Focus

The Rules of the Game: When Outsiders are Offsides in Peacemaking
by Andries Odendaal

The role of conflict resolution practitioners and peacemakers in conflicts around the globe is an increasingly professional one, generally backed by the best of intentions.

But good intentions are not sufficient to guarantee that interventions will be constructive and helpful. The South African experience attests to the limitations of 'outside interventions.' 'Outsiders' who do not belong to the community or the parties involved - especially foreigners coming from far afield - are most successful in conflict intervention when they play within the lines, such as:

1. Focus on empowering the role players.
Parties in a conflict need "empowerment", especially the weaker party. If a peace accord or some other form of settlement is agreed to because the weaker party is unable to resist the bullying of the stronger party, it has very little long-term potential. The weaker party, therefore, has to be assisted to meet its foe with greater confidence and on an equal basis. At the same time the stronger party has to come to the understanding that a settlement with the other party is preferable to other options, such as continued oppression, in terms of its own interests. "Empowerment" refers to the processes needed to convince and prepare the parties to achieve the goal of a "win-win" solution.

At the heart of the conflict in South Africa was the severely skewed power relations. Empowerment of the weaker party took many years and included processes such as the black consciousness movement; the legalization of black trade unions; the establishment of alternative local authorities; and the exploitation of the power of non-collaboration. The fact that so much of this originated from, and was driven by, insiders made a great contribution to black empowerment.

Outsiders, however, played a significant role. Firstly, the black people of South Africa received the symbolic support of the international community in various ways, which contributed to their empowerment. Secondly, outsiders assisted on the material level by providing funding and other forms of logistical support. Thirdly, outsiders facilitated real, empathic listening.

For example, the Media Press Centre of the National Peace Secretariat encouraged communities in conflict to talk on video camera. This video was then shown to their adversaries and their reactions were again recorded and shown to the first group. Thus they began listening to each other, which was impossible to achieve in any other way. Real listening remains the most important tool in breaking down stereotypes and preventing further conflict.

Fourthly, outsiders make a significant impact by providing training in relevant skills. In terms of conflict resolution skills, a significant input was made by outsiders who familiarized themselves with South African conditions and provided training in a sensitive and respectful way. But 'training' which was nothing more than an imposition of foreign ideas and wish-lists unfortunately also took place.

2. Engage civil society in peacemaking.
Those who wish to intervene in conflicts often fail to realize that a peace process must be sustained by internal forces on a long-term basis. Hit-and-run conflict resolution happens, but because the vital aspect of sustaining the peace process is ignored, such solutions don't last.

It is best to anchor a peace process in civil society, because it has the greatest interest in stability and peace. Arguably one of the greatest lessons learnt from South Africa's peace process was: don't leave it to the politicians.

For the most part South Africa's political leaders played a courageous and enlightened role in bringing peace to the country. Likewise, inputs by organs of civil society, such as business organizations, religious bodies, trade unions, the press, and a host of NGOs were vital. On many occasions, representatives of these bodies acted to establish contact and form a fragile middle ground in South Africa. Business and church leaders, for example, played a critical role in the formation and implementation of the Peace Accord. President F.W. de Klerk had decided to hold a peace summit in 1991, but because the initiative came from him, there was little interest. When business and church leaders took over the initiative, it resulted in the formulation and signing of the Peace Accord. The various peace committees on regional and local level formed under the auspices of the Peace Accord played an important role in protecting the country from implosion. The backbone of these peace committees were the representatives of civil society, who often found themselves mediating between different political forces and defusing violent conflict.

3. Exercise humility.
Even though conflict resolution practitioners may be theoretically aware of the need for cultural sensitivity and may be trained to understand the power of traditional perceptions, not all of them succeed in practicing this. A number of well-meaning outsiders left South Africa in exasperation because they felt rejected, or because they were overwhelmed by what they perceived as irrational and ungrateful responses to their inputs. Those who stayed and were valued for their inputs were those who put more effort into listening than moralizing; who sought to understand rather than to lecture; and who were willing to let local leaders receive credit for what they had initiated.

4. Invest in good process, rather than in peace events.
Within such a complex society as South Africa, 'peace' can never be understood as a single event (such as the first democratic elections or the acceptance of a new constitution). None of these events could ensure an end to all violent or destructive conflict. What they did achieve was to establish a favorable framework within which South Africa's people could continue on the bumpy and sometimes dangerous road towards peace.

The lesson here for us is twofold: firstly, there is an ongoing need for outside intervention. Secondly, it is more profitable to invest in projects which aim at developing good process rather than specific outcomes.

The dynamics in South Africa obviously differ from those in other equally troubled countries. Yet it is difficult to imagine a peace process in any other country which would not require similar multi-faceted and patient interventions.

Andries Odendaal is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Conflict Resolution's Project Saamspan which trains and empowers people in conflict resolution throughout rural communities in the Western and South Cape.

Originally published in Track Two, April 1997. Track Two is a quarterly publication of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Rondebosch, South Africa.

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