Focus on Europe

Focus on Europe: Interview with Eberhard Rhein
by Eva Dalak, Middle East Programmes Officer, European Centre for Common Ground, Brussels

In the interview below, Eberhard Rhein, a former high-ranking official with the European Commission who was central to the formation of the Euro-Med Partnership, discusses his views on the Partnership's progress and future, the current crisis in Palestinian-Israeli relations, the role of the EU in the search for Middle East peace, and the need for track II and other civil society activities in the region.

1. What were the original goals in creating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and why did you think it would gain political support?

The Euro-Med Partnership (or Barcelona Process) established in 1995, builds on the Euro-Maghreb Partnership of the early 1990s, as well as on various Mediterranean policies developed by the European Union (EU) since the 1960s. In June 1994, the European Council asked the European Commission to draft a proposal for a new Mediterranean policy. The resulting Barcelona Declaration is divided into three main sections: economic-trade, political, and cultural.

The initiative gained political support because it came at a favorable time. Certainly the post-Oslo and post-Washington euphoria played a role, when people naively thought that Israelis and Palestinians would finally reach genuine peace. Another important factor was that three Mediterranean countries - France, Spain and Italy - chaired the EU in that period. They gave priority to enhanced cooperation with the other Mediterranean countries.

2. How has the Euro-Med partnership contributed to improving the relationship between Europe and the Mediterranean member countries?

Although the Barcelona Process contributed to building a new spirit of partnership between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, it has not lived up to the hopes of those who signed the Barcelona Declaration.

The tense situation in the Middle East, related to the lack of progress in the Middle East peace process, has limited the extent to which full regional cooperation could develop. The Mediterranean countries also often feel frustrated because the process of negotiation and ratification of the Association Agreements has been slower than expected. The EU bureaucracy and complicated procedures exacerbate the already difficult circumstances.

Nevertheless, the partnership contributed to the economic reform process in Morocco Jordan, Israel, Egypt and Tunisia. It established a "reference" for the Mediterranean partners that allowed them to tackle (though slowly) their economic and political reforms with technical and financial support from the European side.

3. What are some of the challenges facing the Euro-Med Partnership in the short and long-term? What are the opportunities?

The major challenge is to reinvigorate the political involvement of both sides. Without a strong impetus, the Partnership will remain just a routine process that will not achieve the required breakthroughs. Several Mediterranean countries still lack the leadership and reform minded-people who can push forward the process, as was the case in Eastern Europe. In addition, there is a certain level of Euro-Med "fatigue" on the European side, and other priorities have crept into the EU agenda. In fact, the EU focuses less on the Mediterranean than it did in the early 1990s. The Mediterranean partners do not do enough to engage the EU in a meaningful dialogue and to capture more of its scarce political energy.

The EU should also modify its approach; there is no need to always include all 12 of the Mediterranean partners, which constitute an extremely mixed bag in terms of political culture, economic dynamics, scientific achievements, investment climate, etc. The EU should transfer its new concept of "enhanced cooperation" to the Mediterranean and focus more on those partners that are able and willing to move ahead with economic and political reforms. It may prove more efficient to pick winners and set examples for others to follow suit, if and when they are ready.

Indeed, Cyprus and Malta will change sides [i.e., join the European Union] within the next three years or so, as will Turkey within the next 10-15 years. Israel is a case apart. What will remain of the Mediterranean in the longer term are the four Maghreb countries (Libya included) and the five countries in the Mashreq (the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean). Among these, some - like Algeria and Syria - are still at the very beginning of the reform process. Others, such as Lebanon, are far ahead in their overall socio-economic and political development. These differences have to be taken more into account than in the past.

Above all, the EU should concentrate more energy on a meaningful policy dialogue with individual countries in the south, as it does with the accession countries. This dialogue should range across the political, economic, and cultural spectrum. The EU should use its modest financial resources as leverage to induce changes in the south, as it has done very successfully in the accession countries. The funding should be used to implement major long-term reforms in areas like education, privatization, taxation, or government.

NGOs can obviously contribute to the process, but the problem is the lack of a strong civil society and strong NGOs in the south where NGOs are too often government-controlled and even repressed. Most governments in the Mediterranean have not yet fully understood the value of civil society and NGOs. They look at them as competitors for their privileged positions of power instead of institutions that complement the limited effectiveness of government bureaucracies.

The culture of civil society and NGOs is a relatively new phenomenon, even in Europe. Fifty years ago their influence on government was as marginal as it is presently in the Mediterranean. It will take at least another generation for a similar culture of civil society to spread throughout all the Mediterranean countries.

European NGOs should get more involved in spreading the spirit of civil society and NGOs activities in the Mediterranean. They should assist the fledgling NGOs in their work and in persuading governments that NGOs have important functions to perform in modern societies.

4. What are your thoughts on the events in the Middle East since September? Do you foresee an end to violence and a return to negotiations?

The history since Oslo in 1993 is an accumulation of missed opportunities, unfortunate circumstances, lack of the right leadership, and grave mistakes made, in particular, by the Israelis and Palestinians. No doubt, both have missed the unique historical chance that President Clinton offered them during the last six months of his presidency, essentially due to a mismatch of chemistry between Arafat and Barak, and the fact that Arafat seemed to have lost touch with realities on the ground. The events since September 2000 are simply the sad result of a series of grave miscalculations, essentially on the Palestinian side.

But this crisis will have to be overcome. Only negotiations can bring about rational and sustainable coexistence between the two sides. Each side knows the essential elements for settling the dispute: the "Clinton parameters" will have to remain the point of reference for any future negotiation, even if this is adamantly rejected by the Israeli side.

Negotiations will only be resumed when both sides have reached a level of fatigue and frustration at which they realize the pointlessness of violence and military actions. It seems this point is approaching very quickly. The present leadership on either side, however, may not be able to bring negotiations to a successful end, both being too constrained by "radical" views and insufficient flexibility. It is equally clear that they will not be able to come back to the negotiation table without a minimum of outside persuasion and gentle pressure. Nor can the parties be left totally to themselves during the negotiations.

Outside powers, above all the US and the EU, have to define and, if necessary, even to impose the minimum parameters of the final settlement without going into the details that Clinton lost himself in. Both sides will have to be "told" a few basic messages to keep in mind; and both the US and the EU will have to use their respective political and financial leverage to make these messages stick. This will not be easy, but considering the extreme complexity of these negotiations, it is probably the only way to reach peace.

5. Many believe Europe should have a greater political role in Middle East peace negotiations. What is your view?

Yes, Europe should definitely become more deeply involved in the peace-making process, but its role must not be overrated. It is suffering from all the constraints of a composite entity with discordant voices. Any individual outside party has its shortcomings, however, whether that be the US, the EU, Russia, the UN, Egypt or Jordan. The solution will be so difficult to negotiate, to finalize, and then to implement and monitor that only a combined and common external front of the main players may hope to have the necessary impact on the conflicting parties. The failure of Camp David II should be a warning in this respect.

The most urgent and most effective action would be for the five most directly concerned external actors to work together and talk to Palestinians and Israelis in order to get them back to the negotiating table. Each of those five has different leverage with one of the two parties, but jointly they embody all the ingredients for success. For Europe to be effective, however, it also needs to become unified and act together. This requires the energy and enthusiasm of a man like Javier Solana to focus on the region and push the tired warriors to change.

6. With official activities largely on hold, is there a role for track-II diplomacy and people-to-people activities between Arabs and Israelis at present?

You need the involvement of an outsider who has the basic knowledge of the situation and a minimum of credibility to speak openly, to shake up both sides, and to ask them where they want to go and what they want to achieve. It requires the kind of activities that NGOs like Search for Common Ground (SCG) are carrying out.

In the present climate of stalemate, official hypocrisy, and sloganeering, the most valuable contribution that an NGO like SCG can make to peace building is to bring together a small number of independent strategic thinkers among the Palestinian and Israeli elites and induce them to work out a "new blueprint for peace." This blueprint should be based on the extremely valuable work undertaken during and after Camp David, but completed and amended where necessary, such as on the refugee issue, in order to establish a synthesis that might serve for future negotiations. Most important, this blueprint should then be made public and be widely discussed in both societies, for peace will need to be accepted by the majorities of both societies.

It will not be possible to secretly negotiate a "peace treaty" and then impose it on the two societies, dashing vain hopes for some, evacuating places that have become homes for others, etc. It will be necessary to convince the people of the two opposing camps that the peace proposed will be in the long term interest of both nations that share this tiny piece of land. The past few months have destroyed the precious capital of trust that had been slowly built up since 1993. The NGOs can and should help to rebuild it; for without trust between Israelis and Palestinians there will never be peace!

Eberhard Rhein was, from 1961 to 1996, an EU official specializing in external relations. From 1985 to 1996, he was in charge of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. He is presently senior advisor at the European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels.

Bulletin of Regional Cooperation in the Middle East Spring 2001
Copyright 2004 Search for Common Ground