INDEPENDENT EVALUATION

OF

CENTRE FOR COMMON GROUND'S PROGRAMME

ANGOLA

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by

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ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

ADRA	Acção Angolano para o Desenvolvimento Rural
ALSSA	Associação Leonardo Sikufinde Shalom Angola
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCG	Centre for Common Ground
COIEPA	Comite Inter-Eclesial para a Paz em Angola
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DW	Development Workshop
EU	European Union
FAA	Forças Armadas Angolanas
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEC	Information, Education, Communication
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KAPB	Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices, Behaviours
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MINARS	Ministry of Social Welfare and Reintegration
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
OIM	International Organisation for Migration
PSI	Population Services International
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicators
PBT	Playback Theatre
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
Radio LAC	Radio Luanda Antena Comercial
RNA	Radio Nacional de Angola
TPA	Televisão Popular de Angola
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	União Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Contextual background to the evaluation

Angola is a country fractured by civil war, extreme inequities and failure of leadership. An almost unbroken forty years of national warfare has led to a seemingly intractable bi-polarisation of the state between the authoritarian governance of the MPLA and its constantly mobilised armed forces, (the second largest standing army in southern Africa), and the radical opposition of UNITA's guerrilla army destabilising vast areas of the rural interior. Implementation of constitution-related reforms that were fast-tracked through rudimentary parliamentary procedure during a partial peace in 1991-1992 has been held in abeyance by the government since reversion to all-out war in 1998. In their place, the country's historical precedent for enforcing stifling controls in the name of national security still holds sway. Unlimited powers are concentrated in the Presidency and through patronage and corruption a politically-favoured elite reaps much of the benefit from the vast revenue derived from the oil and diamond fields and associated businesses. Under these conditions, it remains unsure whether the deaths of Savimbi and his vice president Antonio Dembo will invigorate the course of peace and the stalled political and democratic agenda.

At the other end of the spectrum, despite the country's wealth of natural resources, 70 per cent of the population lives in absolute poverty, and average social, financial and environmental conditions are so poor that the UN's Human Development Index rates Angola 160th out of 174 countries. Displacement of up to four million people and accelerated urbanisation has over-burdened civic structures to a state of collapse and created a humanitarian caseload that absorbs the attention of international agencies to the detriment of longer term social development strategies. The social dislocation of displacement and the poverty of existence in the camps, swollen urban *bairros* and isolated, de-populated rural communities, has unravelled the traditional cohesion of social structures and support networks. In the resulting vacuum, fuelled by harsh competition for scant resources to protect survivalist livelihoods, the culture of war creates an environment where conflict and violence become a normal form of legitimised existence.

Within this dynamic mix of negative forces, the government's incremental success in militarily containing UNITA during the past two years has encouraged a partial relaxation of controls over an emerging civil society movement which has taken the opportunity to develop significant organisation and momentum on a broad front of peace-building initiative. As one element in that loosely coordinated action, the Centre for Common Ground is the only international NGO with the sole mandate to address conflict resolution and peace-building. CCG was previously independently evaluated in late 1999, covering the period since inception in 1996. In February-March 2002, CCG contracted a follow-up evaluation to assess the quality, effectiveness and impact of its programme at all targeted levels of the society and official hierarchy during the two years since January 2000.

2. The Centre for Common Ground's programme

CCG's declared organisational objective is:

To enable people from the grassroots to the leadership to resolve conflict and violence through non-adversarial means.

The programme strategy addresses conflict both in specific cases and in generic terms, aspiring to induce behaviour change in conflict prevention and resolution as the core building block to recovering a culture of peace among individuals, communities, institutions and the national society. The strategy selects its target groups based on criteria of their exposure to conditions of violent conflict, and its operational partners on their capability to positively influence the resolution of such conflict. In broad terms, these categories include:

3. Target Groups:

- 'The Leadership': the official hierarchy, mostly drawn from departments of law and order, security and state administration.

- Communities: rural, peri-urban and IDP camps, reached through traditional leaders (*sobas*) and mechanisms of social organisation and training of local leadership structures (*nucleos)* and women's groups (in IDP camps).

- The larger population (*o povo*): addressed through community training and media, and a programme component combining those two approaches in listening sessions and facilitated dialogues.

4. Partners:

- The media: with the emphasis on radio, through active collaboration with independent stations as well as the government-owned Radio Nacional de Angola; combined with supplementary but significant cooperation with national television and the full range of the press. The primary level of attention is to build skills, capacity and professional ethics among journalists. Editors and management are a secondary, but again significant, partner group.

- Civil Society: identifying critical points of leverage and tapping into opportunities on the broad organisational front of the emerging peace movement. Partners include: the Church (especially the coordinating ecumenical association, COIEPA; local, national and international NGOs with focus on social, democratic and human rights agenda; professional and cultural associations; women's associations; and theatre and music groups.

5. Extension methodologies:

The programme works with all the above groups through a matrix of inter-locking methodologies designed to achieve mutually reinforcing effect. These include:

- Radio soap operas with social and conflict resolution themes; and radio debates on issues of conflict, peace, human rights and other social and democratic issues.

- Television and video production of social documentaries presenting case studies of real-life conditions of existence with examples of organised efforts to address them.

- Training, with emphasis on journalists (radio, television and the press); communities (rural, peri-urban and IDP camps); *nucleos*; branches of the official hierarchy; and various civil society organisations and local NGOs.

- Theatre sketches, promoted through support and training to a number of national and local private drama groups acting out stories of social conflict and methods of resolution.

- Mediation, both directly through CCG's own intervention and through dissemination of skills and confidence to other representatives to tackle cases on their own behalf.

- Advocacy for process, through representation and discussion of conflict-related issues by CCG staff to government officials in positions of influence over social development and the peace process, and through various media presentations, including articles in the press and interviews on the radio and television.

6. The evaluation

The following evaluation report attempts to assess:
i). The relevance of the programme (including its selection of target groups and partners) to the declared goals.
ii). The quality of the programme content and delivery.
iii). Programme impact.

Recommendations are incorporated into relevant sections.

7. Summary comment

As Nick Howen footnotes in his recent invaluable report on peace-building and civil society in Angola: "The question to ask of all [..] projects in conflict-related areas has been described as: "Will/did the project foster or support sustainable structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence or continuation of violent conflict?" ".

The evaluators conclude, on the basis of observation and anecdotal evidence, that CCG's programme successfully advances progress at the frontiers of the peace process in Angola. Capitalising on a context of emerging opportunity and maximising its effect by acting at key points of leverage among the country's complex social and professional networks, the strategy gives evidence of adding value over and above existing contextual trends both at the level of component activities and at that of strategic outcomes and results. Although attribution is difficult and inexact, responses from participants during discussions with the evaluators indicated that where contextual conditions are improving the programme is positively contributing to the upturn in a way that is creating its own margin of local progress and gain. Furthermore, the evaluators heard a number of convincing cases where component activities have acted as reference upon which individuals and groups have based their practice and behaviour with success in specific situations of conflict, indicating that the programme is working effectively as both prevention and resolution when put to the critical test. In brief, the programme demonstrates itself to be ahead of the prevailing situation, and leading it in several ways and places, rather than just riding the curve.

8. Programme components

By component, the evaluators have the following summarised observations and recommendations:

8.1 Planning

Observations: CCG's planning is performed on an annual basis with mid-year reviews. The exercise is participatory, well-informed, analytical and maybe sufficient for the programme's present scope.

Recommendations: The programme's expansion curve now advocates for a more strategic and holistic planning process with a mid to longer term projection of at least three years. The planning exercise should embrace a more formalised analysis of relevant internal and external patterns and trends, needs to review and articulate scenario's, and define responsive programme objectives and detailed operational strategies.

8.2 Monitoring and evaluation

Observations: Currently, programme monitoring and evaluation is almost entirely based on feedback elicited from participants ('customer satisfaction') and anecdotal evidence, including some pre-post comparative findings in the form of case studies. This is valuable working data in its own right, and is being used appropriately to refine, modify or re-tool the programme design and planning during the course of implementation.

Recommendations: The existing, necessarily subjective, form of monitoring and evaluation should be complemented with a (light) indicator-based monitoring and evaluation plan, incorporated into the strategic plan, above.

8.3 Target groups

Observations: CCG has managed an ambitious expansion strategy in terms of enrolling increasing numbers and new levels of participant target groups over the past two years with success. The media and civil society elements of the programme have grown significantly. The integration of the vertical structure of professionals and authorities complements the horizontal coverage of the community-based activity in a new strategy that expands and deepens the overall scope of the programme. On the basis of their exposure to situations of conflict or their position to positively influence such situations, the evaluators endorse the selection of all current target groups.

Recommendations:
i. As part of the strategic planning review, CCG should identify and consider the inclusion of social groups which may exert the most negative influence on stability and peace in the foreseeable future; for example, the case of de-mobilised soldiers.
ii. Two other target groups which should be reviewed for possible inclusion are:
    a). the elderly, due to their traditional role in settling disputes;
    b). youth, whose numbers and energy will shape the society's future.

8.4 Needs assessment

Observations: CCG's conducts informal diagnostics among its target communities to select programme participants and adapt delivery methodologies. This is an appropriate approach and presumed by the evaluators to be effectively utilised in incrementally improving the relevance and content of the programme. On the other hand, holistic and participatory grassroots needs

assessment techniques have been a key focus of development programmes for many years, in particular the diagnostic techniques of PRA, and CCG has not yet explored such analytical tools.

Recommendations: It is recommended CCG investigate with an appropriate NGO whether and how PRA could be adapted to strengthen its analysis of conflict among its target communities for the purpose of improving targeting and programme response.

8.5 Linkages

Observations: CCG's achievements across the broad span of activity in enabling people to resolve conflict from the grassroots to the leadership have been impressive. Among 'the leadership', CCG is making great efforts to mould attitudes and build skills among the formal hierarchy to respond to issues of conflict in the community. At the community level, the representative aspect is addressed through *nucleos* members, and through training other community-based members with leadership roles. CCG aspires to bridge the middle ground between the community and higher leadership structures through their involvement of civil society organisations. In combining grassroots and leadership (including civil society entities) in the total schema, CCG plans to integrate bottom up and top down processes, encouraging positive interaction across the full range of community and institutional presence in the programme area.

CCG may be overlooking two crucial gaps in this plan. One is at the point of linkage between the official 'vertical' hierarchy and the horizontal coverage of the *nucleos*. The second is between the communities and their *nucleos* members. The *nucleos* members are thus at risk of being functionally isolated from their community constituency on one side and from the institutional service and support network on the other. This puts in question both their effectiveness and their sustainability.

Recommendations: CCG should investigate those critical junctures of 'demand and supply' in the social, professional and organisational 'map' of the programme. New strategies may need to be developed to close gaps and open up bottlenecks. The evaluators believe that CCG will need to include formation and mobilisation of community-based organisations (CBOs) in their plan as a grassroots client base. This has major implications on CCG's own organisational capacity and structure.

8.6 Partnerships

Observations: CCG has developed a number of important organisational alliances among Angola's civil society that directly bear upon the ultimate success of the programme in terms of coverage, sustainability and impact. Most significant are the operational links with the Church, in particular through the ecumenical association COIEPA; with various branches of the media; and with several international and national NGOs. Also on the partnership front, the CCG director's relations with donor representatives are excellent, providing an avenue to positively influence the national policy debate. This angle is strongly complemented by the director's and his senior staff's impressive access to high level government figures involved in managing affairs of state integrally related to the peace process.

CCG has successfully developed an initiative where smaller local NGOs are encouraged to apply for limited funding for projects addressing peace-building, conflict resolution or related areas. Although upscaling this activity could stretch CCG's administrative capacity and risk

diverting energy, still supporting incipient institutional growth and capacity among local NGOs is a crucial long term investment in decentralising civil society's reach. The level of funding CCG is currently providing is too low to serve much organisational or programme strengthening purpose.

Recommendations: CCG should consider developing closer partnerships with some agencies with whom they have already made contact. A three-way alliance between CCG (conflict resolution), the National Democratic Institute (democracy and governance) and World Learning (human rights) could create a strategic joint venture towards peace-building. Development Workshop's Peace-building Programme is another apparently compatible programme. CCG should also explore whether there might be benefits from closer linkages with any of the better development NGOs who are adopting rights-based programming, thereby closing the gap between their objectives and approaches and CCG's.

The evaluators recommend CCG consider gradually expanding the scope of their support to local NGOs, including increasing grant levels. This will again require careful planning and clear assignation of responsibilities and accountabilities throughout CCG's central and provincial structure.

8.7 Sustainability

Observations: In the current programme design, sustainability depends upon issues of organised capacity and linkages between the target groups and the partners. The former category includes: IDPs; the formal leadership hierarchy; *nucleos* (as the principal means to reach communities, although communities on a wider basis are also targeted through training activity); and the population at large as reached through the media programme. The major operational partners are the media (primarily journalists); international and national NGOs; and branches of civil society, most especially the church organisations. CCG's donors are also considered partners, especially for their influence at the policy level. Sustainability of some of those actors is still tenuous, especially among *nucleos* and the smaller NGOs, primarily due to their isolation from capacitating relationships.

Recommendations: As part of conceptually developing the three year strategy, the evaluators recommend CCG segregate elements, or build in new ones, within the larger groupings of the existing plan on the basis of estimated viability, risk and potential for creating mutually reinforcing effect that will contribute to the sustainability of each element independently as well as to the total system. Again, a more complex configuration of target groups and partners will need proportionately greater flexibility of approach by the programme, in turn raising again the capacity question of CCG as an operational organisation.

8.8 Coverage

Observations: The programme expansion plan depends on CCG's operational presence; the reach of the media broadcasts, primarily through radio; partnership with various civil society organisations; contact with the population at large through 'leadership' structures; and the *nucleos*. Media has the most extensive reach of those approaches. The other more organisational means, however committed their members may be and well trained through the

programme, will always be restricted in their scope by logistical and capacity issues in the testing conditions of the operational context.

Recommendations: Based on the programme's success to date, the evaluators believe CCG's strategic vision to expand the network of *nucleos* in new provinces is a correct one. However, CCG will need to decide between an ambitious expansion plan and a revision of its own staffing structure. If the post-Savimbi era brings stability to new provinces, CCG may well have to make this decision quite soon. This takes the subject back to the issue of strategic planning, as well as the need for scenario planning.

During the evaluation, some staff and training recipients suggested that increased coverage might be achieved through training of trainers at successive levels among various programme participants. The evaluators recommend against this plan, perceiving it to be an ineffective way to expand, with high investment costs, significant loss of quality control and ever more difficult to monitor and correct as the training becomes increasingly decentralised.

8.9 Extension methodologies

8.9.i Media: radio; television and video; and the press

The media component of CCG's programme is, in terms of scale, complexity and significance, effectively a programme in itself. It is achieving remarkably imaginative and high quality output and the high levels of productivity are achieving effective results. What makes the media strategy even more creditable is how successfully it is integrated into the training and advocacy strategies, thus reinforcing essential messages through the greater depth and persuasion of combining communication methodologies.

- **Radio**

Observations: The media component places emphasis upon radio due to its higher ownership levels among households than television and the limited circulation of newspapers. The sheer volume of activity in which CCG is involved in radio is impressive. The coverage, in one form or another, spans the whole country. The interventions include the development and transmission of radio debates and two soap opera series; training of radio journalists in conflict resolution journalism, human rights and in responsible and ethical reporting; creating improved access to radio among populations with low ownership due to their situation through 'listening groups' and distribution of wind-up radios; and using CCG-produced radio programmes as the basis for facilitated group dialogue sessions.

The evaluators were struck by how, unanimously, respondents believed the radio programmes are a powerfully effective means to change mentalities towards conflict. The two soap opera series are the most popular programme, in itself a valid indicator of success. Unsolicited, Radio LAC, a commercial station offered to air the complete first series for free – a clear sign of its listenership pull – and the series proved so popular in its first airing it has been re-run by RNA. The first series has been formally evaluated both by RNA and by the National Institute of Statistics, and the summary of findings is convincingly positive. Airing of the second soap opera series is ongoing, with the first episodes on air since late 2001. After completion in Luanda it will re-air in each provincial station. CCG is producing CD recordings of both series for distribution to other NGOs. According to all reports, the radio debates are also proving successful.

CCG's achievement with RNA warrants special mention. Until recently the profile of the RNA has been one of voluntary, rather than forced, conservatism, airing only government-approved programmes. Within the past two years restrictive internal controls have been gradually relaxing and the station has been opening up to significant external initiatives. Subjects of political sensitivity that would not have been countenanced by the government two years ago are now being cleared for public release by RNA editors. The evaluators feel sure that a significant part of this 'thaw' is due to CCG's initiative. Even if only partly true, this is a remarkable accomplishment.

CCG's plan to provide training to 16-17 years old in the Department of Journalism in one of Luanda's major high schools deserves real credits. Similarly, CCG is in discussion with Angola's only National School for Journalists (radio and the press) to include conflict resolution in the curriculum and content of practical seminars, supported by services of selected trainers from Radio LAC and Common Ground trainers from overseas as well from Angola. These initiatives deserve high praise.

- **Television and video**

Confirming the finding from the 1999 programme that questioned the cost effectiveness of the video production initiative, CCG's director in 2000 estimated that the benefits of using video as a means of dissemination were outweighed by the logistical difficulties of reaching suitable sized target audiences. (CCG shows the videos through the use of their own equipment at training venues in IDP camps as the introduction and prompt to facilitated group dialogue sessions). CCG thus decided not to begin a new video development project after its first series (*Luzes na Sombra)*. Meanwhile, the investment in the series retains value as it is being re-aired on TPA at a prime time slot. Although the use of the video programmes as a means to stimulate dialogue sessions has been cut back, still the series has been shown to more than a thousand people through five sessions.

- **The press**

In general, the press provides little opportunity for CCG to influence the larger environment of social tension. However, CCG has taken up the challenge to attempt to instil a sense of professional balance in journalistic reporting through its training programme. Given the current limitations of the medium (restricted circulation, high price) but need for its improvement, this appears to the evaluators to be the correct first step in what will probably be a limited strategy in the foreseeable future.

- **Training of the media**

Eight training sessions have taken place in four provinces, including 175 journalists from eight provinces, representing all branches of the media, both state and private. Trainers included journalists and experts in conflict resolution and human rights from Belgium, Greece and Burundi as well as Angolans. The opening occasion drew wide-ranging interest and was reported in more than one regional country as well as nationally. Several newspaper articles have since appeared on the subject of objective and ethical journalism which, while not making specific attribution to the training, must be more than coincedence. Again, CCG must be congratulated for this initiative.

Recommendations:

- **Radio**

Soap operas in some other countries maintain their sense of continuity by threading what are known as 'strands' into the episodic progression of the storyline, whereby while one 'strand' of

the story is closing, another is at its height, and a third is beginning. This may help to hold the audience from week to week more than each weekly episode being 'rounded off'.

In support of radio listening sessions and radio-based debates in IDP camps, wind-up radio sets have been distributed. The evaluators received one report that the radio's durability was doubtful, leading to a maintenance need. Some owners were over-winding and breaking mechanisms, or trying to adapt them to electricity and blowing the works. CCG should look into this. It is possible that they are not such a suitable technology as they may appear.

- **Television and video**

CCG should conduct an internal cost-benefit assessment, based on a rough estimate of relative costs (including time), and levels of attendance, interest, participation and expressed satisfaction among participants at the dialogue sessions compared to the radio dialogue sessions.

- **Training of the media**

CCG's provision of training to journalists will only ever be effective if the journalists are qualified and able in other ways to exercise those skills. Reported constraints include such factors as a centralised management style that denies the journalists opportunities to exercise initiative and decision-making flexibility, and institutional recruitment practices that select journalists on the basis of connections instead of talent. The evaluators discussed with CCG management whether they should think of providing technical assistance and training to RNA, or the other partner stations such as Radio LAC, in critical areas of middle management that might impact on quality of service. In the interest of maintaining focus, the evaluators agree the time is not right for CCG to consider undertaking such a new front in the near future. However, they think it should be kept in mind in case an opportunity might arise for an institutional strengthening approach to leverage improved performance at management and editorial levels as well as among journalists.

8.9.ii The wider training programme

Observations: Apart from its investment in the media component, CCG's principal approach to building awareness, techniques and skills in conflict resolution among its target groups is through training, including facilitated dialogues. Almost certainly, no other single activity absorbs so much of CCG's time, energy and resources as the training programme. The training programme is widely diverse in its content and is delivered over a huge area from Luanda's IDP camps to any province that CCG can effectively access. During the evaluation, various respondents made special mention of its practical value, reported that they had specifically used their newly learned skills in settling potentially violent disputes, and gave examples. The evaluators constantly heard from participants that they liked the training and would like more; and department heads asked for more coverage of their staff.

Recommendations: The end-effect of training is notoriously hard to evaluate, especially with any sense of cost-effectiveness. The monitoring and evaluation plan should explore means of more rigorously assessing the general effectiveness of the various training programmes and their different sub-components and activities.

8.9.iii Training: quality issues

Observations: The evaluators observed real strengths in the implementation of training. All the trainers demonstrated infectious commitment and interest in their facilitation. With consistent

upgrading of skills, the training programme will become excellent across its extensive coverage. There will always be skills differences among staff and Social Promoters, but there still exists a number of small points in basic training practice that could be improved. One example is hitting off an appropriate balance between the conceptual subject matter and the practical; and in particular presenting concepts in a form that less educated participants can comprehend and assimilate. This is partly a question of language (Portuguese versus local languages). It is however also a matter of reducing the number and complexity of the concepts to only the most essential, and simplifying the trainers' vocabulary to express and explain those points clearly. The evaluators believe this reduction process has not yet been taken far enough, and the training content still includes some unnecessarily intellectual concepts and the language for expressing those is sometimes still too sophisticated. The other major point regarding simplicity of presentation is to use the written word less in training.

CCG will always have a tough decision to make with its training programme regarding the best balance of 'depth versus breadth'. Several programmes are iterative, requiring successive sessions with the same participants. Estimating the correct interval between sessions is important to maintain momentum of interest and accumulative effect.

Recommendations: CCG should maintain consistent input into internal training of trainers, including contracting in from time to time carefully selected external trainers to work with the senior training staff to be sure their skills also continue to grow.

CCG should try to move away as much as possible from an assumption of literacy among their participants and develop a toolbox of non-literate techniques for most occasions.

CCG should plan training schedules with participants to decide the most viable schedules for the most consistent participation.

8.1.iv. Training materials

Observations: CCG has developed a range of well-researched and field-tested materials, including:

i. A conflict resolution trainer's manual with substantial content defining and explaining issues of conflict and methods for its resolution, with advice to the trainer how to impart this information and facilitate the sessions;

ii. An adapted version of the manual presenting the same content but in appropriately simplified form of short summary sentences and graphics;

iii. A comic book with graphics recounting a story of a displaced family with reference to the Deng guiding principles on internal displacement;

iv. A set of large graphic flip charts depicting the Deng principles, with one picture per principle.

The graphics convey clarity and persuasion. The posters are becoming in high demand from other agencies in a number of provinces, thus significantly expanding the outreach of CCG's programme through proxy. The evaluators congratulate CCG on their inventiveness and productivity with all these training materials.

CCG has had some contact with Mosaiko, a local NGO specialising in human rights which develops and produces communication materials, such as pamphlets, comic books and posters. The quality of these products is excellent.

Recommendations: The conflict resolution manual raises a misgiving with the evaluators whether some of the concepts are too sophisticated for trainers such as Social Promoters who are drawn from less educated backgrounds. This may incur a risk of inadequate comprehension of subject matter at all levels of participation in the training when it could be avoided by simplifying messages and editing conceptual content that is unnecessary. The evaluators recommend CCG move away from using the more theoretical training manual to common usage of the simplified version. However, if the more sophisticated manual remains in use, CCG should ensure that all trainers fully understand the concepts and can explain them in a way that that they will be internalised by less educated participants.

There appears to be an opportunity to collaborate more closely with Mosaiko in designing and producing training and communication materials: recommended CCG explore this

8.1.v. Theatre

Observations: CCG commissions a number of local theatre groups to portray illustrative scenes of conflict and violence combined with acting out simplified messages of how these situations may be resolved in non-adversarial ways. The sketches vary widely in quality depending on the group, but the groups draw audiences of dozens or hundreds of men, women and children from all sectors of the community to watch and applaud, achieving more effective coverage than any other programme component except radio. CCG currently provides some financial support to the groups, and training in conflict resolution techniques. As a complement to the training activity, the evaluators found the achievement of the theatre component to be entirely convincing and worthy of increased support.

Recommendations: Levels of CCG grant levels vary widely among the theatre groups. The evaluators would like to encourage CCG to increase levels of financial support, mostly needed for transport and props (clothes), and to assist with exposure to improved drama training and maybe cross-visits.

At some point a more methodical evaluation of the impact among audiences than this evaluation attempted would be advisable.

8.1.vi. Playback Theatre

Observations: Playback Theatre is a technique developed in the west as a means of psychotherapy for those who have been through traumatic experience. The evaluators have serious misgivings about CCG attempting this practice. Its effect in African social cultures is unknown, and experimentation could cause severe distress or psychological and social harm.

Recommendations: The evaluators strongly recommend against CCG pursuing Playback Theatre as a component activity, or straying further into areas of psychosocial health, perceiving it also to lie outside the organisation's area of expertise.

8.1.vii. Mediation

Observations: On occasion, CCG's Provincial Coordinators are drawn upon by communities to mediate to resolve local disputes. Such cases clear bottlenecks and bring credibility to CCG in their field of conflict resolution. Those whom the Coordinator works with on the case also learn

the techniques of mediation from the practical experience. The evaluators see examples of CCG using actual cases of mediation as the practical means of more widely disseminating mediation skills as a functional form of on the job training to reinforce the training programme component on mediation techniques. Its effectiveness can be judged to a certain extent by the successful outcome of the cases, the expressed appreciation of those who benefited from CCG's intervention, and the continuing demand for their mediation in otherwise irresolvable cases.

Recommendations: CCG needs first to be sure that they are not just being 'used' as a convenience for their skills and influence before every other avenue has been explored and tried by the relevant parties, and secondly that mediation skills are indeed being effectively decentralised away from CCG's 'ownership' to their client base. Otherwise, sustainable benefits from this programme component will be at stake when CCG finally leaves the area.

8,1.viii. Human rights

Observations: CCG is not a human rights organisation *per se*, but it perceives raising awareness of human rights to be an essential part of peace-building and enabling people to settle divisions and conflict issues without resorting to violence. CCG's primary message in its training regarding human rights is that rights have to be respected, and individuals must be able to demand respect for their rights by non-adversarial means.

Recommendations: The evaluators believe this approach to supporting human rights as a core element of conflict management without moving closer to becoming a more formal human rights organisation is entirely the correct balance.

8.1.ix. IEC strategy

Observations: The various components of CCG's extension strategies fit together and reinforce each other to incremental effect very successfully. CCG's dynamic, inventive and productive extension programme earns high credits. This achievement is all about what is termed in some programmes IEC (Information, Education, Communication).

Recommendations: CCG's positive experience in extension may have strategic commonalities with some other organisations which employ IEC strategies to tightly focussed (but still complex) goals. HIV/AIDS programmes may be especially relevant. PSI commonly develops sophisticated IEC strategies to support their social marketing approach. CCG may benefit from more cross-reference with such organisations employed in similar vein.

8.1.x. Advocacy

Observations: CCG does not advocate for special issues in the way of a lobby group; rather they advocate for processes towards resolving conflict. Special mention should be made of the formal and informal representation performed by CCG staff, especially in peace building fora, with opportunities made and taken to develop close working relations with senior government officials of influence. Equally impressive have been the comment articles that CCG has managed to have published in national newspapers on conflict resolution in Angola and CCG's work. Six features on CCG's work have been televised on TPA and dozens of radio interviews aired. This representation is leveraging consciousness at both the public and policy levels.

9. CCG structure

Observations: CCG's organisational structure is light, flexible, mobile and highly productive. The evaluators heard from several external sources, including international NGO directors and embassy reps, that CCG has been especially successful in attracting exceptionally high calibre staff to work for them. The evaluators' own observation from meeting a number of those staff is that comment is certainly true. The level of professionalism, enthusiasm, application and dedication among all members of the team is tremendous, and the depth of imaginative and analytically critical faculty available to CCG from the quality of its staff is a huge resource.

At the scale and level of intensity (which is impressive) with which the programme operates today, the evaluators believe the structure is adequate and the selection, performance and management of staff is ideally suited. The question remains whether the organisational capacity vested in such a light staffing structure will be able to carry an ambitious expansion plan.

Currently the areas of monitoring and evaluation and IEC are managed separately by different projects. Ultimately, especially when facing a period of programme expansion, while retaining the admirable process of cross-fertilisation between projects, the two major areas may benefit from a more holistically defined plan, formalised approach and specialised oversight.

CCG currently has a system of regular informal feedback as its means of individual staff development and the director conducts formal appraisal of all staff in December.

Recommendations: The evaluators do not propose that CCG adopt too many new internal structures and management tools too fast, any more than they recommend too rapid an expansion plan for the programme. However, they do recommend that the strategic plan should include detailed correlation between upgrading CCG's institutional and human resource development and the programme expansion with carefully planned and managed synchronicity in scheduling and implementation. CCG will almost certainly need to deepen its levels of management structure, create more formalised and specialised scopes of work for individual staff members, and deepen skills in critical management areas (as well as programme areas).
.
As part of increasing capacity, CCG should also consider whether to:
a. Add one or two key head office posts, in particular one to be assigned responsibility for monitoring and evaluation, and another to oversee the development and integration of IEC strategies;
b. Structure a senior management team;
c. Incorporate a more holistic and formalised staff performance management system.

Above all, CCG will need to decide to what extent it wishes to upscale its central and provincial staffing structures to implement an expanding programme, considering institutional costs of time, energy and resources of managing a larger, more complex human resource strategy.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Centre for Common Ground's programme in Angola addresses issues of conflict, violence and peace-building at all levels of national society. In an operational context characterised by radical flux, CCG has needed to adjust its programme to dynamically changing circumstances while retaining consistent long term vision and strategic direction. Soon after establishing its organisational presence and initiating programme activities in 1996, the reversion to all-out

warfare in 1998, as the period of quasi-peace between the MPLA and UNITA of the preceding four years fell apart, intensified CCG's previous priorities and added others. As the government has gradually attained the upper hand in the military conflict from late 1999, the situation, while remaining vulnerable, has become more positive. In particular, the government has steadily become more tolerant of civil society's participation in the national debate and peace-building process. Although the relaxation of a number of restrictions is not yet safeguarded by enforceable legislation and there have been setbacks that make the trend unpredictable, hitherto suppressed possibilities have opened up for broader involvement of those agencies whose objectives and capacities (and courage) qualify them to capture the new opportunities. CCG is the sole organisation in Angola with the specific mandate to target the crux of the country's predicament: a culture of violent conflict that has become embedded in the social and institutional fabric through the experience of forty years of national warfare. From early 2000, CCG has taken the initiative offered by the opportunity of a more supportive environment and striven to diversify and deepen its programme to expand its positive effect in the space provided. With the startling news of the death of Jonas Savimbi and his vice president Antonio Dembo in mid-February 2002, the situation may again be expected to shift and develop in ways that at the time of writing remain uncertain, requiring CCG to review plans and adapt to new changes.

CCG's first external evaluation was conducted in late 1999. The organisation intends to establish a regular sequence of such independent assessments of its performance, impact and relevance to conflict resolution in Angola. The purpose of the exercise is to maintain an impartial record of achievement and to provide rigorous and constructive identification of areas for adjustment or improvement or where opportunities may be better taken. Accordingly, from February 23 to March 9, 2002, CCG contracted two consultants to review and evaluate the programme for the two year period from January 2000. The evaluation scope of work is attached as Appendix 1.

2.0 METHODOLOGY

The evaluation scope of work declares CCG's principal goals to be as follows:

a. To move towards the overall objective of promoting a culture of peace in Angola.
b. To increase the acceptance and practice of conflict prevention and conflict resolution by Angolan individuals and institutions.
c. To bring Angolans from all walks of life together in peaceful collaboration and co-operation, around issues of common concern.
d. To build and strengthen the internal capacity of Angolan peace and conflict resolution organisations.

Core to the evaluation was an assessment of how appropriate these goals and the selected programme interventions are for building peace in the contemporary context of Angola. The evaluators retained this question in the front of their minds when meeting a diverse range of analysts, informants and programme participants throughout the two weeks of the consultancy, either specifically asking their opinion on the relevance of CCG's strategy and approach to the prevailing situation or indirectly deducing from discussions on related topics and observations of programme activities.

The scope of work defines the three main areas of enquiry to be:

a) How well the activities CCG has designed are impacting upon the above goals.
b) Whether CCG is conducting activities with the correct target groups.

c) How effectively the activities are being managed and implemented.

The evaluators addressed these questions through a wide number of informal individual and group interviews, and observation. The list of all those met and interviewed is attached as Appendix 2.

CCG has full time staff presence in Luanda, Kwanza Sul, Huila, Namib and Bengo provinces. The programme reaches several other provinces, including Benguela, Cabinda, Huambo and Cuando-Cubango among others, through occasional visits by Luanda staff, especially in providing training to *nucleos* and civil society organisations. The broadcasted radio programmes achieve national coverage. The evaluation itinerary was planned to include visits to Luanda, Kwanza Sul (Sumbe and Porto Amboim) and Namib. However, heavy rain while in Kwanza Sul caused the Namib visit to be cancelled. Observations on other provinces are therefore based on documents and discussions with staff.

The two evaluators worked together throughout the process, benefiting from the opportunity for continuous recapitulation and discussion of mutual observations and opinions. The evaluators wish however to make one cautionary comment. CCG is a conflict resolution, not a development, organisation. The evaluators recognise there to be essential differences between those two types of organisation, in approach, style and means of intervention as well as in philosophies (although these areas are rapidly closing as rights-based programming gathers steam among development NGOs). Both evaluators come primarily from a development background. We hope this may bring some fresh and alternative perspectives to CCG, and we may be able to suggest some tools from the development world that can be usefully adapted to CCG's business. However, it is no secret that development NGOs carry a lot of baggage with them: conceptual, analytical, managerial, organisational and, above all, in their obsessive pursuit of 'process' in all aspects of programme development and institutional management. We will do our best to avoid this trap, and keep our recommendations appropriately light and streamlined. But, reader, be aware!

Another important point is that one limitation to the following evaluation will be its subjectivity. Conflict resolution does not offer itself easily to monitoring and evaluation systems based upon hard data in the way technical or economic development projects might. While the final achievement of CCG's programme activities and organised processes should be transformation of attitudes, behavioural change and human development, this is notoriously hard to measure, especially in a domain as sensitively integral to social culture and human nature as conflict. The CCG programme has no formal baseline nor control group for comparative purposes, and it is unsure how appropriately such evaluation methods could be adapted to the subject of conflict resolution, and to what extent the results would justify the cost[1]. Thus for the most part the evaluation necessarily focuses upon matters of programme strategy, and otherwise assessment of impact at the activity level is anecdotal and mainly based upon 'customer satisfaction', being comments from those who have participated in the programme (and in some cases those who have not, to test how widely it is known). It is well understood that the majority of these responses will be biased towards the more positive. The evaluators made every effort to pose questions neutrally to avoid this, and probed for reasons and detail of why participants answered as they did. In the end, however, readers should be aware that even to be included in the CCG programme might be perceived by some participants to be somewhat flattering (to be noticed,

[1] The evaluators understand that Common Ground is establishing a central technical unit in their Washington DC office to assist the field programmes to develop monitoring and evaluation systems. This is a brave and creditable undertaking: strongly encouraged.

still more involved). In this case, these respondents are unlikely to give negatively critical feedback, especially in a professional culture (which Angola may be?) where training is too often conducted for training's sake, for its own self-justifying activity, with insufficient attention to quality and results.

The evaluators would like to express sincere gratitude to all those who gave up valuable time from their busy schedules to talk to us. This report depended on that feedback and advice. Thanks also to all CCG's donors, to whom the scope of work was copied before the evaluation, for their comments on that draft. Most of all, sincere thanks to Steve Utterwulghe and the entire CCG team who were endlessly patient in answering our many questions, providing excellent documentation and records (one of the real strengths of the programme), and arranging many meetings and complicated logistics. We well know it's hard work managing consultants; it stretches the patience. Well, if it did, it never showed – thank you!

3.0 FORMAT OF THE REPORT

The sections of the following report generally follow the major areas of enquiry outlined in the scope of work. The context is broadly presented to highlight some major factors that relate to the causes and effects of conflict in Angolan society. The sections covering CCG's programme are divided into the main categories of:

- Programme approaches, including media, civil society and the formal leadership hierarchy.
- Target groups and partnerships.
- Extension methodologies, including interventions and activities in media, training and dialogues, theatre, mediation and advocacy for process.
- Some organisational and management aspects that may bear upon the effectiveness of the programme, particularly regarding structural issues of managing growth.

Each section will include an outline of the situation as it is now, including major activities, achievements and other points of significance from the past two years of implementation experience; the evaluators' observations; and their recommendations. The overarching question of the programme's relevance to the context is touched upon in all sections.

4.0 THE CONTEXT[2]

Background to Angola's perennial conflict

Contemporary Angola is a country of stark dichotomies. The country abounds with mineral wealth and productive natural resources and yet the great majority of the population is compelled to compete in a harshly survivalist economy while the profits of national production accrue to a very slim stratum of the uppermost politically-connected elite. The World Bank reports that between 1995 and 1998 "the richest 10% of the population enjoy[ed] a 44% increase in wealth while the poorest 10% suffered a 59% decrease". Angola is the fourth largest exporter of high grade diamonds in the world and the second largest exporter of oil in sub-saharan Africa,

[2] Two recent publications that are essential reading for anyone wishing to understand the current context of Angola are: Tony Hodge's 'Angola From Afro-Stalinism To Petro-Diamond Capitalism' (African Issues series, 2001); and Nick Howen's 'Peace-Building and Civil Society in Angola: A Role For International Development Assistance' (DFID, 2001). This section is indebted to those two documents for data.

(providing more crude oil to the United States oil than Kuwait)[3], but only a fraction of that phenomenal bounty is invested in basic public services or infrastructure, which continue to rank among the worst in the world. The UN's Human Development Index (2000) ranks Angola 160th out of 174 countries. The IMF estimates 70 per cent of the population live in absolute poverty. A 1996 survey by the Angolan Institute of Statistics calculated that 60 per cent of urban households could not afford the minimum calorific intake[4]. The national population is the most urbanised in Africa[5] mostly sustaining livelihoods by buying and selling in the high risk environment of the informal sector, while only three per cent of the enormous agricultural potential of the vast interior is cultivated.

The great discrepancies between rich and poor have grown and consolidated over time through a history of radical polarisation between nationally powerful interest groups ruthlessly pursuing their respective goals. The colonial era set the precedent with its exclusively extractive policies and its failure to invest in any attempt at creating indigenous technical or managerial capacity, still less systems of governance or the fundaments of nation building, before the overnight exodus of the Portuguese in 1975. Even prior to the precipitate departure of the colonialists, the main contending nationalist parties, the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, were menacing each other for supremacy. Within a few brief months of independence, Angola was at war with itself. The country has been riven by civil war ever since, apart from brief periods of 'neither peace nor war' between 1991-1992 and 1994–1998. International intervention in the various forms of South African invasion opposed by Cuban military and technical support, and Eastern bloc provision of credit and military hardware countering destabilisation orchestrated by proxy by the United States and South Africa, added their own sustaining impetus to the long drawn out war years of the mid-1970's to the mid-1990's. As foreign geopolitical ambitions retrenched with the end of the Cold War and South Africa's transition to democracy and regional rapprochement, motivations of ideological or ethnic differences that initially fuelled the Angolan war have become superseded by the compulsive need of the two belligerent parties to retain or wrest control of the country's principal resource base: the fabulous wealth of the oil fields and, to a lesser extent, the diamond areas.

Today, the Angolan civil war is currently the longest lasting almost uninterrupted war in the world. The intractable competition for resource control between the two protagonist parties is – or was until only two weeks prior to the writing of this report - heavily personalised in its most senior leadership. The complete lack of trust between those leaders raises the stakes of the war's final outcome to 'winner takes all'. As the very few in the inner circle of the single leaders well understand that it is they who will acquire most of that 'all', the fate of the country's population in effect ultimately stands or falls on the moral stance of those individuals.

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[3] Apart from oil and diamonds, the country is rich in other minerals, has world class fishing stocks, natural gas supplies and hydroelectric potential.

[4] The contrasts between rich and poor are indirectly reflected in a number of other figures. Since the 1980's GNP per capita has dropped by about 75% while oil revenues to the government have increased by more than 200%. Annual inflation has maintained percentages in hundreds for more than ten years, peaking at 12,035% in July 1996. March 2000 figures indicated that the price of food had increased by 479% annualised and transport and communication by 1,078%. Fewer than a quarter of Angolans have access to basic health care and less than one third have access to safe water. The infant and maternal mortality rates are some of the highest in the world. (Howen).

[5] In 1960, 11 per cent of Angolans lived in urban areas; only 14 per cent in 1970, whereas by 1993 the urban population was estimated at 42.2 per cent and this is certain to have increased during the subsequent years of conflict. It is now assumed that over half the national population lives in urban areas,(Howen and Hodges).

This is a disenchanting prospect for the great majority of Angolans as, aside from the suffering and privation caused by the war, Angola has ever been a phenomenally rich country abusively mismanaged by a very small, tightly-knit oligarchy. These personal clients of the Presidency, known as 'the hundred families', function as a mutually protectionist political-commercial power elite. They live secure in the patronage of the President himself who exercises a concentration of power that bypasses any checks or balances of consultation or approval by the National Assembly or any individual post of high office such as a prime minister[6], and even foregoes endorsement of major decisions by his own governing party. Similarly, although UNITA's leadership has been compelled to decentralise due to the exigencies of operating as a parliamentary party - at least in token terms - as well as a guerrilla bush army operating across huge swathes of the country's land area, the militant opposition party has been held together through almost a quarter of a century's armed struggle by the figure and charismatic personality of one man, Jonas Savimbi.

'Savimbi morreu'

On Friday February 22, 2002, the Angolan government announced the death of Savimbi. He was reported to have been finally caught in an ambush deep in the bush of Moxico province. What was most notable in Luanda the night the news was made public and during the subsequent few days was how muted was the reaction among the Luanda population. A few celebratory shots in the air were to be heard the first evening; some street parties were observed in the *bairros* during the weekend; but for the most part there was no public display of strong feeling to mark what must have been regarded by most of the people of all classes as a momentous event. Life continued without even a hiccup of visible change: shops, bars and restaurants stayed open, people moved on the streets as before. People were to be seen reading the extraordinary news in the weekend newspapers, watching on television the re-played scenes of Savimbi's body laid out under a tree in the Moxico bush, and listening to the re-aired accounts of the military general who finally tracked him down. This lack of reaction may appear to be remarkable, given that Savimbi was recognised, by both sides, as the single-most intractable element in the promotion of the war. Due to sheer force of necessity (the average Angolan family has had to run away for its own survival at least once), Angolans of all classes are an exceptionally politically aware people who monitor and analyse changing events closely. Why then the appearance of almost consciously ignoring what foreigners may have expected to be the most significant event in Angolans' lives for many a long year?

One interpretation may be that the capital's population was holding its breath to see what may follow. Rumours were afield, (given some substance by reports at a 'think tank' meeting of diplomats mid week after Savimbi's reported death), that Savimbi's vice president Antonio Dembo and even his closest personal aide Paulo Gato, had also been killed, although they were leading separate armed columns at considerable distance from Savimbi himself[7]. The implications of this possibility to the country's future hiked the importance of the news still further. However, the atmosphere of the city felt far from one of a population waiting with baited breath. Rather, it was more conspicuous that life maintained its normal tenor. Speaking to Angolans, some even surprised themselves by their own lack of reaction, still less excitement, at what might be hoped to be a historic turning point in the war. In general, the analysis was one that indeed included a large element of uncertainty but mixed with the pragmatic understanding confirmed from long experience of flux that uncertainty in various radical forms is a consistent part of Angola's existence and will continue to be so despite even such influential events as the

[6] The President sacked the previous prime minister in 1996, since when the post has been vacant.

[7] At the time of writing this report (mid March), there is no further news of Gato. Denbo's death "from illness and hunger" was publicly confirmed by the government two weeks after the announcement of Savimbi's.

past week's. As such, although Savimbi's death was perceived as a 'spike' of high significance, the week in Luanda never assumed a profile any different to business as usual.

Post-Savimbi scenario's

Although different sources suggested widely different analyses of the situation and potential scenario's resulting from Savimbi's death, the short term outlook may be broadly categorised in three ways[8].

- ***The military scenario***

The government may choose to seize the advantage of UNITA's diminished leadership and forcefully pursue the military option to attempt to mop up resistance among its bush army once and for all. Some diplomats feel this is a viable course for the MPLA. They perceive UNITA's armed attacks to have become less frequent and effective over the past year. Since reverting to bush tactics in 1999 after failing to secure military advantage through more conventional warfare during the previous year, UNITA has been losing its financial means to re-supply with arms, ammunition and equipment under the gradually incremental effect of UN sanctions and more importantly since they have lost access to productive diamond fields. Transaction costs for their diamond trade has also risen as it has become steadily more dangerous for dealers' charter planes to enter the war zone and since diamond markets have become marginally more wary of buying illicitly exported stones. Economically the government carries the disproportionately greater advantage of its oil economy as the means to bankroll its war effort)[9].

Of equal strategic importance is the point that, for the first time ever in UNITA's pursuit of armed aggression as the means of opposition, UNITA can no longer depend on the support of neighbouring countries, in particular Zambia and the DRC, for escape routes and rear bases. It is reported that the MPLA are drawing upon the assistance of the Banyamalenge to close off the eastern and northern international borders, permitting themselves capacity in reserve to file into the UNITA's reduced operational area in the interior provinces of Moxico (where Savimbi's and Denbo's two columns were operative) and Malange, Kwanza Norte and Bengo where a widely dispersed third column of 1500 men under General Apolo is still active. The government will remember only too well that one of the main reasons why political negotiations foundered immediately after the 1992 elections was because UNITA retained the military capacity to revert to armed aggression when they lost at the polls. The MPLA may well wish to build on the remarkable success of removing the army's two primary leaders by eliminating the residual capacity of its armed forces and insisting upon an unconditional surrender before agreeing to re-open a political process.

- ***The political scenario***

Other analysts, while agreeing that the government may indeed take the above course, perceive it to be the worst possible option. They do not believe UNITA's military capacity is so seriously impaired by the loss of its leaders as the operational chain of command has been effectively

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[8] Again at the time of writing this report, the situation has moved on and FAA and UNITA generals are currently negotiating a conditional surrender of UNITA forces and cessation of hostilities as the first step towards establishing a military solution before opening political discussions (at least openly). As the situation may still go either way, the above scenario's are left in this report as they represent some of the analysis the very days after Savimbi's death and at least some of the projections may still prove relevant.

[9] The UN sanctions committee (UN, Dec 2000) estimated that UNITA had earned about $3 billion from diamond sales in the six years between 1993-1998 inclusive, (ie. about $500 million per year). Hodges estimates that UNITA's income has since dropped to about $200 million per year and that the government earns about $2 billion per year from oil, (Howen).

decentralised to its dispersed units for years. While recognising that for a while a continuing low intensity bush war is likely to be little more than an irritant, UNITA could still fight on for years in this way, incurring the risk to the MPLA that it may recoup organised capacity over time. Some observers perceive Savimbi's death to be a one-time opportunity with a very limited timeframe to restore the political process that was derailed by the return to war in 1998, and are seriously concerned that if the government pursues the military option the chance will be missed to coax UNITA to the negotiating table. Their fervent hope (and presumably advocacy) is that the government will call an immediate ceasefire and allow UNITA the dignity and space to re-open political dialogue. (Coincedentally, President dos Santos was on a scheduled visit to President Bush at the White House the very week after Savimbi's death, where Bush openly attempted to persuade dos Santos to adopt this course).

Even if the political scenario is allowed a positive opening, analysts are concerned that, with the death of Savimbi and Denbo and perhaps Gato, UNITA has been decapitated as a viable opposition, leaving the MPLA and particularly the President to do what they like with even less pressure to adopt the constitution-related reforms declared in 1992 but scarcely implemented in any form since. In the absence of Savimbi and Denbo, analysts are guessing who may step into the leadership vacuum. One candidate may be Abel Chivukuvuku, a former political adviser to Savimbi, who is now a Luanda-based UNITA member of parliament who has always avoided joining the UNITA splinter faction UNITA *renovada*, which retains little credibility with its original parent body due to the manner of their MPLA-coerced breakaway. There may also be other UNITA parliamentarians in the National Assembly who have remained with the party, keeping a low profile during its hardline years since the 1998 reversion to war, among whom figures of new stature may now step forward to participate in a recovered political and democratic agenda.

- ***The social scenario***

The third scenario is not mutually exclusive from those above, but includes serious social concerns attached to the political perspectives. For almost the entire period of its post-independence history in power, the MPLA has justified its autocratically controlling means of governance by the need for national security in the face of UNITA's armed aggression, expediently personified by the MPLA themselves in the figure of Savimbi. In this manner, the personality cult attached to Savimbi has been equally nurtured by the MPLA as well as UNITA, for opposing reasons. It may be no coincedence that not only is the Angolan civil war currently the longest lasting war in the world, but dos Santos is the longest lasting President in power in sub-Saharan Africa. The two continuities are linked inasmuch as the threat to the MPLA (and its members' privileges), represented by the President and the party as synonymous to the threat to the security and welfare of the country, has always been attributed to UNITA and Savimbi. However, on occasion, when the MPLA has lost popularity to the extent that it might be threatened by social upheaval, such as in August 1996 when annual inflation exceeded 12,000 per cent or when the war was being lost in 1999, the government has deflected attention from its own vulnerability by inciting righteous aggression through very organised means against selected minority groups. For this reason above all other, Luanda may have received the news of Savimbi's death - especially startling for being so completely unexpected - with concern. In the days that followed, the question was being asked privately among diplomats and Angolans whether the MPLA might replace the conveniently diversionary factor of Savimbi by looking to target a particular social, ethnic or economic group - or civil society - as a substitute scapegoat to divert criticism of the President and the party's record of governance. Related to this scenario is the understanding among the general population that the openly autocratic and arrogant

intolerance among the MPLA's formal and professional hierarchy towards UNITA followers is unconducive to chances of successful social reconciliation[10].

Characteristics of central and provincial government

Although the process of negotiations between the government and UNITA during 1991-1992 caused a number of democratic reforms and relaxation of authoritarian controls to be developed and even legislated, few were ever implemented and MPLA's vulnerability at the reversion to war from 1998 caused most to be over-ruled by fiat. Several of the totalitarian controls of the Portuguese era still remain active, especially in respect to the operations of the state security apparatus, and systems of high level governance are devoid of transparency, accountability and acceptance of criticism. Civil society organisations which investigate, protest or report on internal government matters that touch upon basic freedoms or rights do so at their peril.

In the provinces, the level of state control and fear of retribution is even more intense. Provincial Governors are appointed by the President and there exists no legislative framework to define limits to their powers. Due to no precedent of local democracy or decentralisation of systems of good governance, as well as their physical isolation from the centre caused by the war, their rule is personal and absolute. Party representation pervades all levels of state administration and reaches into communities through such positions as the community 'coordinators' who act as the *sobas'* deputies, the civil defence, the police, and often the *sobas* themselves. The effect is deliberately suppressive, stifling individual or organisational freedom of expression or any active initiative that is perceived by the authorities to threaten state security or control.

The culture of war

Forty years of almost incessant war on a national scale creates its own social culture of entrenched, endemic violence and conflict. In a country with an average life expectancy of 47 years[11] and with 45 per cent of the population under 15 years of age, most of the population has never known anything but a lifetime surrounded and touched by warfare. In the majority of cases, this contact with armed conflict has been only too direct. Some estimates of numbers of people displaced by the conflict amount to almost four million[12], a large proportion more than once. Hundreds of thousands of people have been killed or died from the effects of war. Flight to urban centres in search of physical security, especially to Luanda, has created rapidly swollen conglomerations with appallingly inadequate infrastructure and basic services such as housing, roads, water, sanitation and waste disposal, and minimal access to essential health and education facilities[13]. Among that vast humanitarian caseload, under the psychological and physical stress of displacement, under-nourishment, ill health, unemployment and impoverishment, the ties of social cohesion and traditional support networks overstretch, break down and part. In their place, conflict, provoked by over-crowding, frustration, fear and fierce competition for scare resources, becomes the coping strategy of necessity.

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[10] Symptomatically, printed on the national bank notes, under the portraits of the country's first president Agostinho Neto side by side with dos Santos, is the MPLA party motto: Victory is Certain. Although the slogan is a carry over from the clarion call of the 1960's liberation movement against the colonial regime, its import – and its attitude - persists as the driving, uncompromising persuasion of the party in power.

[11] UNICEF's estimate. The National Institute of Statistics estimates 42 years.

[12] Although the UN (1999) estimated approximately 1.4 million displace people, this figure excludes past IDPs who have become integrated into households and thus are no longer in IDP camps as part of the UN's operational caseload.

[13] The population of Luanda is currently estimated to be over four million, more than one third of the national population. The city's population is thought to have grown sixfold from the 480,613 recorded in the 1970 census; and has more than tripled in the 17 years since the last provincial census in 1983, which recorded a population of 927, 867, (Hodges)

In an environment where the experience of living with conflict and violence becomes the norm, other options for attaining physical or livelihood security become subsumed as unviable under the conditions, and even unknown by a second generation that grows up in a world which has demonstrated no other means of subsistence or self-protection. Conflict becomes legitimised as the only effective means of getting along, be it through the independent initiative of calculated crime as the only way to ensure an income, reactive force in the face of personal threat, or employment in the armed forces as an escape from lack of any alternative opportunity. Ultimately, violent conflict as the only known means of safeguarding individual or family survival attains the stature of its own justifying morality. Once the assumption of violent conflict as a way of life becomes engrained in the home, members of the family too easily turn it upon themselves in such ways as physical abuse and gender based violence. In this way, almost two generations of the experience of war has created its own contemporary tradition of violent practices and behaviours among Angolan society: violence has become intrinsic to the social culture.

Civil society

In the face of these contextual constraints, the most encouraging trend of the past two years has been the government's apparently increasing tolerance of a gathering groundswell among civil society organisations and actors. Although only recently emerging and still fragile in its institutional growth and far from being an organised movement, a growing number and diversity of groups are participating in the larger peace-building debate. The broad agenda includes efforts to break down the polarisation of the two major parties, recover forward direction with the stalled process of democratic reform, increase freedom of expression, and build essential bridges of representation by acting in the middle ground between the political-commercial elite and the *povo*. Foremost among the main players is the Church, in particular COIEPA (*Comite Inter-Eclesial para a Paz em Angola*) which has assumed the principal coordinating role for the broad front. Other important elements in the collective endeavour include non-government organisations, community-based organisations, professional associations, philanthropic, recreational and religious organisations, trade unions (especially the National Union of Teachers which has periodically organised strikes for better wages and payment of arrears) and journalists. Prominent examples of informal groups include the *Grupo Angolano de Reflexao para a Paz, Mulheres para a Paz e Desenvolvimento*, and *Congresso Pro Pace*. A few local NGOs are gradually gaining in organised capacity and influence, although new on the Angolan scene and only legalised after 1990. However, although local NGOs are numerous, they are still mostly relatively weak and their capacity too limited to substitute, except minimally and very locally, for collapsing social and civic structures. Only the larger UN and international NGO relief operations partly fill the vacuum in social services. Similarly, the contextual instability that undermines all spheres of national institutional development similarly constrains that of civil society, including a regional imbalance that concentrates their presence in the coastal provinces to the detriment of the interior.

5.0 CCG's PROGRAMME

5.1 Related to the operational context: issues of planning

CCG performs an annual planning meeting involving all their staff every January, with mid year reviews. The previous year is reviewed for successes and shortfalls in achievement, lessons learned and contextual implications are discussed, and the next year's plan outlined. The output

from the January 2002 meeting is attached as Appendix 3 as an example of such a plan. The process is consultative and consensual and well informed by the staff members' own experience and insights. From discussions with the staff, the evaluators believe the contextual analysis is well founded and forward-looking as the basis upon which each time the next phase of the programme is projected and developed. It is a light exercise, efficient in terms of time taken, valuable for being participatory and securing staff buy-in, and gives evidence of being both accurate and extensive in its consideration of key factors to determine annual planning.

The evaluators perceive the current means of planning to be appropriate and successful as far as it goes. However, CCG has no analysed or documented mid to long term projection of strategy. The evaluators believe CCG should go further than the annual planning process to attempt strategic planning of more holistic and longer term scope. Regular annual planning would then continue to be a sub-activity based on levels of achievement monitored against the longer term strategy.

The evaluators recommend CCG attempt a three year planning projection. The purpose will be for CCG to define as realistically as possible where it wants to be by the end of that period, and how it proposes to get there. This will require an intensified and more far ranging analysis of the prevailing context and trends. From this broad picture, scenario's reflecting possible directions the country may take should be projected and consideration given to how they may bear upon CCG and its conflict resolution mandate. External supporting and constraining factors of the operational environment should be defined and analysed, such as donor trends, CCG's comparative advantage vis-a-vis other agencies in similar fields, an analysis of the available partnership network and potential alliances, and the security environment. Internal organisational issues would include review of CCG's own institutional capacity and anticipating pressures such as changes of senior management or short term funding. These components need to be factored into the decision-making and development of the end-product, being a working plan which articulates, at the minimum: contextual features, trends and influences; objectives; strategic directions; and a broad implementation plan[14].

While CCG's 2002 annual plan meets that final description to some extent, it falls short in substantiation from wider and more detailed analysis and its twelve month projection is seen by the evaluators as too short term. The evaluators stress that the strategic planning process needs to be in itself carefully designed, planned and scheduled in order to achieve the best balance of invested time and energy for the optimum output. There is always a danger of the process becoming over-ambitious, counter-productively sucking up resources and getting bogged down. It is recommended CCG draw upon appropriately skilled external support and facilitation at

[14] The plan should include an assessment and mapping of types and levels of need for CCG's specialist services among the country's 18 provinces, as well as an estimation of operational viability, in order to plan the provincial sequence of the programme's roll out. In this respect, the evaluators questioned the apparent contradiction why CCG, with its specialisation in conflict resolution, had selected Namib province for its most recent expansion when Namib is the most stable province in the country, almost untouched by the war, and contains the third least number of IDPs (after Cunene and Cabinda). The reason given was that the culture of war has reached every province, none is exempt from conflict, most other provinces are currently too insecure to attempt operational presence, and the opportunity was offered by an invitation from the provincial Ministry of Family Affairs and Women to enter and attempt an innovative intervention that CCG believes could later be replicated in other provinces. The evaluators may argue that an agency mandated to address conflict resolution in a country riddled with violent conflict should as far as possible go where the conflict is worse rather than not so bad. However, equally important is the point that, if the justification for expansion into Namib is the value of the pilot opportunity, the strategic plan must include where and how the pilot experience may be replicated in areas of – preferably greater – need.

critical junctures to ensure momentum is maintained and to help force the product. Above all, participation and buy-in by CCG staff at all stages remain crucial to the success of the exercise.

5.2 Related to planning: issues of monitoring and evaluation (M&E)

Ultimately, CCG's programme endeavours to change social behaviour. By its very nature, this is a difficult area to measure in terms of impact, especially in terms of attribution to any one programme. The evaluators regret that they themselves are not especially qualified to recommend anything very specific to help in this respect. However, as a general recommendation, the evaluators do feel that it would be worth the investment for CCG to design an evaluation approach based upon other examples of Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice, Behaviour (KAPB) surveys. In this respect, apart from drawing upon Common Ground's own experience from other countries in designing M&E systems, there are some development organisations and private sector agencies which have made some headway in developing reasonably lightweight proxy indicator-based M&E systems (although admittedly usually to measure the uptake and adoption of quite specific products).

The social marketing agencies are generally ahead in this field of evaluation. While commercial companies would probably not divulge trade secrets (and their systems would probably be very costly to implement), CCG may be able to learn from and adapt systems from some non-profit organisations, especially those promoting health products and related behaviour changes in their usage. Specifically, the US, Washington-based NGO Population Services International (PSI), the world's principal purveyor of condoms, is currently developing its M&E plan for its new programme in Angola, including attempts to systemise its evaluation of change in sexual behaviour. There may turn out to be important similarities with CCG's area of interest in systems and methods to evaluate sensitive areas of social behaviour change. It is probable PSI/Angola will end up drawing heavily from their national programme in Mozambique, which is their best global example of KAPB evaluation. CCG could either go straight to source in DC or Maputo, or keep in touch with PSI/Luanda for the chance of beneficial collaboration.

CCG's monitoring of programme achievement is currently based on occasional and ad hoc feedback elicited from programme recipients by staff and Social Promoters. This is sometimes intensive; for example, one staff member recently spent four days with ALSSA in Huila monitoring their programme collaboration with CCG. Other initiatives are underway: the CCG team have begun this year to design quantitative and qualitative indicators for monitoring the IDP programme; the Provincial Coordinators submit monthly written reports to Luanda recording programme activities with interpretive comment. The evaluators assume these comments are indeed revealing, carefully analysed and put to good use by the programme. However, the evaluators believe the programme would benefit from a more systematic indicator-based approach to monitoring, integrally factored into the strategic plan. This should be standardised to allow comparison and cross-reference between provinces. In one or two cases, where the donor has required, project proposals have had a formal logframe, complete with some OVIs (objectively verifiable indicators). CCG might consider whether this tool might be functional for the purposes of monitoring and evaluation, as well as maybe for other purposes of implementation planning.

5.3 Related to planning: issues of balance and tension

As always, planning will involve compromise, but a large part of its importance is to decide where and how gain can be maximised to the programme's ultimate impact with least

opportunity cost. In particular, the evaluators identified seven main areas that CCG will need to seriously analyse to decide the best balance. In each case both sides of the equation could potentially either act as opposites or as mutually reinforcing 'like types': the purpose is to decide the most productive compromise. Consideration of management and resource aspects, as well as programme concepts, will need to be factored into that planning process.

1. Anchoring the programme through retaining a tight focus on conflict resolution as core business versus factoring in related, influencing subject areas (such as human rights, democratisation, good governance, social reconciliation or psychotherapy - all included in some of CCG's project proposals).

2. Similarly, retaining a limited number of activities and target groups versus building up a wide diversity of approaches to what is a broad problem.

3. Geographical expansion and increasing the number of new programme participants versus deepening capacity among existing participant structures, (breadth versus depth).

4. Addressing specific conflict cases ('hard issues', eg. land, gender-based violence, ethnicity) versus training in general techniques as the means to disseminate generic conflict resolution skills.

5. Observing the need to intellectually and conceptually define and analyse the nature and facets of conflict as the means to better understanding the subject area versus simplifying the issues for easier comprehension and assimilation by less educated audiences.

6. Observing the need to scale up the programme and its coverage ambitiously, given the scale of the national problem, versus retaining an awareness of CCG's organisational capacity constraints and the great advantages of retaining light, flexible, cost-efficient structures.

7. Developing operational partnerships with international NGOs, with the advantage of their greater capacity, versus strategic alliances with national NGOs, with their potential for ultimately more sustainable longevity.

All of these areas of consideration are touched on in the sections below.

6.0 PROGRAMME APPROACHES

The CCG programme in Angola is designed as a counter current to the contextual downward and inward spiral of violence. The organisation's defined goal is to enable people to resolve conflicts in non-adversarial ways from the grassroots to the present and future leadership, (CCG plan, 2002). In broadest terms, CCG categorises its approach as triple-pronged, being through media; capacity building of civil society; and instilling awareness and appropriate conflict resolution techniques among the government hierarchy. Although CCG occasionally tackles specific cases of conflict through its own direct intervention on a tactical basis, in particular through mediation by one of its own staff members, the strategic plan is to train and capacitate the programme's target groups in essential conflict resolution techniques and practices in order that they may be qualified and able to apply those skills to resolve various different cases of conflict on their own behalf. To this end, the programme identifies specific real-life causal

factors of conflict from the Angolan context, such as gender-based conflict in the home or land issues, but rather than the programme addressing each example of conflict as its own case, the issues are employed as reference to support the skills building in generic conflict resolution techniques and practical ways to settle differences and disputes through non-violent means[15].

6.1 Media

Common Ground has strong experience in several other countries in working with media as a primary means of leveraging conflict resolution and peace processes. Among its most prominent and acclaimed examples are the Talking Drum studio in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and Common Ground's Studio Ijambo in Burundi. From the outset of its presence and programme in Angola, CCG has drawn upon that organisational experience to develop its broad-based media strategy, working mostly with the national television station, Televisao Popular de Angola (TPA); the national government-owned radio station, Radio Nacional de Angola (RNA - the only station with national coverage); Radio Luanda Antena Comercial (Radio LAC – an independent station, although still receiving government subsidy); Radio Ecclesia, owned by the Catholic Church; and the Angolan daily, weekly and bi-weekly newspapers, both private and government-owned. Although television and the press present a number of opportunities considered to be worth the programme's investment for retaining a broad media strategy, Angola is primarily a radio culture[16]. In developing new programmes during the past two years, CCG has accordingly focussed its attention upon radio to capitalise on the greatest advantages.

6.2 Civil Society

CCG's main thrust into the field of civil society is through the formation and training of loose-knit networks, known as *nucleos*. In some cases, such as through ALSSA in Huila, CCG works with existing *nucleos;* and in some provinces CCG provides occasional training services to *nucleos* supported by other NGOs, such as Development Workshop's in Huambo. *Nucleos* are dispersed groups constituted of up to 15–20 members, who are selected by their own communities, generally one person from each community, to become their communities' principal representatives in the programme. Members are a diverse selection of volunteers including church leaders, police officers, local government officials, local NGO association representatives, journalists, human rights activists and teachers. While CCG's initial approach to the communities is necessarily conducted through the traditional and party leadership structure of the *sobas* and community 'coordinators', and continues to involve their participation and support to the programme throughout the period of organisational contact, the members of the *nucleos* are those whom the programme concentrates upon to develop their awareness and skills in the area of conflict resolution for their communities' benefit[17].

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[15] One analyst of the post-Savimbi situation was concerned that, if there is a cessation of hostilities and Angola begins a process of post conflict demobilisation and rehabilitation, issues of multi-ethnicity may surface that have been mostly subsumed during the bi-polarisation of the civil war. The evaluators recommend CCG should analyse this potential area of conflict and consider whether to factor it as a specific 'hard issue' into their strategic contingency plans for supporting the national process of social reconciliation and re-assimilation.

[16] Although only 33% of households (51% in urban areas; 22 in rural areas) were estimated to own radio's in 1996 (Hodges), many others have access to those owned by others. Only 9% of households own a television (1999, INE).

[17] Note: The evaluators recommend that *sobas* be *not* included in the *nucleos*, as is sometimes currently happening. Instead, they should be included in the target group of 'the leadership'. As one interviewee remarked: "*Sobas sao figuras de consenso mas nao sempre de competencia*". The satirical portrayal of *sobas* in all the theatre group skits also suggest the same ambiguity towards the traditional leaders: humorously poking fun at their aged traditionalism and yet respectful of their wisdom and arbitration.

The concept is that both the sustainability and self-replicability of the programme's effects are vested in the organised capacity of the *nucleos*. In the case of the rural provincial programmes where the programme covers sparse populations over large areas, the groups are very dispersed in location although they maintain permanent communication among themselves as far as logistical constraints permit. In the IDP camps where *nucleos* members are living in much closer proximity to each other, a higher degree of coordination exists. Also, in the IDP camps, CCG forms women's groups of up to 20. members, who similarly receive training in conflict resolution techniques. A certain amount of communication and spontaneous interaction occurs between the *nucleos* and the women's groups in addressing issues of mutual concern, and CCG is working to maximise opportunities to combine efforts and outputs.

CCG develops *nucleos* and women's groups both through the intervention of their own 'staff', being low numbers of Social Promoters selected from the local project area and employed on the programme part time with a small cash subsidy, and through the services of partnership organisations. Currently, such agencies include ALSSA in Huila and CCG is looking at the possibility of working with the Lutheran World Federation in Moxico. CCG's senior management has declared an intention (in some respects subject to advice from this evaluation) to expand coverage to new provinces, with the expansion strategy working through organisational partnership alliances rather than significantly increasing the number of CCG field staff.

6.3 The Official Hierarchy ('The Leadership')

CCG targets with selected training key government departments and agencies whose official role most bears upon areas of conflict. The formal 'leadership' hierarchy broadly divides into two categories, those whose official role is public law and order and the state and provincial administration. Such departments include various branches of state security, the police, the civil defence, central and provincial ministries and state administration, and related professional associations. The purpose of this training is to open up the subject and break down barriers and create linkages between the various vertical layers of the hierarchy in order that officials at all levels may ultimately be enabled to deal with issues of conflict at their own initiative without deferring responsibility or compromising themselves in the eyes of their superiors.

An important complementary role of CCG's senior staff is 'diplomatic' representation in raising and discussing issues pertaining to the broad area of conflict and the larger peace process to higher levels of the government structure. In the case of CCG's provincial presence, areas of consultation may include general explanation of CCG's role and objectives or matters of programme implementation, managed between the CCG Provincial Coordinator and senior members of the provincial administration. In Luanda, CCG's representation reaches very high places, through such formalised channels as participation in the potentially far-reaching National Assembly Commission on Peace and National Reconciliation, chaired by the MPLA Head of Information.

7.0 CCG's TARGET GROUPS

CCG's strategy is to target the sectors of society most exposed to violent conflict, and individuals and agents with the position and potential to positively influence conflictual and violent aspects of the social culture. The former group embraces the span of social structure at

all levels from individuals to families to communities to an attempted national coverage, province by province, through the programme's media interventions. Within that broad sweep, some specific groups are selected for being especially vulnerable to violence in their particular context, such as the internally displaced camp populations, with a special focus upon women. CCG addresses the case of conflict through the application of its own organisational resources and, in larger part, indirectly through partnership with a wide selection of officials from the formal government hierarchy; civil society organisations and members; and professionals and respected figures among community leadership structures. These partners should also be defined as specific target groups as they stand to benefit from CCG's programme collaboration and inputs as well as serving to leverage the broader effect of the conflict resolution programme.

The evaluators observed that CCG has managed an ambitious expansion strategy in terms of enrolling increasing numbers and new levels of participant target groups over the past two years with clear success. The media and civil society elements of the programme have grown significantly. The integration of the vertical structure of professionals and authorities complements the horizontal coverage of the community-based activity in a new strategy that greatly expands and deepens the overall scope of the programme. The essential criteria for selection – those most exposed and vulnerable to situations of conflict, and those in positions of most influence over situations of conflict – are clearly valid and well understood by CCG staff. From observations and discussions during the evaluation, as well as from personal background experience, the evaluators would endorse the selection of all CCG's current target groups.

The evaluators see it as important that CCG should include those target groups who may impact negatively on social stability as well as those whose position exerts positive influence. In discussion with various CCG staff on who else may be beneficial to include, or who the programme may be overlooking, demobilised soldiers were touched upon. Currently the numbers of ex-military who are passing through the formal process of demobilisation are so low, a couple of dozen or so at any one time, that it would not appear cost-effective to include them in the programme. The point was well made that for reasons of impact and management control the programme must retain focus and optimise the concentration of limited resources even while expanding its scope. For this reason, CCG had decided not to continue an innovative and successful component activity targeting children, funded by UNICEF in 2000, on grounds that there are numerous other agencies active in Angola whose mandate and traditional institutional experience to work with children and who could thus perform the service as well or better than CCG. However, one of the CCG staff who had himself fought in active military service, expressed his strong concern that one of the greatest barriers to the process of ultimately instilling widespread peace and stability will be the difficulty of re-assimilation of young ex-soldiers back into communities. The situation is well known from other countries where Common Ground operates, such as Burundi and Sierra Leone. Young males return from a closed way of life in which extreme violence, both random and institutionalised, is normal and rewarded, to a social environment where they will most likely be unoccupied and in many ways unaccepted by the community. Currently, CCG may reach such cases only incidentally through the programme's wider community level activity and the media component. The evaluators recommend this area of need warrants more specific investigation and planning[18].

One social group who may be found to have the potential to actively resolve conflicts are the elderly people. Although their influence may have been diminishing in latter years and

[18] If the post Savimbi era moves towards a peace process that involves disarmament and demobilisation, CCG would be well advised to be prepared. This will require early decision-making to what extent they wish to become involved in areas of support to resettlement, reinsertion, social reconciliation and personal readjustment – and how.

especially in societies that have been fractured by long periods of war, traditionally in many African countries the elder members of families and communities are respected as reservoirs of wisdom and are resorted to to exert authority and settle disputes in troubled times. CCG may wish to explore this possibility in Angola to see if the inclusion of the elderly as a specific target group in one pilot area may produce identifiably positive results[19].

At the other end of the spectrum, CCG might consider targeting youth, as the most numerous age bracket of the population and those who will most influence the future. The Development Workshop Peace-Building Programme targets youth, and may be able to offer some lessons learned. In discussions in Kwanza Sul, the chief of Porto Amboim's department of Culture, Youth and Sport, suggested CCG might effectively target schools, football teams, or musical groups. The Social Promoters suggested reaching the school children by targeting the teachers. The theatre groups suggested schools could be influenced by theatre. A Catholic Church representative considered the church is effective at reaching children and would be open to collaboration with CCG on that front. The evaluators recommend CCG seriously consider the potential for including youth as a specific target group and the most appropriate ways to enrol their participation in the programme.

7.1 Related to target groups: issues of needs assessment

CCG recognises that their core business of conflict resolution has many different aspects and dimensions. Equally, it was clear from the evaluators' conversations with all programme recipients, partners and CCG staff that conflict in its many and various forms is consciously perceived to be an integral negative feature to daily lives, ever simmering and surfacing in innumerable damaging, corrosive, distressing ways. Enabling people to address the general condition of conflict as well as individual cases so they may aspire to free themselves from the threat and fear of violent disputes and ultimately attain personal and communal peace of mind as well as situation is surely meeting a basic social and psychological need with much further economic and health ramifications.

The CCG staff are clearly fully aware of this significance, and show strong evidence through their dedicated attitude to their work of firmly believing in its importance. From the gamut of conflict, CCG identifies and targets some specific 'hard' issues that perennially risk causing violence, such as land issues or gender-based domestic aggression, and also enable people to tackle conflict generically by training in techniques and skills that may be applied to various situations, such as negotiation and mediation. Both the selection of particular types of conflict for inclusion in the programme, and the more general definition of conflict employed as a basis for the applied skills training, is based on diagnostic enquiry performed by CCG staff among the target groups and communities.

It is the evaluators' impression that the staff's knowledge and understanding of the prevalence and effect of the various kinds of conflict that exist among those groups was insightful and accurate. The diagnostic is based on dialogue between CCG staff and Social Promoters and members of those groups, an entirely appropriate and almost certainly effective means of analysis. Similarly, the IDP team performed an assessment of the most critical areas of conflict in the camps. However, it is still possible that there may be aspects or areas of conflict that may

[19] HelpAge International (HAI) is the only international NGO whose mandate is exclusively towards the elderly and aged. The organisation has a great deal of experience of working with the elderly in conflict zones and peace building programmes, and their experience is well documented. HAI are not present in Angola, but may be contacted in London through Adam Platt, Director of International Programmes, aplatt@helpage.org

be overlooked in the discussions. In some cases subjects of social sensitivity may not be openly expressed, or topics may be unconsciously subsumed as the conversation passes them by, or the dialogue may not include members of the group or community who have something important to say.

The evaluators suggest that CCG explores whether the process may benefit from some participatory needs assessment techniques commonly utilised by development programmes, such as tools selected from the broad experience of PRAs (Participatory Rural Appraisals, or Assessment), carefully adapted to the identification and analysis of conflict as the focus area of need. A number of development NGOs in Angola are qualified to demonstrate effective PRA techniques in rural and urban conditions. It is possible that other conflict-related NGOs may have already experimented with adapting PRA to become an effective diagnostic technique for segmenting their analysis of conflict, (although probably not yet in Angola). CCG should consult with some of the more creditable organisations to see if this is the case[20]. CCG might then develop what may be the first such initiative in Angola as an action research project to improve their own needs assessment and the wider understanding of the elements of conflict.

7.2 Related to target groups: issues of linkage

CCG's declared strategic objective is to enable people to resolve conflict from the grassroots to the present and future leadership. The level of achievement during the past two years in reaching members, agencies and departments of the formal hierarchy has been impressive. Similarly, through streamlining the Kwanza Sul staffing structure and taking special care to select a very strong Provincial Coordinator and six most impressive Social Promoters, the *nucleos* strategy is becoming steadily established at the community level in selected areas of that province. Although the evaluators did not manage to visit Namib, the staff report that the *nucleos* programme in that province is doing even better than Kwanza Sul in much less time (the Namib programme began in November 2001, Kwanza Sul in October 1999), and doors have been opened to various branches of the official hierarchy through CCG's close collaboration with the Ministries of Social Reintegration (MINARS) and Family Affairs and Women. It is clear to the evaluators that the sound conceptual logic of the broad strategy is being successfully translated into significant results on the ground.

In combining grassroots and leadership (including civil society entities) in the total schema, CCG plans to integrate bottom up and top down processes, encouraging positive interaction across the full range of community and institutional presence in the programme area. The ultimate success of this plan depends on some major assumptions, in particular whether the targeted individuals and agencies, however willing, are able to overcome various institutional, logistical and cultural barriers to permit them to practise what they have learned from the programme. For a number of reasons of recent history Angola retains exceptionally conservative institutional traditions in its public services and administration, and leadership at the community level is fraught with politicised, co-opted and 'planted' representation where opportunity for initiative is quelled by the tentacular reach of the political security apparatus. Under these rigid and unconducive conditions, CCG – and the evaluators – well understand that long termism is the name of the game and inducing change is necessarily a process of maintaining small advances through steady and strategic application.

[20] The London-based Conciliation Resources, (which is soon to enter Angola), may be one organisation worth trying. Another may be International Alert, also based in London.

Although CCG is fully aware of contextual constraints and is actively working through strong representation and an ever-expanding training programme to chisel away at critical bottlenecks, there may however remain to be identified and addressed some lacuna in the system. Specifically, the evaluators suggest that, in the 'map' of institutional and community target groups, CCG may be overlooking two crucial gaps. One is at the point of linkage between the official 'vertical' hierarchy of law and order and the horizontal coverage of the *nucleos*. The second, which is critically related to the first, is between the communities and their *nucleos* members.

The standard contemporary model for social development or democratisation strategies, especially among the growing trend for rights-based programming, is founded upon principles of demand and supply acting through representative and responsive structures. The demand side is mobilised from the grassroots community level through a process of social organisation that ensures inclusion of all sub-groups, including the marginalised, and attains reasonable consensus in identification and definition of community priorities. The next level of process is for selected representatives from the community to articulate those issues and needs to relevant public or private sector service providers (the supply side) and access appropriate response for a combined solution.

The parallel with CCG's strategy is clear. Among higher level structures, CCG is making great efforts to mould attitudes and build skills among the formal hierarchy to reach down and respond to issues of conflict in the community. At the community level, the representative aspect is primarily addressed through the function of the *nucleos* members, and through CCG's training of other community-based members with leadership roles, such as the civil defence, the 'coordinators' (MPLA community leaders) and the *sobas.* CCG aspires to bridge the middle ground between the community and higher leadership structures through their involvement of civil society organisations, such as the church, journalists, local and national NGOs and other associations. However, at the grassroots, CCG does not form community groups or facilitate social organisation of any more cohesive nature than the *nucleos*, which are a loose network of one member per community dispersed over large areas. Without the programme basis of community-based organisations (CBOs) there is little way of knowing how inclusive of all sectors of the community is the process of bottom-up representation. Similarly, without the programme inclusion of that crucial lowest level of the demand side, it remains unsure to what extent the community *nucleos* member is representing his 'constituency'. In short, there may exist a critical layer of disconnect running laterally throughout the programme's community strategy between the *nucleos* and the *povo* that introduces the possibility of seriously reduced effectiveness of the total plan.

This limitation is compounded if the *nucleos* members are unable to effectively represent their community needs upwards through the professional and social hierarchy to those agencies which might be expected to provide responsive support and assistance, such as the administration and divisions of law and order[21]. It is probable that this channel of communication is at best extremely tenuous due to logistical difficulties over large distances, (often complicated by insecurity), and the discouraging, disempowering culture of official authority with its governing precepts of preserving centralised control at all costs and with whom concepts of accountability to its client base are - literally - foreign. The *nucleos* members are thus at risk of being functionally isolated from their community constituency on one side and

[21] Commercial private sector service providers are out of the equation in rural Angola.

from the institutional service and support network on the other. This puts in question both their effectiveness and their sustainability.

Unfortunately the evaluators did not manage to meet members of a *nucleos* to investigate in detail these areas of possible weakness. However, in design, the capacity of the *nucleos*, as a mechanism for promoting social behavioural change, appears to be fragile, depending mostly on individual members' initiative with little support from the community organised through the programme[22] and with a raft of constraints stacked against them. The evaluators recommend that CCG investigate those critical junctures of the social, professional and organisational 'map' of the programme where the demand and supply stream may be extenuated or blocked. New strategies may need to be developed to close gaps and open up bottlenecks. This goes back again to the recommendation regarding strategic and holistic planning.

Above all, the evaluators believe that CCG will need to include formation and mobilisation of CBOs in their plan as the basic organisation of a necessary grassroots client base. This has major implications on CCG's own organisational capacity and structure.

8.0 PARTNERSHIPS

In addition to the participatory nature of its work with its target groups, which may be fairly termed partnerships, CCG has developed a number of important organisational alliances in the wider field of Angola's civil society that will surely directly bear upon the ultimate success of the programme in terms of coverage, sustainability and impact. Most significant are the operational links with the Church, as the primary leader of the national peace-building process, in particular through the ecumenical association COIEPA; with various branches of the media, including the national television and radio stations, private radio channels, and the national press; and with several international and national NGOs. Also on the partnership front, the CCG director's personal relations with the organisations' donor representatives are clearly excellent, providing an avenue for CCG to positively influence the national policy debate, an opportunity which the director evidently capitalises upon. This angle is strongly complemented by the director's and his senior staff's impressive and oft-availed access to a considerable number of high level government figures involved in managing affairs of state integrally related to the peace process.

During recent years, the peace process in Angola has been steadily gathering a broad front of increasingly organised representation and actively applied programming. Invested agencies range from such sharp-edged investigative lobby groups as Global Witness, to UN human rights agencies and foreign and Angolan rights-based groups, to development NGOs which include in their brief informed advocacy at various levels and technical projects tailored to encourage inclusivity and 'space' conducive to social reconciliation. CCG, however, is the only NGO in Angola, international or national, exclusively dedicated to addressing conflict resolution as its sole mandate. One great advantage of that degree of specialised focus is that it clearly defines CCG's identity and establishes their profile within the wider operational field of national peace-building. The clarity of that standpoint also permits CCG to accurately identify which elements of other organisations' programmes most closely relate to their own objectives and thus to successfully distinguish, when judging the potential value of new partnerships, between the 'nice to do' and 'must do', a distinction many NGOs too often fail to make.

[22] Although the programme's community level training does indeed act to complement the *nucleos* strategy.

In concept, successful organisational partnerships bring with them four main inter-related advantages: increased programme coverage, sustainability and (ultimately) cost-effectiveness, as well as the opportunity to build in mutually reinforcing elements from different programmes to diversify the approach and the effect while still retaining focus upon the strategic goal. In this respect, the evaluators recommend CCG consider developing closer partnerships with some agencies with whom they have already brushed sleeves but for whatever reason have not yet taken it further. In particular, a three-way alliance between CCG with its conflict resolution mandate, the National Democratic Institute with its democracy and local governance brief, and World Learning with its specialisation in human rights could create a strongly inter-related strategic joint venture towards peace-building. There may also be other appropriate human-rights organisations in Angola with whom partnership would further complement the combined approach.

Separately, Development Workshop has been coordinating the Angola Peace-building Programme since 2000. This programme has almost identical objectives as CCG's, employs several of the same methodological approaches, and collaborates with many of the same partners. The evaluators perceive CCG and DW's programmes may be travelling in parallel to the same ends, with loss of opportunity to both en route. More broadly, while recognising that CCG is a conflict resolution organisation, not a development organisation, many of the better development NGOs are increasingly adopting rights-based programming, significantly closing the gap between their objectives and approaches and CCG's. Although the evaluators do not advocate coordination for its own sake unless there are mutual programme advantages and efficiencies to be gained from it, they do recommend that CCG explore more closely whether there might be benefits from closer linkages with these various organisations.

CCG has successfully developed an initiative where smaller local NGOs are encouraged to submit proposals for limited funding, to a maximum of $500, for projects addressing peace-building, conflict resolution or related areas. (Although allocated funds have been normally limited to $100-200, some NGOs with demonstrated credibility have received as much as $250, such as ACI). The discipline required for the application process in itself plays an institutional strengthening role. Funds are mostly used for such purposes as transport or material procurement for training events. Sub-granting is a notoriously time-consuming and risky business, requiring close vetting of the quality and accountability of partners' programmes. To upscale this activity could stretch CCG's administrative capacity and risk diverting energy. However, as CCG recognises, supporting incipient institutional growth and capacity among local NGOs is a crucial long term investment in decentralising civil society's reach. The level of funding CCG is currently providing is probably too low to serve much organisational or programme strengthening purpose. The evaluators recommend CCG consider gradually expanding the scope of this component activity, including increasing grant levels. This will again require careful planning and clear assignation of responsibilities and accountabilities throughout CCG's central and provincial structure[23].

8.1 Related to target groups and partnerships: issues of sustainability

As outlined above, CCG's current programme includes four main target groups: IDPs; the formal leadership hierarchy; *nucleos* (as the principal means to reach communities, although

[23] ADRA have experience that might help CCG in this initiative. ADRA in four provinces extends sub-grants to local NGOs and associations to a maximum of $2000, accounted for by the ADRA provincial office to their Luanda head office.

communities on a wider basis are also targeted through training activity); and the population at large as reached through the media programme. The major operational partners are the media; international and national NGOs; and branches of civil society, most especially the church organisations. CCG's donors should also be considered partners, especially for their influence at the policy level. Figure 1 presents a simplified schema as this plan stands today. As discussed above, sustainability of some of those actors is tenuous, especially among *nucleos* and the smaller NGOs, primarily due to their isolation from capacitating relationships.

As part of conceptually developing the three year strategy, the evaluators recommend CCG segregate elements, or build in new ones, within the larger groupings of the existing plan on the basis of estimated viability, risk and potential for creating mutually reinforcing effect that will contribute to the sustainability of each element independently as well as to the total system. For example, as recommended above, the current emphasis on *nucleos* as the primary 'institutionalised' means to reach the communities needs shoring up with the addition of an organised constituency base through the formation of CBOs and stronger access and linkages to the service provider network, including the formal leadership. CCG's strategy towards the leadership itself, in the interests of reducing its aloof distance from the communities and their representative *nucleos* members, may benefit from a more consciously divided approach between addressing the less formal professional associations and chipping away at the hard rock of officialdom. For example, the Kwanza Sul programme has targeted the women's police association as well as the official police departments. In such cases, the programme content and means of communication may need to be adapted for the different tenor of the group, although in fact they may even be the same people as participate in the programme at other occasions in their more formal professional capacity. Partnership with national NGOs always constitutes a risk as well as a potential investment for sustainability and expanded coverage. The plan should be divided between those with proven capacity and capability, such as ADRA and ALSSA, and the smaller ones which may turn out to be worth backing for the programme's larger benefit but will require more caution and probably support. Partnerships with some international NGOs will also need to be separated out in the plan on the basis of potential added value to the programme.

Figure 2 presents a revised systems chart to reflect some of these sub-divisions and the linkages that need to be developed and strengthened. It is most important to note that the more complex configuration of target groups and partners will need proportionately greater flexibility of approach by the programme, in turn raising again the capacity question of CCG as an operational organisation.

8.2 Related to partnerships and target groups: issues of coverage

CCG's declared institutional strategy is to keep its staffing structure light for reasons of management control and cost-efficiency. In the provinces, the only regular CCG staffer on the central payroll is the Provincial Coordinator. The interface with the participant target groups is primarily managed through Social Promoters, two per district, with the attempt to have equal numbers men and women, who are members of the local community and draw a minimal monthly stipend from CCG. The provincial programmes function with a high degree of delegated independence from the Luanda head office, including decision-making autonomy and self-accountability. In consultation with the Provincial Coordinators, technical assistance, staff training, monitoring and management oversight is provided by relevant members of the Luanda team, who are regularly very mobile. The overall management principle is to decentralise organisational capacity to the provinces and maintain appropriate levels of support. The evaluators observed the decentralisation to be working effectively in Kwanza Sul, and

discussions with the Social Promoters and Provincial Coordinator confirmed that they were satisfied with the level of coordination and support they were receiving from their colleagues, (consolidated in the Coordinator's case by his spending one week each month in Luanda). The evaluators believe from discussions with Luanda staff that management in Namib province is operating equally productively.

Beyond the Social Promoters, the programme expansion plan depends on the reach of the media broadcasts, primarily through radio; partnerships with various civil society organisations; the contact with the population at large through the 'leadership' structures; and the *nucleos*. In terms of coverage, media, as will be discussed below, albeit constrained by limited radio and television ownership among private households and technical radio transmission and receiving issues, surely has the most extensive reach of those four approaches. The other three more organisational means, however committed their members may be and well trained through the programme, will always be restricted in their scope by logistical and capacity issues in the very testing conditions of the operational context.

CCG's senior management informed the evaluators that their long term vision is to expand the programme to include increasing numbers of provinces as security permits, replicating the success of the pilot experience from the current three provinces, with a Provincial Coordinator, a team of Social Promoters and a network of *nucleos* in each new province. CCG declares they do not intend to significantly upscale their staffing structure ("like Development Workshop or CARE") to manage this expansion, but to achieve the increased coverage through partnerships with dependable NGOs, as proven effective with ALSSA and ADRA[24].

The evaluators have to comment that, while of course there should always be a creative tension between an organisational vision and the current situation, the discrepancy in this case is marked. Community *nucleos* will never easily self-replicate; their expanded coverage will require significant organisational application. Given the conservative and isolationist professional culture of the leadership hierarchy, their members will not naturally reach out to support communities in innovative ways without considerable external investment over time in inducing changes in personal and institutional behaviour. National and local NGOs are thin on the ground in Angola and generally of fragile organisational capacity, and in the majority of cases their compatibility of philosophy and approach may be questionable. Partnerships with international NGOs may be more productive due to their greater capacity, but managing such joint ventures is always a handful. To increase effectiveness in any one of these strategic relationships will demand considerable resource input; to attempt all at the same time as a combined front, although desirable for reasons of increased impact, will require significantly (although not proportionately) more.

Based on the significant levels of the programme's success to date, the evaluators believe the declared strategic operational vision to expand the network of *nucleos* in new provinces is a correct one (as one among others). However, issues of how to scale up to such coverage are as yet far from answered (and maybe, it must be remarked, still insufficiently asked among CCG staff). It is the evaluators' perception that CCG will need to decide between a limited expansion plan or a change of its own organisational strategy in respect to its staffing structure. If the post-Savimbi era brings stability to new provinces, CCG may well have to make this decision quite

[24] The week after the evaluation the CCG director was off to Moxico province to discuss partnership opportunities with Lutheran World Federation in that province.

soon. This takes the subject back to the issue of strategic planning, as well as the need for shorter term scenario planning[25].

9.0 EXTENSION METHODOLOGIES

9.1 Media

The media component of CCG's programme is, in terms of scale, complexity and significance, effectively a programme in itself. It is achieving remarkably imaginative and high quality output and, the evaluators believe, the high levels of productivity are achieving very effective results, (probably under-estimated in this report due to inadequate time and means of evaluation during the two weeks of the consultancy). What makes the media strategy even more creditable is that in fact it is *not* its own programme, but is very successfully integrated into the training and advocacy strategies, thus reinforcing essential messages through the greater depth and persuasion of combining communication methodologies.

- ***Television and video***

Prior to 2000, CCG independently produced a 12-part documentary series called *Luzes na Sombra,* dealing with conflict and human rights issues. Each 30 minute programme depicts a real-life scene focussing on selected representative social groups who are especially exposed to conditions of violent conflict, such as demobilised soldiers, street children or women in the home and IDP camps, and presents the work of organisations and individuals who are tackling such cases of hard reality and addressing the larger issues of social services, reconciliation and support to re-assimilation of marginalised groups. The series has been aired on the national government-owned Televisao Popular de Angola (TPA), and on the Portuguese Radio and Television in Africa (RTPA). In addition to this coverage, CCG show the videos through the use of their own equipment at training venues in IDP camps as the introduction and prompt to facilitated group dialogue sessions.

The 1999 evaluation of the CCG programme questioned the cost effectiveness of the video production initiative. In 2000, the CCG's new national director also assessed that the benefits of employing video as a means of dissemination were outweighed by the logistical difficulties of displaying the video to suitable sized target audiences. Furthermore, it is estimated that only nine per cent of households own a television set, and those would almost exclusively be richer families. In the interests of focussing energy and limited resources on programme interventions that reach the greatest number of people among the identified target groups, CCG decided not to begin a new video development project after *Luzes na Sombra*. Meanwhile, the investment in the series retains value as it is being re-aired on TPA at a prime time slot. Although the use of the video programmes as a means to stimulate dialogue sessions has been cut back, still the series has been shown to more than a thousand people through five sessions. The evaluators

[25] On more than one occasion, CCG Social Promoters and training recipients suggested that increased coverage could be achieved through training of trainers at successive levels among *nucleos* members and other civil society participants in the programme. The evaluators suggest that this is unlikely to be an effective way to go, with high investment costs, significant loss of quality control and ever more difficult to monitor and correct as the training becomes increasingly decentralised.

were unable to assess the impact or cost-benefit of this combination of visual and discussion methodologies. Instead, they recommend CCG conduct their own necessarily rather impressionistic evaluation based on a rough estimate of relative costs (including time), and levels of attendance, interest, participation and expressed satisfaction among participants at the dialogue sessions compared to the radio dialogue sessions.

- ***Radio***

The sheer volume of activity in which CCG is involved in radio is impressive. As always, these activities are well documented, and the record, report by report, accumulates to a tremendous combined output. The coverage, in one form or another, spans the whole country. The interventions include the development and transmission of radio debates and two soap opera series through as many as eight different radio stations; training of radio journalists in human rights and in responsible and ethical reporting, including neutrality and balance in sensitive conflict environments; creating improved access to radio among populations with low ownership due to their situation, such as IDPs, through the organisation of listening groups and distribution of wind-up radios; and using CCG-produced radio programmes as the basis for facilitated group dialogue sessions.

In terms of the various interventions, the evaluators were unable to make a detailed investigation of impact but it was striking how every enquiry, whether with journalists and trainers from the three main partner radio stations, with donors (the Swiss, the Dutch, the British and UNHCR), with random listeners to the soap operas and with participants among the listening groups and dialogue sessions, produced a positive response. Unanimously, respondents believed the radio programmes are a powerfully effective means to change mentalities towards conflict.

The two soap opera series are undoubtedly the most popular programme, probably in itself a valid indicator of their success. Their production is appropriately rooted in Angolan culture through a design process under the auspices of a project advisory board with membership representing a broad spectrum of civil society, professional associations and government departments. Dialogue was created by a nationally renowned professional scriptwriter and recorded with the voices of actors from the national drama group Mulemba wa Mwenho. The 30 fifteen-minute programmes of the first series, *Vozes que Falam*, were aired by RNA from June 2000. Unsolicited, Radio LAC, a commercial station offered to air the complete series for free – a clear sign of their listenership pull. The episodes depict the story of one extended family, the Benzas, composed of two daughters and two sons, who are displaced from Moxico province. In an educational and entertaining way the episodes deal with such issues as sexual violence, child labour, prostitution, sexual education, unemployment, road accidents and domestic violence. Information on skills and practices to resolve conflicts are woven into the storyline. The series proved so popular in its first airing, it has been re-run by RNA. Meanwhile CCG is developing the second series, a 20-part series called *Coisas de Nossa Gente*, with the first episodes on air since late 2001. After completion in Luanda it will re-air in each provincial station. CCG is producing CD recordings of both soap opera series for distribution to other NGOs.

Vozes que falam has been formally evaluated both by RNA (May 2001) and by National Institute of Statistics (February 2002). The summary of findings from the INE evaluation is attached as Appendix 4. They are convincingly positive. The evaluators only have one

recommendation to offer on the soap opera series, being a suggestion from the British donor. Generally in other countries soaps maintain their sense of continuity by threading what are known as 'strands' into the episodic progression of the storyline, whereby while one 'strand' of the family's story is closing, another is at its height, and a third is beginning. This may help to hold the audience from week to week more than each weekly episode being 'rounded off'.
According to all reports, the radio debates are also proving successful. Twenty debates, of 30 minutes to one hour each, covering a wide range of social subjects and including participants from a diverse range of Angolan culture and society have been broadcast in six provinces the length of the country through RNA and independent stations. The debates include call-in's from the public audience. Despite regular difficulties with telephones, the debates elicit a significant response. Although the evaluators did not manage to speak to public members of the audience, the considered opinions of interviewed radio professionals from Radio LAC and Radio Ecclesia strongly suggested that the debates are playing an important functional part in pushing the envelope with freedom of expression and helping to create a more open cultural attitude towards overcoming tensions in society due to divisions, polarisation of positions and conflict. The evaluators are happy to hear CCG will continue their collaboration with Radio Ecclesia, considered to be the most trusted radio station in the country for its neutrality, with a second airing of the 20-part *Vozes do Jango* programme, specifically designed to give IDPs the power of a 'voice'.

Radio listening sessions and radio-based debates have been facilitated in communities and eight IDP camps. In support of this activity, 1000 wind-up radio sets have been distributed to allow more than 5000 people to listen to the soap opera and other radio programmes. The evaluators received one report that the radio's durability was doubtful, leading to a maintenance need. Some owners were over-winding and breaking mechanisms, or trying to adapt them to electricity and blowing the works. CCG should look into this. It is possible that they are not such a suitable technology as they may appear. Unfortunately the one radio-based dialogue session that the evaluators were to observe was rained off. As one form of participatory training though, the design holds clear potential, even if the evaluators cannot comment on the implementation first-hand. (It would be tempting to say that the high level of attendance before interruption by the rainstorm indicated high levels of interest. However, the very low level of any alternative interest in the IDP camps and the provision of a free lunch distorts that assumption).

CCG's achievement with RNA warrants special mention. Until recently the profile of the RNA, the only station with national coverage (or anything close), has been one of voluntary, rather than forced, conservativism, devoid of imagination beyond the airing of standard government-approved programmes and messages. Lack of innovation has been justified on grounds of preserving national security and stability. Senior management is politically appointed and careful to toe the line. Within the past one to two years, however, restrictive internal controls have been gradually relaxing and the station has been opening up to significant external initiatives. Subjects of political sensitivity that would not have been countenanced by the government two years ago are now being cleared for public release by RNA editors. Speaking to three members of RNA (a deputy, the chief of information and a journalist), the evaluators feel sure that a significant part of this 'thaw' is due to CCG's initiative. Even if only partly true, this is a remarkable accomplishment.

The British Embassy has been in close consultation with the senior echelons of RNA, trying to shift the policy agenda in respect to permitting and safeguarding greater freedom of expression under the umbrella of the draft Press Law. The British government is offering to provide

services from the BBC at senior management and technical levels; an initiative that the Embassy hopes may come to fruition relatively soon. The Embassy judges CCG's activity and interaction with the mid to lower structures to be an important complement to this higher level investment. The evaluators discussed with CCG management whether they should think of providing technical assistance and training to RNA, or the other partner stations such as Radio LAC, in critical areas of middle management that might impact on the quality of their service. CCG's provision of training to journalists will only ever be effective if the journalists are qualified and able in other ways to exercise those skills. Reported constraints include factors such as a centralised management style that denies the journalists opportunities to exercise initiative and decision-making flexibility, and institutional recruitment practices that select journalists on the basis of connections instead of talent. A senior trainer and member of management of Radio LAC commented that it is not programme content that is his concern, but the station's limited human resource capacity. CCG's response to the idea of providing management training was that "CCG does not do those sort of things". In the interest of maintaining focus, the evaluators agree the time is not right for CCG to consider undertaking such a new front in the near future. However, they think it should be kept in mind in case an opportunity (especially in light of the British involvement with the BBC) might arise for an institutional strengthening approach to leverage improved performance at management and editorial levels as well as among journalists.

CCG's plan to provide training to 16-17 years old in the Department of Journalism in one of Luanda's major high schools deserves real credits for strategic imagination. Similarly, CCG is in discussion with Angola's only National School for Journalists (radio and the press) to include conflict resolution in the curriculum and content of practical seminars, supported by services of selected trainers from Radio LAC and Common Ground trainers from overseas as well from Angola. These initiatives deserve high praise.

- ***The Press***

Angolan newspapers are notable for their lack of impartiality and balance. The one daily newspaper, *Journal de Angola*, owned by the government and managed by appointees, is predictably conformist, blandifying news that may reflect negatively upon the government and questionable in its reportage of facts and data. Several weeklies and bi-weeklies exist, the more popular and influential being *Folha 8, Angolense* and *Agora*. Most of these are private and their zip provides some counter-balance to the turgidity of the *Journal*. However, the tone of almost all the newspapers is highly personal and reactionary and, as their scope to be outspoken against the government is sorely constrained, they not infrequently deteriorate instead into individual vendettas between editors as a substitute for main news stories. They almost certainly sell more for their gory photographs than on the strength of level reporting, neutral comment or informed analysis. Courageous attempts by some journalists to report the facts where it has crossed the government have met with repression, physical intimidation and even imprisonment. The surprisingly good quality of paper, print and coloured photography contributes to the high sale price of the papers, making it accessible only to a richer urban middle class readership, and circulation is limited to Luanda. In general therefore the press provides little opportunity for CCG to influence the larger environment of social tension. However, CCG has taken up the challenge to attempt to instil a sense of professional balance in journalistic reporting through its training programme. Given the current limitations of the medium and the need for its improvement, this appears to the evaluators to be the correct first step in what will probably be a limited strategy in the foreseeable future.

- ***CCG's training of the media***

Again, CCG must be congratulated for this initiative. CCG's entry on the EC's website reports that eight training sessions have taken place in four provinces, including 175 journalists (55 more than expected) from eight provinces, representing all branches of the media, state and private. Trainers included journalists and experts in conflict resolution and human rights from Belgium, Greece and Burundi as well as Angolans. (The evaluators were informed that the case studies from Burundi were especially appreciated for their relevance to the Angolan situation). The opening occasion drew considerable interest on a wide front and was reported in more than one regional country through a number of media channels as well as nationally. Several newspaper articles have since appeared on the subject of objective and ethical journalism which, while not making specific attribution to the training, must be more than coincedence.

9.2 CCG's wider training programme

Apart from its investment in the media component, CCG's principal approach to building awareness, techniques and skills in conflict resolution among its target groups is through training, including facilitated dialogues. Almost certainly, no other single activity absorbs so much of CCG's time, energy and resources as the training programme. CCG has invested a great deal of input at significant cost into devising training strategies, training their own trainers and developing materials. CCG staff have received training from Common Ground trainers from the Middle East and external trainers from Brazil, and two CCG staff have visited South Africa for training.

CCG's training programme is widely diverse in its content and is delivered over a huge area from Luanda's IDP camps to any province that CCG can effectively access. Given the level of investment in the training component and its importance as CCG's main thrust to directly reach its target groups with extension messages and skills building, it warrants more specific methodological and impact evaluation than this evaluation was able to achieve in the limited time. Several recipients of the training made special mention of its practical value; others reported that they had specifically used their newly learned skills in settling potentially violent disputes; CCG staff gave examples of one or two particular cases. The evaluators constantly heard, unprompted, from participants that they liked the training and would like more; and department heads asked for more coverage of their staff. The evaluators found these anecdotes convincing. However, the end-effect of training is always notoriously hard to evaluate, especially with any sense of cost-effectiveness. Again, the M&E plan should explore means of more rigorously assessing the general effectiveness of the various training programmes and their different sub-components and activities.

9.3 Related to training: issues of quality

Given the level of organisational investment in implementing training activity, and its primary importance to the impact of the programme, it is critical that the delivery is absolutely top-notch. The evaluators observed training sessions conducted by CCG staff in Moxico IDP camp, and by Social Promoters and the Provincial Coordinator in the *bairro* of 4th Fevreiro in Porto Amboim. They also arrived at the close of a four day training to the civil defence in Porto Amboim where the charts were still up on the walls of the venue. The evaluators observed real strengths in the implementation of the two training events that they witnessed, and all the trainers demonstrated infectious commitment and interest in their facilitation that indicated that the CCG training programme, with consistent upgrading of skills, will become excellent across its extensive

coverage. The evaluators do recommend however that CCG maintain quite a high level of invested input into internal training of trainers. The evaluators are aware that this is currently being performed by its own best trainers to others such as the Social Promoters, including on the job training through co-facilitation. It is recommended that this strategy is maintained on a consistent basis. Furthermore, the evaluators recommend CCG contract in from time to time carefully selected external trainers of trainers to work with the senior training staff to be sure their skills also continue to grow. The evaluators recognise that there will always be skills differences among staff and Social Promoters, but it must be said that they did observe a number of small points in basic training practice among both the most and less experienced trainers that could be improved quite easily with hands-on advice to make the effect even more participatory and effective.

Most problematic to the content of the training programme is hitting off an appropriate balance between the conceptual subject matter and the practical; and in particular presenting the concepts in a form that less educated participants can comprehend and assimilate. This is partly a question of language (Portuguese versus local languages), and the evaluators observed this was mostly managed skillfully. It is however also a matter of reducing the number and complexity of the concepts to only those that are really essential for the participants to understand, and then simplifying the trainers' vocabulary to express and explain those points clearly. The evaluators believe this reduction process has not yet been taken far enough, and that the training content still includes some unnecessarily intellectual concepts and the language for expressing those is sometimes still too sophisticated.

The other major point regarding simplicity of presentation that the evaluators wish to make is to recommend CCG use the written word less in their training. In the case of the civil defence training, the walls were literally covered in dozens of charts densely pre-prepared with sections transcribed from the training manual. Apart from the huge amount of work that it must have taken the Social Promoters to prepare the charts, the volume of information, even over four days of training, would certainly have been too much for the trainees to absorb. In the IDP camp and the *bairro* training, literacy was assumed. Even if this were true for the majority of participants, the writing of the charts did not encourage participation from the group. The evaluators recommend CCG try to get away as much as possible from this method of training and develop a toolbox of non-literate techniques for most occasions.

CCG will always have a tough decision to make with its training programme regarding the best balance of 'depth versus breadth'. Several programmes are iterative; for example, programmes may include three or more sequential training sessions in communities or IDP camps, scheduled at one per month, and sometimes including refresher sessions. Estimating the correct interval between sessions is important to maintain momentum of interest and accumulative effect: it is possible a month is too long. The participants should advise on this, although logistical issues and limited staff availability will also be important factors. (As CCG well know, the participants' time availability is also crucial. It was noted at the Porto Amboim *bairro* training – a total of only three hours – that several participants changed over at the half way mark. Again, changes of participants during any training course will limit the depth achieved).

Case study reflecting impact of training:
In most parts of Angola, as in many African countries, when a pedestrian is hit by a passing vehicle, an excited and angry crowd will usually gather. If they catch the driver, the likelihood is that they will beat him up and even kill him. In one reported case, a child had been hit and badly hurt. The crowd, at fever pitch of dangerousness, had caught the driver and were on the point of

lynching him. Unexpectedly, a *nucleos* member intervened. Against all the odds and at very real personal risk to his own safety as well as his social reputation, he prevented the mob from lynching the man and persuaded them to deal with the situation reasonably. He himself said that it was CCG's conflict resolution training that prompted him to intervene and enabled him to resolve the situation successfully.

Case study reflecting impact of CCG's training:
OIM IDP camp on the outskirts of outside Luanda was first peopled by families from Bengo province from 1992. In 1998, displaced people from Huambo and Bie provinces arrived to settle at the same camp. Available space was extremely cramped, basic services and sanitation were desperately inadequate, poverty was extreme; conditions were ripe for conflict. Tensions first began to arise between families from the different provinces due to children playing pranks. From that point, under the pressure of the camp's harsh conditions, conflict grew between the separate provinces to alarming levels of social tension and potential violence. It was then that CCG's programme entered OIM camp, with its dissemination of conflict resolution messages and techniques of how to settle disputes in non-adversarial ways. The theatre activity, group dialogues, soap opera listening sessions and programme facilitation led to the formation of a women's group and a *nucleos*. These social organisations, supported by the effect of various components of CCG's extension programme, managed to establish level relations among the three provinces. Today, the camp functions with amity. The camp's inhabitants attribute the resolution of the previously divided and volatile situation to CCG's programme. One particular example of success was demonstrated when the camp opened its first school, all the teachers were from Huambo and Bie provinces. Children from Bengo did not at first attend the school as they were frightened of reprisals, but the teachers took the initiative to go house to house to persuade the children and their families that differences were buried. The school now includes children from all provinces and sectors of the camp.

9.4 Training materials

In support of its training activity, CCG has developed a range of well-researched and field-tested materials. Although rather too theoretical in the evaluators' eyes, the conflict resolution trainer's manual includes substantial content defining and explaining issues of conflict and methods for its resolution, with clearly presented and practical advice to the trainer how to impart this information and facilitate the sessions. Recently, the manual has been adapted to a new version which presents the same content but in appropriately simplified form of short summary sentences and graphics. A comic book with graphics recounting a story of a displaced family with reference to the Deng guiding principles on internal displacement has also been published and is ready for distribution. Finally, the training programme to IDPs has developed a set of large graphic flip charts depicting the same principles, with one picture per principle. These were developed by a local artist and convey convincing clarity and persuasion, with a fine blend of humour. In a very short space of time since their publication, these training posters are becoming in high demand from other agencies in a number of provinces, thus significantly expanding the outreach of CCG's programme through proxy. The evaluators congratulate CCG on their inventiveness and productivity with all these training materials.

As mentioned, the conflict resolution manual raises one misgiving with the evaluators, whether some of the concepts are too sophisticated for trainers such as Social Promoters who are drawn from less educated backgrounds. This may incur a risk of inadequate comprehension of some subject matter at all levels of participation in the training (beyond the CCG staff) when it possibly could be avoided not only by simplifying the message as in the new revised version but

by editing out conceptual content that maybe is not necessary. For example, the evaluators believe the conceptual distinction between conflict and violence, or traditional and modern methods of resolution, while maybe important to a higher organisational analysis of the subject, must be difficult points for a trainer to explain and for a group to internalise in a way that will ultimately lend itself to behaviour change.

CCG has had some contact with Mosaiko, a local NGO who specialise in human rights and develop and produce communication materials, such as pamphlets, comic books and posters, as well as other publications, for the Church and COIEPA. The evaluators observed the quality of these products to be excellent. Mosaiko has many of the same target groups as CCG. CCG attempted to work with Mosaiko in co-training on human rights to journalists, but the collaboration was not too successful due to Mosaiko's busy schedule disallowing much participation. CCG are still keen to make it happen, and the evaluators believe CCG should try again. There also appears to be an opportunity to collaborate more closely with Mosaiko in designing and producing training and extension materials, (as World Learning does with its human rights agenda).

9.5 Theatre

In complement to its direct delivery of training and the inductive process of facilitated dialogues, CCG commissions a number of local theatre groups to portray illustrative scenes of conflict and violence in the home or the community combined with acting out simplified messages of how these situations may be resolved in non-adversarial ways. The evaluators observed performances by three different theatre groups, Julu in Moxico IDP camp, Estrela Negra in Sumbe prison, and another in a Porto Amboim *bairro*, and discussed their work with the actors. The skits and scenes inevitably varied widely in quality depending on the experience and resources of the group. Julu, as a nationally renowned group, was highly professional; the local Porto Amboim group was understandably considerably less so. However, in terms of visible impact with their audience every group scored impressive success in those cases the evaluators observed.[26] Each time the piece spontaneously drew dozens or hundreds of the community to watch and applaud, enthralled. The audiences included men, women and children from all sectors of the community. In that respect the coverage of the theatre activity as a means of message extension is more effective than any other programme component except perhaps radio. The content of the pieces were actual types of conflict drawn from the real life experience of the audience ('hard issues') and acted out with compelling drama (and evidently appealing humour), closing with clearly presented conflict resolution methods and skills.

The evaluators perceive CCG's theatre component to be a great success in catching the attention and raising the interest of large numbers of people from a complete cross-section of all the community target groups. The actor groups' inventiveness and their enthusiasm and dedication to their work is wonderful. As a complement to the training activity, the evaluators found the achievement of the theatre component to be entirely convincing and worthy of increased support. CCG currently provides some financial support to the groups, and training in conflict resolution techniques. Grant levels vary widely: Julu receives $400, Estrela Negra receives only $25. The evaluators would like to encourage CCG to increase levels of financial support, mostly needed for transport and props (clothes), and to assist with exposure to improved drama training

[26] Except, it must be admitted with the Porto Amboim troupe in front of the civil defence training participants, where the quality of the acting was clearly not sufficient for the sophistication of the more educated audience. As one of the civil defence said: "We are amore used to television".

and maybe cross-visits. At some point a more methodical evaluation of the impact among audiences than this evaluation attempted would be advisable.

9.6 Playback Theatre (PBT)

Very much more questionable in the evaluators' minds is CCG's experimentation with playback theatre. The basis of PBT is a technique developed in some western countries, particularly Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as a means of psychotherapy for those who have been through traumatic experience. Someone from an assembled group tells his or her real life story to the theatre troupe who acts it out to the group, who then discuss the scene afterwards. The evaluators have serious misgivings about CCG attempting this practice for a number of reasons. The technique originates from a western concept of psychosocial healing through a process of encouraging the victim (or 'survivor') of trauma to release the distress by expressing and externalising the experience. As such, it is not rooted in an understanding of African society and how African group culture deals with terrible personal experience. At best, those agencies which are developing the theory and practice of PBT are learning their way towards understanding its appropriateness to other cultures through the experimentation of organisations in the field, such as, in this case, CCG.

There is a great risk in that process of organisational self-learning that the implementers will misinterpret their findings and develop an erroneous approach either in broad concept or in the detail of delivery, causing severe mental distress or damage to participants. Psychosocial treatment falls in the domain of health, and in very sensitive and little understood regions of mental health. Even in the west, with all its technical facilities, research and experience, that area remains complicated enough, with the basis of treatment and care focussed on the individual and stabilising his or her situation within society. Given foreigners' scant understanding of the social and psychological mores of Africa, particularly in respect to coping strategies, the position of the individual within society, and group structures of inclusion and exclusion, the evaluators believe the adaptability of such approaches is far from sure and potentially dangerous. At the very least, in the interest of retaining programme focus, the evaluators recommend against CCG straying into areas of psychosocial health, perceiving it also to lie outside the organisation's area of expertise.[27]

9.7 Mediation

On more than one occasion, CCG's Provincial Coordinators have been drawn upon by communities to mediate when an impasse has been reached despite their own best efforts to resolve a dispute. Even while the evaluators were in Kwanza Sul, representatives from a group of local NGOs requested the Provincial Coordinator's personal intervention, as a neutral third party, with the local Ministry of Justice with whom their provincial registration had met objections despite approval from the central ministry in Luanda. Such cases evidently clear bottlenecks and bring credibility to CCG in their field of conflict resolution. More importantly,

[27] Since post-genocide Rwanda and Bosnia, psychosocial programming has attracted significant funding opportunity and been taken up as a new niche activity by a number of agencies. One of the evaluators witnessed the early boom growth of this sector in Rwanda in 1994-1996 where occasionally it appeared to come close to self-advertising fashionability. Several programmes, performed by agencies with inadequate background experience in the technical area, came into disrepute as it was revealed that they were actually making matters worse and causing lasting harm and pain through adopting inappropriate approaches. As well as the question of organisational responsibility, there is an image risk attached to this point.

for longer term benefit, those whom the Coordinator works with on the case learn the techniques of mediation from the practical experience. The evaluators see examples of CCG using actual cases of mediation as the practical means of more widely disseminating mediation skills as a functional form of on the job training to reinforce the training programme component on mediation techniques. Its effectiveness can be judged to a certain extent by the successful outcome of the cases, the expressed appreciation of those who benefited from CCG's intervention, and the continuing demand for their mediation in otherwise irresolvable cases.

CCG does need, however, first to be sure that they are not being asked for their assistance before every other avenue has been explored and tried by the relevant parties, and secondly that mediation skills are indeed being effectively decentralised away from CCG's 'ownership' to their client base. If CCG is just being 'used' as a convenience for their skills and influence, with troublesome cases unnecessarily gravitating to their mediation instead of being independently resolved, then CCG's action is doing no service to the concerned parties and any sustainable benefits from this programme component will be at stake when CCG finally leaves the area. In this respect, the evaluators do wish to give all due credit to the case study below.

Case study reflecting CCG's dissemination of mediation skills:
In January 2001, *sobas* who were unable to resolve a conflict between a Chinese fishing cooperation and local fishermen approached the Porto Amboim *nucleo* for assistance. Chinese fishing boats had been fishing too close to shore and breaking the local fishermen's nets. The *nucleo* members held talks with a delegate from the ministry in charge of fishing who held the Chinese cooperation responsible for the damages done and demanded reimbursement. After the *nucleo's* three month long shuttle diplomacy, the cooperation finally took the first step to pay the damages to local fishermen in April.

9.8 Related to extension methodologies: human rights

Although CCG is not a human rights organisation *per se*, it perceives raising awareness of human rights to be an essential part of peace-building and enabling people to settle divisions and conflict issues without resorting to violence. The IDP programme comes closest to a formal human rights approach through its training in the UN's Guiding Principles for IDPs, developed by Francis Deng, the Special Representative for the Secretary General for IDPs. Training in human rights was also provided to journalists in Luanda and provincially through collaboration with ADRA. However, in more general terms, CCG's primary message regarding human rights is that rights have to be respected, and individuals must be able to demand respect for their rights by non-adversarial means. These are the means - with techniques, skills and capacities - that CCG trains in. The evaluators believe this approach to supporting human rights as a core element of conflict management without moving closer to becoming a more formal human rights organisation is entirely the correct balance.

9.9 Related to extension methodologies: an IEC strategy

It is the evaluators' observation that the various components of CCG's extension strategies fit together and reinforce each other to incremental effect very successfully. For example, complementary theatre pieces are used to illustrate messages imparted at training events; radio pieces are used to prompt dialogue sessions as one part of more extensive training sessions; selected methodologies are appropriately and imaginatively adapted for the various target groups. The impact of the whole is almost certainly more than the sum of its parts. CCG's dynamic, inventive and productive extension programme earns high credits.

Another piece of baggage in development organisations' backpacks, inevitably with its own acronym, is an expandable feast called IEC (Information, Education, Communication), essentially just another term for extension strategies. In practice, CCG is all about IEC, on all selected fronts to the common goal of conflict resolution. CCG's positive experience in extension may have strategic commonalities with some other organisations which employ IEC strategies to tightly focussed (but still complex) goals. HIV/AIDS programmes may be especially relevant, and again PSI commonly develops sophisticated IEC strategies to support their social marketing approach. CCG may benefit from more cross-reference with such other organisations employed in similar vein.

9.10 Advocacy

CCG does not advocate for special issues in the way of a lobby group; rather they advocate for processes towards resolving conflict. Special mention should be made in this respect of the high levels of representation performed by CCG staff in various formal and informal ways. Most distinctive has been the active participation in peace building fora, with opportunities made and taken to develop close working relations with senior government officials of influence. Equally impressive has been the number of comment articles that CCG has managed to have published in national newspapers on the subject of conflict resolution in Angola and CCG's work. In addition, six features on CCG's work have been televised on TPA and literally dozens of radio interviews have been aired. These are substantial and professional pieces of informed analysis, in no way mere self-publicity. Furthermore, CCG has managed the first website entry on the EU's civil society site, giving a detailed presentation of the CCG programme. These efforts are hard work, additional to long days of programme management, and it is greatly to CCG's credit that they make the extra effort and draw upon their considerable staff skills of articulation to create and access these opportunities. Although the time and energy invested is considerable and the outcome hard to evaluate, it is sure that the application and quality of this representation is leveraging consciousness at both the public and policy levels[28].

10.0 CCG STRUCTURE

CCG's organisational structure is admirably light (and paper-light), flexible, mobile and clearly highly productive. The 15 members of the Luanda head office team are structured laterally with a shallow and informal management hierarchy[29]. The director explained that, prior to his own arrival in early 2000, individual terms of reference were more flexible still. He has chosen to define assignations rather more specifically and in the 2002 plan has allocated staff responsibilities by project. The evaluators heard from several external sources, including international NGO directors and embassy reps, that CCG has been especially successful in attracting exceptionally high calibre staff to work for them. The evaluators' own observation from meeting a number of those staff in Luanda and Kwanza Sul is that comment is most certainly true. The level of professionalism, enthusiasm, application and dedication to the central cause among all members of the team is tremendous, and the depth of imaginative and

[28] Final note on extension methodologies: Prior to 2000, CCG had attempted a newsletter as another form of extension, but it proved too time consuming and the initiative never took off.

[29] As an exclusively civil society-oriented NGO (rather than humanitarian), CCG actually has a larger structure than several others, such as NDI (4-5 staff), World Learning (4-5 staff), Friedrich Ebert (3-4 staff) and DW's Peace-building programme (2 staff). However, CCG's operational reach, in addition to the emphasis upon leverage through media and advocacy, is far greater than those organisations.

analytically critical faculty available to CCG from the quality of its staff is a huge resource. At the scale and level of intensity (which is impressive) with which the programme operates today, the evaluators believe the structure is adequate and the selection, performance and management of staff is ideally suited.

The question remains whether the organisational capacity vested in such a light staffing structure will be able to carry an ambitious operational expansion plan. The evaluators do not propose that CCG adopt too many new internal structures and management tools too fast, any more than they recommend too rapid an expansion plan for the programme. However, they do recommend that the holistic strategic plan should include detailed correlation between upgrading CCG's own institutional and human resource development and the programme expansion roll out with carefully planned and managed synchronicity in scheduling and implementation. In general, CCG will almost certainly need to deepen its levels of management structure, create more formalised and specialised (and documented) scopes of work for individual staff members, and deepen skills in critical management areas (as well as programme areas). The evaluators recommend that, without spoiling the evident democracy of the organisation, CCG Luanda might consider forming a senior management team of the four or five most qualified senior staff.

As part of increasing capacity, CCG should also consider whether to add one or two key head office posts, in particular one to be assigned specific responsibility for M&E and maybe another to oversee the development and integration of IEC strategies. Currently both these areas are managed separately by different projects and their various activities are meshed through characteristically consultative (and highly collegial) organisational management under the director's coordination. Ultimately, especially when facing a period of programme expansion, while retaining the admirable process of cross-fertilisation between projects, the two major areas may benefit from a more holistically defined plan, formalised approach and specialised oversight.

CCG currently has a system of regular informal feedback as its means of individual staff development and the director conducts formal appraisal of all staff in December. This is a good start but the evaluators believe the organisation, its programme and its staff would benefit from a more holistic performance management system. Above all, CCG will need to decide to what extent it wishes to upscale its central and provincial staffing structures. The evaluators are fully aware of the institutional costs in terms of time, energy and resources of a larger, more complex human resource strategy. The risks are that the organisation will lose its streamlined efficiency and cost-effectiveness. But expanding the organisation need not mean diminishing its productivity and practical value with cumbersome structures and systems so long as the strategy is planned carefully and managed incrementally and the overall system continues to be well supported at all levels. In discussions with senior staff, the evaluators heard how the organisation has grown and upgraded its staff's skills and responsibilities over the past two years. The evaluators sincerely congratulate CCG on this very significant achievement. The upcoming question, in the post-Savimbi era, may well now become to what extent CCG wishes, and is able, to upscale their organisational presence and capacity into an expanding operational context of need and opportunity in order to address to their fullest potential their mandate in Angola.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK
Appendix 2 PEOPLE MET FOR THE EVALUATION
Appendix 3 CCG SUMMARY OF INTERNAL REVIEW AND STRATEGIC PLANNING
Appendix 4 SUMMARY OF SOAP OPERA SERIES EVALUATION BY THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STATISTICS

APPENDIX 1

EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

Scope of Work

A. Accountability and Communications

CONSULTANT will report directly to the SFCG Program Director **Steve Utterwulghe** for the duration of the assignment and will provide one copy of the consultancy report to the **Program Coordinator**.

B. Location and Dates

This consultancy will take place in Angola from approximately **25 February 2002** to approximately **9 March 2002**. The final report will be due **23 March 2002**.

C. Duties

The principle objective of the consultancy will be to evaluate program activities in the areas outlined below:

Independent Evaluation
Centre for Common Ground in Angola

SUMMARY SCOPE OF WORK

INTRODUCTION

The Centre for Common Ground in Angola (CCG) was established in August 1996 to support the process of national reconciliation as Angola began to recover from thirty years of war. Since the recurrence of fighting, CCG has continued to carry out a range of activities aimed at strengthening civil society and increasing the capacity of Angolans to resolve conflicts in mutually agreeable, non-violent ways.

The CCG program currently consists of two major components:

- **Capacity Building activities.** These activities are primarily aimed at helping to develop and support Angola's capacity to resolve inter-personal and community conflicts in a constructive and non-violent manner. CCG works specifically in **IDP camps**, and generally with **community groups and local government**, where it conducts a variety of technical and informal activities in Angola to teach creative, non-violent conflict resolution techniques. Among these activities are:
  - Conflict Resolution Trainings
  - Dialogue sessions
  - Mediation
  - Theater

- **Media activities**: CCG engages and supports the media –print, radio, and television- to produce programming that promotes collaborative communal problem solving, reduction of stereotypes between groups in Angola, and that disseminates information in a way that stresses shared interests and empowers people to work across traditional barriers to further those interests. To these ends, CCG supports the production and broadcasting of TV documentaries, radio "soap operas" and talk shows, and conducts trainings for journalists.

CCG has commissioned an independent, participatory evaluation of its overall conflict resolution and prevention program.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

CCG has set out its main goals in Angola, which are to:

e. move towards the overall objective of promoting a culture of peace in Angola;
f. increase the acceptance and practice of conflict prevention and conflict resolution by Angolan individuals and institutions;
g. bring Angolans from all walks of life together in peaceful collaboration and co-operation, around issues of common concern;
h. build and strengthen the internal capacity of Angolan peace and conflict resolution organisations.

One of the primary focuses of the evaluation will be to determine how appropriate these goals are for building peace, given the current Angolan context. Following upon that, the evaluation will then seek to determine:

d) how well the activities CCG has designed are impacting upon the above goals;
e) whether CCG is conducting activities with the correct target groups; and
f) how effectively the activities are being managed and implemented.

In order to fully understand the relevance and appropriateness of CCG's work in the current Angola context, the evaluation team will interview a wide variety of people working in and with Angola -including CCG staff, international and local NGO staff, international organizations, Angolan officials, Angolan and international media, funders- to determine what are the overarching dynamics in the country and which are the critical targets.

The team will then examine the specific CCG activities that are part of each of the two major CCG in Angola program components:

Capacity Building

Capacity building in **IDP groups** (nucleos, women and children) in Mussende, Moxico, OIM, Cambambe II, and Irmaoes Coragem Camps.

a. Interviews, focus-group discussions, and case-studies will be conducted with different key IDP groups - "nucleos"(conflict resolution working groups), women, children, traditional leaders - as well as with other stakeholders, such as host community groups, local government officials, theatre troupes, international NGO representatives, UNHCR, OCHA Field Adviser for Luanda and Bengo, and UNICEF to discuss the impact and implementation of CCG's conflict resolution and protection trainings, dissemination of guiding principles, dialogue sessions (group, radio, and video), and theatre.

The evaluation will examine specifically:

- how participants view CCG and its role;
- the degree of integration and pre-planning of the various elements;
- how participants, their family members and non-participants in the IDP camps view the impact each of the capacity building activities has on:
    - the participants' behavior;
    - how problems are addressed in their families and communities;
    - the participants' understanding and practice of conflict resolution techniques to improve their lives.

b. Capacity building in **local organizations, nucleos, churches, traditional authorities, police, and local ministries in provinces;**

The evaluation will ask the same questions as above. In addition the team will look at:

- **the functioning of the "nucleos" system**
- **relationship between ALSSA and Luanda headquarters**

c. Production of a conflict resolution manual in Portuguese

The evaluation team will conduct interviews with those who have received the manual and will survey people who have not heard of a manual to find out how they could use it.

Media

a. Capacity building of media professionals through journalism training sessions

The team will conduct facilitated focus-group discussions with the journalists to see how effective the trainings have been. The team will also interview the journalists' colleagues, superiors and possibly listeners to find out whether they have observed any changes with the journalists after the training sessions. Finally, the team will be questioning other stakeholders about the perceived need for this kind of media training.

b. Radio programs (soap operas and discussion programs) and TV documentaries

- A qualitative assessment based on interviews and focus group discussion sessions held with selected stakeholders and decision-maker entities in the IDP camps, in Kwanza Sul, and in

other provinces where the programs have been aired. This qualitative assessment will help CCG:

a) clarify the media landscape in Angola through questions demographics and listening habits of audiences, capacities of broadcasters;
b) identify the targets CCG can and want to reach, and how CCG might best be able to do that, through examining CCG's current targets and current topics.

The evaluation team will also:
a) examine the impact of the current media programs; and
b) look at how well integrated CCG's media work is with its capacity building work.

In addition, the assessment of the CCG in Angola program will:
- fully engage stakeholders in the process of assessing the program;
- document accomplishments, unmet challenges, and lessons learned, and generate knowledge and investment on the part of key stakeholders;
- address performance-level indicators and indicators of program impact;
- examine both the individual components of the CCG in Angola program and the relationships and synergies between them;
- explore the impact on program implementation of the continuing civil instability in Angola; and
- assess staff understanding and commitment to the program's overall mission.

D. Final Product

A written evaluation that will examine in-depth the topics covered in the Scope of Work described in Section C.

APPENDIX 2

PEOPLE MET FOR THE EVALUATION (in order of meetings)

Luanda

CCG Staff

Steve Utterwulghe, Director
Miguel Francisco, Logistician
Daniel Miala, Director of Finances
Engracia Francisco, Coordinator Media programme
Fernanda Pinto de Andrade, Consultant (IDP programme)
Clarisse Caputo, Coordinator of Leadership programme
Manuel Figueredos, Consultant (IDP programme)
Carlos Pinto, Driver
Jose Sampaio, Coordinator of IDP programme
Romao, Driver
Paulo da Cruz, Trainer

External meetings

Ana Graca Cabreran, Programme Officer, UNHCR
Allan Cain, Director, Development Workshop
Fion de Vletter, Consultant, UNDP
Quirine Timmerman, Embassy of the Netherlands
Jean-Michel Jordan, Coordinator & Country Representative, Swiss Agency for Development & Cooperation
Maggie Brown & Joao Neves, Consultants, SCF-UK/Angola
Silva Junior, Deputy, RNA
Abilio Kabambi, Chief of Information, RNA
Bela Malachias, Journalist, RNA
Paula Simon, Journalist, Radio LAC
Ismael Mateus, Trainer, Radio LAC
Norberto, Journalist, Agora
Cristina, ex-newspaper journalist (participant in CCG training)
Clayton Davies, outgoing Country Director, PSI/Angola.
Tony Hodges, Consultant, UNDP
OIM IDP camp, women's group members and *nucleo* members
Moxico and Mussende IDP camps, CCG training participants
Theatre group Julu, actors
Manuel Domingos, Population Services International
Jeremy Astill-Brown, Second Secretary, British Embassy
Pat Buckley, Country Director, CARE Angola

Note: The evaluators were especially sorry not to have met Mr Luigi Marcuccio, Adviser to the EC Delegation, Luanda, a major donor to the CCG programme, who was out of the country during the two weeks.

Kwanza Sul Province

CCG staff

Carlos Vicente, CCG Provincial Coordinator, Kwanza Sul
Faustina, CCG Social Promoter, Porto Amboim
Abrao Manuel, CCG Social Promoter, Porto Amboim
Arnaldo Jose Antonio, CCG Social Promoter, Sumbe

External meetings

Porto Amboim
Antonio Luis Paquete, Policeman (& CCG training participant)
Pastor of Apostolic Church of New Jerusalem of Angola
Pedro Caetano Ganga, Delegate of Culture, Porto Amboim District (& CCG training participant)
Tony, Comandante, Civil Defence, Porto Amboim District (& CCG training participant)
Theatre group, Porto Amboim

Sumbe
Theatre group, 'Estrela Negra'
Padre Francisco Vigario, Catholic Priest, Diocese of Sumbe
Lourenco Mendes, Chief of Immigration, Sumbe (& CCG training participant)
Joao Japao, Police Commandante (responsible for moral and civic education), Sumbe (& CCG training participant)
Antonio Frederico, Director, Institute of Statistics, Sumbe (& CCG training participant)
Helder de Jesus Morais de Castro, Immigration Officer, Sumbe (& CCG training participant)
Julio Manuel, ex-CCG Coordinator, Seles
Abilio Francisco, ex-CCG Coordinator, Porto Amboim
Maria Lourdes Soares, Superintendent of Women's Police, Sumbe (& CCG training participant)

Luanda

Frei Zeca, materials development and production, Mosaiko
Antonio de Sousa, Journalist, Radio Ecclesia

APPENDIX 3

CCG SUMMARY OF INTERNAL REVIEW AND STRATEGIC PLANNING

Centre for Common Ground in Angola

Strategic Planning 2002

Tuesday 15, January 2002

I. 2001

Activities	Target Groups	CCG Teams
Capacity Building	IDPs (women, youth)	IDPs
Training-Theatre-Dialogue	Civil Society Police Nucleos Journalists	Training Media
Media	IDPs Angolans Journalists	Media IDPs
Soap opera-Radio debates-TV		

II. 2001-2002

"From the Grassroots to the Present and Future Leadership"

1. Displaced People

Strengths 1998-2001:

- Deal with vulnerable groups
- Create opportunities for dialogues and meetings.
- Capacity building in conflict resolution
- Empowerment
- Link between IDPs and the rest of the population
- Association building (women's associations)

Weaknesses 1998-2001:

- Percentage of people reached is limited compared to global IDP population
- More follow-up needed with certain groups (e.g. end of pilot project with children)

- Need more indicators (number of people we want to reach, time and region of intervention need to be pre-established).

IDPs 2002:

- Reduce general activities with IDPs
- Focus on newly established women's associations, coordinators of nucleos, sobas, displaced professors and students.

2. <u>Media</u>

Strengths 1998-2001:

- Induce interaction between state and private media
- Excellent element of dissemination
- Give a voice to the voiceless
- Create a space for dialogue
- Sensitization (e.g. fate of IDPs)
- Capacity building (e.g. journalists)

<u>Weaknesses 1998-2001:</u>

- Need more staff organization in preparation of radio debates

Media 2002

- Focus on work with junior journalists (through training and cursus at school)
- Continue using media with IDPs, civil society and leadership
- Try to have TV debates about conflict resolution
- Continue work with radio programs (direct impact)
- Hold the production of a new radio soap opera and use the two existing ones

3. <u>Theatre</u>

<u>Strengths 1998-2201:</u>

- Help disseminating messages to various groups: police, children, prisoners, civil society, etc.
- Empowerment of local theatre groups (Kwanza Sul)
- Help disseminating conflict resolution techniques and other messages
- Playback theatre (PBT) can be a conflict resolution tool because it creates empathy and foster dialogue

<u>Weaknesses 1998-2001:</u>

- Not sufficient empowerment of local theatre groups in the provinces (except KS)
- PBT: needs psychological support for participants who exteriorized their emotions. CCG does not have the capacity or expertise to do it and it is outside its focus.

Theatre 2002:

- We will continue using theatre as a complementary tool for our main activities.
- Focus on empowering local theatre groups in conflict resolution theatre.
- Use theatre to support our work with the leadership.

4. **Training**

Strengths 1998-2001

- Strengthening the capacity of the local civil society
- Empowerment
- Targets groups are well identified (case of work with nuclei)
- Gives opportunities to discuss Peace, Common Ground, Conflict Resolution
- There is acceptance from the government to talk about conflict resolution
- It is a means to achieve various objectives or groups (e.g. deputies, journalists)
- Training can be the trigger to more comprehensive work (e.g. new nuclei in Namib which are a spin-off of the training cycle in conflict resolution)

Weaknesses 1998-2001

- A training not included in a cycle and without follow-up has no long-term impact
- The participants need to have the capacity (material, intellectual, and financial) to disseminate the techniques learned, hence the importance of tight selection process
- Evaluation of impact needs to take place on a permanent basis

Training 2002

- Training will focus on present and future leaders from the church and the political, media, university and civil society worlds
- Training will be less numerous and even more targeted and followed-up.

5. Nuclei

Strengths 1998-2001

- Continuity exists thanks to on-the-ground promoters
- Efficient dissemination of messages (people on the ground)
- Use of local expertise/resources
- Bridge between CCG and the communities
- Exist a permanent CCG staff on the ground (KS) to coordinate the work and evaluate it

Weaknesses 1998-2001

- Difficulty to manage human resources without a permanent CCG staff on the ground

III. 2002

CAPACITY BUILDING
&
MEDIA

5 Projects
Activities/Target Groups

Media & Culture Project	Displaced People and Women Project	Training* Project	Provincial Nuclei Project	Leadership Project
Radio debates TV Journalists Theatre	IDPs (nuclei & leaders) Displaced women	Civil Society COIEPA	Kwanza Sul Huila Namib others	Politics, MPs Military Police Women's org. University stud. (COIEPA)

* Training Project is a support tool for other projects

APPENDIX 4

SUMMARY OF SOAP OPERA SERIES EVALUATION BY THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STATISTICS

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2002

After an exhaustive analysis of the information gathered from interviews conducted in six provinces with 1500 people on the impact of the soap opera series produced by the *Centre for Common Ground in Angola*, the following are the findings:

- 69% of those interviewed communicate in Portuguese and only 11% communicate in a foreign language, while Huambo Province accounted for the highest number of interviewees that communicate in their mother tongue.
- 87% of interviewees said that they listened to radio and a breakdown by Provincial Capitals indicates Benguela, Luanda and Namibe as the capitals with highest percentages of audience.
- In all the cities where the interview was held, RNA Channel A stood out as the station that had the widest coverage of listeners of the soap operas, but in Luanda, 77% of the listeners listen to LAC (Luanda Antena Comercial).
- 80% of those interviewed listened to the soap operas, majority of them were in Luanda and Benguela.
- Although Vozes Que Falam was originally meant to reach out to IDPs, 71% of those interviewed said that they listened to it, especially in Huíla Province.
- Coisas da Nossa Gente was mostly listened to in Luanda and Lubango and was generally listened to by 58% of the interviewees.
- The topics that aroused most interest in interviewees included: Human Rights and conflict resolution, Fight against HIV/AIDS, Street Children, Health Education and Love for fellow-creature.
- 91% of those interviewed noticed an increase in their conflict resolution and prevention capacity.
- The quality of the soap operas was rated as good by"68% of the interviewees"
- The continued production and broadcast of soap operas was nearly unanimous
- 81% of those interviewed would like to see the quality of the soap operas improved although it is not bad.
- Finally, they want a greater variety of topics to be covered by the soap operas.