The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes

by John Darby

(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 144 pages, US$19.95 (paper)

In this straightforward analysis of peace processes and how violence has been repeatedly used to disrupt them, John Darby unveils the motives behind the violence, offering a sobering critique, which in its very cogency serves as a basic blueprint for progress. By providing examples and a range of policy suggestions, together with profiles of some of the most irreconcilable conflicts of our day, Darby enables us to take a calm step back, reflect on the motivations that has brought each individual and group to the war zone and negotiating table, without becoming mired in historical rhetoric, and simply go forward with a cleaner vision.

Darby, a scholar in residence at the Kroc Institute for International Peace at the University of Notre Dame, began research on this book when he was a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. He focused on those conflicts that did not have a heavy U.N. presence, since it afforded him the opportunity to better analyze how peace processes unravel from within.

The book is divided into five main sections; the first section, "Contemporary Peace Processes," provides a discussion of peace processes and agreements, and how they have fared lately. The second, and most compelling, section of the book, "Violence and Its Implications," details why peace processes are often accompanied by an upsurge in violence. The third section, "Violence as a Catalyst for Peace," essentially offers the view that once the public has reached its breaking point in absorbing violence, the sides will soon find themselves at the negotiating table. The fourth section, "Five Propositions," is just that, an outline of the most basic steps required for progress once a peace process is underway.

Interspersed throughout the book are a number of country profiles written by subject experts that dramatize the discussions. The profiles cover Northern Ireland (written by Darby himself), Sri Lanka, Spain and the Basque Country, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and South Africa. Spread throughout the book (rather than in one section which might have provided for better flow of the text itself and more impact) these profiles were useful even for one well versed in the history of all or some of the conflicts. Their very brevity served to bring to the fore the critical issues, characters, and interplay of forces without numbing statistics and the need to impress with detail. They crystallized each conflict's history into a dramatic picture that served to underscore the prickly points brought up throughout the book.

In the book's main section, Darby distinguishes between the four main types of violence that may occur after a cease-fire or peace accord has been written, and thus undermine it. The first is violence by the state, where the government itself may use its military force to maximize its pre-negotiation status, or to further undermine the position of its opponents. Demilitarization was also discussed as a key factor to that can further destabilize the state.

The next type is violence in the community, where rival militant organizations take their fight into the streets, against each other, as opposed to against the government. A second aspect is that once a cease-fire is underway, the security forces often stop policing the street, leaving a vacuum to be exploited by criminals. In this section there is only a slight reference to civil society, but Darby does seem to shine a light on what may be another bulwark against a successful peace process: "a ceasefire relaxes the discipline of the military campaign, but it has little effect on the underlying hatred." Surely this, too, needs to be better addressed for successful peace processes.

Violence as an issue during negotiations is an interesting concept, since it focuses on how contentious issues, such as inclusion of terrorist organizations in negotiations, decommissioning of weapons, and early prisoner release, can be used to stall progress.

By far, the most serious threat discussed was violence by militants. In this expansive section Darby, working on Stephen Stedman's description of splinter groups, identifies four types of militant groups: the Dealers, or those who are willing to make a deal; the Zealots, the most dangerous group since they are determined to ruin the peace process; the Opportunists, those who would use violence to improve their chances for a better deal; and the Mavericks, those who are in it for personal rather than political motives. As Darby goes on to explain, each group must be dealt with differently, but as he emphasizes, each must be dealt with, for exclusion is generally a death knell for the process. The effect that Zealots have in prolonging so many conflicts make his dispassioned analysis and simple suggestions all the more chilling, since so many lives are lost when they "take over."

Darby's concluding five propositions for success seem so simple, but as the country analyses highlight there is often much pressure preventing their implementation. In his final words Darby comments that "the central task is to alter human behavior from a helpless acceptance of fell deeds to the civilized conduct of human relationships," and it seems that he is trying to help those who sit down to the negotiating table recognize and deal with this "fourth party," humanity. Though there is no talk of how third parties, neighboring states, civil society and economics affect a peace process, this targeted look at violence during a peace process may, perhaps, help understand how to get over this high hurdle. (Laura Richter)

Copyright 2004 Search for Common Ground