

## **PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT**

### *“Countering and Preventing Radicalization in Indonesian Prisons”*

#### ***I. Project Background***

Since 2002 Search for Common Ground (SFCG) has worked with local civil society organisations, the media, conflict survivors and others to develop appropriate and innovative conflict transformation initiatives. In 2009 SFCG sought resources from the US Embassy Jakarta to implement a two year project that aimed to counter and prevent radicalization in Indonesian prisons. In partnership with the with the Directorate for Corrections within the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the program specifically focused on key corrections institutions in several vulnerable regions throughout Indonesia.

The rationale for the proposal acknowledged that Indonesian prisons provide convicted extremists with recruiting space for new recruits and provide a breeding ground for future violent acts. This environment continues to flourish because prisons lacked constructive-change programming and prison staff lacked sufficient training, particularly related to the handling of convicted and suspected terrorists.

SFCG Indonesia proposed to use its local knowledge and networks as well as its expertise and established reputation in the field of conflict transformation to achieve the long term goal of establishing an enabling environment for de-radicalization work in Indonesian prisons To this end the shorter term goals of the project – as per the proposal - are to “*transform the way in which prison officials handle terrorist and at-risk prisoners within the Indonesian corrections system*”, with the following specific objectives:

- To engage prison officials, guards, and prisoners in Indonesia in a process of constructive change to counter and prevent radicalization within Indonesian prisons.
- To enhance the capacity and sustainability of the Indonesian prison apparatus, as well as civil society organizations, to play a more active role in de-radicalization processes, and to manage these functions in the long-term, without external assistance.

The project was divided into two major phases:

- 1) Development of Standard Operating Procedures for handling suspected and convicted terrorists, as well as those at-risk of radicalization within prisons;
- 2) Capacity strengthening within prisons; and
- 3) Empowerment of government institutions and local civil society organizations (CSOs) to aid in de-radicalization.

## ***II. Aims and Methodology***

This evaluation intends to not only analyze the outcomes of the program such as developing the guidelines, training modules or the implementation of the training itself, but to look at the levels of change, especially with regard to the knowledge and behavior transformation of prison Officers, and the transformation of the prisons internal governance as well as its communication with other parties outside.

The evaluator visited three representative areas: Surabaya (East Java), Nusakambangan (Central Java) and Palembang (South Sumatra). Questionnaires, *focus group discussion* (FGD) and in-depth interviews were used to collect data from each region as a general representation of the programs progress (the program included five prisons in total)

- The questionnaire contained general attitude questions about the program in addition to specific knowledge questions that aimed to measure the success of the program vis a vis the project goals and objectives. The questionnaire was distributed to 15 prison officers in each region. For comparative purposes five of these officers had no exposure to the training.
- FGDs were conducted in the Correctional Facilities with high risk Inmates, such as Porong, Batu Nusakambangan and Class I Palembang Correctional Facilities. The FGD participants included training participant officers and officials from the Correctional Facility security, registration and development.
- In-depth interviews were conducted with one or two training participant officers who also participated in the FGDs. These interviews were needed to obtain clear information about fixed procedures, trainings and inputs for the program in the future. Other general information, was obtained via interviews with the head of each Correctional Facility and the head of Penitentiary Agency.

## ***III. Findings***

### ***3.1 Relevance with community needs***

Several recent developments provide a strong rationale for this program and its further development in the future. Local communities, government and international media have increasingly focused attention on the danger and need to eradicate terrorism in Indonesia. There has also been direct links made between prisons and terrorism with attention focused on the prisons ability to deal with convicted terrorists and the problem of recidivism. Moreover, the emergence of Government Regulation Number 28 Year 2007 concerning the Terms and Procedures of Correctional Facility Patronage Citizen Rights, provided a legal framework for differentiating extraordinary crime status from other crimes, suggesting that a parallel set of treatment procedures should be developed alongside this framework.

FGDs in several regions confirmed that this program was valued and appropriate. Participants said that they consider the provision of SOP and training to be necessary. Specialized treatment of high risk prisoners whether in administrative, security or advisory aspects should be treated on the same magnitude as specialized treatment to children, women or any other specific group. In fact findings from some FGDs suggested that SOP could also be further broken down to have specific guidelines for men and women.


FGDs also revealed that these prisoners have several characteristics that set them apart from other prisoners: they are highly ideological, they have relatively good levels of education, they have good communication skills and they are also very confident. Existing operating procedures and institutional knowledge are not appropriate for this type of prisoner. This means that prison staff cannot access or refer to an appropriate framework for executing rehabilitation programs nor do they have a framework or set of procedures to identify security risks.

The prison community currently lacks the capacity to deal with such prisoners as most FGD participants suggest that they are witnessing the development of a new type of criminal. The prison officers say that they often find themselves confused and opt to do nothing and/or treat these prisoners as they would any other prisoner. Therefore, they believe there is demand for different and specific treatment methods to institutionalize proper rehabilitation procedures and in order to be able to identify security risks.

### 3.2 Training evaluation

Three FGDs done during this evaluation concluded that, the implementation of training was executed well as participants found the material easy to understand. The participants also highly enjoyed the simulation that shows how real problems occur in the field. SFCGs own data confirm this, as the diagram below (Table 1) shows that the participants really liked the material about handling security problems, guarding and searching; all three materials involved simulation presentations from SFCG staff.

Table 1



An internal evaluation undertaken by SFCG also showed that the training was received well. Table 2 below provides the data on various questions that were asked to the participants to determine the level of their satisfaction with the training.

Table 2

Attitude/ Appraisal	Enough balance between theory & practice	The trainer explain the purpose & the importance of each material	The trainer gave materials clear & easy to understand	The trainer always adapting the participant's need	There are Q&A session in the end of materials giving	The materials given is very easy & useful to be implemented
Strongly Disagree	1 (0.9%)	0	1 (0.9%)	1 (0.9%)	1 (0.9%)	0
Disagree	9 (8%)	0	3 (2.7%)	10 (8.9%)	1 (0.9%)	7 (6.3%)
Agree	86 (76.8%)	70 (62.5%)	80 (71.4%)	82 (73.2%)	61 (54.5%)	77 (68.8%)
Strongly Agree	16 (14.3%)	42 (37.5%)	26 (23.2)	15 (13.4%)	48 (42.9%)	27 (24.1%)
Do not know	0	0	0	1 (0.9%)	0	0

Self assessment pre and post tests administered by SFCG provide mixed results about the knowledge increase from the training (Table 3). There are concerns related to the participants understanding of terrorism in Indonesia, their ability to detect terrorist movement and networks within the prison and their ability to anticipate the dissemination of terrorist knowledge throughout prisons. These results demonstrate that while the security aspect of the training is understood, more weight needs to be given to providing a basic understanding of terrorism.

Table 3

Question	Test	Number of answered participants:				
		Strongly not knowing	Not knowing	Lack of knowing	Knowing	Strongly knowing
The understanding of High Risk Inmate's (NRT) Treatment SOP	Pre	13	28	53	17	0
	Post	0	1	7	100	5
Specific Understanding about NRT treatment	Pre	4	23	59	22	2
	Post	0	1	8	99	6
Understanding about terrorism in Indonesia	Pre	12	26	45	24	0
	Post	1	3	33	66	7
The ability to detect terrorism movement & network in Penitentiary/ Correctional Facility	Pre	15	25	55	11	0
	Post	0	5	37	66	3
The ability to anticipate the dissemination of terrorist concepts/knowledge in Penitentiary/Correctional Facility	Pre	15	27	49	13	2
	Post	1	4	32	70	5

From FGDs it was concluded that the training is possibly too focused on the security aspect because of the time limitation. Most of the focus group discussion training participant in the three regions feels that the training's time is not enough.

### 3.4 Impact

The impact of the program, especially the training, is measured by comparing the knowledge of respondents (officers) who participated in the training with those respondents (officers) who did not. The underlying assumption in this comparison is: *respondents who participated in the training will answer [yes] for every question except for 1 question – Is the Penitentiary's fix procedures of 2003 adequate for handling high risk prisoners?* The scoring system used for this comparison is as follows: the expected (positive) answer will be given score of 1 while the unexpected (negative) answer will be given the score of 0.

#### 3.4.1 Knowledge about High Risk Inmates

Knowledge about High Risk inmates is directly related to understanding the nature of extraordinary crimes. The question therefore seeks to understand the participant's knowledge with regard to extraordinary crimes. Table 4 compares knowledge levels of training participants and non participants. 66.7% of all respondent participant or non-participant knows about the extra ordinary crime. There two interesting findings: First, more than 50% (11 people) of non-participant respondents know about the extra ordinary crime. Second, 25.8% of respondents who were participants do not know about extraordinary crime.

Table 4		Knowing about extraordinary crime		Total
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	8 25.8%	23 74.2%	31
Non-Participant	No %	9 45.0%	11 55.0%	20
Total	Total	17 33.3%	34 66.7%	51

Even though the training included information about extra ordinary crime and its dangers the 25.8% (8 people) who did not gain knowledge about this subject is a cause for concern. Increasing participants knowledge about extra ordinary crime and its dangers is an important step that need to be completed before they can go on to learn about treatment for high risk inmates.

<b>Table 5</b>		<b>Terrorism as a form of extra ordinary crime</b>		Total
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	2 6.3%	30 93.8%	32 100%
Non-Participant	No %	0 0%	20 100.0%	20 100%
Total	Total	2 3.8%	50 96.2%	52 100%

Table 5 above also indicates some weakness from the training on this subject. The assumption is that all the training participants know that terrorism is a form of extraordinary crime, but the results show us that 3 participants (9.4%) do not know that terrorism is a form of extra ordinary crime. It is also interesting that all of the non-participant respondents *know* that terrorism is an extra ordinary crime.

<b>Table 6</b>		<b>Knowing the Terrorism Inmates are High Risk Inmates</b>		Total
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	2 6.3%	30 93.8%	32 100%
Non-Participant	No %	0 0%	20 100.0%	20 100%
Total	Total	2 3.8%	49 96.2%	52 100%

Table 6 shows that all the non-participant respondents know that the terrorism inmates are high risk inmates. However, there are 2 participant respondents who do not. Even though this number is small (6.3%) it is still of concern since the assumption is that all participants know about terrorism and high risk inmates.

<b>Table 7</b>		<b>Knowing the High Risk Inmates</b>		Total
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	1 3.1%	31 96.9%	32 100%
Non-Participant	No %	5 25.0%	15 75.0%	20 100%
Total	Total	6 11.5%	46 88.5%	52 100%

Table 7 shows that 1 (3.1%) of participant respondents do not know about high risk inmates. Table 8 also shows that two participants do not know that inmates who retain a crime network are included in the high risk category.

<b>Table 8</b>		<b>The Inmates who still has an active network crime are high risk</b>		Total
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	2 6.3%	30 93.8%	32 100%
Non-Participant	No %	3 15.0%	17 85.0%	20 100%
Total	Total	5 9.6%	47 90.4%	52 100%

<b>Table 9</b>		<b>Terrorism as a form of extra ordinary crime</b>		Total
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	2 6.3%	30 93.8%	32 100%
Non-Participant	No %	3 15.0%	17 85.0%	20 100%
Total	Total	5 9.6%	47 90.4%	52 100%

Two (6.3%) participants do not know that the inmates who are able to have access on weapons and explosives are high risk inmates as shown in Table 9. Table 10 shows that 3, (9.4%) participants do not know that 'escaped inmates' are also included in the high risk category. Furthermore, 2 (6.3%) participants do not know that inmates who tried to escape are also included in the high risk category.

<b>Table 10</b>		<b>Inmates with an escape record</b>		Total
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	3 9.4%	29 90.6%	32 100%
Participant	No %	7 35.0%	13 65.0%	20 100%
Total	Total	10 19.2%	42 80.8%	52 100%

Table 11 below shows that there are 2 (6.3%) participants who do not know that inmates with influence within the correctional facility are high risk. Table 12 shows that there are 4 (12.5%) participants who do not know that recidivists are also high risk.

<b>Table 11</b>		<b>Inmates who have influence within the prison</b>		Total
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	2 6.3%	30 93.8%	32 100%
Non-Participant	No %	5 26.3%	14 73.7%	19 100%
Total	Total	7 13.7%	44 86.3%	51 100%

<b>Table 12</b>		<b>Recidivists are high risk</b>		Total
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	4 12.5%	28 87.5%	32 100%
Non-Participant	No %	5 26.3%	14 73.7%	19 100%
Total	Total	9 17.6%	42 82.4%	51 100%

#### 3.4.2 Technical Knowledge about the Treatment of High Risk Inmates

In general the results show that the training has provided adequate basic knowledge about handling high risk inmates. However there are several weaknesses that are summarized below.

Table 13 below shows that the majority of participants know about the existence of these procedures. However, there are 2 (6.5%) participants who do not know about the handling procedures.

<b>Table 13</b>		<b>Knowledge about treatment of High Risk Inmates</b>		Total
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	2 6.5%	29 93.5%	31 100%
Non-Participant	No %	13 26.3%	7 73.7%	19 100%

Total	Total	15 29.4%	36 70.6%	51 100%
-------	-------	-------------	-------------	------------

<b>Table 14</b>		<b>The Necessity to differentiated terrorist and non terrorist Admission procedures</b>		Total
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	4 12.9%	27 87.1%	31 100%
Non-Participant	No %	9 45.0%	11 55.0%	20 100%
Total	Total	13 25.5%	38 74.5%	51 100%

Table 14 shows that 4 participants (12.9%) do not see the need to differentiate terrorist and non terrorist admission procedures. Ideally, all of training participant should answer that it is necessary to have a special admission procedure for terrorism inmates.

The data on table 15 below shows that all of the respondents - participants and non participants - know about the necessity of special placement for terrorism inmates. This data indicates that the Penitentiary/Correctional Facility Officers have partly mastered this part of the training without actually having the training.

<b>Table 15</b>		<b>The Necessity of Special Placement for Terrorism Inmates</b>
		Yes
Participant	Yes %	31 100%
Non-Participant	No %	20 100%
Total	Total	51 100%

Table 16 shows that 29 (90.6%) participants know that it is necessary to differentiate the visitation procedures from other inmates. But there are 3 (9.4%) participants who do not know about this necessity.

<b>Table 16</b>		<b>The necessity to differentiated Terrorism Inmates Visitation Procedures with Others</b>		Total
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	3 9.4%	29 90.6%	32 100%
Non-Participant	No %	6 30.0%	14 70.0%	20 100%
Total	Total	9 17.3%	43 82.7%	52 100%

Table 17 shows that the majority of participants - 26 (81.3%) - know that there are different searching procedures for terrorist inmates. However, 6 participants (18.8%) do not know about those differences. All participants consider it is necessary to search officers as shown in Table 18.

<b>Table 17</b>		<b>The necessity to differentiated search procedures</b>		Total
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	6 18.8%	26 81.3%	32 100%
Non-Participant	No %	12 60.0%	8 40.0%	20 100%
Total	Total	18 34.6%	34 65.4%	52 100%

<b>Table 18</b>		<b>The Necessity to Search the Officers</b>		Total
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	0	32 100.0%	32 100%
Non-Participant	No %	3 15.0%	17 85.0%	20 100%
Total	Total	3 5.8%	34 94.2%	52 100%

Even though it is not a part of training material, Table 18 shows the respondents opinion about the Penitentiary Implementation's Fix Procedures of 2003. 26 training participant (81.3%) stated that the 2003 SOP is not enough for dealing with terrorism inmates, and 6 (18.8%) participants stated otherwise.

<b>Table 19</b>		<b>2003 SOP Sufficient to Handle Terrorism Inmates ?</b>		<b>Total</b>
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	26 81.3%	6 18.8%	32 100%
Non-Participant	No %	17 89.5%	2 10.5%	19 100%
Total	Total	43 84.3%	8 15.7%	51 100%

### 3.4.5 High Risk Inmates Assessment

Table 20 below, shows that the majority of participant's 24 (75%) know that it is necessary to do a risks and needs assessments (appraisal) of terrorism inmates (high risk). Communicating with outside sources is also considered a key aspect of risk and needs assessment. The table 21 shows that 23 participants (74.2%) know it is necessary to involve other institutions like the Police in the preliminary assessment. And 26 (83.9%) participants know it is necessary to involve religious leaders as shown in Table 22.

<b>Table 20</b>		<b>Terrorism Inmates risks and needs Assessment needs to be done</b>		<b>Total</b>
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	8 25.0%	24 75.0%	32 100%
Non-Participant	No %	10 50.0%	10 50.0%	20 100%
Total	Total	18 34.6%	34 65.4%	52 100%

<b>Table 21</b>		<b>Other Institutions need to be involved in the assessment</b>		<b>Total</b>
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	8 25.8%	23 74.2%	31 100%
Non-Participant	No %	12 60.0%	8 40.0%	20 100%
Total	Total	20 39.2%	31 60.8%	51 100%

<b>Table 22</b>		<b>Religious leaders need to be involved in the assessment</b>		<b>Total</b>
		No	Yes	
Participant	Yes %	5 16.1%	26 83.9%	32 100%
Non-Participant	No %	4 20.0%	16 80.0%	20 100%
Total	Total	9 17.6%	42 82.4%	51 100%

### 3.4.6 Summary of results

Table 24 below summarizes the comparison between the participants and non - participants.

<b>Table 23</b>			<b>Categories of Knowledge</b>			<b>Total</b>
			Lack of	Sufficient	Good	
High risk inmates Training participant	Yes	Count % within high risk Inmate's training Participant	0 .0%	9 28.1%	23 71.9%	32 100.0%
	No	Count % within high risk Inmate's training Participant	3 15.0%	12 60.0%	5 25.0%	20 100.0%
Total	Count % within high risk Inmate's training Participant	3 5.8%	21 40.4%	28 53.8%	52 100.0%	

The table shows that, 23 persons (71.9%) who participated in SFCG training have good levels of knowledge, 9 participants (28.1%) had sufficient knowledge and none were found to have a lack of knowledge. The 20 respondents who did not participate in the training showed significantly less knowledge levels as seen above. This summary demonstrates that while there were several weaknesses, in general participants have gain a good level of knowledge.

#### ***IV. Qualitative attitudes toward the program***

Information gathered from substantive interviews and discussions from several regions, revealed that the SOP could be considered as too wide and not specific enough. Various comments suggested that the SOP and training modules can be improved by compiling more specific procedures for each inmate such as special SOP for terrorism, or drug related crimes. Furthermore, as mentioned above several comments suggested that too much attention was given to the security component and more attention needs to be given to the treatment or rehabilitation of these inmates.

There was also a number of concerns raised about the socialization of the material. Participants from FGDs and interviews suggested that many officers were not aware of the 2003 operating procedures and it will be a challenge in the future to socialize the new SOP.

The FGDs revealed that the Penitentiary still need third party support like donors and civilian community organizations because of the low capacity of the Directorate General of Penitentiary. Therefore, hopefully SFCG can keep providing support on similar trainings and on broader scale.

A final observation is related to the incentives or lack of, that officers had to undertake the new tasks. It was discussed that without financial or symbolic reward the officers were unlikely to commit to implementing an additional load of tasks. While it is minimized by emphasizing the officers must always be technically educated to deal with a range of tasks it was also suggested that the Director General could provide higher evaluation scores to officers involved with high risk inmates.

#### ***V. Recommendations***

§ After considering the substantive analysis of the SOP as well as the impact from the training, this report has several recommendations:

1. The SOP can be further developed to produce more specific procedures for terrorists.
2. Due to the weakness in SOP ability to provide direction for inmates treatment it is recommended that risk assessment mechanism incorporate sociological, psychological and mental/spiritual factors. This can be undertaken with specific SOP guidelines as mentioned above. The assessment result can then determine what treatment terrorist inmates require during their incarceration.
3. The Directorate General of the Penitentiary, and the Justice and Human Rights Department, need to do similar training in the future with or without third party support (donors or civilian community organization). The training can focus on terrorist inmates as they are the most important group within the high risk category. SFCG can still taken role in pushing the development of SOP from a strategic perspective.

4. The Directorate General of Penitentiary needs to initiate a partnership with Human Resources Agency of Justice and Human Rights Department of Republic of Indonesia, to encouraging the Science Academy Prison (AKIP) to include the SOP in its curriculum. This will ensure sustainability of the SOP. SFCG can take part in facilitating this effort.
5. To support the socialization efforts and exchange knowledge between penitentiary officers from different prisons should meet regularly. The meetings can be facilitated by Directorate General of Penitentiary or Regional Office or a Third Party if needed. Essential participants are: the head of the prisons technical unit along with related officials under it, officer and community advisors, and the representatives from other related organizations in the community.
6. Considering that crime patterns are constantly changing, SOP and other materials within training manual must be open for revision and adjustment. SFCG can provide the strategic support and facilitation for this essential element. Periodically, the consultative meetings can be used as mechanism to update SOP and training manual.