a radio. Radio access is greatest in Yei River where 77.8% have access to a radio, followed by Wau at 62.6% and Juba at 61.4% (see figure 20). Radio access is however scarce in Tonj East where only 8.8% have radio access, partly due to lack of infrastructure and poor radio coverage – indeed, Radio Miraya, which has the broadest reach in South Sudan, is not broadcast in Tonj East.93 Across the country, “whereas urban youth might be considered oversubscribed, in terms of the media programing and other peace building activities targeting them, rural youth are often underserved.”94

Figure 21 Radio Access, by County

Radio access is higher among males than females, with 63.2% of males but 45.3% of females having access. Radio access also decreases with age: while 56.1% of those under the age of 25 have access to a radio, this is the case for 53.2% of those aged 25-45, and 47.5% of those over the age of 45.

92.1% of respondents with radio access listen to the radio at least several times per week. While 80.3% of males with radio access listen to the radio every day, this is the case for 72.7% of females – reasons for lower female listenership require further investigation, but could include clashes between airing times and daily tasks.

More of those with access to radios in Wau listen daily than in any other county: 86.80% of those with radio access in Wau listen to the radio every day, compared to 68.8% in Juba and 74.3% in Awerial. 71.3% of respondents with radio access listen to radio programs with their family members, suggesting that radio has the potential to bring people together in a unifying

fashion – this finding conflicts with preliminary research, which found that “radio listening is a surprisingly unsocial activity in South Sudan.”

Listeners are able to understand a broad range of languages (see figure 21). FGD participants broadly identified Juba Arabic as the language best suited to radio programming across the country. Reflecting these findings, quantitative data reveals that, when listening to the radio, 82% of those with radio access would be able to understand Arabic. At the county level, Arabic is best understood in Malakal, at 95.8%, while those in Tonj East have the lowest understanding of Arabic at 27.10%. English, meanwhile, is understood by 58.6% of those surveyed – 65.4% in Juba, but only 47.9% in Tonj East. Understanding of other languages, such as Dinka, varies considerably by county. Indeed, while Dinka is understood by 99.5% in Awerial, it is understood by only 0.7% in Yei River. Likewise, while 51.7% can understand Shilluk in Malakal, Shilluk is very little understood in other counties.

Figure 22 Languages Understood by Radio Listeners

Although the radio is by far the most popular communication channel in South Sudan, many still lack access. Causes for lower female listenership in particular should be investigated and addressed. In addition, radio programming should be combined with local forms of media such as megaphones and dramas to ensure inclusiveness, as “even those programs in local languages have limited penetration into very rural areas.”

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95 McKay, “Desk Review and Consulation Report for Search for Common Ground.”
96 Although quantitative data did not specify whether this referred to traditional Arabic or Juba Arabic, quantitative findings generally refer specifically to Juba Arabic.
97 As the survey was written no data was collected on why there are fewer women listening to the radio or why they have less access as group.
5.4.3 Radio for Peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SFCG Indicator 1a</td>
<td>Percentage of community members who believe that South Sudan media are promoting tolerance and reconciliation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4D Principles</td>
<td>Linking community perspectives and voices with sub-national and national policy dialogue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFCG Indicator 2.1a</td>
<td>Number of interactive communication platforms that amplify voices of marginalized/conflict afflicted groups and/or generate debate, and/or link community perspectives with sub-national and national policy dialogue (PBEA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBEA Country Level Indicator 3.1</td>
<td>Percentage of youth reporting a positive change in perception of identity (nationality), tolerance and respect for girls and other groups, self-awareness and self-confidence and related behaviours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4D Principles</td>
<td>Facilitating enabling environments that create spaces for plurality of voices, promote narratives of communities, encourage listening, dialogue and debate and the active and meaningful participation of children and women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4D Principles</td>
<td>Reflecting the principles of inclusion, self-determination, participation and respect by ensuring that marginalized and vulnerable groups (including indigenous populations and people with disabilities) are prioritized and given visibility and voice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFCG Indicator 2.1c</td>
<td>Percentage of regular radio listeners demonstrating knowledge necessary to address intergroup conflict (PBEA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFCG Indicator 2.2a</td>
<td>Percentage of target populations that cite an example of practicing new knowledge, skills, and relationship development developed through programming to address conflict drivers and promote peace (PBEA).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Radio prevails as one the most popular means of communication in South Sudan. 87.2% of men and 81.7% of women receive information about peace and conflict from the radio. Results vary across counties: 93.8% in Malakal receive information about peace and conflict from the radio, compared to 74.2% in Bor (see figure 22). Education appears to influence where individuals receive information about peace and conflict. While 35.8% with no education, 36.1% with primary education, and 21.3% with secondary education receive peace and conflict information from the radio, only 5.4% with university education indicate the same. In fact, the highest proportion of respondents with university education, at 22.2%, receive peace and conflict information from Twitter.
Quantitative data uncovers high awareness of existing edutainment programming: “there is a show on preventing conflict”, “there is a program of the news situation”, “there are dramas and programmes that can educate people on how to promote health, […] violence against women etc.”\textsuperscript{99} Preliminary research warns that the edutainment media landscape in South Sudan is already crowded. Indeed, “Internews, USIP, BBC Media and the UN Mission all broadcast drama-style programs that discuss issues of peace building, youth and behavior change vis-à-vis violence, health and gender.”\textsuperscript{100}

No doubt partly as a result of existing programming, the radio is broadly acknowledged to have the potential to promote peace: 83.6% of females and 86.6% of males consider the radio a means of promoting peace. This is highest in Malakal, where 96.3% consider the radio a means of promoting peace, and lowest at 76.3% in Torit (see figure 23).

\textsuperscript{99} KII with Journalist in Wau, Western Bar el Ghazal during February 2015 ; FGD with respondents ages 13-36 in Juba, Central Equatoria, during February 2015.

\textsuperscript{100} Mckay, “Desk Review and Consulation Report for Search for Common Ground.”
Data analysis reveals that there is in fact a strong statistical correlation between radio access and positive knowledge, attitudes and practices of social cohesion and conflict. This does not necessarily suggest causation – other factors, such as relative wealth or education levels, should also be taken into consideration and could be the focus of further study. However, people with radio access display:

- Decreased propensity to address conflict with violence (see figure 24);
- Increased propensity to resolve conflict through dialogue (see figure 25);
- Increased propensity to trust members of other tribes.

Indeed, people with radio access trust members of other tribes more than those without radio access (47.4%, compared to 44%). In addition, in case of stolen cattle/destroyed crops, those with access to radio are more likely to talk (32.3%) and very slightly less prone to fighting (9.2%) than those without access to radio (26.3% and 9.9% respectively). Likewise, in case of insults, those with access to radio are again more likely to talk (41.8%) and slightly less prone to fighting (8.3%) than those without access to radio (39.4% and 8.9% respectively); in case of disagreement meanwhile, those with access to radio are again more likely to talk (52.1%) and slightly less likely to fight (4.1%) than those without access to radio (44.7% and 5.3% respectively).

**Figure 25 Percentage of “Fighters” in Aggravation Scenarios, by Radio Access**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Radio Access</th>
<th>No Radio Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stolen Cattle/Destroyed Crops</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insults</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreements</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Given the positive correlation between radio access, social cohesion and conflict resolution, it would appear that peacebuilding efforts could be enhanced by increasing radio access where possible, and promoting radio listenership groups, as yet unpopular and undeveloped, in areas with limited access. Indeed, “whether or not a young person accesses behavior change/peace building or edutainment style media is primary driven by access to radio, as opposed to want of content.”\textsuperscript{101} However, the Minister for Information and Communication in Wau nevertheless argued in favour of “more awareness on peacebuilding”, and capacity building for radio staff.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{101} Mckay, “Desk Review and Consulation Report for Search for Common Ground.”

\textsuperscript{102} KII with Minister of Information and Communication in Wau, Western Bahr El Ghazal during February 2015.
5.5 Bor Case Study

5.5.1 Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices

Quantitative analysis reveals that Bor County is particularly prone to conflict and negative knowledge, attitudes and practices towards social cohesion. In addition, resilience is lower in Bor than any other county, with only 15.8% able to manage challenges well.

Clan identity is more strongly valued in Bor than in any other county, with 47.4% most strongly identifying with their clan. As noted previously, clan identity is in fact often associated with negative knowledge, attitudes and practices in terms of social cohesion. In fact, 34.2% of those in Bor have not interacted with a member of another tribe within the last week, and 21.1% have not interacted with a member of another clan within their own tribe. Likewise, 57.2% of people in Bor do not consider members of other ethnic groups trustworthy.

This lack of social cohesion feeds into the county’s conflict trends. In Bor, it is perceived as normal for arguments to become violent. 38.8% will fight in reaction to stolen cattle or destroyed crops, insults, and disagreements. FGD participants believe that “violence is necessary when someone kill your relative or stolen your cattle.” One community leader from Bor stated that “people from different communities do not understand each other.”

Cattle raiding is common, and is the most recent type of conflict experienced by 37.8% of people in the county (see figure 26).

![Figure 27 Most Recent Conflict in Bor](image)

Negative knowledge, attitudes and practices in Bor with regards to social cohesion and conflict can partly be explained by the current security situation. Since the eruption of violence in December 2013, Bor has been at the frontline of the conflict. In a series of battles, the town of Bor was captured by rebels in December 2013, only to be recaptured by government forces in

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103 FGD with respondents aged 25-45 from Bor South, Jonglei during February 1, 2015.
104 KII with Pastor from Bor South, Jonglei during February 4, 2015.
January 2014. Fighting led to mass displacement; Bor currently has some 52,957 internally displaced persons (IDPs), mostly ethnic Nuer.

5.5.2 Dividers and Unifiers

Violent conflict in Bor occurs on a weekly basis, with FGD participants explaining that “people are addicted to conflict”. Conflict triggers outlined during FGDs and KIIIs include cattle raiding, kidnappings, disputes over women, access to water and petroleum, land disputes and gossiping, broadly reflecting conflict triggers countrywide. However, conflict triggers in Bor also include dancing and wrestling, which are also perceived as potential unifiers – it would appear that, although dancing and wrestling can bring people from different communities together, competitiveness can rapidly escalate into violence. Likewise, while “taking girls for marriage” is cited as a conflict trigger, intermarriage is perceived as a unifier – further study could be useful to investigate whether marriage is used as a conflict resolution mechanism in the aftermath of rape, unwanted pregnancy or illicit relationships, to the potential detriment of the woman involved. One less controversial unifier is religion: “church activities” are cited as powerful peace-building instruments.

5.5.3 Radio in Bor

50.6% of people in Bor do not have access to a radio. Of those who do have access, 83.5% listen to it at least several times a week. Radio is most often listened to with family members, as indicated by 51.6% of respondents. A further 19.4% said they listen to the radio with community members, while 16.10% listen with their friends and 12.9% listen alone. Dinka is understood by 91%. Both Arabic and English are well understood, by 54.3% and 51.10% respectively.

The radio continues to play a role in peacebuilding. 74.2% reported getting information about peace and conflict from the radio; 77.8% perceived radio to be the form of media most capable of promoting peace. A community leader nevertheless cautioned, “many people do not have time to know what is going on in the country”; other interlocutors highlighted the role of Church

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109 FGDs with respondents aged 24-45, 20-24, 15-19 and 10-14 in Bor, Jonglei during February 2015.

110 Ibid.

111 KII with Government Official in Bor, Jonglei during February 2015.

112 It is assumed based on the wording of responses that participants are referring to Christianity. Christianity was also referred to explicitly in a number of cases.

113 FGDs with respondents aged 24-45, 20-24, 15-19 and 10-14 in Bor, Jonglei during February 2015.
announcements and preaching in spreading information and promoting non-violent conflict resolution.\textsuperscript{112}

In line with overall findings, people with radio access in Bor are more trusting of members of other tribes those without radio access (23.6%, compared to 14.2%). However, while in general it has been shown that people with radio access resort more to dialogue and less to violence when aggravated, people with radio access in Bor in fact broadly display:

- Increased propensity to fight if insulted or in cases of stolen cattle/destroyed crops;
- Decreased propensity to solve disagreements through dialogue (see figure 27).

Indeed, if cattle are stolen/crops destroyed, a higher percentage of people with radio access attempt to solve the conflict through dialogue (25%, compared to 20.3%). However, people with radio access are also more liable to fight than those without radio access (30.4%, compared to 28.6%).

Similar results emerge in case of insults: although people with radio access are more apt to use dialogue than those without radio access (40.9%, compared to 33.2%), the former are still much more prone to fighting (19.4%, compared to 10.2%). Meanwhile, during disagreements, while people with radio access display less tendency to fight than people without radio access (5.9%, compared to 9%), they are also less likely to talk (39.8%, compared to 50.4%). These conflicting dynamics suggest that radio access in Bor has a less clearly defined impact on social cohesion and conflict that amongst the general population – in some cases, access to radio even appears to have a negative impact on attitudes and practices.

As such, Bor emerges as an outlier in the findings of this baseline. Radio access has little to no positive impact on knowledge, attitudes or practices with regards to social cohesion and conflict. Current radio content in Bor ought to be investigated as a potential explanation for these trends.

\textsuperscript{112} KIIs with Community Leader, Journalist and Pastor in Bor, Jonglei during February 2015.
Moving forward, additional focus may be needed in Bor-specific programming on non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms.
### 6 Conclusion and Recommendations

#### Social Cohesion & Conflict Trends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ▪ There are low levels of social cohesion and conflictual attitudes among members of different groups, in particular in Bor.113  
▪ National cohesion is limited, with few valuing national identity over other forms of identity. | ▪ Encourage exchanges between different communities, clans and tribes, celebrating both cultural diversities and similarities. | **SFCG Indicator 3a:** Percentage of community members, children, and young people who cite non-violent means to address conflict drivers and conflict management.  
**SFCG Indicator 3.1b:** Percentage of targeted communities that address their needs and interests through non-violent means. |
| ▪ Clan identity correlates with negative knowledge, attitudes and practices in terms of social cohesion and conflict, while tribal identity is linked to dialogue. | ▪ Use communications programming to raise public awareness of the harmful nature of manipulative identity politics, via radios and loudspeakers. | **PBEA Country Level Indicator 3.1:** Percentage of youth reporting a positive change in perception of identity (nationality), tolerance and respect for girls and other groups, self-awareness and self-confidence and related behaviors. |
| ▪ Violence in the home and cattle raiding are the most common types of conflict. Violence in the home is disproportionately experienced by women. | ▪ Develop a participatory radio programme specifically targeted at the prevention of gender-based violence, fostering dialogue among listeners and programme participants and providing a platform for female voices to speak up against gender based violence and discuss the implications of disputes over women. | **C4D Principles:** Facilitating enabling environments that create spaces for plurality of voices, promote narratives of communities, encourage listening, dialogue and debate and the active and meaningful participation of children and women. |

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113 Note: Respondents from Bor score positively in social cohesion and resiliency under the composite indexes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth are broadly perceived to be responsible for conflicts.</th>
<th>Generate debate among youth on non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms, providing a platform for positive youth influencers to share successful instances of peaceful conflict resolution.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict triggers include cattle raiding, access to water points, disputes over women, elopement, debt collection, etc.</td>
<td>Encourage ‘truth and reconciliation’ themed public discussions on conflict triggers and underlying conflict drivers in the aftermath of conflictual events between ex-combatants, key influencers, women and youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics, discrimination, identity politics, resource scarcity and poverty are key underlying conflict drivers.</td>
<td>Promote education and the continuation of education, especially for children to remain in school past the primary level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As education levels increase, attitudes towards other tribes and clans become more positive.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Peacebuilding & Conflict Resolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Community-bridging activities such as sports, school, traditional</td>
<td>- Build peacebuilding activities around popular unifiers, and encourage</td>
<td><strong>SFCG Indicator a:</strong> Percentage of public in targeted states who state they are currently engaged in inclusive dialogue on key issues relating to ongoing local conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dances and religion are recognized inter- and intra-communal unifiers.</td>
<td>participation through radio programming.</td>
<td><strong>SFCG Indicator b:</strong> Percentage of community members who report increased opportunities for engagement in conflict resolution within their communities. Conflict resolution works to address the underlying causes of conflict by finding common interests and goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SFCG Indicator 2a:</strong> Percentage of key group members participating in capacity building activities who have improved attitudes towards the use of peaceful mechanisms for conflict resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>PBEA Country Level Indicator 3.2:</strong> Percentage of youth and “officials” trained in sports demonstrating a positive change in behaviors related to relationships with others and alternative means of resolving conflicts on the sports field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Community members reported positive perceptions about South Sudan as</td>
<td>- Radio programming should devote time to discussions of positive perceptions of</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>a country, such as natural resources and fertile land.</td>
<td>South Sudan and positive examples of inter-communal cooperation to increase</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>feelings of national identity as part of a positive perception campaign.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Inclusive dialogue is recognized as paramount for peaceful conflict</td>
<td>- Increase opportunities for inclusive and constructive dialogue within and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resolution, but there is a lack of opportunities for dialogue and</td>
<td>between communities on key issues relating to ongoing local conflicts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>solutions are not always effectively implemented.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Key Influencers & Youth as Peacebuilders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Key influencers, especially community leaders and elders, are critical in shaping the overall attitudes and behaviors of people in their communities, establishing societal norms that either promote or discourage peaceful conflict resolution.</td>
<td>▪ Peaceful conflict resolution messages should target key influencers in order to ensure maximal awareness of non-violent alternatives.</td>
<td><strong>SFCG Indicator 2a</strong>: Percentage of key group members participating in capacity building activities who have improved attitudes towards the use of peaceful mechanisms for conflict resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Other key influencers include religious leaders and government officials. Government officials are particularly important in situations of inter-communal violence.</td>
<td>▪ Support of key influencers is necessary in order to encourage the participation of youth and other community members.</td>
<td><strong>PBEA Country Level Indicator 2.2</strong>: percentage of target teacher/education personnel who have increased confidence and capacity to apply skills (including development of materials) in the provision of LS/PB and conflict sensitive services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Youth are overwhelmingly perceived as responsible for conflict, but also perceived as having the power to build peace. However, there are few opportunities for youth to engage in the peacebuilding process.</td>
<td>▪ Youth should be educated about peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms, and encouraged to apply these mechanisms in practice.</td>
<td><strong>SFCG Indicator b</strong>: Percentage of community members who report increased opportunities for engagement in conflict resolution within their communities. Conflict resolution works to address the underlying causes of conflict by finding common interests and goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Youth desire opportunities to build peace and recognize the ultimate futility of violent conflict.</td>
<td>▪ Increase opportunities for youth to engage in conflict resolution alongside community leaders by creating or enhancing community-level mechanisms for civic and social participation.</td>
<td><strong>SFCG Indicator 3.2b</strong>: Youth Influences (including parents, teachers and community leaders) that are able to identify youth leaders who support conflict resolution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**C4D Principles:**
- Ensuring that children are considered as agents of change and as a primary audience, starting from the early childhood years;
- **C4D Principles:** Building the self-esteem and confidence of care providers and children.
## Communication for Peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ▪ Radios are the most popular channels of communication. However, radio access is limited, and affected by language barriers. | ▪ Combine radio programming with local forms of media such as megaphones and dramas to ensure inclusiveness.  
▪ Investigate and address causes for lower female listenership. | **SFCG Indicator 2.1c:** Percentage of regular radio listeners demonstrating knowledge necessary to address intergroup conflict (PBEA). |
| ▪ Although the radio is a major source of information on peace and conflict, and is believed to have the potential to promote peace, it is sometimes perceived as biased and government controlled. | ▪ Amplify voices of marginalized groups and diversity of opinions to increase legitimacy and reduce perceptions of bias. | **SFCG Indicator 2.2a:** Percentage of target populations that cite an example of practicing new knowledge, skills, and relationship development developed through programming to address conflict drivers and promote peace (PBEA) |
| ▪ There is a positive correlation between access to radios and trust in members of other tribes; those with greater access to radio are also more likely to solve conflicts through dialogue and less likely to fight when aggravated. | ▪ Increase radio access where possible, and promote radio listenership groups in areas with limited access.  
▪ Mount radios to boda-bodas with regular rotation of drivers to ensure inclusive access to information. | **C4D Principles:** Facilitating enabling environments that create spaces for plurality of voices, promote narratives of communities, encourage listening, dialogue and debate and the active and meaningful participation of children and women. |
| ▪ Contrary to the general trend, radio access in Bor does not appear to have a positive impact on knowledge, attitudes and practices of social cohesion and conflict. | ▪ Investigate current radio content in Bor as possible explanation for negative knowledge, attitudes and practices.  
▪ Bor-specific programming should address conflict drivers and triggers and encourage inter-communal exchange and dialogue. | |