This forum was a special meeting organized to take advantage of the opportunity to hear from Margaret Carey, the Deputy Director of Africa Division of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). Among other topics, the discussion centered around the issues facing MONUC for the implementation of the third phase of its mandate particularly with regards to the DDRRR process in the Democratic Republic of Congo. (DRC)

**MONUC and Phase III activities of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration in the DRC**

What will the impact of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue be on MONUC’s operations? If there is an agreement on transitional institutions, then how should MONUC respond within a global framework and what role should MONUC play? However, if there is no agreement or only a partial agreement, then can and should the international community continue to support this process? Will further assistance move the process forward or just serve to further polarize the situation with the RCD for example? How long should the Security Council continue to fund a UN presence in the DRC in the absence of an agreement given that MONUC’s budget only stretches to $603 million/year.

MONUC recognizes that it is important to create pressure on the ground as well as continuing its support for the process and one example of this is its Radio Okapi, which is now operational and working to do just that. MONUC also recognizes however, that the international community needs to support and push for an agreement, and agrees with the widespread sentiment that a super envoy is needed to focus the process and focus the coordination of the international institutions and agencies involved in the DRC.

How to move the DDR process forward?
Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration activities constitute a primary focus of the phase III part of MONUC’s UN mandate. However, in order to clear up some common misunderstandings concerning MONUC’s mandate, three points must be clarified: Firstly, the DDR activities are based on voluntary disarmament and decisions by the various armed groups within the DRC to come to a MONUC demobilization center. Secondly, this stage should be done as quickly as possible. Unlike Angola’s long cantonment periods, MONUC wants to move rapidly through this phase. Thirdly, there are plans for a great degree of coordination with other UN systems’ agencies and NGO’s that are on the ground.

Currently MONUC is in the planning stages for such Phase III activities. A highly informative report was submitted to the UNSC with an in-depth assessment of the armed groups in the DRC. This kind of detailed information was crucial to gather before any DDR activities could be organized and the report is available to read at: [www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/2002/341e/pdf](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/2002/341e/pdf).
Following this report, MONUC will continue its military deployment to the East in order to verify information, develop operational plans and design appropriate camp structures complete with the cost breakdown for the camps’ operations.

MONUC is also currently preparing its teams for situations when spontaneous disarmament will arise, most likely in areas such as Masisi and Camina. The momentum created by making tangible progress in these two areas specifically would go a long way to creating pressure to opening up the dialogue as well as moving it forward.

MONUC also recognizes that it needs to work on increasing its credibility with the Congolese people, given recent criticism of the conduct of some peacekeepers, and their passivity and disconnection with the local communities around which they work. Acknowledging that the UNTAC mission in Cambodia required a huge public information campaign, MONUC designed a budget precisely for such activities, but unfortunately the degree to which peacekeepers are willing to become involved and reach out to the local communities very much depends upon the national policies of the various troop contributors. For example, while Uruguay, a provider of many peacekeeping troops, is willing to work with and help local communities such as by providing free medical services one afternoon a week, Morocco, another large contributor, has a very insular policy regarding troop involvement.

In the likely event that a number of groups or individuals will not submit to voluntary disarmament, MONUC has recognized the need for a possible contingency plan. A number of experts have suggested that a regional security architecture be put in place. However, MONUC faces a number of logistical issues with respect to the demand for an increased number of troops with greater power.

Countries who contributed troops for Phase I and Phase II activities did so with the agreement that their troops would be used for guard duty and other similar tasks. However, for Phase III, with a variety of new demands on MONUC, there is a real need for more robust troops, and therefore a renegotiation of troop contributor agreements will be necessary. Additional logistical problems include the need for civilian police in order to provide police training and to help build momentum for the demobilization of Kisangani and well as the need, and unfortunate paucity of middle management officials working within the MONUC system.

Some participants felt that much of the violence in the East of the DRC does not actually have a lot to do with the overall issues between the Rwandan and Congolese governments specifically. Thus, they could be most effectively met with separate unilateral agreements with the two governments and a facilitation team organized by MONUC to work at the local level, instead of waiting for a political framework between the two countries.

Ultimately, if there is too much credibility given to an MLC/Kinshasa agreement that does not include the RCD, then this may further polarize the conflict and the situation
both politically and locally on the ground. What is perhaps needed is an assessment of the situation with reaction gauged from Kigali and other key capitals. Other obstacles for MONUC include the fact that while it derives its mandate from the Lusaka Protocol, there are many armed groups fighting on the ground that were not signatories to this agreement, thus further complicating MONUC’s operations.

In conclusion, it was emphasized that MONUC’s job was not a linear one. The inclusion of the World Bank’s recent Greater Great Lakes initiative, as well as suggestions such as doing some reconstruction activities before completing demobilization and disarmament, will all be part of the multifaceted and complex process in which MONUC is involved.