Palestinian-Israeli Moment of Truth

by Ze'ev Schiff

The renewal of the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians assumed special significance against the background of the failed meeting in Geneva between President Clinton and President Assad in March. Failure in Geneva did not close the door on the negotiations between Israel and Syria, as many believe. The fact is that the negotiation process was simply interrupted. Efforts on that front will now shift to a unilateral Israeli move when Israel pulls out of Lebanon in accordance with Security Council Resolution 425. Prime Minister Ehud Barak wants to keep his 1999 election promise to pull the IDF out of Lebanon - a withdrawal whose repercussions are as yet unknown.

Attention is now diverted to the Israeli-Palestinian track. The Americans say that everything should be done to achieve at least one peace agreement by the year’s end and, if that is possible after Geneva, prospects are best on the Palestinian track. The Clinton Administration rejects a unilateral Palestinian declaration of a Palestinian state, which it believes could open a Pandora’s box. The Americans rightly say that failure on the Palestinian track could suspend the peace process for many years and could end up in violent confrontations.

Israel should also give some thought to the following strategic considerations:

After the failed negotiations with Assad, Israel should try to isolate him. The way to do it is by making genuine progress in the negotiations on the Palestinian track. At the same time, Israel should create international understanding and support for withdrawal from Lebanon and for Israel’s right to active self-defense if, after withdrawal, attacks from Lebanon persist. Israel stands to gain quite considerable support if, concurrently with the withdrawal from Lebanon, genuine progress is made in the peace process on the Palestinian track.

The Prime Minister’s obsessive preoccupation with the Syrian track has slowed down the negotiations with the Palestinians. Recent months have shown that Ehud Barak has trouble living up to his commitment to progress along both tracks at one and the same time. He may be intellectually equipped to do so but, like Rabin, he is a one-front man, in war as well as in negotiations.

There have been many stumbling blocks in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. In a few months, the Oslo agreement will be seven years old. There have been some significant achievements, but also some unnecessary dragging of feet. Now the moment of truth is here in the negotiations with the Palestinians. Instead of repeating the enthusiastic promises, the two parties should now reach some fundamental resolutions that make up a part of the final agreement. The fact is that what Israel and the Palestinians now need is a conclusive accord, not a vague framework agreement. An important framework agreement has already been concluded in Oslo. After the drawn-out stalling, it would be advisable to overcome that hurdle. Only one thing can justify a framework agreement at this stage - a more specific framework agreement that will clearly outline the nature of the final agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

The parties now face an historical opportunity. If they so desire, the present leadership can make an historical move along the Palestinian track. From Arafat’s point of view, it may be the last chance. Barak says he is prepared to make an historical move, but it is not quite clear if that is what he wants at this point. President Clinton enjoys the confidence of both parties and is prepared to provide the help of the US towards that end. The majority on both sides is prepared for such a move and peace supporters on either side still enjoy a majority, though nobody knows for how long. We know from past experience that such opportunities don’t last forever.

The choice is between an historical agreement between the two peoples or a "convenient" agreement, one that is more easily achieved where most of the tough issues are put off to a distant future. Putting off solutions could be admissible in certain cases, provided that the issues signed include some weighty matters such as security arrangements and the establishment of a Palestinian state by mutual consent. If the parties look for "convenient" solutions, the conflict will remain an open file - a dangerous situation from the start. The Palestinians will neither wish nor be able to end the dispute with Israel, and a big question mark will hang over the entire situation. Peace opponents, be they Hamas and the like or settlers and the like, will disrupt the rapprochement between the two peoples with acts of terror or by creating facts on the ground, making life under the agreement impossible.

The key to an historical agreement cannot be found in one camp alone. From the territorial aspect, Israel could do more than has been hitherto published. It could also be more generous on the water issue and the deployment of the settlements, control of border passages, and even on the question of Jerusalem. At the same time, the key is in the hands of Palestinians in all that concerns the refugee problem and the so-called "right of return," in security arrangements and especially in regard to agreement to end the painful and bloody conflict once and for all.

Ze’ev Schiff is the Defense Editor for Ha’aretz newspaper in Tel Aviv.