The Lessons of Oslo: Peace is a Grassroots Initiative

by Edward S. Walker, Jr.

Such is the sad state of affairs today that if a funeral were held to mark the demise of the peace process born in Oslo, the mourners could find themselves outnumbered by the revelers.

Israelis and Palestinians have now reached the point where the measure of success in the bilateral relationship is whether the two sides attend a meeting together - not whether they accomplish anything. The substance of their discussions is almost irrelevant. The issues they tackle are not the relics of Camp David and Taba - Jerusalem, right of return, compensation, water sharing - but the inheritance of 25 months of intifada - IDF pullbacks, security cooperation, humanitarian relief efforts.

Despite the obvious setbacks, however, I firmly believe that we should hold on to the process and the considerable achievements that were once its most famous trademarks. Among them, the outreach programs that local NGOs and PVOs initiated to improve understanding and build trust between the two peoples. The Neve Shalom and Seeds of Peace models of integrating the two communities, once trailblazing ideas, became part of the mainstream.

In the long run, these invaluable efforts were not able to prevent the gradual asphyxiation of the peace process by its avowed enemies (and a few friends too). There is no point focusing on how it perished. The tactics of its opponents are, sadly, quite familiar: suicide attacks, settlement expansions, repeated closures, and civilian casualties on both sides all played a role in withering the spirit of Oslo.

Former President Bill Clinton recently remarked that on the day of the Rose Garden ceremony there were nine acts of violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories. He asked his audience if anyone remembered those incidents. No one could say they did. Peace and hope for the future overwhelmed even the fiercest opponents and their despicable attacks. The same cannot be said today.

How can both sides negotiate and, more critically, implement an enduring peace accord? Oslo offers some essential lessons, which, if heeded, could dramatically increase the resiliency of any future agreement.

First, don't bring in the politicians too early in the process. Instead, let peace grow from the collaborative efforts of people and organizations on both sides. At its inception, Oslo was a meeting of prominent Israeli and Palestinian academics. After holding a number of productive sessions, the participants enthusiastically reported the nature of the talks to their respective governments. The politicians on both sides assumed the reins and pursued a tangible result - a peace accord. The emphasis became process over substance and the focus was on leaders rather than their people.

Second, understanding and trust cannot be built on the back of even the most comprehensive agreement. The architects of Oslo lost sight of these essential precursors. When I was U.S. ambassador to Israel, people-to-people programs were among the most effective tools at my disposal for lowering the social and psychological barriers between Israelis and Palestinians.

During the 90s, scores of Israeli and Palestinian organizations developed close ties and worked in concert to improve relations between the two peoples. NGOs and PVOs worked through closures and the intermittent violence to forge strong bonds that, in some cases, have endured until today and at considerable risk to their staff. However, as the Palestinians became shuttered behind increasingly severe IDF closures and as Israelis barricaded themselves behind sandbags and bulletproof glass in fear of suicide attacks, the modest gains of these groups were all but wiped out.

Third, accords whose contents are negotiated almost entirely in secret have no opportunity to build a constituency for peace. Opponents seize upon people's confusion and are quick to illuminate the agreement.s most controversial provisions. The framers are then left to defend their decisions. The entire document ends up a collection of independent parts, the overarching objective lost in a constant battle over minute details.

Fourth, leaders must prepare their people for the sacrifices required of any agreement. In the end, neither side, but most notably the Palestinians, was prepared for a future as it was outlined in the concept of Oslo. Leaders must endeavor to instill confidence in the goals of peace and must do so not only with their own population but also with the other. Ideally, they should consider that population a domestic constituency group.

So the enemies of Oslo have won this round.

The number of settlers has doubled, from 100,000 to almost 200,000 since the White House signing ceremony. Suicide bombers have turned peace into a blood feud and, in the process, have supplanted hope with fear. "Confidence building measures" or "CBMs", much vaunted during the halcyon days of peacemaking, are now meaningless anachronisms.

But the enemies of a lasting and secure peace need not win the next round. The key to their defeat and to the success of any future accord lies in heeding the lessons of Oslo. The question remains whether two years of constant, daily strife have worn away any hope of finding a common vision for the future.

Ambassador Edward S. Walker has been President and CEO of the Middle East Institute since May 2001. He was previously a distinguished career Foreign Service Officer for nearly 35 years serving in such senior positions as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, Ambassador to Israel (1997-1999), and as Ambassador to the Arab Republic of Egypt (1994-1997), among others.

Copyright 2004 Search for Common Ground