PROJECT TITLE:
PLATEAU WILL ARISE! BUILDING AN ARCHITECTURE FOR PEACE AND TOLERANCE

Mid-term Evaluation

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Jos, Nigeria

Lead Evaluator: Charline Burton
Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist
SFCG West and Central Africa
cburton@sfcg.org

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1. Executive Summary

Context and Project
Nigeria’s Plateau State is home to a diverse population and stands at a critical crossroads. Located where the Christian south meets the Muslim north, local conflict in Plateau State is bound up in interreligious and regional tensions at a national level. The political and economic marginalisation of recent migrants or “settler” communities has led to resentment and fear among both indigenous (predominantly Christian) and newer (predominantly Muslim) communities. The two communities are engaged in a two-decade long cycle of violence comprising a cycle of attacks and reprisal attacks between the two communities. The “Plateau Will Arise! Building an Architecture for Peace, Tolerance and Reconciliation”, (PWA!) project is an 18-month (2013-2014) project funded by the European Union’s Instrument for Stability in Plateau State, Nigeria with a total budget of € 1,350,000. This project was funded as a response to this context of conflict. The overall objective of the project is to “build an active, locally-owned and inclusive Peace Architecture in Plateau State”. The specific objectives of this work are to 1) create an improved climate of peace in eight Local Government Areas, and 2) strengthen the role of the State to provide security for the population. In order to create these changes, Search for Common Ground (SFCG) is implementing a multi-layer programme working with a wide array of community, civil society, and government stakeholders, in partnership with two local civil society organisations. The programme targets key communities within eight Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Plateau State: Jos North, Jos South, Riyom, Barkin-Ladi, Bokkos, Qua’an Pan, Shendam and Wase. These areas are deeply affected both by recent and on-going violence, as well as other regions where there is an opportunity to consolidate peace.

Objective of the mid-term evaluation
The evaluation explores two main evaluative questions: the project’s relevance and effectiveness. For the purpose of this evaluation, relevance is defined as the extent to which the aid activity is suited to the intended impact and effects of the programme, and to which the activities of the intervention respond to the needs of the peacebuilding process. Effectiveness is understood to be the extent to which the aid activity is produced or likely to produce the intended changes and therefore reach its intended objectives in a timely fashion. The intended use of this evaluation is to: (a) Review programme strategy and methods, and (b) Inform long term learning. This report therefore primarily targets the PWA! staff and implementing partners as the primary users of the evaluation findings.

Methodology
SFCG used a mixed method qualitative/quantitative methodology to conduct an internal mid-term evaluation, which took place over the period of April – August 2014. The evaluation took place in a sample of 50% of the target areas, namely Barkin Ladi LGA, Bokkos LGA, Shendam LGA and Jos South LGA. The activities conducted to collect this mixed data included a literature review of relevant project documents and reports, 19 Key Informant Interviews (KII), a survey of 240 randomly selected adults and 10 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Eight interview guides and six focus group discussion guides were created for the purpose of this evaluation, as well as one survey questionnaire.
A large variety of groups and people participated in the evaluation, both at the state and at the LGA level, including: SFCG staff, the donor, project implementing partners, organisations receiving the Early Warning Bulletins, Security actors, officials at the State and LGA level, senior participants to the Peace Architecture Dialogues, participants to the Advanced Conflict Transformation trainings and to the step-down trainings, community members, children and the general population of our target areas. A total of 335 people participated in the evaluation, comprised of 172 men and 163 women.

Charline Burton, SFCG’s Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist for West and Central Africa for SFCG’s Institutional learning team, was the lead evaluator. She was supported in this process by Sarah Bentu, SFCG Jos-Nigeria Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator, as assistant evaluator. The evaluation team faced several challenges, which lead to a few limitations of this evaluation report. The largest issue we faced was a major security incident that took place in Jos (suicide bombing claiming over 120 lives) during the data collection period that made it virtually impossible to organise meetings with the security forces, errors in targeting the appropriate LGA officials for the interviews, and low attendance of the focus group discussions.

**Key Findings**

The Advanced Conflict Resolution Trainings, step-down trainings and conflict response strategies are relevant ways of contributing to “an improved climate of peace in eight LGAs” (Objective 1). The relevance of this training series lies in the connection between the training of trainers, the step-down training, and the implementation of the conflict mitigation response. Further contributing to the relevance is the selection of participants, with key leaders identified during the baseline as well as key stakeholders of the conflict identified after an LGA-based conflict analysis conducted with SFCG’s support. The trainings proved to be very effective, as the participants dramatically increased their knowledge about conflict response strategies (average increase of 40% from the pre-to post-tests). A large majority of participants (75%) were able to provide real-life examples of using the knowledge and skills either at a personal level or through initiatives that impacted their entire community. Both types of trainings therefore made positive contributions towards an improved climate of peace in the target LGAs. Such contribution could be further increased by building on the newly acquired skills and knowledge of local conflict and peace actors and multiplying the number of step-down trainings and subsequent conflict mitigation activities (currently: 4 per LGA).

The Early-Warning System (EWS): Over 150 messages were sent by community members over a 7 month period of project review, and the information was passed along to relevant official and non-government bodies. EWS bulletins were subsequently published and shared with local peace and security actors. Additionally, data collected shows a good level of awareness of the system by the community members directly involved in the program, as well as among CSOs and key LGA officials. However, evidence points at little spill-over from direct beneficiaries to the larger community (indirect beneficiaries). Regarding the use of the EWS, data collected shows a lower level of use than initially intended by the project. The intended purpose of the EWS is to
CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN OF RESPONSE STRATEGIES BY KEY ACTORS SUCH AS THE GOVERNMENT, THE SECURITY SERVICES AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS. BUT EVALUATION FINDINGS POINT TOWARDS MIXED RESULTS IN TERMS OF USE OF THE EWS DATA BY THOSE ACTORS. SIMILARLY, LITTLE EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THE USE OF THE EWS DATA BY THE SFCG TEAM TO RESPOND TO RUMOURS OR CONFLICT SITUATIONS IN REAL-TIME, HENCE HINDERING THE RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM. THE SMS BLAST IS A RELEVANT WAY OF CONTRIBUTING TO REINFORCING PUBLIC ATTITUDES THAT ARE FAVOURABLE TOWARDS A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT. IT HAS BEEN USED BY SFCG TO SEND MESSAGES OF PEACE TO OVER 1,000 COMMUNITY MEMBERS, BUT LITTLE EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THE LINK BETWEEN THE EWS AND THE SMS BLASTS. THERE IS CURRENTLY LITTLE FUNDS, TIME AND EFFORTS DEDICATED TO THE SYSTEM, HENCE A LIMITED NUMBER OF SECURITY INCIDENT SMS RECEIVED, WHICH HINDERS THE INTEREST OF KEY SECURITY AND PEACE ACTORS IN THE EWS BULLETINS. ADDITIONALLY, THIS SYSTEM WOULD ALSO HAVE ADDITIONAL ADDDED VALUE IF THE FORMAT OF THE EWS DATA BETTER MATCHED THE VARIOUS INTENDED AUDIENCES.

ABOUT THE MEDIA PROGRAMMES VOICES OF PEACE, OUR CHILDREN ARE TALKING AND THE STATION: ALL THREE PROGRAMMES ARE RELEVANT AND SFCG HAS MOSTLY MADE RELEVANT PROGRAMMATIC CHOICES THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. THE CHOICE OF RADIO (85% REGULAR LISTENERSHIP AMONG PLATEAU STATE) AND TELEVISION (76% VIEWERSHIP) AS A MEANS TO REACH OUT TO A WIDE AUDIENCE IN PLATEAU STATE PROVED TO BE A STRATEGIC CHOICE, AS WELL AS THE CHOICE OF THE PROJECT'S PARTNER RADIO AND TELEVISION STATION. WHILE DATA COLLECTED SHOWS THAT THE STATION HAS A HIGH POTENTIAL TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS, SO FAR THIS SHOW HAS NOT HAD SUCH INFLUENCE DUE TO ITS LOW VIEWERSHIP RATE (12.9% HAVE WATCHED THE SHOW AT LEAST ONCE) AND THEREFORE IS UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE SUCH EFFECTS TOWARDS THE END OF THE PROJECT. THE VOICES OF PEACE RADIO PROGRAMME HAS A HIGH REACH (OVER 50% HAVE HEARD IT AT LEAST ONCE) AND RESONATES WITH THE AUDIENCE'S CONCERNS FOR PEACE AND IS THEREFORE LIKELY TO BE PRODUCING A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON THE PUBLIC'S ATTITUDES. WHEN ASKED "HOW USEFUL DO YOU THINK THAT SUCH PROGRAMME IS IN ORDER TO REDUCE RUMOURS IN YOUR LGA?": 80% OF RESPONDENTS RATED THE VOP AS "VERY USEFUL" ON A 4-POINT LIKERT SCALE. THIS POINTS TOWARDS A HIGH RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM. NO LISTENERSHIP SURVEY WAS CONDUCTED FOR THE OUR CHILDREN ARE TALKING PROGRAMME BUT THERE ARE CLEAR INDICATIONS THAT DEMONSTRATE A STRONG LISTENERSHIP AND RELEVANCE OF THE PROGRAM TOPICS, WHICH ARE ALIGNED WITH THE INTENDED PURPOSE OF THE SHOW AND THE CONCERNS OF CHILDREN FOR PEACE. HOWEVER, THE PROJECT LISTENERSHIP SEEMS TO BE LIMITED TO AN ADULT AUDIENCE, WHILE THE SHOW IS MEANT TO TARGET BOTH ADULTS AND CHILDREN.


THE PEACE ARCHITECTURE DIALOGUES (PAD): ALL PEOPLE INTERVIEWED DURING THE EVALUATION CONFIRMED THAT THERE IS A HIGH LEVEL OF MISTRUST BETWEEN THE SECURITY FORCES AND THE LOCAL POPULATION. ABUSES BY SOME SECURITY MEMBERS – MOSTLY STF – AND RUMOURS OF SECURITY FORCES COLLABORATING DURING ATTACKS AGAINST VILLAGES ARE COMMON IN PLATEAU STATE, CONTRIBUTE TO POOR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE COMMUNITIES. EFFORTS TO CREATE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY, POPULATION,
government, and security actors are therefore highly relevant. All PAD participants mentioned that the meeting was conducive to an open and impartial dialogue, and that it was easy to have their voices heard. The nature of the facilitation is therefore relevant to contributing to the objectives of this activity. Data collected shows that the Peace Architecture Dialogue is a powerful tool for increasing mutual understanding and communication between civil society, government and security services and for networking of the various actors across all sectors. The partnership with the Office of the Special Adviser to the Governor on Peacebuilding is a relevant choice that contributes to the credibility of the event. The regular and active presence of senior security forces is perceived as very positive by all participants to these monthly meetings. The presence of the media during the PAD allowed for an increased reach of the activity’s outcomes to a larger audience. To a lesser extent, the PAD also contributed to increased coordination of responses to conflict-prone situations, when on several occasions, recommendations and action plans were agreed upon to reduce tensions over security threats raised during the PAD.

**Main recommendations**

- Build on previously increased local capacities and multiply the training effects by increasing the number of the step-down trainings and conflict resolution activities in each LGA;
- Dedicate more effort and time to perfecting the Early Warning System, including: adapting the information-sharing format to the diverse audience and consider adding the community as one of the audience, allocate one person to monitor and maintain the SMS Frontline software, increase community awareness of the system;
- Better document the links between the SMS blasts and the reports received via the Early Warning System, for monitoring purposes
- Continue the effort towards changing the attitudes of the population by using the mediums of radio and television
- Ensure a quick start-up of the activities that have not yet started
- Continue the Peace Architecture Dialogues and pilot it at the LGA level. Document the lessons learned to allow other SFCG programs to duplicate similar experiences;
- Dedicate more effort to the capacity-building of implementing partners. Better document such efforts for monitoring purposes.
2. Programme Background and Conflict Analysis

A. About the conflicts in Plateau State

Nigeria’s Plateau State is home to a diverse population and at a critical crossroads. Located where the Christian south meets the Muslim north, local conflict in Plateau State is bound up in interreligious and regional tensions at a national level. The political and economic marginalisation of recent migrants or “settler” communities has led to resentment and fear among both indigenous (predominantly Christian) and newer (predominantly Muslim) communities. The two communities are engaged in a two decade long cycle of violence with a cycle of attacks and reprisal attacks between the two communities. Outside the capital, farmer-pastoralist tensions, armed banditry, and a heavy-handed military response bring violence to rural areas. Because farmers and herders involved in clashes are often “indigenous” farmers and “settler” Fulani herdsmen, this violence is perceived as closely linked to the broader ethno-religious conflict.

Since December 2013, there was an escalation of violence and tensions in Plateau State which spilled into the year 2014 with violent attacks in Riyom, Jos South, Barkin-Ladi, Bassa, Bokkos, Mangu, Langtang North and South and Wase LGA. Arrests were made by security forces from the months of January to April of criminal groups allegedly responsible for cattle rustling and the killing of herdsmen in Riyom, Barkin-Ladi and Jos South LGA. On a positive note, the Local Government Elections were held in February in 15 out of 17 LGAs to elect ward Councilors and Local Government Chairmen. The elections were peaceful without violence, which observers attributed to the measures put in place by the government, sensitisation by the media, CSO/NGO efforts and measures put in place by security. One of the latest evolution in the conflict dynamic in Plateau State is the supposed presence of the Islamic sect Boko Haram, to whom the May 2014 terrorist bombings of Jos – which claimed over 100 lives - were attributed. The presence of this new actor of conflict is likely to have a negative influence on the efforts towards peace and reduction of violence in Plateau State.

The concentration of violence in the Plateau creates an opportunity to set a positive example for the entire country; the consolidation of peace in a state notorious for interreligious and ethnic violence can shift perceptions on a national scale. In this context of threat and opportunity, there is a critical need for a locally-driven peace process in Plateau State, and for the emergence of a “Peace Architecture”: a network of structures capable of analyzing, preventing and responding to violent conflict within the State. Religious and political leaders in Jos have increasingly been able to restrain their respective communities from the cyclical attacks and reprisals that have plagued the city in previous years. While the city of Jos is heavily segregated between Christian and Muslim neighborhoods, there have been signs of progress, with people circulating more freely than during a few years ago1.

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1 Project’s Grant Application form, pages 6 - 7
B. About the “Plateau Will Arise!” Project

Project objective and logic

The “Plateau Will Arise! : Building an Architecture for Peace, Tolerance and Reconciliation”, (PWA!) project is an 18-month (2013-2014) project funded by the European Union’s Instrument for Stability in Plateau State, Nigeria, with a total budget of € 1,350,000. This project was funded as a response to the conflict context described above.

To achieve this goal, the project proposal notes that four initiatives are to be in place. First, there is a need to support confidence-building, mediation and reconciliation efforts that reduce tensions and the overall level of violence. Second, there is a need to build the capacity of key local stakeholders to prevent or mitigate future conflict. Third, there is a need for increased linkages between civil society, security and the State Government to have a coherent and holistic response to influencing conflict dynamics. Finally, there is a need for increased participation for alternative and historically marginalized groups.

In order to create these changes, Search for Common Ground (SFCG) is implementing a multi-layer programme working with a wide array of community, civil society, and government stakeholders, in partnership with two local civil society organisations: Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP) and JRT (Jos Repertory Theatre). The overall objective of the project is to “build an active, locally-owned and inclusive Peace Architecture in Plateau State”. The specific objectives of this work are to 1) create an improved climate of peace in eight Local Government Areas and 2) strengthen the role of the State to provide security for the population. A cross-cutting objective is to reinforce the capacity and knowledge of local partners to implement this kind of programming.

Based on previous experiences and programming by SFCG and CAPP, there are expected results of PWA!, and a variety of methodologies and tools are utilized to achieve these results. The results and their associated activities are explained in Figure 2 next page (cross-cutting objective does not appear in the figure).

Geographical scope of the project:

The programme targets key communities within eight Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Plateau State: Jos North, Jos South, Riyom, Barkin-Ladi, Bokkos, Qua’an Pan, Shendam and Wase LGAs. These areas are deeply affected both by recent and on-going violence, as well as others where there is an opportunity to consolidate peace. The LGAs themselves were identified strategically after consultations with local leaders, civil society organisations involved with peacebuilding in the state, and government officials. They include two of the most deeply divided LGAs that continue to be affected by farmer-herder issues: Barkin Ladi and Riyom, as well as Wase who was facing inter-ethnic violence and cattle rustling. Also included are three LGAs that have seen significant progress on the same issues and where there is an opportunity to consolidate gains and share lessons: Bokkos, Qua’an Pan, and Shendam. Finally, Jos-North and Jos-South are included, as historically scenes of the worst intercommunal violence took place there and they’re location to the State-level institutions.
OVERALL OBJECTIVE: Building an active, locally owned, and inclusive Peace Architecture in Plateau State.

O.S.1: Improved climate of peace in 8 Local Government Areas
- ER1.1: Key local actors, including women, in eight strategic communities have enhanced knowledge and undertaken initiatives to address conflicts
- ER1.2: Public attitude is favourable towards a peaceful resolution of conflict are reinforced
- ER1.3: Increased numbers of successfully resolved conflicts in eight strategic communities
- ER1.4: Examples of successfully resolved local conflicts contribute to the success of other local peace processes

Act 1.1.1: Identification of Sites, Conflicts and Mapping of Key Actors in 8 LGAs
Act 1.1.2: Advanced Conflict Resolution Training Workshops for Key Local Leaders
Act 1.1.3: Transformation Leadership Training for key women leaders
Act 1.1.4: TOT and step-down training for real-time conflict resolution within LGAs
Act 1.1.5: Developing local conflict response strategy by key local leaders
Act 1.2.1: Civil society- led EWS, report and disseminating
Act 1.2.2: Airing of rapid responses on radio to debunk rumours and manipulation
Act 1.2.3: Re-furbishing and broadcasting existing TV Programmes
Act 1.2.4: Producing and airing child-oriented radio dramas series
Act 1.3.1: Planning and implementing local dispute resolution processes by local leaders
Act 1.3.2: Accompanying actions within communities to enhance visibility and viability of local dispute resolution processes
Act 1.4.1: Documenting of local peace process as Multimedia case-studies

O.S.2: Role of the State to provide security for the population is strengthened
- ER2.1: Security forces ability and government officials with a peace building mandate have enhanced ability to analyse and respond to conflicts commensurately
- ER2.2: Mutual understanding of situations which create conflicts between civil society, government and security actors is enhanced

Act 2.1.1: Developing a Capacity Building and Training Plan for Security Actors and State Government
Act 2.1.2: Conflict Resolution Trainings for Security Actors
Act 2.1.3: Training in Conflict Mainstreaming skills for key government officials
Act 2.2.1: “Peace Architecture Dialogues”: Civil Society-Security Actors and state government Problem-Solving Discussions

Figure 2: Plateau Will Arise - Project’s logic
Project targets:-

Targets for activities contributing to Objective 1: Create an improved climate of peace in eight Local Government Areas

- In September – October 2013, SFCG conducted a conflict mapping as a starting activity of the PWA! project, with the objectives of (a) identifying the most vulnerable communities in each target LGAs of the project; and (b) identifying key conflict actors in the eight LGAs as potential participants in project activities with the potential to influence – for the better or the worse – the conflict situation. The communities selected are: Barkin Ladi (Gashish/Ex-Lands and Barkin Ladi Town), Riyom (Bachit District and Attakar Ward located in Ganawuri District), Bokkos (Mangor and Bokkos District), Wase (Wase, Kadarko and Lamba Districts), Qua’an Pan (Kurgwi and Namu), Shendam (Kuka and Yamini), Jos North (Anguwan Rukuba and Nassarawa), and Jos South (Bukuru and Gyel). The key individuals identified with the potential to influence conflict either positively or negatively, and impact the potential for mediation and future conflict prevention are community and traditional rulers; elders; religious leaders; youths; women leaders; security personnel; members of civil society organisations, community development associations, and tribal associations; vigilante groups; Fulani herdsmen, ethnic Tarok people; Hausa youths; and politicians.

Targets for activities contributing to Objective 2: Strengthen the role of the State to provide security for the population.

State-level institutions and stakeholders are targeted for this objective, including:

- Civil Society organisations, including other Peacebuilding organisations and networks such as the Plateau Peace Practitioners’ Network (PPPN), a group of about 30 civil society peace organisations, including both SFCG and CAPP
- The State Government’s Office of the Special Advisor for Peacebuilding, an implementing partner of this project
- Community leaders and representatives
- Security services, such as the STF, Police, Operation Rainbow, and SSS.
3. Methodology of the Evaluation

Objectives of the evaluation and definitions
SFCG used a mixed method qualitative/quantitative methodology to conduct an internal mid-term evaluation. The evaluation explores two main evaluative questions: the project’s relevance and effectiveness. The OECD DAC “Guidance on evaluating Development Co-operation” and “Guidance on evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding activities” were used as resources for defining the evaluator’s understanding of the relevance and effectiveness criteria.

- **Relevance**: The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the intended impact and effects of the programme and to which the activities of the intervention respond to the needs of the peacebuilding process.

- **Effectiveness**: A measure of the extent to which the aid activity is provoking or likely to provoke the intended changes and therefore to reach its intended objectives, in a timely fashion.

The intended use of the evaluation is to: (a) Review programme strategy and methods and (b) Inform long term learning. This report therefore primarily targets the PWA! staff and implementing partners as the primary users of the evaluation findings. The intended secondary users of this evaluation are SFCG’s implementing partners, the beneficiaries and the European Union.

Evaluative questions
For each of these evaluation themes, a set of more specific evaluative questions were elaborated. Those evaluation questions were decided upon as a result of a participatory process involving the PWA! staff, SFCG’s Institutional Learning Team and the European Union. Those stakeholders agreed to explore the following questions:

**Theme 1: Relevance**
- Are the following activities and output relevant with the expected results and objectives to which they should be contributing: Leaders trainings, Early warning system, the Voices of Peace radio programme, The Station TV program, Our Children are talking radio programme, Peace Architecture Dialogues?
- Are the programmatic choices for implementing the activities the most appropriate in order to ensure the project’s activities’ effectiveness:
  - Are the activities’ beneficiaries the most appropriate people in order to reach the intended results of the project?
  - Are the project’s activities inputs appropriate in order to provoke the expected change (i.e.: time frame, frequency, resources inputted, etc.)?

**Theme 2: Effectiveness**
- In what way do key local actors in the 8 LGAs have increased knowledge and show real world examples of initiatives undertaken to address conflict?
- Did PWA! lead to any initiatives to address and successfully resolve conflicts?
- Is there an increased coordination and interaction between government/security agencies/CSOs/Communities to address conflict?
- In what ways is public attitude towards favourable resolution of conflict being influenced / likely to be influenced?
- What is the reach and use of the Early Warning System?
- Has the partner's capacity to implement this kind of programme been developed or improved upon?
- What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-Achievement of the expected project's results?
- Is (or will) the efforts achieve progress within a reasonable timeframe? Is it possible to accelerate this process?

**Timeframe of the evaluation**

The evaluation took place over the April – August 2014 period and was articulated around the following main periods:

- April 1-15: Literature review
- April 16-30: Elaboration of ToR and validation of final evaluation's key evaluative questions
- May 1-15: Design and validation of data collection tools
- May 15-June 3: Data collection
- June 4-7: Data entry
- June 7-20: Data analysis
- June 21-August 15: Report writing

**Target population, Data collection and tools**

**Geographical scope of the evaluation**

The project is implemented in eight LGAs of Plateau State and the evaluation took place in a sample of 50% of the target areas, namely Barkin Ladi LGA, Bokkos LGA, Shendam LGA and Jos South LGA. Those LGAs were selected because Plateau state is usually divided into three zones: northern, central and southern zones. For that reason, one LGA was selected in each of the three zones: Barkin Ladi LGA in the Northern zone, Bokkos in the Central zone and Shendam in the Southern zone. Jos South was chosen as the part of the greater Jos representing state headquarters where government and other policy stakeholders reside.

**Data collection activity and tools**

The activities conducted to collect this mixed data included a literature review of relevant project documents and reports, 19 Key Informant Interviews (KII), a survey of 240 randomly selected adults and 10 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Eight interview guides and six focus group discussions guides were created for the purpose of this evaluation, as well as one survey questionnaire. All tools were in English, however some of the questions were translated into vernacular language for some focus group discussions. The key informant interviews and the focus group discussions were articulated around semi-structured open-ended questions, while the survey used 40 closed-ended questions. All data collection tools are to be found in the report appendix (shared on request by sending an email to: cburton@sfcg.org).
Evaluation Targets
The evaluation was targeting a large variety of groups and people, both at the state and at the LGA level. The table below summarizes the groups of people who participated to the evaluation process, with regards to the type of activity conducted: Key informant interviews (KII), Focus Group Discussions (FGD) or Survey.

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<td>FGD (3)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants to the Step-down trainings</td>
<td>FGD (2)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community members – Youth</td>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community members – Women</td>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community members – Religious leaders</td>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>FGD (2)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target areas population</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>335</strong></td>
<td><strong>172</strong></td>
<td><strong>163</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1: Evaluation targets**

Sampling of the survey
The survey targeted randomly selected people in four LGAs of Plateau State, with an average of 60 surveys per LGA. Given the segregated nature of some of the LGAs targeted by the project and this evaluation, the exact locations of the survey were selected in order to ensure a balance of Muslim and Christian-predominant communities. The table below summarizes the various communities where the survey took place.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Local Government Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jos South LGA</td>
<td>Barkin Ladi LGA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Express Road / Gyel</td>
<td>Rakwok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade center / Vom</td>
<td>Takwok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dadinkowa</td>
<td>Barkin Ladi town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukuru town</td>
<td>(Muslim and Christian comm.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yelwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plateau state university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manguna</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2: LGAs and communities covered by the Survey**

The evaluation team was aiming for a 50-50% representation of genders, a 60-40% representation of Christian - Muslims religious groups, and an equal representation of the various age categories. In reality, the team was not able to perfectly meet those targets, yet they succeeded in being quite
close to it with a representation of Gender: 50.6% women, 49.4% men; Religious groups: 62.1% Christians, 37.9% Muslims; Age categories: 17.1% of 18-25 years old, 24.6% of 26-35, 29.6% of 36-45 and 28.8% of 46 and above.

**Evaluation team**

The evaluation was conducted by Charline Burton, SFCG’s Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist for West and Central Africa for SFCG’s Institutional learning team, as lead evaluator. She was supported in this process by Sarah Bentu, SFCG Jos-Nigeria Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Manager as assistant evaluator.

The evaluation methodology and tools were designed by Charline Burton, with input from the PWA! team and the Institutional Learning Team at SFCG headquarters. Interviews and focus group discussions were conducted by Charline Burton and Sarah Bentu, with SFCG in Jos staff Courtney Hess (Programme Associate) and Patience Chaimang (Office Manager) for note-taking and translating. The survey was conducted by a team of six surveyors, including three women and three men, all team members of SFCG and its implementing partners. SFCG Media Manager Chima Onwe supervised the process on the field, while the day-to-day debriefing and coaching sessions was conducted by Sarah Bentu. The training of the survey team, including the supervision of the testing process for the survey protocol, was conducted by Charline Burton.

Quantitative data entry to an Excel database was conducted by an external consultant, while the quantitative data entry was done by Charline Burton and Sarah Bentu. Data analysis was done by Charline Burton, with support from Institutional Learning Team intern Abdul Khabir Mirzakhail in Washington, D.C. The report was written by Charline Burton.

**Challenges and limitations of the evaluation**

A major security incident took place during the data collection phase on May 20, 2014, with a double terrorist bomb attack claiming over 120 lives in Jos. This event influenced the data collection process: it forced the team to interrupt the data collection for two days, contributed to a lower attendance to focus group discussions during the first few days, and also influenced the discussions held with informants. In addition, this event made it almost impossible to meet representatives of the security forces services to attend the planned interview meetings, as they were busy dealing with the security challenges. As a result, the evaluation team could only meet 2 representatives of the security services, which is too small a sample to draw accurate conclusions. Another subsequent limitation is the low participation to focus group discussions, with an average of 7.6 participants per discussion, while 10 to 12 people were systematically invited to participate.

In addition to this security incident, a few challenges took place while organising the key individual interviews at the LGA level: firstly, the evaluator planned on meeting security services representatives in each LGA. However, it proved impossible to organise such meetings as only the State-level security services were habilitated to talk to the evaluators. In addition, there were other challenges around the selection of “LGA officials” for the key informant interviews: while the methodology required that LGA officials talk on behalf of the LGA and provide a neutral point of view of the relevance and effectiveness of the project, the LGA officials who were invited to participate in the interviews were not specifically well-positioned in the administration, but rather were selected because they had previously been involved in the PWA! project activities. They were therefore unable to answer all questions on behalf the LGA administration, but rather with their personal point of view.
4. Findings

4.1 Evaluation theme 1: About the relevance of the program

This section does not intend to provide an analysis of the overall programme’s relevance; instead this section focuses on looking at a specific subset of activities. In section 4.1, each of the project’s activities are analyzed in detail. We assess whether the implementation choices represent relevant ways of contributing to the related expected results and objective, and if the programmatic choices for implementing the activities the most appropriate in order to ensure the effectiveness of the project’s activities.

A. RELEVANCE OF ACTIVITIES CONTRIBUTING TO OBJECTIVE 1

About the trainings, step-down trainings and conflict response strategies (act. 1.1.2, 1.1.4 and 1.1.5)

The advanced Conflict Resolution Training Workshop for key leaders (act. 1.1.2), the step-down trainings for real-time conflict resolution (act. 1.1.4) and the Development of a local conflict response strategy by key local leaders (act. 1.1.5)

There is a causal relationship at the center of the strategy designed by SFCG to undertake the activities related to the expected result 1.1 “Key local actors, including women, in eight strategic communities have enhanced knowledge and undertake initiatives to address conflicts”. The first step in this activity set is the advanced training in conflict transformation in each LGA for key leaders with experience in conflict resolution (total = 8 trainings). This 5-day training (also referred to as the “training of trainer, or ToT”) is facilitated by SFCG’s training coordinator, who provides the participants with theoretical knowledge, a set of analysis and conflict resolution tools in an experiential learning environment to provide practice. Selections of the advanced training participants are based on SFCG’s baseline research in each LGA during which the leaders with a capacity to de-escalate tensions were identified (see Figure 3 for more details on the selection criteria) as well as previous participation in past activities organised by SFCG and CAPP. This selection process, based on a thorough analysis of the local conflict dynamics contributes to the relevance of the activity to address the core drivers of conflict.

The advanced trainings are based on a participatory process where participants are requested to identify the conflict issues that represent a threat to the social cohesion in their LGA. The entire training is then articulated around those locally-identified conflict issues: while the conflict analysis tools are being taught, participants are trained on their use by applying the tools to the local conflict theme identified. In a similar way, the key drivers and manifestations of conflicts are analyzed, as well as the main actors are identified – those with the influence to de-escalate the conflict, and those who contribute to escalating the conflict. Once the Advanced conflict transformation (ToT)
training concluded, sixteen participants from each LGA, in groups of four facilitate and organise one “step-down training” aimed at addressing the main local conflict issues identified by the participants. Based on their earlier analysis, the newly trained key-leaders identify the people who are most relevant to influence the conflict and invite them to the training. In each LGA, four step-down trainings are organised by the ToT participants, with close technical and logistical support from SFCG and the implementing partner. Because it targets the people who are directly involved and/or have some influence on each conflict, the training is meant to have:

a) an immediate effect on the main conflict-stakeholder’s attitudes and knowledge of peaceful conflict resolution;

b) mid-term effect on the conflict thanks to the collaborative identification of a response strategy

Following the “step-down training”, a response strategy is meant to be implemented with SFCG’s support over the course of the project (act. 1.3.1 and 1.3.2, one strategy identified during each step-down training, so 4 per LGA and 32 in total). Figure 3 shows the causal link between the various activities.
Data collected among the communities demonstrates that the participants to activities 1.1.2, 1.1.4 and 1.1.5 are in line with the profile of community members considered to have an influence over the context of peace or conflict in their LGA: Representatives from all tribes; Religious leaders; Elders; Warring parties / vigilante; Women; Traditional rulers; and Youth are especially mentioned as one of the most important groups that can increase or decrease conflict. In addition, all step-down participants gathered in focus group discussions stated that according to them, all relevant stakeholders and actors to the conflict identified had been invited to the training, and that they could not think of anyone relevant who had been left out of the training organised to tackle the local conflict.

Based on this data, we may conclude that, the activities and the process that links them to one another are relevant because:

- the people identified to participate in the Advanced trainings are key leaders identified through an in-depth analysis of the conflict dynamics in each LGA;
- the conflicts that are at the core of the step-down trainings, as well as the list of main stakeholders to invite to the step-down trainings, are based on analysis made by the local leaders of each LGA;
- the conflict local response strategies are identified by the stakeholders directly linked to the conflict.

Amongst the ways for improvement, we recommend:

- to ensure that the exact procedure used to select the ToT and step-down participants be clearly documented in the activities reports, with clear information about the participant’s relevance with regards to their role in the LGA’s conflict trends and their capacities to influence it positively;
- to carefully monitor the choice of the conflicts identified by the ToT participants and validate their importance with regards to the local conflict dynamics;
- to ensure that the conflict mitigation strategies (act. 1.3.1 and 1.3.2) involve all participants to the step-down trainings as well as the ToT participants who were in charge of organising the step-down trainings. The aforementioned represents an opportunity to further strengthen the peacebuilding capacities of the key local leaders at the LGA level.

**About the civil-society led Early Warning System (act. 1.2.1)**

The Early Warning System (EWS) is meant to be an independent, civil society resource for all actors, and a point of departure to inform common planning and response to emerging threats – real or perceived. “The foremost objective is to collect current information that can assist the security to respond to the attacks. We want to provide them with real time information” explains a SFCG Senior Staff. “Then secondly, it is meant to help us and other civil society actors monitor trends of violence, so that it could inform policy”.

The EWS is an SMS-based system that relies on informants from the project’s target areas: any community member with information regarding a security or conflict issue is encouraged to send information via SMS to the EWS phone number. Should the information be validated, it is shared:
• via an immediate incident report sent by SMS to the relevant security forces in case of any situation for which an immediate response is necessary (i.e. threat of attacks against a village);
• via the monthly 2-page EWS bulletin listing all the messages received over the course of the month. This report is printed and shared with key civil society, government and security actors as well as during SFCG’s activities.

About the relevance of the EWS to contribute to the related result: The EWS was designed as a means by which to contribute to E.R.1.3 “Favourable attitudes towards a peaceful resolution of conflicts in reinforced”. In order to do so, the following hypothesis should be true:
1) the EWS should respond to a gap in terms of the Early Warning System;
2) the EWS should contribute effectively in the design of response strategy by key actors, including security actors;
3) The EWS should serve as a source of information to narrow the focus of other PWA activities (i.e. SMS blasts or the Voices of Peace programme), to ensure that those activities respond to the rumours or conflict situations in real-time.

Those three aforementioned factors are analysed below:
1) Does the EWS respond to a gap in terms of early warning systems in PWA?
A variety of other mechanisms were mentioned by informants as existing in the region, such as the state-run system Operation Rainbow EWER, or others systems run by other non-governmental organisations: APRURIMAC’s Frontliners, the Interfaith Mediation Center’s EWS or CORNs (Community resilience network). However, the efficiency and scope of such systems was not assessed by the evaluation team. SFCG senior staff mentioned their confidence in the idea that the EWS was responding to a gap: “Other systems are sporadic or nationwide, and therefore do no provide the information that is needed in Plateau State”. The evaluation team did not collect enough evidence to draw strong conclusions on this question.
SFCG undertook an interesting initiative in late 2013 that is likely to increase the EWS’ relevance and effectiveness: “To add to our platform, we decided that because there already were other EWS, we needed to work towards a synergy with or merge all the existing systems” explains SFCG’s Senior Staff. SFCG therefore invited other EWS actors (Operation Rainbow, IMC, JDPC, etc.) to participate in meetings where everyone could explain their system in more detail and think creatively about ways to synergize efforts in order to ensure more accurate, timely, and effective information sharing. However, it soon became obvious that it would not be possible to merge all the systems, for reasons such as:
• reluctance of CSOs to “hand out” their system to state institutions, given the risk of manipulation of the systems in line with the upcoming elections;
• opacity from some organisations, who are not willing to share “their” systems;
• various types of methodologies are used from one system to the other, which are difficult to merge (i.e. focal points already trained by various organisations, different types of indicators being collected, etc.)
Since it proved unrealistic to create one sole system out of the various ones that are currently active in Plateau State, SFCG and its partners decided to keep on holding the “EWS”
meetings, and use them as a platform for sharing information, analysis of conflict trends and learning from one another.

2) Does SFCG’s EWS contribute effectively to the design of a response strategy by some local stakeholders – is it used?

As explained in more details in section B.2 About the awareness and use of the Early Warning System (page 22), there is little evidence of the EWS actually being used to inform a response strategy by the CSOs. Some security mentioned a limited use the information collected via SFCG’s EWS, yet the following information shared by SFCG’s staff points to a weak usefulness of such reports: “In most cases, even before we send them [to the security] the information, they are already on ground because they have their own means of information. Our added value is usually when it is at the rumours level, when the violence has not started yet”.

3. Does the EWS inform other PWA! activities to respond to the rumours on real time?

As we further explain it in the “SMS Blasts” and the “Voices of Peace” sections, the EWS is not used by the program staff to “respond to rumours on real-time”. The program members ensure that the general strategy of some activities - such as the VOP programmes or the SMS blasts - is informed by the monthly analysis of the EWS SMS. “The EWS and the Voices of Peace project are meant to correlate” explains a senior project staff, “but this correlation is indirect because we do not want to re-broadcast a rumour”. However such relation is not documented by SFCG staff and the evaluation team could not find any evidence in the monitoring data or project’s reports of any time when a SMS blast was used as a direct consequence of information collected via the EWS.

There is not enough evidence to answer the three questions raised, and it is therefore impossible for the evaluation team to draw conclusion on the EWS system. However, data collected point towards

**About the SMS blasts:**

SFCG’s SMS contact data base holds 1,400 entries of names and phone numbers to whom peace messages are likely to be disseminated on a regular basis. The computer-run Frontline SMS system that SFCG uses allows the sending of messages to thousands of recipients in just one click and in just a few hours. Because it is possible to disaggregate the contacts by gender, location or professional background, it opens up lots of possibilities to provide accurate and relevant response messages to a determined audience (i.e. the female leaders of the Bokkos LGA). The SMS blasts not only is an efficient way of communicating messages of peace, but it is also an ideal tool to both keep in touch with previous participants to the SFCG activities, and to encourage people to send messages that can feed the Early Warning System. However, there are two main downfalls to this system:

- First of all, the phone network does not cover the totality of the project’s target LGAs. Some villages and remote areas face a weak or even a non-existing network. Yet the proportion of

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2 under section 4.1 Relevance and section 4.2 Progress towards results respectively, pages 6 and 20
areas covered by the network is higher than the proportion that is non-covered and unlike phone calls, SMS will eventually be received when the recipient enters a network-covered area;

- Second, many of SFCG's contacts and local leaders do not know how to read and/or to read English. This is particularly true for the female contacts.

Despite those flaws, the SMS blast is a relevant way of contributing to reinforcing public attitudes that are favourable towards a peaceful resolution of conflict. However, this requires the following action to take place, which we recommend:

- Regular maintenance and attention to the system to avoid technical issues;
- An ability to constantly monitor the context of conflict and provide quick response;
- Avoiding the overload of messages – which annoy the recipients;
- A close supervision by the senior management staff to ensure the quality and relevance of the messages that are being sent.

More information about the effectiveness of the system is to be found in the Effectiveness section.

**About the airing of Voices of Peace (act. 1.2.2)**

Voices of Peace (VOP) is a short peaceful message recording, aimed at responding to rumours and vitriol in town, and debunking them, according to the project’s staff. It gives voice to a variety of people – i.e. religious leaders, men on the street, or officials - who share messages of peace and/or respond to present-day rumours. The Voices of Peace programmes are aired twice daily.

**About the use of the radio**

**Radio listening rate:** 85.3% of people surveyed (N=238) listen to the radio on a regular basis (at least once a week). Looking more closely at the disaggregated data, it is evident that the listenership rate varies from one LGA to another. In Shendam LGA for instance, the listenership rate is 71% while in Bokkos it reaches 93%. Yet, all in all, the proportion of regular radio listeners is high in the Plateau State, which makes the radio an appropriate way to reaching out to a large number of people.

**Airing time and station:** The VOP are aired daily at 8:30 AM and 5:25 PM on Plateau Radio Television Corporation’s (PRTVC) Peace Radio 90.5 FM. Graph 1 shows that the morning time is a great for reaching a wide audience, as the 7-9 am timeslot is among the most preferred of radio listeners.
For the evening time, project staff explains that the 5:25 slot was selected because it is immediately after the evening news. However, audience survey data shows that only 6% of the audience mention the 5 to 6 PM time as their favourite moment to listen to the radio, as opposed to 32% for the 6-9 PM period. As shown in Graph 2, Peace FM is the most popular radio station in all the LGAs surveyed (the exception being Shendam, where the international radio stations are listened to more than Peace FM).

**About the content of the VOP**

**Language:** The VOP are mostly aired in English, even if a minority of the programmes happens to have Pidgin-English or Hausa interviews recorded and aired. As shown in Graph 3, there is a clear difference in the language that Muslims and Christians prefer to listen to on the radio, with the Christians preferring English (73.3%) and the Muslims preferring Hausa (65.5%). Disaggregated data also shows that there are large disparities in the preferences of radio listeners from one region to the other (see Graph 4): while in Barkin Ladi and Jos South most people surveyed prefer listening to English on the radio (68.8% and 75.7% respectively), only 31% of Bokkos respondents and 46.4% of Shendam respondents shared this point of view. “There are constraints as people here are predominantly farmers and hardly listen at the time the programme is aired. Also the language used is another issue; it will help to have the VOP in local languages”, explains an LGA Authority in Bokkos.
As the VOP are meant to target the entire population of Plateau State – disregarding their religion and location – it would be more relevant to air this programme in Hausa and in English. One option would be to air it the morning programme in one language and in the afternoon programme in the other language.

**About the relevance of the messages with regards to the objective:** As stated earlier, the objective of the VOP is to “respond to rumours and vitriol in town, and debunk them”. A close look at the content of the messages aired over the course of the project shows that the VOP does not respond to rumours; rather they spread general messages of peace that usually fall under one of the two following categories:

1. **Messages calling for a change of attitudes by the population, such as:**

   November 17th, 2013: “People should look up to god and fear god, love each other and do things within the confines of the law because there is no amount of money that can buy peace, and without peace there is nothing that can be achieved”. – A Muslim leader

   January 17th, 2014: “Plateau is like the clock of Nigeria, whatever happens on that clock determines what happens in Nigeria and so there is a need for peace on the plateau; however small the effort, everyone is called up to work for peace”. – A Christian musician

2. **Messages providing recommendations, such as:**

   March 8th, 2014: “Religious leaders should talk to their followers about peace. There should be a continuous dialogue with regards to security issues. As an individual I think that the military should be removed from the streets because they course more problems than they have come to solve”. – A Christian Child Protection Network member

One of the reasons why SFCG does not use VOP to respond to rumours, explains SFCG staff, is because most rumours only spread locally – at the neighborhood or at the LGA level – while the
VOP airs in the entire region. Hence there is little use of expending such a format to debunk rumours.

**About the resonance of VOP:** The majority of the people interviewed during this evaluation mentioned how much they appreciate hearing everyone’s voices, from the “big man” to the market lady on the radio. As shown in the Graph 5, over 90% of those who listen regularly to the programme agree with the following statement: “The topics covered by the Voices of Peace programme are in line with my daily concerns for peace”, and 90.1% said the VOP programme at least once related to an issue happening in their LGA. Those two figures demonstrate a strong resonance of the VOP.

![Graph 5: Resonance of Voices of Peace](image)

However, in order to increase the resonance of the VOP among all groups of the Plateau State’s radio listeners, more attention should be paid to the balance between Christian and Muslim interviewees. Indeed, a close look at the programme logs shows a clear unbalance towards Christian voices (see Graph 6). In order to meet the objective of airing all public attitudes – Muslims and Christian – more room should be given to Muslims’ voices to enable a balanced perspective.

![Graph 6: Voices heard on Voices of Peace](image)

**About the broadcasting of “The Station” (act. 1.2.3)**
*The Station* is a television drama meant to reach a “university audience” according to the project’s proposal document. According to SFCG’s staff, the programme is a drama that could appeal to all youth in general – not only university youth – and aims to change their approach to dealing with
conflict. The programme was created in 2004 and aired in all Nigeria at the time. Because SFCG deemed the episodes relevant to Plateau State’s current context, they decided to re-furbish the episodes by giving them a more modern look and to re-air 26 episodes. *The Station* is showed every Tuesday at 5:30 PM on PRTV television.

**About the use of the television**

On average, 76.2% of people surveyed (N=235) watch TV regularly. Graph 7 shows the rates disaggregated by age range: it appears that the “youth” category (18-25 years) has a high viewership, with a rate of 78% watching TV regularly. Using the television as a tool to change attitudes therefore is an effective strategy.

The choice of the TV channel PRTV is a very relevant one, given that this is the favourite TV station in that region, with 44% of the viewer’s choice (see Graph 8). However, the time chosen to air the drama is far from the best option, as the 5 to 6 PM time slot is a time of the day when most people are either still at work, or on the way back from work. The viewership rate at that time is therefore very low (5%, see Graph 9). The 6 to 9 PM slot has a much higher viewership rate and would be a better time to reach a larger audience.

**About the content of the program**

A total of 26 episodes of *The Station* were aired over the course of the project, among which all 26 were already aired at the time of the evaluation. Season 1 episodes discuss various types of issues
such as: domestic violence, drug abuse, corruption at school, environmental pollution, involvement of youth in scam emails, education of youth living with HIV/AIDs, etc. Season 2 episodes all relate to one story line: The Station’s journalists follow three politicians during the election campaign period, bringing out a lot of issues related to the election. Season 1 episodes that were rebroadcasted during PWA! were selected by SFCG because of their resonance with Plateau State’s context; while Season 2 episodes are pertinent given the upcoming Presidential elections taking place in Nigeria in 2015.

**About the Airing of Our Children are Talking (act. 1.2.4)**

*Our Children are Talking* is a 30-minute child-oriented radio programme aired on Sundays at 5:30 PM on PRTV’s Peace FM. *Our Children are Talking* intends to feature a “child’s view” of the conflict, aimed at reducing the risks of manipulation or recruitment, reflecting manifestations of trauma, drug and substance abuse, while also encouraging adult listeners to reflect on the consequences of violence and conflict upon children. It is divided into two parts:

- a 15-minute radio drama about a fictitious situation related to the consequences of conflicts on children and youth; and
- a 15-minute phone-in segment with children panelists and callers reacting to the theme of the radio drama.

**About the use of the radio**

*Radio listening rate:* As stated earlier, radio is a powerful tool to reach a large audience given the high listenership rate (85.3% listen to the radio on a regular basis). However, no figure is available regarding the listenership rate of children, as only adults were surveyed during this evaluation. The data collected during two focus group discussions comprised of groups of children in Jos South and Bokkos shows that a majority of the children’s parents would give them permission to listen to such a show. However, because children usually are not in charge of managing the household radio station and selecting the programme, an important marketing campaign targeting children and their parents is necessary in order to ensure a good listenership rate among the programme’s targets.

*Airing time and station:* As previously explained in the “Voices of Peace” section, Peace FM is the most popular radio station in the target areas, which makes it an appropriate choice to air *Our Children are Talking*. No specific data is available about the listenership habits on Sundays, but experience show that they usually differ greatly from the weekdays’ listenership habits. Graph 9 (previous page) “Favourite time to listen to radio” showed that the 5 to 6 PM slot was not a time of high listenership during weekdays, but we may assume that this situation changes on Sundays when people do not go to work and listen more to the radio at all times of the day.

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3 This terminology relates to SFCG’s approach to measuring the success of her media programmes, called “The three Rs framework: Reach, Resonance, Response”: The framework focuses on three main dimensions of our media project, which gives a comprehensive picture of the results achieved. *Reach* relates to (a) the saturation of a show in the society and (b) the types of people who view / hear the show; *Resonance* seeks to understand whether or not the audience is relating to and absorbing the messages of the show; *Response* intends to measure what changes occur in the society as a result of the show.
About the content of Our Children are Talking

Language: The radio drama usually uses a mix of Pidgin-English and proper English. The vocabulary is usually quite simple, and whenever any “difficult” word is used, the actors help the target audience understand the sense of the word. Sometimes one of the less educated characters of the drama even asks for more explanation, such as in the example below:

- M.A: “Mr. Market head, I have brought them here so that we can do something about that, even if it means apprehending their masters.
- M.H: A-pprey-hand... a-pprey... wettin... what?!
- M.A: I mean like to question and if possible arrest them”.

During two listening sessions organised with children between 7-12 and 12-15 years old, all children and teenagers interviewed were able to understand and explain the messages and the story of the drama. Only the younger children aged 8 and below had a hard time identifying the core problem and the main characters of the story.

The call-in portion is facilitated in “proper” English. As stated earlier in the “Voices of Peace” section, there are large differences from one religious group to the other and from one LGA to the other regarding the preferred language when listening to the radio: Muslims tend to prefer to listen to Hausa while Christians tend to listen to English. Some LGAs show a clear preference towards English (Barkin Ladi and Jos South) while there is an opposite tendency in other LGAs (i.e. Bokkos). Again, the choice of English may therefore contribute to a lower reach of some groups whom PWA intended to target with this programme.

About the drama’s content

The drama explores a variety of topics linked to the impact of conflict on children and on their surroundings, about children in conflicts, and about the role that children have in preventing violent conflict. The samples below give an idea of the types of topics covered:

- Episode 2: One Muslim and one Christian classmate are paired for a school spelling competition, but struggle when asked to spell religious words. Who is more resistant to accepting the other religion, the children or their parents?
- Episode 7: It is election time and several people are running for the same position. One of the contestants decided to recruit youth as thugs enticing them with money and promise of a better life. Some of the boys died of substance abuse, while the others were arrested and sentenced for murder.

In both listening sessions, one third of the children said that they had been facing issues that are similar to those of the show, and were willing to share examples of such situation. This demonstrates the resonance of the programme among children, which means that the expected audience is relating to and absorbing the messages of the show:

“A man questioned me on why I go to a Christian school and tried telling me not to go to the school anymore and to disassociate with Christians”. - A Muslim Jos south boy
"I am scared of going to the market due to rumours of a bomb scare some days ago, so I understand the feeling of this kid in the drama, who says he's afraid on entering some places".

– A girl from Bokkos

The format of the drama is appealing to the children, given that most laughed at various moments during the listening sessions. Most said that they would love to listen regularly to such a radio programme. A close look at the script of those episodes shows that even if children characters are always present in all dramas, their role is minor with regards to the roles that is given to adults characters. Graph 10 shows the proportion of words dedicated to adults’ text versus children’s text in 4 randomly selected episodes of Our Children are Talking. Given that children are an important target of this drama, it would be more effective to leave additional space for children’s voice in subsequent episodes.

We may therefore conclude that the issues addressed during the show resonate with the expected audience and that the format and level of language are appropriate to provoke a change of attitudes. As such, both the issues addressed and the format of the show are relevant.

**About the call-in part of Our Children are talking**

The call-in portion of the programme is meant to be a place where some panelist children and/or experts discuss the issues raised in the drama that was aired during the first part of the programme. SMS received from listeners are supposed to enrich the discussion, while a skilled facilitator (called “Uncle Charles”) ensures that an appropriate balance and rhythm of the programme.

While this format is an appropriate way to give a voice to “real” children and to leave room for public expression on a given subject, some defects were noticed during the evaluation:

- There is sometimes a disconnect between the theme of the drama aired during the first half of the programme, and the theme discussed during the call-in part of the programme. This happened on various occasions, out of a desire to liaise the theme of the call-in portion with the region’s latest news (i.e. the Chibok girls’ abduction). However, because the call-in portion is
meant to ensure that the drama’s message is well understood by the listeners, the link should not be broken between the two halves of the programme.

- The children panelists who participate in the call-in portion are chosen randomly by the programme’s facilitator. A purposeful selection of children - ensuring that they have a personal story to share with regards to the programme’s theme of the week - would ensure richer debates and discussions. In addition, as children are not used to speaking publicly on radio, it is important to work with them and give them some guidelines on how to best share their messages.

### B. RELEVANCE OF ACTIVITIES CONTRIBUTING TO OBJECTIVE 2

As activities related to the Expected Result 2.1 "Security forces and government officials with a peace building mandate have enhanced ability to analyze and respond to conflicts commensurately" had not yet begun at the time of the evaluation, we did not explore those activities in detail and did not collect information about their relevance.

- Act2.1.1: Developing a Capacity Building and Training Plan for Security Actors and State Government
- Act 2.1.2: Conflict Resolution Trainings for Security Actors
- Act 2.1.3: Training in Conflict Mainstreaming skills for key government officials

All people interviewed and community members whom we met during the evaluation confirmed that there is a high level of mistrust between the security forces and the local population. Abuses by some security members – mostly STF – and rumours of security forces collaborating during attacks against villages are common in Plateau State, contributing to poor relationship between the State and the communities. Efforts to create mutual understanding between civil society, population, government, and security actors are therefore highly relevant. Involving those three types of actors in a **Peace Architecture Dialogue** to discuss security and peace concerns was a great way of contributing to improved relationship while making a strong contribution to the climate of peace in Plateau State. According to the project’s staff, the objective of the Peace Architecture Dialogue (PAD) is to:

- Build trust among civil society, population, government, and security forces;
- Increase the coordination of action;
- Enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the Office of the Special Adviser to the Governor on Peacebuilding (co-organiser).

**About the collaboration with the Office of the Special Adviser to the Governor on Peacebuilding (SA Peacebuilding):** offering the lead to the SA Peacebuilding to organise the PADs was an excellent idea as it contributes to enhancing this Office’s credibility while making the PAD more than “just another NGO initiative”, hence also giving more credibility to the PAD itself. As the SA Peacebuilding strengthens its capacities to organise and facilitate such events, it also stresses the importance of such an office to be sustained over time. The central role given to the SA
Peacebuilding in organising the PADs could hopefully contribute to the institutionalisation of this Office, which will otherwise disappear when a new Governor comes into office.

**About the participants to the PAD:** An average of 40 to 60 people participate in the PADs: representatives of the Government, the Security forces, civil society and leaders, as well as representatives of the most prominent communities (i.e. ethnic groups, religious groups, women’s organisations, youth etc.). Whenever an issue is raised, additional people may be invited based on their relevance to the given issues. “*When there were attacks in Riyom, we invited representative from that location to the PAD, so that they could testify and share their views*” explains SFCG’s Country Director.

All PAD participants mentioned that the meeting was conducive to an open and impartial dialogue, and that it was easy to have their voices heard. The nature of the facilitation is therefore relevant to contributing to the objectives of this activity.

**About the scope of the PAD:** PAD is mostly a State-level activity with a State-level reach, and there is very little awareness of it at the LGA level. Various key informants expressed their hope that such an event could be organised at the local level, where there is significant need to improve mutual understanding between the various stakeholders. An Operation Rainbow representative said: “*We pray they expand the participation to other parts of the state such as the conflict prone areas of the state and involve particularly the traditional rulers at each level*”.

We therefore present the following recommendations:

- Start the activities relative to the Expected Result 2.1 as soon as possible
- Widen the scope of the PAD by organising pilot LGA-level PADs in future programmes
4.2. Evaluation theme 2: Assessing the project’s effectiveness

A. ABOUT THE PROGRESS TOWARDS EXPECTED RESULT 1.1

“Key local actors, including women, in eight strategic communities have enhanced knowledge and undertake initiatives to address conflicts”

A.1 About the increase of knowledge and acquisition of new skills by key local actors

More than a dozen topics are being taught during the Trainings of Trainers (ToT), while 8 are presented during the step-down trainings. According to the evaluation session that accompanies each ToT, the three preferred topics of the participants are: (1) Honoring dignity; (2) Mediation; (3) Identity. All three subjects are among those that the participants to the trainings mostly remember when, several months later, they are asked to list the topics covered by the training: Honoring Dignity, Respect, Conflict and Violence, Communication, Values and Facts, Mediation, Positions and Interests, and Do no Harm.

In follow-up focus groups of participants from the ToT and step-down trainings, participants reported increased knowledge and/or skills as a result of the trainings; participants were very positive about their overall experience and newly acquired skillsets. The analysis of the ToT pre-and post-tests clearly demonstrates an increase of the participants’ knowledge, as shown in Graph 11, while the quotes below illustrate the types of skills acquired and attitude changes that took place over the course of the trainings.

"I learned how to be very patient with conflicting parties and how to address the conflict through mediation", "I learned tolerance and respect", “I never knew there was a difference between conflict and violence”, “Before the training I used to judge people when they talk, but with the training I learned not to judge people”

– Testimonies of Bokkos and Barkin Ladi ToT participants

Factors contributing to or hindering a successful training and increase of knowledge

About the Trainings of Trainers

• Focus groups of ToT participants from every LGA mentioned the quality of the training’s facilitation; saying instruction was either “good” or “excellent”. The use of a participatory methodology and the simplification of the topics made it easy for all participants to take part, regardless of their level of education. “The trainer had a passion for the job and wanted to transfer that knowledge to everyone” said a ToT participant in Jos South;
The training module and material were appreciated by the participants, who said the materials were useful as a basis for revision and application once the training was over. However, almost all of them requested that such training material be translated into Hausa;

Most participants said the training was too dense, yet they said that all topics covered were useful and that none should be removed from the training agenda. Some suggested that the duration of the training be extended, while others said that it would be hard for them to make themselves available for a longer period.

About the step-down trainings

- Trainers for the step-down trainings were selected by SFCG based on their involvement and active participation during the ToT and most of them felt confident to step-down the trainings. In fact, during the focus group discussions with the ToT participants, most said that they felt well equipped after the ToT to start stepping down the training;
- The ToT lasted 5 days, while the step-down lasted just 2 days and only the most important topics of the ToT were stepped-down. Further, the step-down training was more about the use of some analysis tools and the development of local action plans than about theoretical knowledge on conflict issues. These two factors contributed to the quality of the step-down facilitations;
- Grouping the ToT participants in teams of 4 people, each team being in charge of a step-down training, was an efficient way of overcoming the fears and/or ineptitudes of some trainers, while allowing for a large participation of ToT participants in the step-down trainings;
- All trainers mentioned that SFCG's support during the step-down training was a very positive factor that contributed to the quality of the training;
- Step-down participants and trainers all agreed that the training material should be translated into Hausa, as many step-down participants cannot read English well.

A.2 About the initiatives undertaken by key local actors to address conflicts

All ToT participant focus groups were able to provide real-life examples of using the knowledge and skills of the training in their daily lives and most of them independently took initiative to increase the climate of peace in their community as a result of the training. While some of the examples shared by the ToT participants are at a personal level, other initiatives have had a larger reach with the potential to positively impact an entire community, as shown in the examples below:

"There was an attack in Barkin Ladi on a Fulani family, and one of the ToT teams gathered – Christian and Muslim – and started meeting that very night: they went from religious leader to religious leader, from youth leader to youth leader, and talked to them about the importance of de-escalating conflict. This lasted over 2 weeks. They were able to de-escalate conflict and we did not hear of a reprisal attack. This group in Barkin Ladi created their own early warning system, sharing information with one another, and created these response teams". - SFCG Training coordinator

"Muslims and Christians are now jointly involved in vigilante groups in the communities and also in sensitisation activities" - A- An official in Bokkos

As stated earlier, the ToT participants were also able to apply the skills learned in their daily lives:
"The lesson on dignity and seeing humanity in others helped me in a situation I faced when a friend asked me to lend him my roofing materials but [to] date he has not given it back to me. Had I not seen the humanity in him, I would have made serious trouble". – A ToT participant in Bokkos

"In my area people now call me 'baba settler', because since the training I have been putting what I learned about mediation into use and so far I have helped settle over five disputes in my community." – A ToT participant, Barkin Ladi

A.3 About the contribution towards an improved climate of peace

The trainings of key leaders and the step-down trainings for real-time conflict resolution both made positive contributions towards an improved climate of peace in the target LGAs. All focus groups agreed on that point, and lots of participants were able to cite concrete examples of how the step-down training helped contribute to a reduction in tension or conflict surrounding step-down training topics. "We organised a step-down training focusing on the farmer vs. grazer issue here in Jos South", explains a ToT participant, "If not for the training you would see more conflicts particularly now because it is the rainy season". Another woman, whose step-down training focused on the issues of segregated markets, said, "The markets are now open for everyone. It is the result of the training".

An indirect effect of the E.R.1 activities is the changed attitudes of individual participants. Indeed, SFCG made a continuous effort to ensure all religious and ethnic groups were represented in the trainings. In the early stages of the project, this proved to be challenge. But as the project progressed, SFCG became more and more successful at ensuring a proper representation of most groups. This contributed to building personal relationships between group members who usually did not talk to each other or collaborate in any way. In some cases, the relationships continued after the training was over:

"I was invited for a wedding by Christians and I attended the wedding; I even attended the church service and people kept looking at me as it was strange and one of the women who invited me came to greet me, saying she was happy I was able to come. I went for the wedding because I learned how to see people as people and not as objects and I wanted to show love to the family. My action touched some people present and made them reflect" – A Muslim woman in Barkin Ladi

"One of the participants told me: "I never imagined that I would call a Fulani, “brother”, but now I know he is my brother" – SFCG training coordinator

The data collected demonstrate very positive effects of the trainings on the key leaders’ knowledge, and initiatives to address conflicts, as well as a clear contribution of such activities to an increased climate of peace. Yet, the dosage of the activities is could be increased in order to further contribute to a lasting change at the LGA or State level. The trainers trained by SFCG represent a perfect entry point to conduct more real time conflict resolution step down trainings at the local level. Many ToT trainers are well-positioned to determine other key conflicts or tensions that could be tackled.

Recommendation: Increase the number of step-down trainings. In groups of four, ToT members - with SFCG’s support – would be reliable partners to increase spill-over effects of the ToT trainings
and to contribute to spreading the knowledge and skills acquired among more community members, for greater impact on the climate of peace.

**B. ABOUT THE PROGRESS TOWARDS EXPECTED RESULT 1.2**

“Public attitude is favourable towards a peaceful resolution of conflict are reinforced”

**B.1. About the influence of the media programmes on public attitude towards favourable resolution of conflicts**

**Reach of the programmes**

Before measuring whether the media programmes were able to provoke any kind of response⁴ on public attitudes, it is necessary to measure the reach of those programmes, as the two factors are closely linked.

The Graph 12 clearly shows a strong listenership of the **Voices of Peace (VOP)** radio programme: over 50% of the respondents (N=237) to the survey have heard the VOP programme at least once. The disaggregation by LGA shows a higher listenership rate in Bokkos, with 60% of respondents stating they have heard VOP, while the lowest rate is in Jos South with 45.7%. The disaggregation by religion unveils a higher listenership rate among the Christians (56.8%) than among the Muslims (44.9%). Among the VOP listeners, 39.5% listen to the show “daily” or “almost daily”, and 29% listen to it “once or twice a week”.

However, the rates are lower for **The Station**. 12.95% of respondents mention that they have watched the show at least once. The reach of The Station is low when compared to other television programmes aired by SFCG in the West Africa region⁵. Graph 13 shows a slightly higher popularity of the show in Barkin Ladi LGA, with 22.4% of respondents having watched

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⁴ See SFCG’s approach to measuring the success of her media programmes, called “The three Rs framework: Reach, Resonance, Response”.

⁵ As an example, in Cote d’Ivoire, the TV programme « L’Equipe » (**The Team**) had a viewership rate of 57% according to an external viewership survey conducted in 2014 on a sample of 5176 people.
The Station at least once, while in Bokkos (5.1%) and Shendam (7.8%) the rates are the much lower.

Among the reasons for this overall low viewership rate, the PWA! staff point at the timing of the programme which is not suitable for reaching a large audience. Another sign of the weak reach of this programme is the lack of success of the SMS feedback mechanism that SFCG set up for this TV drama: not a single SMS has been received from the viewers since the programme started airing in December 2013.

At the time of this mid-term evaluation, the children’s radio drama began airing just a few weeks prior. For this reason, the listenership of Our Children are Talking programme was not measured during the survey. However, some information provides an indication of the listenership rate: over 70 SMS or calls were received during each of the May episodes. While this demonstrates a strong listenership of this show with lots of enthusiasm for the “call-in” part of the programme, 100% of the feedback received came from adult listeners. This may be explained by the fact that only adults have phones and phone credit to send SMS. But this most probably points out a disconnect between the intended listeners of the show (children and adults) and the actual listeners of the show (adults). Because no specific marketing was organised towards children or alternatively towards their parents for the Our Children are Talking radio program, it is not surprising that SFCG faces such a situation. Indeed, children rarely have the control over the household radio station and unless they specifically request permission from their parents, they are most likely not the ones in charge of selecting the programmes. A specific marketing campaign aimed at children - including leaflets or stickers they could bring back home - would help increase their awareness of the programme and their desire to listen to it.

**Resonance and Response of the programmes**

The VOP programme has a strong resonance among its listeners, as stated in the “relevance” section and a strong reach as shown before. However, measuring response – the change that occurs as a result of the show – is harder: because it is such a short program, the listeners do not identify any change of attitudes or beliefs that are directly linked to the programme. The focus groups were mostly unable to cite any specific example of the VOP programme debunking rumours for them or their relatives. Below are two of the four examples that were shared during the three focus groups held with community members.

"During the step-down training, there was a youth there who said he heard the VOP talk of how people ought to behave as true Christians and he, being a Muslim, was surprised to learn that there are true Christians like there are true Muslims. It helped him to discover that in every religion there are the true followers and those who are not true" – A Community member of Jos South

"A politician who was misunderstood by the people was featured in the Voices of Peace, but listening to him speak on the radio in the Voices of Peace changed what people thought about him" – a Youth in Bokkos
However, even if listeners are mostly unable to provide real-life examples of how *Voices of Peace* helped debunk rumours, the listeners of this programme answer positively when asked “How useful do you think that such programme is in order to reduce rumours in your LGA?”: 80% of respondents rated the VOP as “very useful” on a 4-point Likert scale (see Graph 14). During the focus group discussions and interviews, all participants clearly pointed out the usefulness of such a programme to change the public attitudes and to contribute to more peaceful minds and attitudes: "*It helps us to see people as people with a human face*" – A female community member in Shendam.

The questions relating to the *resonance* of *The Station* programme were responded to only by those who stated having watched the programme at least once. Because of the low reach of the program, the sample (N=28) is not large enough to infer to the entire group of *The Station* watchers.

- 32.1% of watchers appreciate *The Station* “a little”, 60.7% appreciate it “much”
- 50% of respondents state that they know someone in their community who reminds them of one of the characters of *The Station* (28.6% say “no”, 21.4% say "I don't know")
- 89.3% say that the topics covered by the show are in line with the concerns they face in Plateau state

Based on the figures above, we may conclude that on the one hand, *The Station* has a high potential to influence public attitudes towards peaceful resolution of conflicts because it resonates with viewers’ reality and is perceived as a show that positively contributes to peace. However, so far the show has not had such influence due to the very low viewership rate, and is very unlikely to produce such effects towards the end of the project unless reach is increased. On the other hand, the VOP programme has both a high reach and a high resonance and is likely to be producing a positive influence on the public attitudes, even if such change is very diffused and hard to point out.

### B.2 About the awareness and use of the Early Warning System

#### Level of awareness and reach of the EWS system, including the Bulletin

Because the EWS is meant to target community members on the one hand (for data collection) and security and official authorities as well as CSOs on the other hand (for data use to plan the response), the awareness and the reach of the Early Warning System (EWS) was assessed during interviews with key authority, security and CSO informants but also during focus group discussions with community members.
Among the community members we met, the data collected points at a good level of awareness of the Early Warning System by the community members directly involved in SFCG activities. Indeed, SFCG systematically organises an introduction to this system when organising activities in the communities. However, evidence points at little spill-over from the participants in our activities to the larger community. Among the two groups met in Bokkos and Shendam, only 1 person was aware of the EWS.

Among the officials, security and CSO persons we met, the level of awareness of the system varies from one group to the other. The level of awareness is high among CSOs and among key LGA officials. The EWS bulletins are mainly known by the CSOs and to a lesser extent to some LGA officials and security persons:

- The CSOs we interviewed were selected because of their involvement in this system, and for that reason all of them were aware of the EWS and they receive the EWS bulletin on a regular basis;
- As explained in the “Limitations” section of this report, we were able to interview only 2 Security persons: one of them had never heard of SFGC’s EWS, while the other was aware of the system but did not have the phone number. One of them had read the EWS Bulletin, the other did not. However, the sample is too little to draw conclusions on the awareness by Security persons;
- The LGA officials we met were mostly aware of the EWS and have the system. However, in one of the LGAs, the person we met said he had not heard of it. Only one of the four LGA officials we met had ever come across SFCG’s EWS bulletin.

Level of use of the EWS

151 SMS were received over the seven months during which the system has been in place (November 2013 – May 2014), with an average of 21.6 messages per month. Given the number of security events, rumours, tensions or killings that actually happened in the project’s area during the reporting period, given the size of the population in this area, and given that one single event could be reported by more than one person, that the number of SMS received is below expectations. Additionally, during the focus group discussions with community members, only two community members out of 23 were aware of anyone ever sending or receiving an SMS through the EWS system.

The use of the EWS by the CSOs, Security and Government officials is difficult to assess. CSOs in Jos are receiving the Bulletin but they seem to be only vaguely using it: one CSO said that “It is helpful, it helps refresh the memory of our team on the ground”, but the other said “It is not useful at all: the information in this bulletin is usually outdated so such report is no good for more than documentation or reporting to the donor”. While for the LGA’s officials, only one out of the four officials met during this evaluation had ever received the EWS Bulletin, which leaves little possibility for any use of this Bulletin.

Assessing the use of the EWS reports by the Security is a difficult task, due to the sensitive nature of such information which leads to ambiguity from the project’s counterparts. “Security says it (EWS reports) is useful” explains SFCG’s senior staff, “but we don’t have data to establish if and how they
are using the information we send them. When we send a SMS to the Security for an urgent situation, they usually reply saying ‘thanks for the information, it was useful’, but we don’t have the details’. Similarly, during the interviews with key Security agencies, one of them said: “When we receive them, we send the EWS reports to our intelligence department, where they study the material. We use the information in the bulletin to understand the conflict trends in the state. This helps us to plan our responses and operations”. One testimony collected during a focus group with community members was hinting that such reports may lead to a response action. As explained by a Jos South community member: “I sent an SMS to the EWS and the security personnel were called in to address the situation and a message was also sent to me acknowledging receipt and stating the measure taken to address the situation”.

There are some major challenges hindering the success of the EWS, some of them linked:

- First of all, there is a disconnect between the intended use of the EWS and the present-day format and frequency of the report: A one-page bulletin with short SMS-type information does not contain enough data and analysis to actually serve the OSC’s needs.
  - **Recommendation:** SFCG should therefore either opt for greater frequency of the report or provide more analytical information if they decide to keep the monthly format.
  - Secondly, the number of reports received by SFCG is too small to actually become added value to other CSOs who receive SFCG’s monthly EWS Bulletin. Similarly, the number of reports sent to the Security being subjective, it does not help position SFCG as a key actor of early warning. To be functional, the system requires that the community be motivated to send reports and feed the EWS. As of today, the EWS Bulletin has a very limited audience as it only targets officials, CSOs, Security and there is therefore a need for increased reach of the EWS data via a new means that will specifically target the communities. **Some recommendations** to improve the number of messages sent by the community include: The EWS Bulletin be distributed more largely, using the Hausa language; Creating EWS marketing products such as leaflets, spots on the radio or stickers; Creating a “EWS radio program” in Hausa language, where security information could be sent live; Better use SFCG’s database of 1400 community members to encourage (via SMS blasts) the sending of reports to the EWS system.

- Due to budget constraints, there is no SFCG staff specifically dedicated to the management of the Frontline SMS software (software through which SMS are received and sent). The EWS management had previously been put in the hands of an intern, but with the departure of this intern, no long-term solution had yet been resolved at the time of the evaluation. On top of this, the system was facing technical issues with messages pending to be received for several days and with no phone credit on the SIM card for several weeks, which made it impossible to send an SMS blast. Those technical and management considerations hardly make it possible to serve as a “real-time” early warning system.
  - **Recommendation:** dedicate someone to manage the Frontline SMS software.

We may therefore conclude that there is a gap between the intended use of the EWS, and the inputs (financial and human capital) that are put into this system to allow for real-time data collection from the community members. This hinders the potential for this activity to contribute to the expected result 1.2.
C. ABOUT THE PROGRESS TOWARDS EXPECTED RESULT 1.3

Increased numbers of successfully resolved conflicts in eight strategic communities

No activities linked to the Expected Result 1.3 had started at the time of the mid-term evaluation. Such activities entail:

- Act 1.3.1: Planning and implementing local dispute resolution processes by local leaders
- Act 1.3.2: Accompanying actions within communities to enhance visibility and viability of local dispute resolution processes

Such delays in starting these activities are hindering the potential of making a lasting contribution to the climate of peace. Successfully resolving a conflict requires time and effort. For this reason, such initiatives should be started as soon as possible in order to ensure sustainability of the action. In addition, the delays in implementation of those activities also hinder the potential to link with the Expected Result 1.1’s activities: the ToT and the step-down trainings of key local leaders. Indeed, there is a clear relationship between the ToT – during which some key conflicts or tensions are identified at the LGA level - , the step-down trainings – during which such issues are at the core of the activity with all key stakeholders of the identified conflict invited to the training - , and the local dispute resolution processes – which are meant to be follow-up actions addressing each of the conflicts or tensions that have been at the core of the step-down trainings. Because the activities are closely linked to one another, it is advisable that they happen with a deferral no longer than three months if we are to keep the local stakeholders’ interest and motivation high. However, at the time of the evaluation, this was not happening.

**Recommendation:** To prioritize E.R. 1.3’s activities in the weeks to come.
D. ABOUT THE PROGRESS TOWARDS EXPECTED RESULT 2.1

\textit{Security forces and government officials with a peace building mandate have enhanced ability to analyze and to respond to conflicts commensurately}

Almost no activities linked to the Expected Result 2.1 had started at the time of the mid-term evaluation. Such activities entail:

Act 2.1.1: Developing a Capacity Building and Training Plan for Security Actors and State Government
Act 2.1.2: Conflict Resolution Trainings for Security Actors
Act 2.1.3: Training in Conflict Mainstreaming skills for key government officials

By the end of April, the draft training manual had been prepared and sent to the Special Task Force (STF) for inputs in line with Activity 2.1.1, and a training consultant had been identified. The actual trainings for Security actors and key Government officials, however, were facing delays due to budget constraints on one hand (no budget line to pay the training consultant) and to management priorities on the other hand.

Because the trainings are meant to be “one-time” activities, such delays do not represent much of a challenge towards the success of Expected result 2.1 nor does it hinder the potential reach of Objective 2: Role of the State to provide security for the population is strengthened.

Recommendation: To ensure the quality of the training and to overcome potential difficulties to organise the trainings with key security actors and government officials whose agenda are usually very busy, it is important that the budget issues be quickly resolved with the donor to allow for these preparations to take place.

E. ABOUT THE PROGRESS TOWARDS EXPECTED RESULT 2.2

\textit{Mutual understanding of situations which create conflicts between civil society, government and security actors is enhanced}

According to the project’s staff, the objective of the Peace Architecture Dialogue (PAD) is to build trust among civil society, population, government, and security forces; and to increase the coordination of action. According to the project's staff and partners involved in the Peace Architecture Dialogues (PAD), “mutual understanding” is defined as an understanding of the role, challenges and efforts undertaken by the various actors towards peace and security; while “coordination” is defined as transparency over the actor's activities towards peace and security and agreement on complementary and/or joint action plans to increase peace and security. The project proposal mentions that “At a minimum, these will provide an opportunity to discuss conflict trends and the EWS bulletins, and share information and ideas on how to improve conflict response. The meeting (...) may also provide an opportunity for constructive discussion on issues of abuses, or to provide feedback on priorities or concerns linked to the role of the government in ensuring security and resolving conflict.”
About the expected improved mutual understanding
There is unanimity among the project’s main stakeholders and beneficiaries that the PAD is a useful tool for increasing coordination and mutual understanding between Security actors, NGOs, CSOs, Government officials and Community representatives. Regular brainstorming sessions on key security issues involving the various stakeholders proved to be a very successful way of enhancing mutual understanding between organisations and people who have a history of distrust. Various security-related issues were discussed during the dialogues, allowing for a common understanding of each actor’s perspective, role and capacity to respond. The majority of the key informants interviewed said that the PAD helped enhance their personal network and it created links, as detailed below:

“At the end of the gatherings I see civilians meeting with the security and even exchange numbers, which would not have been possible before, so it (PAD) is working in cementing relationships” - A CSO representative

“Through the sharing of ideas and challenges and networking it (PAD) helps the NGOs and CSOs understand themselves better” – A representative of the Security forces

As explained in details in the project’s baseline evaluation report, the general population has a very negative perception of the security forces due to all the abuses that have been reported over recent months and years. “Security is still closed up and there is little honesty on the part of some government personnel. People view security now as only attainable by those who can buy the security so there is a lot that is still to be done” said an official in Bokkos during data collection for this mid-term evaluation. In a context of much obscurity from the security forces, the presence of their representatives makes a strong impression among the community representatives and the non-governmental organisations. “It makes the government accountable to its people and creates awareness”, explains an official in Barkin Ladi. “For the security, it helps make them more responsive”. The presentation made by a STF Colonel during the April 24th PAD particularly impacted the participants, who said that it was one of the first times they heard STF report on their activities and describe the challenges that they’re facing. “[The STF] have built trust in me here today,” said a leader of a youth organisation. “If [stakeholders] are aware of these things it will help in disseminating information to the locals,” said a representative of the Berom community.

About the reach of the PAD: the media presence during the PAD allowed for an increased reach of the PAD’s outcomes and contributes to the expected results. “Because this kind of discussion is already powerful, if people see on TV that different people work together, it’s already having a wider impact” said one participant of the dialogue.

About the expected increased coordination of the response to conflict prone situations
In addition to the “mutual understanding” objective described in the project proposal, an additional objective of this activity was mentioned by the program staff, which relates to “an increased coordination of the response to conflict prone situations”. Data collected shows that some issues raised during the PAD contributed to de-escalate conflict, such as when a Muslim scholar had been
arrested, provoking the unrest of the Muslim community. Raising this topic during the PAD and listening to security agencies’ point of view on the issue contributed to reducing the tensions in the affected communities.

“Through this PAD, there have been quite a number of agreements reached in Barkin-Ladi and signed by the Fulani and the Berom, agreements such as how the Fulani herder and the Berom farmer can live [together] peacefully” - An Official Barkin Ladi.

On several occasions, recommendations and action plans were agreed upon to reduce tensions over security threats raised during the PAD, and follow-up committees were set up to implement those recommendations. However, the PAD is less effective at reaching this “increased coordination” objective for the following reasons: First of all, the nature of the meetings makes it hard to discuss long-term trends or root causes of the tensions and the conflicts and actually plan a joint response strategy. “The dialogues did a lot, but most of the issues raised are beyond the group: the only thing that the groups can do is to advise, but most of the discussed issues are supposed to be handled by government” said a participant of the PAD.

Further, the follow-up of PAD recommendations is not always systematic and SFCG does not have the power to constraint the committee’s members to complete their follow-up tasks as promised.

In conclusion, the Peace Architecture Dialogue is a powerful tool that is contributing to an increased communication and mutual understanding between civil society, government and security actors. However, this tool is less effective at contributing to increased coordination of action towards peace and de-escalation of tensions. We therefore advise that the PAD focuses on the objective of increasing communication and mutual understanding.

**F. ABOUT THE PROGRESS TOWARDS THE CROSS-CUTTING OBJECTIVE**

_The capacities of implementing partners are strengthened to conduct peacebuilding activities_

SFCG partners with two Nigerian organisations in the framework of the PWA! project:
- CAPP - Community Action for Popular Participation
- JRT – Jos Repertory Theater.

CAPP works jointly with SFCG in the ToT (mobilizing participants), the step-down trainings, and the conflict mediation activities. JRT is in charge of production of *Our Children are Talking* radio programmes. Both organisations had partnered with SFCG previously: CAPP worked with SFCG on a previous EWS pilot project and on an interreligious project, while JRT created 50 radio dramas for a “Common Ground” project in 2011-2012. On top of the two specific objectives, PWA! has a cross-cutting objective related to its partnership with the national organisations: “Capacity and knowledge to implement this kind of programming is reinforced”. In this section we will assess the progress towards this objective.
**Formal vs. informal capacity strengthening**

The project proposal mentions that a “capacity and needs identification” will take place with each partner. However, such activity was not budgeted, neither is “capacity building for partners”. For that reason, the capacity and needs identification session did not happen; neither did any formal capacity strengthening activity (i.e. workshop). This is a missed opportunity to reach the cross-cutting objectives. Organising a one-day workshop in SFCG’s office could have been held at no cost and would have been a good opportunity to work with CAPP and JRT to determine some learning objectives and benchmarks that they were hoping to meet by the end of the project. Similarly, SFCG staff themselves are well suited to share the appropriate skills or knowledge with CAPP and JRT.

However, even if no formal training occurred, informal and continuous training and collaboration with the partners did take place over the course of the project. The capacity strengthening mainly focused on financial reporting (working with SFCG Finance), narrative reporting (working with the SFCG Programme Associate), M&E (working with the SFCG DME coordinator).

**Improvement of partners’ capacities to undertake similar types of project**

As explained earlier, this project is not the first partnership with CAPP, JRT and SFCG. CAPP is a large Nigerian organisation that is well versed in conflict resolution activities and has a very large network of community members in many LGAs and states. JRT is a professional theatre troupe with extensive experience in script writing, acting, and production of plays. Both partners expressed that the partnership with SFCG helped increase their technical skills:

“Working with SFCG helped us learn about the use of radio theatre programmes. We used to do ‘simple’ theatre, not radio. Now we have the capacity to take a radio programme from inception to conclusion. That would not have been possible without the contribution of SFCG. One of my projects, pending funding, is to train our staff in radio programming and look at the possibility of having and running our own studio. We also learned a lot about how to work with children, which is a specialized way of working”. – Artistic Director of JRT

“Definitely this project is helping us increase our skills. As an organisation, we can do conflict resolution because that’s our core business. But we don’t have the skills to conduct a mediation or to do trauma counseling. Through our involvement with advanced conflict resolution training, we learned a lot. We at CAPP have experience and we know the area better than SFCG, but sometimes SFCG has other things that CAPP does not have. (From, SFCG), we learned a lot on the use of Internet and Social Media, and the use of radio programming. We’re envisioning starting this kind of media to reach a wide audience. And we have also seen an increase in our membership since we started this project, as people get interested and ask to become members”. – CAPP Programme Manager

Both organisations also highlighted the usefulness of SFCG’s support in understanding and meeting the finance reporting requirements and, to a lesser extent, the narrative reporting requirements:

“The reporting process of the EU is a bit alien to our style of working: we find it too heavy. But again, working with SFCG has introduced us to another way; our partnership has brought us new skills in the area of management”. – One of SFCG’s partners
“Our general strategy is to make the partners responsible for their activities, which has helped improve their capacities to coordinate and organise themselves - we push them to lead the process. This process has opened new doors for them”. PWA! Programme Manager

**SFCG’s technical assistance**
Both partners mentioned SFCG’s quick response to any of assistance requests. However, JRT mentioned that the validation process for the radio drama scripts was too long and should be made simpler: the involvement of the donor in the revision process makes the process very lengthy and hinders their capacity to deliver their work on time.

**Improved ability to analyze and respond to conflict**
Both partners mention that the project helped improve their ability to analyze and understand conflict. The EWS is one of the elements that CAPP found useful in that vein. JRT mentioned that the collaboration with SFCG helped them in their creative process: “Within the context of the story, we now have the capacity to know that we should (a) relate with people from different sites of the conflict (b) check the validity of the information”.

4.3. Project Indicators

The project’s logical framework states that the eight indicators will be collected at mid-term, in order to assess the progress of the project towards results. Here is the data that was collected by the evaluation team during this mid-term evaluation, as well as information about the data source and means of collection:

- **Percentage of workshop participants who cite example of specifically applying workshop skills two months after training:**
  - Level achieved at mid-term: 75%.
  - Further explanation: Out of 32 people who participated to the 5 focus groups conducted with ToT and step down trainings participants, 24 were able to cite an example of applying the workshop skills.

- **Percentage of organisational capacity development benchmarks attained by partner organisation:**
  - Level achieved at mid-term: Not applicable.
  - Further explanation: no capacity development benchmark was undertaken during the kick-off phase of the project, it is therefore impossible to measure the progress on the benchmarks.

- **Percentage of project participants and nonparticipants who cited improvements in inter-group relations:**
  - Level achieved at mid-term: Unknown.
  - Further explanation: this indicator data was not collected during the mid-term evaluation, as the evaluation team and the project team agreed that it was too early to measure such type of indicator of mid-term to long-term change

- **Reach of media programmes: percentage of target population who listen to/watch SFCG’s programmes, disaggregated by gender, age, religion, socio-economic group:**
  - Level achieved at mid-term: 52.3% of population heard the Voices of Peace at least once (N=237), including:
    - 42.4% of listenership among females, 64.7% among males;
    - 47.5% of listenership among the 18-25 years old, 49.2% among the 26-35 years old, 56.5% among the 36-45 years old, and 53.6% among the 46 years old and older;
    - 56.8% listenership among Christians, 44.9% among Muslims;
    - 69.1% of listenership among the employed, 46.5% among the self-employed (other professional categories are not displayed as they were not represented well enough in order to extrapolate the figures).
  - Level achieved at mid-term: 12.9% of population watched “The Station” at least once (N=224) including:
    - 12.7% viewership among females, 13.3% among males;
    - 15% among 18-25 years old, 12.5% among 26-35, 12.1% among 36-45, 12.9% among the 46 years old and older;
    - 14.3% among Christians, 10.7% among Muslims;
    - 16.3% among employed, 13% among self-employed.

- **Resonance of media programmes: percentage of listeners/viewers who appreciate our programmes:**
Voices of Peace: 78.5% of those who listened to the show at least once (N=121) would want the show to continue, and 20.7% of listeners would want it "continued but with changes."

The Station: 60.7% of The Station viewers (N=28) appreciate the show “much”, 32.1% “a little” (7% “don’t know)."

- Resonance of media programmes: percentage of listeners/viewers who state that our programmes are in line with their daily life and concerns:
  - Voices of Peace: 90.2% of listeners (N=123) say that VOP at least once related to an issue happening in their LGA; 91.1 % of listeners (N=123) agree to the statement: “The topics covered by the Voices of Peace programme are in line with my daily concerns for peace”.
  - The Station: 50% of viewers (N=28) know someone in their community who reminds them of one of the characters of The Station; 89.3% of viewers (N=28) agree to the statement “The topics covered by The Station are in line with the concerns we face in Plateau State”.

- Number of Security actors and Government who site real world examples of improved skills and coordination’s in providing security in the State attributed to the project:
  - Level achieved at mid-term: unknown.
  - Further explanation: the activities relative to E.R. 2.1 had not started at the time of the mid-term evaluation, for that reason indicators relating to this result were not collected.

- Percentage of Staff of Government agencies with a peace building mandate who feel more able to analyse and respond to conflict than 1 year ago:
  - Level achieved at mid-term: unknown.
  - Further explanation: the activities relative to E.R. 2.1 had not started at the time of the mid-term evaluation, for that reason indicators relating to this result were not collected.

- Percentage of Staff of security forces who feel more able to analyse and respond to conflict than 1 year ago:
  - Level achieved at mid-term: unknown.
  - Further explanation: the activities relative to E.R. 2.1 had not started at the time of the mid-term evaluation, for this reason, indicators relating to this result were not collected.
5. Conclusions

**THEME 1: RELEVANCE**

*About the relevance of Objective 1: an improved climate of peace in eight LGAs*

The activities undertaken under the project’s Objective 1 are relevant, as programmatic choices, as inputs and efforts are in most cases appropriate to effectively produce the expected change: “an improved climate of peace in eight local government areas”. Among the factors that contribute to the relevance of the programmatic options are the following:

- the process linking the advanced training of trainers of key local actors in conflict transformation, the selection of key conflicts representing a threat to the peace at the LGA level, the step-down training of local conflict stakeholders around those key conflicts identified and the selection of a conflict response strategy to address those issues hand in hand with the main stakeholders
- the choice of participants for the community activity, which is based on both an in-depth baseline conflict assessment and local analysis of conflict trends and actors by key leaders of each LGA
- the choice of radio and television as a means to reach out to a wide audience in Plateau state (85.3% listen to radio on a regular basis, 76% watch TV regularly), as well as the choice of the project’s partner radio and television stations (78% name the partner radio station as their favourite station, 44% name the partner TV station as their favourite station) and the time for broadcasting the radio programmes, in particular the VOP
- the resonance of the messages aired via the radio programmes, which have been demonstrated to be clearly in line with the audience’s daily concerns for peace and to which the audience has proven to be relating (i.e. 90% of VOP listeners state that the topics are in line with their daily concerns for peace)
- relevance of using children’s voices to reach out to children, appropriate presentation (drama) and level of language
- the choice of an implementing partner with a large grassroots network and in-depth understanding of the local conflict dynamics
- the constant monitoring of conflict to inform the programmatic options

Despite the overall positive conclusions regarding the relevance of Objective 1’s activities, the evaluation also brought to light some disconnects between the programmatic options over some activities (such as: quantity, human resources allocated, targets), and the result to which such activities are meant to contribute. First, there is a major disconnect between the stated purpose of the Early Warning System and both a) the effort put into this system to ensure that the community reports security incidents via this system, and b) the format and audience of the bulletin. While the project staff present the EWS as a system meant to reduce immediate threats of violence and conflict and to inform mid-term and long-term response policy, the amount of SMSs received, the absence of a dedicated SFCG staff to maintain the system and the choice of a monthly 1 page bulletin distributed to an elite in Jos reduces the relevance of this activity as it hinders the EWS to contribute to the two stated purposes of the system. Another minor disconnect exists
between the stated audience of the “Our Children are Talking” radio show – supposed to target children and adults – and the format used (a call-in session while children do not have access to phones or phone credit) is not fully appropriate as well as the inexistent marketing efforts conducted to reach a child audience. Lastly, there is a missed opportunity relating to the quantity of community conflict response and mitigation activities. The efforts deployed to train key local actors (E.R. 1.1) could be more efficiently used to multiply the effects and sustainably resolve more conflicts in the target LGAs (E.R.1.3).

About the relevance of Objective 2: the role of the state to provide security for the population is strengthened
With regards to Objective 2, the data collected signify a high relevance of Expected Result 2.2’s activity (Peace Architecture Dialogue). Much effort, energy and resources dedicated to this activity also contributes to the likeliness of the Peace Architecture Dialogue to contribute to the change it was designed to create (increased mutual understanding). Programmatic choices, such as the type and level of participants, the representation of the various communities and ethnic groups, the collaboration with the Office of the S.A. to the Governor on Peacebuilding and the involvement of high ranking security force representatives, contribute to the relevance of this activity. However, at the time of the evaluation, most activities related to Expected Result 2.1 had not yet begun. This delay is likely to negatively influence the overall success of the project, as each result is linked and is meant to contribute to the overall objective.

THEME 2: EFFECTIVENESS

Effectiveness of Expected Result 1.1 “Key local actors, including women, in eight strategic communities have enhanced knowledge and undertake initiatives to address conflicts”
The participants dramatically increased their knowledge (average increase of 40% from pre- to post-tests) in the various topics explored during the trainings, most importantly during the five-day Trainings of trainers. A large majority of participants (75%) were able to provide real-life examples of using the knowledge and skills either at a personal level, or through initiatives that impacted their entire community. We may therefore conclude that both types of trainings made positive contributions towards an improved climate of peace in the target LGAs.

Effectiveness of Expected Result 1.2 “Public attitude favourable towards a peaceful resolution of conflict is reinforced”
About the media programmes and their contribution towards a change of attitude: The Station has a high potential to influence public attitudes towards peaceful resolution of conflicts because it resonates with viewers’ reality and is perceived as a show that positively contributes to peace. However, so far The Station has not had such influence due to the low viewership rate (12.9%), and is unlikely to produce such effects towards the end of the project unless reach is increased. On the other end, the Voices of Peace radio programme has both a high reach (50% of the population has heard it at least once) and a high resonance and is therefore likely to be producing a positive influence on the public’s attitudes, even if such change is very diffused and hard to point to. No listenership survey was conducted for the Our Children are Talking
programme but there are clear indications that demonstrate a strong listenership. However, such listenership seems to be limited to an adult audience, while the show is also meant to target children. **It is therefore unlikely that the children's attitudes will be influenced towards a peaceful resolution of conflicts via this programme.**

About the Early Warning System and its contribution towards a change of public attitude: In order for the EWS to provoke a change of attitude, it is necessary that the system be known and used by the community and key security actors. The data collected points at a **high level of awareness of the EWS among Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), among key LGA officials and among community members who have been directly involved in the project.** However, there has been little spill-over to the community, hence a **low level of awareness of the EWS by the communities targeted by the project. The use of the system by the communities at large is middle-low**, with an average of 21.6 messages received per month. The **use of the EWS data by the CSOs and Government officials is also low**: government officials – when they were aware of the EWS system – are unable to provide concrete examples of actually using the data, and CSOs interviewed showed mixed attitudes towards the bulletin. Not enough effort is being put into this system by SFCG to bring this pilot system to a higher level and ensure it becomes a tool for real-time collection and sharing of information. Therefore, currently the Early Warning System does not contribute to the reinforcement of favourable public attitudes towards peaceful resolution of conflicts.

**Effectiveness of Expected Result 1.3 “Increased numbers of successfully resolved conflicts in eight strategic communities”**

No activities linked to the Expected Result 1.3 had started at the time of the mid-term evaluation. Delays in the start of those activities could hinder the potential lasting contribution to the climate of peace, as successfully resolving a conflict requires both time and effort. In addition, the delays in implementing those activities could also hamper the potential to link with the Expected Result 1.1’s activities and to increase the global effects of the project’s activities.

**Effectiveness of Expected Result 2.1: “Security forces and government officials with a peace building mandate have enhanced ability to commensurately analyze and respond to conflicts”**

Almost no activities linked to the Expected Result 2.1 had started at the time of the mid-term evaluation, as the trainings for Security actors and key Government officials were facing delays linked to budget constraints. Because the trainings are meant to be “one-time” activities, **such delays do not hinder the potential effectiveness of Objective 2, as long as the activities are implemented before the end of the project.**

**Effectiveness of Expected Result 2.2 “Mutual understanding of situations which create conflicts between civil society, government and security actors is enhanced”**

There is unanimity among the project’s main stakeholders and beneficiaries that the Peace Architecture Dialogues (PAD) is a **useful tool for increasing mutual understanding** between organisations and people who have a history of distrust and suspicion: Security actors, NGOs, CSOs,
Government officials and Community representatives. All data collected also points to an increased mutual understanding and increased personal network of the various actors across all sectors. The presence of the media during the PAD also allowed for an increased reach of the PAD’s outcomes. The PAD is also contributing slightly to an increased coordination of the response to conflict-prone situations, when on several occasions, recommendations and action plans were agreed upon to reduce tensions over security threats raised during the PAD. However, it has proven more effective to increase mutual understanding than to increase an actual coordination of action towards peace.

Effectiveness of cross cutting objective “The capacities of implementing partners are strengthened to conduct peacebuilding activities”

No capacity and needs identification of the partners took place over the course of the project, and there is no budget assigned to “capacity building” of the partners. For those two reasons, no formal capacity strengthening ever took place as part of the project. This significantly reduces the possibility of this cross cutting objective to be effective. However, even if no formal training occurred, informal and continuous training and collaboration with the partners did take place over the course of the project. Both partner organisations highlighted an increase in technical skills (radio production for the JRT, trauma healing and conflict resolution for CAPP). They also reported on the usefulness of SFCG’s support in understanding and meeting the finance reporting requirements, and to a lesser extent, the narrative reporting requirements of the donor. Lastly, both partners mention that the project helped improve their ability to analyze and understand conflict.
6. Recommendations

(All recommendations are targeting SFCG staff)

Increase the length and number of the step-down trainings and conflict resolution activities. Those activities and the programmatic options taken by SFCG are highly relevant and make those activities effective tools to improve the climate of peace in the target LGA. However, the number of their occurrence is too limited to have a lasting and spill-over effect on the entire LGA community. We therefore recommend an increase of the number of step-down trainings and subsequent conflict resolution activities. We also recommend that special care be taken to ensure that the same ToT and step-down training participants be involved in all steps of a conflict resolution, as a way to (a) increase appropriation and relevance of the actions undertaken, and to (b) ensure confidence and skill building of the key local leaders at the LGA level.

Dedicate more energy to the Early Warning System. Data collected was not sufficient to draw conclusion on the EWS's relevance. There were mixed results in terms of its effectiveness, as it is little known or used. We therefore recommend that major efforts be dedicated to increasing the awareness and use of the system. Ways for improvement include: dedicating a staff to manage the SMS Frontline software and provide real-time response and sharing of information received; undertake some marketing efforts among the population in order to increase the number of SMSs received; create a Hausa “early warning” radio programme linked to the SMS-based early warning system; continue the efforts towards more coordination of the early warning system actors in Plateau State; once the number of SMS reports have increased, adapt the periodicity and format of the Bulletins to the various expected audience.

Link more directly the SMS blasts to the reports received via the Early Warning System. In addition to the dissemination of peace messages, SMS blasts should be more clearly linked to the SMS reports received via the Early Warning System. The SMS Frontline software used by SFCG allows for SMS to be sent to a specific location, gender or age category, but so far this opportunity has been underutilized. It is advisable that each time an incident report is sent via the EWS, a specific SMS blast is sent to the contacts in that area or to representatives of the group who are at the focus of such incident (i.e. one ethnic group).

Continue the efforts towards changing the attitudes of the population by using radio and television. SFCG’s media products have proven to be relevant, with content that is in line with the context of conflicts and with the audience’s concerns for peace and is mostly adapted to their expected audience. Small programmatic changes should be made in order to improve the effectiveness and relevance of the programmes, such as: making more use of the Hausa language in order to appeal more to the Muslim community; ensuring a larger presence of Muslim characters and voices in the media programmes; ensuring all media programmes are aired during prime-time; reconnecting the expected audience of the “Our Children are Talking” show with the marketing efforts towards this audience.

Ensure a quick start-up of the activities that have not yet begun. The conflict resolution activities at the LGA level should start as soon as possible. The bottlenecks that hinder the
realisation of the Expected Result 2.1 should be discussed with the donor in due time in order to allow enough preparation time for those activities to be properly organised.

**Continue the Peace Architecture Dialogues**, which have proven to be both relevant and effective. In the future, lobby with each security agency and government body to ensure that they designate one senior staff as the “PAD focal point”. This would allow smoother follow-up of recommendations and action points decided upon, and would therefore contribute to a higher degree of effectiveness of these activities. If budget allows, try a pilot Peace Architecture Dialogue at the LGA-level by partnering with a relevant government body at the LGA level and inviting the representatives of the security services deployed in that LGA. Indeed, according to the baseline data, the level of mistrust between population, government and security is extremely high at the LGA level, and this activity could help decrease suspicion. If this experience proves effective to increase mutual understanding, SFCG may consider replicating it in future programmes in Plateau State.

**Dedicate more efforts to the capacity-building of partners**, i.e. by organising quarterly one-day capacity-building sessions for the partners’ staff on key management issues.