Focus

Focus: Regional Arms Control In The Middle East
Arms control in the Middle East is a complex and difficult topic, as reflected by the relative lack of progress in this arena during the last several years. The following article examines some of the general issues that define this field and attempts to provide some sense of where progress may be achieved in the future.

Background
Arms control can be divided into conventional and non-conventional spheres, the former dealing with classic land, sea and air weapons, the latter comprising nuclear, biological and chemical weapons or so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the Middle East, very little has been done to establish controls on conventional weapons while WMD have been the focus of a number of significant efforts in the past two decades. Incremental steps to have the Middle East become a WMD-free zone (WMDFZ) are ongoing in various forums, although the obstacles to creating such a zone in the near future are formidable.

Contemporary arms control efforts in the Middle East have precedents in the negotiated disengagement and demilitarization agreements that were concluded after the hostilities of 1948-49 and 1973, particularly those regarding the Sinai and Golan Heights. The arms control protocols in the Camp David Accords were another very significant development and resulted in the establishment of ongoing monitoring structures such as the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai and overflights by US reconnaissance aircraft.

Recent Developments
These previous bilateral negotiations helped set the stage for the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) that began in 1992 after the Madrid Conference. The ACRS talks brought together representatives from many of the key states in the region to discuss these issues on a multilateral basis for the first time, although a number of other countries – Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Iraq – were notably absent. In addition to providing a forum for discussion of difficult issues, there was also an expectation that some of the successful arms control and confidence-building experiences from the East-West context could be brought to the Middle East.

The ACRS talks made significant progress during the three years they took place, particularly by putting on the table some of the confidence-building measures (CBMs) that will be necessary for establishing regional arms control regimes. CBMs – such as structured communication links and advance notification about military maneuvers – are considered an important component of arms control because they help make military activities more predictable and transparent for all parties, thereby preventing misunderstandings that might lead to conflict. Additionally, the focus of CBMs is generally on intentions rather than on capabilities, thus avoiding the need for participants to address difficult issues such as changing existing force structures or revealing sensitive information, at least in the early stages of arms control talks.

In 1995, after a number of productive meetings, the ACRS talks foundered when the group attempted to devise a declaration of principles (later a "statement") for its activities. The turning point came when Egypt called for the Working Group members to adhere, in the document, to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). Israel responded that it was sufficient that the group commit to transforming the Middle East into a mutually verifiable zone free of WMD. Acceptable language that would bridge these differences could not be found before the ACRS talks were suspended indefinitely.

This impasse over nuclear weapons reflects the difficulty of overcoming the threat perceptions of each side. In addition to concerns about the conventional strength of its neighbors, Israel sees an even greater existential threat in the development of long range missiles and nuclear weapons by the Arab states and Iran, implying the need to retain deterrent capabilities in these areas. Those countries see Israel’s assumed nuclear weapons arsenal as inherently threatening as well as an unacceptable and potentially coercive monopoly that must be offset either by restriction or by acquiring such weapons themselves. Moreover, the differing approaches to these perceptions inevitably impinge on broader issues. Israel insists on achieving peaceful relations in the region (including with Iran) before addressing WMD, citing the pressure it already feels to make territorial concessions and its concerns about countries that remain hostile to its existence. Egypt, on the other hand, believes the progress made through the ACRS and other venues addresses Israel’s desire for regional political recognition and, therefore, its refusal to commit to signing the NPT is an obstacle to further progress.

Looking Ahead
Meaningful progress on regional arms control issues will be difficult in the future without the participation of Iran, which also promotes the creation of a Middle East WMDFZ, as well as other states absent from the ACRS talks and other official and unofficial forums. In addition, the current situation with Iraq and the struggles over its weapons of mass destruction programs provide a strong cautionary note about the effectiveness of arms control and inspection regimes. Nevertheless, these difficulties need not necessarily prevent other states and international bodies from attempting to move forward with new initiatives and ideas.

The creation of a permanent international forum for dialogue on arms control issues in the Middle East may be an achievable goal, despite some of the impediments cited. In addition to a broadly inclusive group of Middle East countries, such a forum might also bring together the five permanent members of the Security Council, as well as other countries from the EU, who would play the role of guarantors of any significant outcomes. And while the prospects for implementing controls on WMD in the Middle East remain somewhat dim at present, the conventional sphere is seen, by some, as ripe for discussion and possible progress.

Although official discussions on regional security issues are at a virtual standstill, alternative venues remain available through track-II (non-governmental) activities. A number of these unofficial activities are currently in progress, including the newly established International Commission for Security and Cooperation in West Asia and the Security Working Group of Search for Common Ground in the Middle East, which has been bringing together senior security professionals from throughout the region since 1992. As long as official channels are unproductive or inactive, non-governmental forums will provide opportunities for such professionals to establish and expand relationships, deepen dialogue, and develop ideas. According to Jalil Roshandel, a strategic analyst at the Institute for Political and International Studies in Tehran and currently a Guest Research Fellow at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute in Denmark,

"[t]he pivot and axis of any attempt to address arms control in the Middle East is through track-II diplomacy particularly given the difficult environment of mistrust currently dominating the region. Official channels are incapable, at present, of paving the way for such an important goal unless they are initiated and directed by track-II diplomacy efforts."

In the larger context, progress on arms control in the Middle East is clearly tied to progress in the peace process and overall regional relations. As Shai Feldman, an Israeli strategic analyst, states in his volume, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East, "a verifiable agreement among all the region’s states to transform the Middle East into a WMDFZ is unlikely except in the context of a comprehensive peace." That peace, like arms control agreements, requires good will and trust so that stable relationships can flourish and tensions subside.

References

Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997).

Ariel E. Levite and Emily B. Landau, "Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Middle East" in Regional Security in the Middle East, Zeev Maoz, ed., (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 143-171.

Lawrence G. Potter, "Confidence-Building Measures in the Persian Gulf"in The Persian Gulf at the Millennium, Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter, eds., (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 231-248.

This article has also benefited from the views of retired US Ambassador James Leonard, Dr. Jalil Roshandel, and Ms. Aliza Kaplan of Search for Common Ground.