Conflict is political. It becomes violent when a party doesn’t think it can get what it wants through politics. What do parties want to get through violence? 1. attention (demonstrative); 2. a change in policy; 3. a change in policy makers. It’s unreasonable for a government to say it won’t negotiate under duress: they are negotiating because they are under duress. Violence is the “money” of rebels; they won’t give it up until they have their demands met at an acceptable level. If they are just trying to get attention, this level is usually low. If they are trying to get policy makers changed, it is high. Ceasefires can also be used when parties want to make a down payment on the process. You wouldn’t expect a ceasefire at the beginning of the process, but at the middle or end.

Negotiations happen when both parties are stalemated. But the sense of stalemate needs to continue through negotiations, or parties will go back to their other options. Sometimes, a return to violence is there to remind people of what would happen if negotiations fail. The parties need to keep threatening violence at a symbolic level, but not to return to open violence (the role of the mediator is to assure this doesn’t happen). Violence (sporadic) is more likely the closer you move toward an agreement, because the sides are trying to get the last little bit of advantage before an agreement is signed. It’s artificial to break off negotiations because violence has occurred; it can actually be a sign of sincerity. It’s usually the party who breaks the agreement who is suspect (they didn’t really want the agreement anyway).

A ceasefire is a conflict management tool. It means that the conflict continues politically, but not violently. Reducing violence pushes parties to get to the heart of the conflict and to resolution. There’s an expectation that a ceasefire will be followed by conflict resolution, and people are disappointed if that does not happen. There are exceptions; if there is no conceivable solution, a lasting ceasefire may result, because it will seem like a waste of resources to fight for something that is not feasible. A ceasefire is different from a temporary truce, which gives the parties down time (maybe to rearm).

Ceasefires can be defined as expedient soft measures introduced during violence as ways of stopping escalation and getting people back to the table. It’s the best option that can be grabbed, and usually put in place with some kind of outside pressure. It usually requires outside monitoring, but that rarely happens. From a tactical or strategic standpoint, it can be to a party’s advantage to take a break and gather strength. In general, ceasefires favor governments, as opposed to insurgents. But in failing or weak states, that gets turned around.

In the case of a non-transparent ceasefire, such as in Angola, it can help to build international legitimacy, while giving the parties time to build strength. Sudan was the opposite, and was a very exceptional case, as the ceasefire was put in place early. There was violence throughout, but it was kept small and didn’t destabilize the situation. There was a significant relaxation of the lines of conflict. The ceasefire had profound impact on negotiations. It was a way to stand down and stabilize. Another pattern in ceasefires is recurrent failure, such as Darfur. So, in Sudan there are completely opposite types of ceasefires in the same country. There can also be a frozen
conflict: some line in the conflict that is accepted over time, even though no formal agreements are made.

There are several factors that help determine whether a ceasefire will be successful or not, such as accountability/enforcement. How is it monitored? There is always some violence that a party can undertake and then deny accountability. Another factor is the coherence between the military and political command.